State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1911

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony Dimitri Limogianni,
Appellant.

Filed January 13, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-22-1670

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County
Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Anthony M. Bussa, CJB Law, PLLC, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Florey,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, arguing that the district court (1) abused its discretion by admitting cumulative
relationship evidence of appellant’s prior conviction of criminal sexual conduct; (2) abused
its discretion by preventing appellant from admitting into evidence his negative sexually
transmitted-infection (STI) test; and (3) erred by not making the necessary findings to
support closing the courtroom to the public during the testimony of the minor victim, in
violation of appellant’s constitutional right to a public trial. We affirm on the first two
issues, reverse on the third issue, and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
and findings.
FACTS
Between August 2020 and January 2022, appellant sexually abused his son on
multiple occasions when son was between ages six and eight. Appellant and his ex-wife,
the mother of son, separated in November 2019. Mother testified that the couple shared
joint physical and legal custody of son. From November 2019 to January 2022, son spent
approximately half his time living in appellant’s home.
In November 2021, son experienced a fever of at least 103 degree s Fahrenheit.
According to son, appellant had a similar fever around that time. On December 21, 2021,
shortly after mother picked up son from appellant’s home during a parenting exchange, son
told mother that his penis hurt and that he could not urinate. Mother, who is a registered
nurse, examined son and observed redness and inflammation of his genitals. Mother took
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son to urgent care, where a doctor prescribed him antibiotics and diagnosed him with a
urinary-tract infection.
Son’s symptoms persisted until at least January 3, 2022, when mother brought him
back to urgent care. A physician’s assistant ordered an STI test for son, and the result was
positive for gonorrhea.
After mother received the test result, she called the Crow Wing County Sheriff’s
Department and reported that she suspected appellant had transmitted gonorrhea to son
through sexual contact. On January 6, 2022, an investigator from the Crow Wing County
Sheriff’s Department interviewed appellant. Appellant told the investigator that son had a
fever of 104 degrees Fahrenheit in late November or early December 2021.
Shortly thereafter, son began attending therapy to “process the experience of having
possibly been sexually assaulted.” On April 17, 2022, son told mother that he and appellant
had “sex” more than one time and that he wanted to tell appellant that he did not want to
play those “games” with him anymore. M other recorded the conversation and sent the
recording to the investigator who had interviewed appellant in January 2022.
On April 25, 2022, son underwent a forensic interview with a nurse practitioner.
Son told the nurse practitioner through words and drawing on anatomical diagrams that
appellant had penetrated son’s anus with his penis. Son also told the nurse practitioner that
appellant “bribed” him by telling him that he would receive a Nintendo Switch and a
gaming headset if he let appellant penetrate him.
On May 3, 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with eight counts
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342 (2020) and
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with four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.343 (2020). Appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. The district court held a
jury trial from July 18 to 21, 2023.
In a pretrial motion, the state requested that the district court close the courtroom to
the public during son’s testimony “on the grounds that closure is necessary to protect the
child victim and ensure fairness in the trial .” At a pretrial-motion hearing, appellant
objected to the courtroom-closure motion, citing his constitutional right to a public trial.
The district court took the matter under advisement. Weeks later, at the close of voir dire,
the district court orally granted the motion from the bench , determining that courtroom
closure was “a very reasonable request” and that appellant did not have an objection at that
time. The district court closed the courtroom to the public during son’s testimony, stating
the exclusion was necessary to protect son’s “legitimate privacy concerns.”
After reopening the courtroom to the public, two witnesses testified regarding
events underlying appellant’s prior criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. The district court
provided the jury with limiting instructions before the testimony of each witness, noting
that the testimony was being introduced as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20 (2020).
Appellant moved to submit evidence of his negative STI test from January 11, 2022.
The district court denied the motion, determining that it would only prove whether
appellant had an STI on the date of the test, and so it would “not have any tendency to
prove any material fact of relevance” in the case.
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On July 21, 2023, the jury found appellant guilty of ten of the 12 counts charged,
two of which had been withdrawn. The district court adjudicated appellant guilty of the
ten counts. The jury found two aggravating factors: (1) appellant violated his position of
trust and authority as son’s father and (2) appellant transmitted gonorrhea to son. The
district court sentenced appellant to 172 months in prison on count one for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim under 13, and
432 months in prison on count five for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, sexual
penetration or sexual conduct with a victim under 14 and actor greater than 36 months
older, to run concurrently. The district court’s sentencing order vacated the judgments of
conviction for the other eight counts. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to present
relationship evidence from the victim of his past criminal-sexual-conduct
conviction and appellant’s former probation agent.

Appellant argues that the state presented cumulative relationship evidence and that
the evidence’s risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. We
are not convinced.
Appellate courts review the district court’s evidentiary rulings on relationship
evidence admitted under section 634.20 for an abuse of discretion. State v. Andersen, 900
N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). The “[a]ppellant has the burden to establish that the
district court abused its discretion,” which resulted in prejudice. State v. Lindsey, 755
N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008).
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Evidence of a defendant’s prior unrelated criminal offense is generally inadmissible.
See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169-70 (Minn. 1965); see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
Section 634.20, however, provides an exception: “Evidence of domestic conduct by the
accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other . . . household members,
is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . . or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
As an initial matter, we note that appellant appears to conflate the standard
governing section 634.20 relationship evidence with the standard governing Spreigl
evidence of prior bad acts by citing three cases that pertain to Spreigl evidence. While
“[r]elationship evidence and Spreigl evidence are analogous” for some purposes, due to the
risks that each presents for unfair prejudice, they are nonetheless distinct forms of evidence.
See State v. Meldrum, 724 N.W.2d 15, 20- 21 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
24, 2007); State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004). For example, relationship
evidence under section 634.20 need not meet the clear-and-convincing standard that is
required for the admission of Spreigl evidence, but instead need only be more probative
than prejudicial. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 155. Moreover, relationship evidence is presumed
admissible unless “its danger for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative
value.” Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at 442 (emphasis omitted). Because there is no dispute that
the prior offense involved a former household member, we apply the standard of review
applicable to relationship evidence.
The challenged evidence includes the testimony of two individuals: appellant’s
nephew H.M., who was the minor victim of the abuse underlying appellant’s prior
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conviction, and appellant’s former probation agent, who supervised appellant following
that conviction. H.M. testified that he lived in appellant’s household during the summers
of 2010 and 2011 when H.M. was approximately age ten or 11. While living there, on
several occasions appellant put on pornography to watch with H.M., then he and appellant
masturbated together. The probation agent testified that appellant admitted to him that
appellant had viewed pornography and masturbated with H.M. and performed oral sex on
H.M.
This relationship evidence is, by its nature, prejudicial to appellant’s defense. But
it is also highly probative, because “evidence showing how a defendant treats his family or
household members” is probative to “shed[] light on how the defendant interacts with those
close to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant may interact with the victim.” State
v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
The district court reasoned that the evidence was also relevant because “it provides insight
into the delayed nature” of both son and H.M.’s reports of appellant’s sexual abuse.
Additionally, the district court took measures to reduce the risk of unfair prejudice,
including by providing limiting instructions to the jury and limiting the duration of
testimony. See State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015) (stating that providing
“numerous cautionary instructions” before introducing relationship evidence lessened
likelihood of jury’s unfair prejudice).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the
testimony of H.M. and the probation agent based on its determination that the danger for
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unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of that relationship
evidence. See Anderson, 900 N.W.2d at 442.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellant’s
STI-test-result evidence was irrelevant at trial.

Appellant argues that the district court’s exclusion of his negative STI-test result at
trial violated his due-process right to present a complete defense because the result was
relevant to demonstrate that appellant did not have gonorrhea on the dates of son’s sexual
abuse and he therefore cannot be the individual who sexually assaulted son. We are not
persuaded.
Appellate courts review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). The district court abuses
its discretion by basing its decision on an erroneous view of the law or by going against
logic and the facts in the record. State v. Tapper, 993 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2023). The
abuse-of-discretion standard applies “even when it is claimed that the exclusion of
evidence deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.”
State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. 2006). “[T]he appellant has the burden of
establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby
prejudiced.” Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a complete defense. State
v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996); see
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. That right “includes the opportunity
to develop the defendant’s version of the facts.” Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865. However,
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this right is not absolute. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 224 (Minn. 2010). A defendant
must still comply with the rules of evidence. State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82, 102-03
(Minn. 2011). Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence
is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. The district court may exclude otherwise relevant
evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
The district court determined that admission of the test result would require a
limiting instruction to explain that the evidence would only be probative of whether
appellant had gonorrhea on January 11, 2022, and not whether he had gonorrhea in
November or December 2021, when son first displayed symptoms of gonorrhea and his
sexual abuse occurred. The district court reasoned that the test-result evidence would “only
be relevant if the jury could somehow extrapolate from it that [appellant] couldn’t have
been the one [who] transmitted” gonorrhea to son and that any limiting instruction would
“pretty much gut[] the relevance” of the evidence due to the timeline issue. We discern no
abuse of discretion by the district court.
Even if we were to assume that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
the STI test-result evidence, the error would be harmless because the jury’s verdict is
“surely unattributable” to that error. See State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn.
2012). Under harmless-error review of a decision to exclude evidence, “the reviewing
court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted
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and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, . . . a reasonable jury[] would
have reached the same verdict.” State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994).
Under this review, appellate courts “may consider the strength of each party’s
evidence.” State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 697 (Minn. 2017). “[O]verwhelming
evidence of guilt is a factor, often a very important one, in determining whether, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the error has no impact on the verdict.” State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d
286, 291 (Minn. 1997).
Although appellant characterizes son’s positive STI-test result as the “linchpin” in
the state’s argument that appellant sexually assaulted son, the state provided other evidence
against appellant that may be weighed under harmless-error review. See Zumberge, 888
N.W.2d at 697. The state presented testimony by son about instances when appellant made
sexual contact with him, testimony that appellant bribed son to engage in sex in exchange
for two video-game devices, and testimony by two witnesses regarding appellant’s prior
sexual abuse of a juvenile of similar age to son under similar circumstances. We conclude
that a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict even if the excluded evidence
had been admitted. The decision to exclude appellant’s STI-test result was therefore
harmless.
III. The district court erred by failing to make the findings required to support its
determination of the necessity of courtroom closure during son’s testimony.

Appellant argues that the district court structurally erred by closing the courtroom
during son’s testimony in violation of his right to a public trial because it failed to provide
specific findings of the reasons for the need of closure to protect son or to ensure fairness
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of the trial, therefore requiring a new trial. We agree with appellant except regarding the
remedy.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide the right to a public
trial in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Whether
a criminal defendant’s right to a public trial has been denied is a constitutional issue that
appellate courts review de novo. Benton, 858 N.W.2d at 539-40. Denial of such a right is
a structural error that is not subject to harmless-error analysis. State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d
129, 139 (Minn. 2009). A structural error may require automatic reversal of a conviction
because it “call[s] into question the very accuracy and reliability of the trial process.” State
v. Brown, 732 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 2007) (quotat ion omitted). However, the remedy
for a violation of the right to a public trial “should be appropriate to the violation,” and a
new trial is unnecessary if remand will remedy the violation. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d at 139;
State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 260 (Minn. 1992).
The purpose of the right to a public trial is to benefit the accused by ensuring that
the public sees that defendants are “fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned” and to
keep the triers of cases “keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance
of their functions.” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quotation omitted); State
v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
The right to a public trial is not absolute. State v. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d 199, 201
(Minn. 1995). For example, “the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive
information” may override a defendant’s public-trial right. Id. (quotation omitted).
“[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor” is an “overriding
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interest” that may support closing a courtroom to the public without violating the right to
a public trial. Id. at 202. A district court may exclude the public from a courtroom during
a minor victim’s testimony “upon a showing that closure is necessary to protect a witness
or ensure fairness in the trial.” Minn. Stat. § 631.045 (2020). However, section 631.045
also requires a district court to (1) provide the state, the defendant, and members of the
public with an opportunity to object to closure and (2) specify the reasons for closure in an
order closing any portion of the trial. Id.
To comply with the constitutional right to a public trial, the Supreme Court
enumerated four requirements to ensure that closure of a courtroom is justified: (1) the
party seeking closure “must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced”
absent closure; (2) the closure must be narrowly tailored ; (3) the district court “must
consider reasonable alternatives” to closure; and (4) the district court must make findings
that adequately support the closure. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
In Fageroos, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Waller standard to guide
determinations of whether courtroom closure is justified. 531 N.W.2d at 201-02.
Nonetheless, the supreme court stated that, while “protection of minor victims of sexual
offenses constitutes a compelling interest, it does not justify closure of the courtroom each
and every time a minor testifies.” Id. at 202. Instead, the closure determination must be
made on a case-by-case basis while weighing several factors, including “the minor victim’s
age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the
victim, and the interests of parents and relatives.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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Here, the district court erred by failing to make any findings to support its
determination that courtroom closure was necessary, referring only generally to the fact
that son’s testimony “can be a sensitive inquiry” touching on “possibly deeply personal
matters.”
At the close of voir dire, the state requested the district court’s ruling on its prior
motion for courtroom closure during son’s testimony. The district court did not recall the
state’s motion and replied that the motion for courtroom closure was “a very reasonable
request.” The district court asked appellant’s counsel if there was any objection, to which
counsel replied, “No, no.” However, the transcript reflects that, during this exchange, the
parties and the district court spoke simultaneously, cutting each other off mid-sentence.
Because of the nature of this exchange, it is not clear from the transcript whether appellant’s
counsel’s “No, no,” statement refers to the state’s motion for courtroom closure or another
motion that the transcript reflects was referenced in passing during this portion of the
proceedings. The following day at trial, the district court ordered closure of the courtroom
during son’s testimony, stating that it was “proceeding to a part of . . . trial involving the
testimony of a minor child on sensitive matters.”
We are not able to discern from this record, including the district court’s order and
the absence of findings on the need for courtroom closure, whether such closure was
justified under the circumstances. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court
for an evidentiary hearing, at which it may reopen the record to make findings sufficient
for review on the necessity of courtroom closure. See id. at 201-02; Waller, 467 U.S. at
48.
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We note that if the district court determines that closure of the courtroom during
son’s testimony was necessary, then it may sustain the verdict. If the district court instead
determines that it should not have closed the courtroom, we then direct the district court to
hold a new trial. Additionally, on remand we direct the district court to make express
findings as to whether appellant’s trial counsel waived any prior objection to courtroom
closure.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.