State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1892

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Derrick Dandre Powell,
Appellant.

Filed June 22, 2026
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-21-4883

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
In this direct appeal, and following a stay and remand for postconviction
proceedings, appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his claim for relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective
because she (1) failed to stipulate to appellant’s prior conviction before trial, (2) failed to
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object to an exhibit that referenced allegations of other bad acts, (3) failed to object to
hearsay, (4) elicited hearsay during cross-examination, and (5) introduced evidence that
connected appellant to an incriminating text message. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts derive from the record of the jury trial and postconviction
proceedings in this matter. In the early morning hours of August 27, 2021, L.E. asked her
son, T.M., to go to appellant Derrick Dandre Powell’s home on Selby Avenue in St. Paul
to check on her dog. L.E. told T.M. that Powell had placed her dog outside in an open
garbage can while it was raining, and L.E. was worried that her dog would drown. T.M.
agreed to go to Powell’s home to look for the dog.
Powell and L.E. had recently ended a romantic relationship. Prior to the breakup,
L.E. lived with Powell in the Selby Avenue home along with her children. T.M. had moved
out of the home because of ongoing conflict with Powell. At the time of this incident,
Powell had a domestic abuse no contact order (DANCO) against T.M. that prohibited T.M.
from going to the Selby Avenue home.
After receiving his mother’s message, T.M. drove through the pouring rain to the
Selby Avenue home with his girlfriend, T.G. They parked T.G.’s car in an alley behind the
home, and T.M. got out of the car to look for the dog. As T.M. approached the home, he
saw Powell outside the house in the dark. T.M. ran back to the car, and he heard a voice
that he recognized as Powell’s yell, “Hey!” Powell has a distinctive voice because a portion
of his soft palate was surgically removed to treat oral cancer. T.M. heard a “gunshot go off,
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and then it hit[] the back of the car and [went] through.” The bullet hit the car’s rearview
mirror. T.M. drove away from the scene and called the police.
T.M. and T.G. both identified the shooter as Powell. T.M. told responding officers
that Powell drove a silver truck and that he could be found at either the Selby Avenue home
or at a home nearby on Ashland Avenue.
A responding officer visited L.E.’s home to see if she had information about the
shooting. L.E. told officers, “He just shot at my son.” L.E. also alleged that “he” had sent
pornographic images to her minor daughter. L.E. then read officers a text message she
received from “him” that stated, “Whoever you sent over I just fired on they a--. You better
check on them.” The contact that sent the message was labeled in L.E.’s phone as “Ain’t
Sh-t.” L.E. did not directly name Powell in the footage.
After finding the Selby house empty, officers drove to the Ashland home mentioned
by T.M., where they saw a silver truck parked in the alley behind the home. While the
officers investigated the truck, a man approached the officers from near the home and
identified himself as Powell. Officers arrested Powell. A canine search of the area revealed
a white plastic bag containing a black handgun in a garden next to the home. Upon later
review, one officer saw that his body -worn camera footage captured a white plastic bag
being thrown from near the truck into the garden just before Powell approached the
officers.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Powell with two counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm or ammunition, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1(2),
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2(b) (2020), and two counts of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2020).
A jury trial was held in July 2023. The state presented T.M., T.G., and six
responding and investigating officers as witnesses. The state also presented numerous
exhibits, including body-worn camera footage showing the white bag being thrown into
the garden, body-worn camera footage of L.E. speaking with officers, photos of the white
bag and the handgun, and a photo of the texts L.E. received from the “Ain’t Sh-t” contact.
The defense presented L.E. and Powell as witnesses. The parties also stipulated after voir
dire that Powell had been convicted of a prior offense rendering him ineligible to possess
a firearm or ammunition, which satisfied one element of the unlawful possession charges.
The jury found Powell guilty on all four counts. The district court convicted Powell
of one count of firearm possession and both counts of second-degree assault. The court
sentenced Powell to 60 months’ imprisonment for the firearm- possession charge, a
concurrent 60 months’ imprisonment for the first assault charge, and a consecutive
36 months’ imprisonment for the second assault charge.
Powell filed a direct appeal with this court and then moved to stay the appeal for
postconviction proceedings. After the stay was granted and the case remanded to the
district court, Powell filed a postconviction petition with the district court alleging that he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court held an evidentiary hearing on
the petition during which Powell’s trial counsel testified. Counsel explained that her trial
strategy was “to emphasize how [T.M.] and his mother at that time were highly antagonistic
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towards [Powell] and were intentionally creating an opportunity to railroad him,” but she
conceded that she made several mistakes.
The district court denied Powell’s petition in a subsequent order. The district court
determined that it was objectively unreasonable for Powell’s counsel to have failed to
stipulate to Powell’s prior conviction that rendered him ineligible to possess a firearm or
ammunition and to have failed to timely object to the body- worn camera footage of L.E.
but concluded that neither error was prejudicial. The district court reasoned that two other
alleged errors—trial counsel’s failure to object to T.M.’s inconsistent testimony about the
gun and elicitation of hearsay about Powell’s truck—were “sound trial strategy” and
“reasonable at the time.” The court further determined that counsel’s introduction of
evidence connecting Powell to the “Ain’t Sh-t” number was reasonable because the
mistake partially resulted from surprise testimony by an officer and “would not have
changed the verdict.” The court concluded that the cumulative weight of any objectively
unreasonable actions by defense counsel did not have a reasonable probability of changing
the result.
Powell appeals.
DECISION
Powell seeks this court’s review of the district court’s decision on his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. Effective assistance of counsel for criminal defendants is
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. Crow v.
State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 14 (Minn. 2019); see U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.
Minnesota courts review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under the two-prong test
6
articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Andersen v. State, 830
N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). Under the first prong, the defendant must demonstrate that
their “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id.
Under the second prong, the defendant must show prejudice, meaning “a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error.” Id.
We maintain a “strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Id.
When considering ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, appellate courts “will
generally not review” counsel’s trial strategy.1 Id. Trial strategy includes “[w]hat evidence
to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object.” State v. Bobo, 770
N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009).
Because Powell challenges the postconviction order, we apply a postconviction
standard of review. See State v. King, 990 N.W.2d 406, 413, 417 (Minn. 2023) (reviewing
denial of a postconviction petition following a stay of the direct appeal under the
postconviction standard of review). Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a

1 Powell asserts that it is inaccurate to say trial strategy is “unreviewable” because strategy
is “always reviewable” under Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-23 (2003). We agree
that it is incorrect to say that trial strategy is never reviewable under any circumstances.
Even so, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Wiggins , “[s]trategic choices made
after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable.” Id. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The Minnesota Supreme
Court has also consistently echoed that it “[g]enerally . . . will not review” trial strategy
when considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d
585, 592 (Minn. 2017); see also State v. Nicks , 831 N.W.2d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013) (“We
give trial counsel wide latitude to determine the best strategy for the client.”). We
understand these cases to mean that, although we may review trial strategy in some
instances, we should generally abstain from reviewing tactical decisions when counsel has
thoroughly investigated the law and relevant facts.
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postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when a decision “is based
on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record, or exercises
its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions, including the
application of Strickland, de novo. Id.; Mason-Kimmons v. State, 26 N.W.3d 858, 869
(Minn. 2025) (reviewing the district court’s Strickland analysis de novo “because the
performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry involve mixed
questions of law and fact” (quotation omitted)).
A. Objective Reasonableness
Powell maintains that his trial counsel made five unreasonable errors: (1) counsel
failed to stipulate to Powell’s prior conviction before trial; (2) counsel failed to object to
the footage in which L.E. accused Powell of sending her daughter pornography; (3) counsel
failed to object to hearsay statements about T.M.’s description of Powell’s firearm;
(4) counsel elicited hearsay on cross-examination indicating that Powell’s truck was
recently driven; and (5) counsel introduced evidence that definitively connected Powell to
the incriminating texts L.E. received. We consider the reasonableness of each identified
instance before addressing the prejudicial impact of counsel’s errors.
Failure to Stipulate to Powell’s Prior Convictions
Powell first argues that it was objectively unreasonable for his trial counsel to fail
to stipulate before trial that he had a prior conviction rendering him ineligible to possess a
firearm or ammunition.
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This alleged error occurred at the beginning of voir dire. The district court read the
complaint to the jury and instructed that the complaint was “not intended to be evidence or
proof of anything at all” and the jury “should not allow [itself] to be prejudiced against
[Powell] because this charge has been brought.” The complaint included the following
statement: “[T]he defendant, Derrick Powell, did possess a firearm while prohibited,
having been convicted or adjudicated delinquent of a crime of violence.” The parties
stipulated to the prior conviction later in the trial, before evidence was introduced to prove
that element of the unlawful-possession charges.
In its postconviction decision, the district court concluded that counsel’s failure to
stipulate was objectively unreasonable because it was a mistake that “served no tactical
purpose.” We agree with the district court that it was unreasonable for Powell’s counsel
not to stipulate earlier to the prior conviction. “A defendant may agree to waive a jury
determination of a particular element of [an] offense by stipulating to it.” State v. Hinton,
702 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2005). In cases
involving a charge for possession of a weapon as an ineligible person, defendants may
generally stipulate to the prior crime that rendered them ineligible, and “[i]n the vast
majority of such cases, the potential of the evidence [of the prior crime] for unfair prejudice
clearly outweighs its probative value.” State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1984).
Here, a stipulation to the prior crime was appropriate because Powell was on trial for
assault. Allowing the jury to hear that Powell had a prior conviction for a crime of violence
could have potentially produced unfair prejudice against Powell because of the implication
9
that he has a history of violence. Counsel’s failure to prevent the jury from learning about
the prior conviction was therefore objectively unreasonable.
Failure to Object to Footage of L.E.
Powell next argues that it was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel not to object
in a timely manner to the body-worn camera footage in which L.E. alleged that the person
texting her about shooting at T.M. and T.G. also sent pornographic photos to her minor
daughter. Powell asserts that the statements were improper other-acts evidence that are
irrelevant to the case and highly prejudicial.
The day before trial, the district court held a hearing to consider motions in limine,
including the state’s motion to admit the body-worn camera footage of L.E. speaking with
police the night of the shooting. The footage was unredacted and included L.E.’s
accusations that “he”— the person who shot at T.M. and T.G.—sent pornographic material
to her minor daughter. Powell’s trial counsel did not object by motion or during the hearing.
Several hours later, counsel emailed the district court with an objection to the footage. The
district court denied the objection as untimely.
On postconviction review, the district court determined that counsel again
performed objectively unreasonably, and w e reach the same conclusion. Generally,
“evidence of other crimes or misconduct is not admissible” except to show “motive, intent,
absence of mistake or accident, identity, or a common scheme or plan.” State v. Kennedy,
585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998); see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). “The danger in
admitting such evidence is that the jury may convict because of those other crimes or
misconduct, not because the defendant’s guilt of the charged crime is proved.” State v.
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Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006). L.E.’s accusations were irrelevant to the charges
against Powell and did not speak to his motive, intent, or a common plan. We therefore are
convinced that Powell’s counsel acted unreasonably by failing to object timely.2
Failure to Object to Hearsay
Powell next asserts that his trial counsel unreasonably failed to object when two
testifying officers recounted T.M. saying that Powell’s gun had a red laser. Powell argues
that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay that were prejudicial because
they corroborated the state’s theory that the gun found outside the Ashland house was
Powell’s.
T.M. testified that Powell owned a .38-caliber silver gun with no distinctive
attributes. That description was contradicted by two officers who testified that T.M. told
them that Powell’s gun had a “red beam” that “was like a laser.” The gun found at the
Ashland house was a black handgun with a laser-sight attachment.
Counsel stated at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that part of her strategy was
to discredit T.M. by highlighting discrepancies in his story. The district court accordingly
reasoned that counsel’s “forbearance in objecting . . . highlighted the inconsistency of the
victim witness testimony,” and “[d]efense counsel’s performance here was not deficient,
but represented trial strategy.”

2 The state argues that counsel’s failure to object was part of her trial strategy to discredit
L.E. We disagree. C ounsel did, in fact, object to the footage, though the objection was
untimely. This shows that counsel’s failure to object earlier was likely not a tactical choice.
11
We similarly conclude that counsel’s lack of objection to the officers’ testimonies
was consistent with her trial strategy. Trial strategy includes decisions about whether to
object to hearsay. See Bobo, 770 N.W.2d at 138 (including decisions about objections
among examples of trial strategy); Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 542 (Minn. 2007)
(“Decisions about objections at trial are matters of trial strategy.”). Counsel’s decision not
to object to T.M.’s statements was a reasonable tactic to show that T.M.’s testimony was
inconsistent and to undermine his credibility. Because the lack of objection represented a
strategic choice, we decline to second-guess counsel’s performance. See Andersen , 830
N.W.2d at 10 (stating that appellate courts usually decline to review trial strategy).
Elicitation of Hearsay
Powell asserts that his trial counsel unreasonably elicited hearsay when one officer
testified that another officer felt the hood of Powell’s truck and it was warm when it was
discovered in the alley behind the Ashland house.
While cross-examining a responding officer, Powell’s trial counsel asked whether
the testifying officer had touched Powell’s truck to see if there was an indication that the
engine was recently on. The officer replied that he “did not, but [another officer] did.” He
went on to testify that “[the other officer] touched it and I believe he gave us the signal that
it was warm, but . . . I guess I didn’t pay attention to the exhaust or anything like that.”
Counsel then asked again if he personally confirmed th e vehicle was warm— the officer
said he did not.
The district court concluded that counsel’s questioning reflected her trial strategy.
Noting that this exchanged happened “in real time, without the benefit of reading and re-
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reading a transcript,” the district court reasoned that the officer’s “uncontrolled,
unrequested interjection” was not the purpose of counsel’s questions, and counsel
“followed a reasonable strategy and confirmed that [the officer] did not personally confirm
whether the vehicle was warm.”
We agree with the district court that counsel’s questions constituted trial strategy.
Counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that her “trial strategy was to focus on the
officer’s lack of follow-through with basic investigation procedures” and to show that the
truck was not operational at the time of the shooting. Her questioning did that—she elicited
testimony that the officer did not touch the truck himself or otherwise determine if it could
have been recently driven.
Powell argues that his trial counsel should have stopped her questioning before she
elicited the hearsay statements about the other officer, and he also points out that trial
counsel admitted during the postconviction hearing that eliciting hearsay was “absolutely
an error.” But appellate courts have repeatedly declined to review trial tactics because
doing so with the benefit of hindsight may constrain trial counsel’s flexibility to represent
their client “to the fullest extent possible.” State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn.
1986). Here, counsel testified that the line of questioning during which the hearsay was
elicited was part of her trial strategy. And the record supports that this strategy stemmed
from a thorough investigation of the facts. Counsel testified at the postconviction hearing
that she understood the testifying officer to have never touched the truck, and her
investigation had shown that the truck was inoperable at the time of the shooting. Counsel’s
pursuit of this line of questioning is thus a trial tactic that we decline to review. See State
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v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 508 (Minn. 2013) (“[T]rial counsel’s choices made after
conducting a thorough investigation of the law and the facts are ‘virtually
unchallengeable.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)).
Moreover, “[w]e assess an attorney’s performance on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). Neither trial counsel’s post hoc assessment of the statement nor
Powell’s assertion of what counsel should have done with the benefit of hindsight impacts
our analysis.
We therefore conclude that counsel’s questions were part of her trial strategy, and
we decline to review them further. See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10.
Introducing Evidence Connecting Powell to Incriminating Texts
Powell further maintains that his trial counsel’s introduction of evidence related to
the “Ain’t Sh-t” contact was objectively unreasonable and highly prejudicial because trial
counsel “effectively introduced evidence that Powell admitted to the shooting.”
On the night of the shooting, L.E. showed officers a text from a contact named
“Ain’t Sh-t” that read, “Whoever you sent over I just fired on they a --. You better check
on them lol.” Powell was not identified explicitly as the sender. At trial, Powell’s trial
counsel questioned one officer about a phone number ending in 2010. The officer answered
that, while preparing for trial that morning, he had checked the 2010 number and
discovered it was registered to Powell at one point. Then, during L.E.’s testimony, Powell’s
trial counsel introduced exhibit 101, which was a photo of the “Ain’t Sh-t” contact in L.E.’s
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phone and listed the associated number as the 2010 number she had asked the officer
about.3
The district court concluded that counsel’s actions were reasonable because she had
“no forewarning” that the officer had investigated the 2010 number that morning. Although
we agree with the district court that the officer’s investigation of the 2010 number on the
day of trial was a surprise, we conclude that counsel’s introduction of exhibit 101 after the
officer’s testimony about the 2010 number was objectively unreasonable because the
exhibit established that Powell likely sent the texts confessing to having “fired” at T.M.
and T.G. We discern no reasonable tactical basis for introducing an exhibit that supported
the state’s case to the detriment of Powell.
B. Prejudice
Under the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, “a defendant must show that
counsel’s errors actually had an adverse effect in that but for the errors the result of the
proceeding probably would have been different.” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842
(Minn. 2003) (quotations omitted). We consider the totality of the evidence before the jury
to evaluate prejudice. Id. In cases involving multiple instances of alleged deficient
representation by defense counsel, courts consider the overall strength of the state’s
evidence to determine whether counsel’s errors had a reasonable probability of changing
the outcome. See Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 539 (Minn. 2023) (concluding that

3 The district court stated that exhibit 101 “did not have a phone number on it.” Based on
our review of the record, this was an erroneous description—although exhibit 101 is blurry,
it shows a number ending in 2010.
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multiple alleged errors by defense counsel were not prejudicial because of “other
overwhelming evidence in this case”).
The district court noted that the “weight of evidence against [Powell] is
considerable.” The court concluded that, “despite any of the aforementioned errors made
by defense counsel, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.”
We have concluded that three out of the five incidents identified by Powell
amounted to objectively unreasonable performance, and we therefore apply the prejudice
prong to those three errors in turn . See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 1 0-13 (reaching
Strickland’s prejudice prong with respect to some, but not all, of an appellant’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims). Because we concluded that the remaining two alleged
instances of ineffective assistance were reasonable trial strategy, we decline to include
them in our prejudice analysis. See State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 271 (Minn. 2019)
(stating that, under the two-prong Strickland test, “[i]f one prong is not met, we need not
address the other”).
Beginning with trial counsel’s unreasonable failure to stipulate to Powell’s prior
conviction, Powell argues that this mistake was prejudicial because the jury learned that he
had been previously convicted of a crime of violence. We conclude that error was not
prejudicial for two reasons. First, the district court instructed the jurors that the complaint
could not be used as evidence. We “presume that juries follow instructions given by the
district court.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 167 (Minn. 2024). And second, the
complaint was read at the beginning of voir dire, prior to the swearing-in of the jury and
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the presentation of any evidence. The combination of the instruction and the timing
mitigate any prejudice to Powell and lead us to conclude that the jury learning about
Powell’s prior conviction for a crime of violence did not have a reasonable probability of
changing the result. See Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842.
We concluded that it was also unreasonable for Powell’s trial counsel not to object
to the footage of L.E. speaking with officers. Although we acknowledge that evidence of
criminal sexual conduct in particular “can be highly prejudicial,” State v. Fardan, 773
N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009), we are unconvinced that this error altered the outcome of
the trial. As the district court found, L.E. was not credible in the footage because she was
intoxicated and she had broken up with Powell. Her accusations about sending
pornography were also not referenced during trial and were irrelevant to the trial issues.
We therefore conclude that, although L.E.’s accusations in the footage were inflammatory
and it was unreasonable for counsel not to object in a timely manner, the lack of attention
drawn to the accusations and L.E.’s lack of credibility makes it unlikely that the statements
influenced the trial outcome, especially considering the weight of the evidence against
Powell.
The last objectively unreasonable performance by trial counsel was the introduction
of evidence connecting Powell to the incriminating texts L.E. received. But we similarly
conclude that counsel’s error was not prejudicial because other evidence introduced still
would have led the jury to infer that Powell sent the texts to L.E. In the body-worn camera
footage where L.E. read the texts to officers, she made several statements about the sender
that indirectly identified him as Powell. She offered the exact a ddresses on Selby and
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Ashland Avenues associated with Powell, stated that there was a no-contact order in place,
and informed officers that the sender drove a silver truck. Also, in the text messages, the
sender stated that he “left the top open so she drown,” which seemingly relates to L.E.’s
dog that T.M. went to retrieve out of Powell’s trash can. The exhibit that Powell’s trial
counsel introduced may have solidified the identity of the sender, but other evidence
already pointed to Powell as the sender. Therefore, we conclude that counsel’s introduction
of the exhibit did not have a reasonable likelihood of changing the outcome of the trial and
did not amount to a violation of Powell’s right to effective assistance of counsel.
We also agree with the district court that the state presented other strong evidence
of Powell’s guilt, such that any of trial counsel’s errors, together or on their own, did not
likely change the trial’s result. Footage captured the white bag containing the handgun
being tossed into the garden outside the Ashland house just before Powell approached
officers from that area. And both T.M. and T.G., who were familiar with Powell, identified
him unequivocally as the shooter based on his voice and appearance. These examples alone
are strong evidence that Powell possessed the handgun and ammunition, and that he
assaulted T.M. and T.G. We are convinced on a review of the totality of the evidence
presented that trial counsel’s performance did not affect the outcome of the case.
It follows that Powell did not establish that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his petition for relief.
Affirmed.