State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1904

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Clinton Albert Christopher Juring,
Appellant.

Filed October 14, 2024
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-20-1584

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Julia Forbes, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
In this direct appeal following a conviction for felony domestic assault, appellant
argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a past incident
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of domestic abuse as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2020). Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, we
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Clinton Albert Christopher Juring
with two counts of felony domestic assault pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4
(2020), based on an allegation that Juring assaulted his girlfriend, M.O. Juring asserted the
defense of self-defense.
Before trial, Juring moved to preclude the state from offering “any evidence” under
Minn. Stat. § 634.20. The state then filed a notice of intent to introduce “[p]ast instances
of domestic conduct” between Juring and M.O. Specifically, the state sought to present
evidence that in February 2011, Juring had assaulted M.O. by strangulation. After hearing
argument on the admissibility of the proposed testimony, the district court issued a written
order denying Juring’s motion to exclude the evidence because Juring had “not established
any unfair prejudice, nor [could] the Court discern any.” The following facts were elicited
at trial.
M.O. testified that she and Juring had an “on an off” romantic relationship and that
Juring was the father of her youngest child. At the time of the alleged offense, Juring lived
with M.O. On the morning of September 29, 2020, M.O. and Juring “got into an argument
like usual.” M.O. drove Juring to work with their child and M.O.’s second youngest child,
D.O., riding in the back seat. The argument continued in the car, eventually prompting
M.O. to pull over and park on the shoulder of the interstate because she was “just tired of
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[the arguing] and just wanted to get away.” M.O. opened the driver’s side door and told
the children to get out of the car. As M.O. tried to exit the car, Juring “grabbed [her] hoodie
and yanked [her] back in and said drive, bitch.” Juring punched M.O. in her right cheek,
and M.O. “backhanded him back,” causing Juring’s nose to bleed. M.O. testified that she
mistakenly “hit the gas,” propelling the car into a ditch. Juring exited the vehicle with
M.O.’s phone and jumped over a wire fence separating the ditch from the frontage road.
As M.O. exited the vehicle, Juring threw her phone, striking M.O. in the forehead. Juring
“took off running,” and M.O. called the police.
A police officer arrived at the scene, saw the vehicle in the ditch, and observed that
M.O. “had some redness around her neck” and “a slight cut and blood near her left
eyebrow.” The officer radioed for assistance to help locate Juring. A DNR conservation
officer found Juring approximately a mile from the scene and placed him under arrest.
The state requested a cautionary instruction on the relationship evidence before
examining M.O. about the 2011 incident. The district court informed the jurors that the
state was going to introduce evidence about the 2011 incident “for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the nature and the extent of the relationship between” M.O. and Juring to
assist the jury “in determining whether Mr. Juring committed the two charges he is accused
of in this case.” The district court further explained that Juring was not being tried for any
conduct other than his actions on September 29, 2020, and instructed the jurors “not to
convict” Juring “on the basis of conduct from February of 2011.”
M.O. then testified that in 2011, she and Juring got into an argument:
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[Juring] started choking me. He’s punching me. I’m
being slammed to the ground. I try to run to break the window
to get the neighbor’s attention because I could not get out of
the home. He kept blocking both the front and the back door
and broke the window finally, and he was choking me on the
couch in front of [the children]. As [D.O.] is saying stop, he’s
telling her to shut up, and I was choked to the point that I
urinated on myself.

M.O. testified that this was the last contact she had with Juring until they rekindled their
relationship in 2019.
Following the presentation of evidence, the district court declined to instruct the
jury on self-defense. In its final instructions, the district court repeated its cautionary
instruction regarding the relationship evidence.
The jury found Juring guilty of both counts of felony domestic abuse. The district
court entered a conviction for count two and sentenced Juring to one year and one day in
prison. Juring appeals.
DECISION
Juring argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting M.O.’s
testimony concerning the 2011 assault as relationship evidence. We review the district
court’s admission of relationship evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Matthews,
779 N.W.2d 543, 553 (Minn. 2010). “ A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Tapper, 993 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). Juring
“has the burden on appeal of proving both that the trial court abused its discretion when it
5
made the evidentiary ruling and that [he] was thereby prejudiced.” Miles v. State, 840
N.W.2d 195, 204 (Minn. 2013).
As an initial matter, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by” law. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401.
But “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that” they committed the offense for which they stand trial. Minn.
R. Evid. 404(b)(1). A district court may exclude such evidence despite its probative value
because of the risk that a jury will convict the defendant based on their prior bad acts,
“though guilt of the crime charged is not proved.” State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 172
(Minn. 1965) (quotation omitted).
An exception to Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) exists for “[e]vidence of domestic conduct
by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct . . . unless the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20; see
State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (adopting Minn. Stat. § 634.20 as a
rule of evidence). “Domestic conduct” includes, among other things, “evidence of
domestic abuse.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Relationship evidence admitted under section
634.20 can “illuminate the relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim and
to put the alleged crime in the context of that relationship.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d
630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010); see also State v. Hormann,
805 N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn. App. 2011) (“ Relationship evidence is character evidence
6
that may be offered to show the strained relationship between the accused and the
victim . . . [and] to place the incident for which appellant was charged into proper context.”
(quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).
M.O.’s testimony about the 2011 assault by strangulation fits squarely within the
express terms of the statute: Juring committed a past act of domestic abuse against M.O.,
the victim of domestic abuse in this case. Thus, the evidence was “presumptively
admissible.” See State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). But Minn.
Stat. § 634.20 also requires that a district court evaluate if “the probative value [of the
otherwise admissible evidence] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” The district court did not expressly conduct a balancing-test analysis of the
evidence other than its conclusory statement that Juring had “not established any unfair
prejudice, nor [could] the Court discern any.” We discern no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s evidentiary ruling.
Juring first argues that the district court’s “fail[ure] to adequately assess the
evidence’s probative value contributed to [ its] abuse of discretion.” We disagree. The
supreme court has held that “admission of relationship evidence was not error, despite the
fact that the trial court did not, on the record, engage in the probative value versus potential
prejudice balancing test.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 2006); see also State
v. O’Meara, 755 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Minn. App. 2008) (concluding that the district court’s
failure to “recite the required balancing test” was “not erroneous”). Thus, the district court
did not commit reversible error merely because it did not, on the record, balance the
probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice to Juring.
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Juring next argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the
relationship evidence because “[t]he evidence had minimal probative value,” “[a]ny
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” and “[t]he
error was not harmless.” We address each argument in turn.
Juring argues the relationship evidence lacked probative value as to the charged
offense because, in general, the real probative value of relationship evidence lies in its
capacity to overcome the unique challenges posed by domestic-abuse cases. Relying on
language from McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161, Juring notes that such cases are difficult to
prosecute because they may occur in the privacy of the home, involve a pattern of activity
that escalates over time, go unreported, or involve abusive dynamics that lead victims to
change their stories or refuse to testify altogether. Juring argues that because “[n]one of
these rationales for admitting evidence of domestic conduct were present in this case,” the
admitted evidence “had little, if any, probative value.”
Although Juring identifies instances where relationship evidence may carry
heightened probative significance, Minnesota courts have routinely upheld the admission
of section 634.20 evidence in a much wider range of circumstances. See, e.g., Andersen,
900 N.W.2d at 441 (affirming admission of past verbal and physical abuse because it
illuminated the relationship between the defendant and the victim and put the alleged crime
in the “context” of that relationship); Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637 (same); State v. Loving,
775 N.W.2d 872, 880 (Minn. 2009) (affirming admission of relationship evidence that
provided context and “helped establish motive, intent, identity, and premeditation”). And
the supreme court has recognized “the inherent value of evidence of past acts of violence
8
committed by the same defendant against the same victim.” State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d
227, 236 (Minn. 1999).
M.O.’s testimony about the 2011 assault by strangulation shed light on the volatile
nature of her relationship with Juring, “and put the alleged crime in the context of that
relationship.” See Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637. The history of violence in the
relationship may have assisted the jury in its understanding of how the argument escalated
into a physical altercation and why M.O. abandoned her car on the side of the interstate
and attempted to flee with her children.
Juring also argues that “the state did not need [the] evidence to show that [the
relationship] was volatile and unhappy” because M.O. separately testified that she and
Juring had an “ongoing problematic relationship” and regularly argued with each other.
He argues that this testimony provided sufficient context for the jury to understand his
relationship with M.O., significantly diminishing the probative value of the section 634.20
evidence.
It is true that “the [state’s] need for section 634.20 evidence is naturally considered
as part of the assessment of the probative value versus prejudicial effect of the evidence.”
Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 639. The jury heard other testimony about the volatile nature of Juring
and M.O.’s relationship which provided context for the state’s allegations. And Juring did
not present evidence at trial to contest that Juring and M.O. were arguing, that Juring
punched M.O., that M.O. struck Juring, and that Juring threw a phone at M.O., striking her
on the forehead. Excluding the relationship evidence likely would not have compromised
the state’s theory or the strength of its case. But evidence of Juring’s past abuse of M.O.
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carries inherent probative value, and that history is probative to explain M.O.’s actions and
the escalation of the conflict into physical violence. See Williams, 593 N.W.2d at 236.
And at the time the district court determined the relationship evidence was admissible ,
Juring had asserted the defense of self -defense, to which the relationship evidence may
have been probative.
Juring also argues that the 2011 assault lacked probative value because it occurred
“nearly a decade before the incident at issue in the trial.” But the timing of the prior
incident does not necessarily negate its probative value. See State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d
719, 722, 724, 730 (Minn. App. 2014) (upholding the admission of a past act of abuse
occurring almost a decade before the charged crime); State v. Apfelbacher, No. A21-0565,
2022 WL 1073231, at *1, *4-5 (Minn. App. Apr. 11, 2022) (upholding the admission of
two prior instances of domestic abuse that took place 16 years and 19 years before the
charged conduct), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2022).1
Juring likewise argues that “any minimal probative value of the section 634.20
evidence was substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice.” “ When
balancing the probative value against the potential prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely
damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence
that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719
N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted). Persuasion by illegitimate means can include “leading
the jury to improperly conclude that the defendant has a propensity to behave criminally

1 We cite nonprecedential authority for its persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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and should now be convicted, and punished, for the charged offenses.” Hormann, 805
N.W.2d at 891.
Juring argues that the relationship evidence introduced a significant risk of unfair
prejudice because “the conduct described in the relationship evidence was disturbing and
far more violent than the charged incident.” We have considered “the level of violence at
issue” in determining whether the admission of evidence of past acts are “overly
prejudicial.” See State v. Wiedeman, No. A17-0282, 2018 WL 414314, at *4 (Minn. App.
Jan. 16, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2018); State v. Couch, No. A15-1662, 2016
WL 7365717, at *4 n.5 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2016) (expressing concern “about the
potential prejudice” from relationship evidence that is “more violent” than the charged
conduct); see also State v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. App. 2008) (noting that a
victim’s detailed description of “harrowing incident” of past domestic abuse was “dramatic
and prejudicial” to defendant).
M.O. provided graphic testimony concerning the 2011 incident. She described how
Juring choked her, punched her, and slammed her to the ground. M.O. tried to break a
window to call for help. Juring continued choking M.O. on the couch in front of her
children to the point where she urinated on herself, while D.O. yelled for him to stop. We
agree that the description of events surrounding this incident are significantly more violent
than the conduct associated with the charged offense, which presented a risk that the jury
would be persuaded to convict Juring by illegitimate means, namely, “his propensity to
behave criminally.” See Hormann, 805 N.W.2d at 891; see also Apfelbacher, 2022 WL
1073231, at *4 (noting that the defendant’s past act of domestic abuse was “more serious
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and more likely to create the impression that [he] was a violent person”). But the two
cautionary instructions issued by the district court “minimized any potential prejudice” to
Juring. See State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 29, 2008). Minnesota courts have repeatedly affirmed the admission of relationship
evidence when accompanied by a cautionary jury instruction. See, e.g., State v. Benton,
858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015) (affirming admission of relationship evidence, in part,
because the district court “provided numerous cautionary instructions . . . which lessened
the probability” of the jury giving “undue weight” to the evidence (quotation omitted)).
And “[w]e presume that juries follow instructions given by the [district] court.” Matthews,
779 N.W.2d at 550. Here, the two cautionary instructions “lessened any probability that
the jury would rely improperly on relationship evidence.” See Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at
441.
Juring argues that the cautionary instruction increased the danger of unfair prejudice
because the district court “failed to caution the jurors” that they were prohibited from using
the evidence “to prove the character of the defendant or that the defendant acted in
conformity with such character.” But both cautionary instructions informed the jury that
the evidence was being introduced “for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature
and the extent of the relationship between” M.O. and Juring, and that Juring was not being
tried for any conduct other than his actions on September 29, 2020. And in both instances,
the district court instructed the jurors “not to convict” Juring “on the basis of conduct” from
the February 2011 assault. These instructions mitigated the danger of unfair prejudice, and
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Juring cites no caselaw to support his contention that a district court must include the
specific propensity language he claims is indispensable.
Finally, even assuming that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the
relationship evidence, Juring’s claim still fails because he has not established prejudice.
See Miles, 840 N.W.2d at 204. “A defendant is prejudiced by an evidentiary ruling when
there is a reasonable possibility that without the error the verdict might have been more
favorable to the defendant.” State v. Miller, 754 N.W.2d 686, 700 (Minn. 2008) (quotations
omitted); see also State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 536 (Minn. 2012) (“An error is
prejudicial if the error substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” (quotation omitted)).
To determine whether the admission of relationship evidence substantially influenced the
jury’s decision, we “consider [1] whether the district court provided the jury a cautionary
instruction, [2] whether the State dwelled on the evidence in closing argument, and [3]
whether the evidence of guilt was strong.” State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 274 (Minn.
2017).
First, the district court cautioned the jury, thus mitigating the risk of unfair
prejudice. Second, the state did not reference the relationship evidence during their closing
argument. And finally, the evidence of Juring’s guilt was strong. M.O.’s testimony about
Juring’s conduct was detailed and corroborated by testimony from D.O. and the responding
officer. It is unlikely that the relationship evidence had any impact on the verdict . Thus,
any error in admitting the relationship evidence was harmless because there is no
reasonable possibility that absent such error, the verdict might have been different. See
Miller, 754 N.W.2d at 700.
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In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to admit
relationship evidence and conclude that the admission of such evidence was harmless.
Affirmed.