Jonathan Samael Greyblood, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1930

Jonathan Samael Greyblood, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 3, 2024
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-21-169

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant testified that he killed his wife and left her body on a frozen river. After
a trial, the jury found appellant guilty of second-degree unintentional murder while
committing domestic assault by strangulation . On appeal from the district court’s order
2
denying his petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues that the circumstantial
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Because we conclude that the
circumstances proved are consistent with the jury’s verdict and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than that appellant intended to strangle his wife, we affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of February 5, 2021, appellant Jonathan Samael Greyblood and his
wife, J.G., ate out with friends in Pierz. After dinner, the group went to a bar in Little Falls.
The bar closed around 10:00 p.m., and the group went to a party at a friend’s house.
Greyblood and J.G. drank alcohol throughout the evening. They had two drinks with dinner
and at least four more drinks at the bar. Greyblood had one more drink at the house party ,
while J.G. had “quite a few.”
Greyblood testified that, during the party, he and a friend looked at a meme that
showed a woman in “very short shorts.” 1 They laughed, and the friend showed the meme
to J.G., who became “extremely upset.” J.G. told Greyblood, “Start the f-ckin’ car,” and,
“We’re f-ckin’ leaving.” Greyblood and J.G. immediately left. Although J.G. “was very
intoxicated,” she drove—over Greyblood’s objection. 2
As they drove, J.G. told Greyblood that she was upset about the meme. She also
said that she did not want to be married to him. Greyblood testified that J.G. was angry and

1 The meme was a photo with sexist text on the image, received as exhibit 67.

2 The evidence conflicted about who drove that evening. Greyblood stated at first that he
drove them home from the house party. After law enforcement asked Greyblood how he
got scratches on the left side of his face, he stated that J.G. drove them home.
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that she “started to claw at the side of [his] face, started to scream at [him], calling [him] a
liar, telling [him] she f -ckin’ hated [him].” According to Greyblood, J.G. used her right
hand to “claw[] at” the left side of his face. The drive took about ten minutes. A neighbor’s
security camera recorded the Greybloods’ sport utility vehicle (SUV) pulling into their
driveway around 12:35 a.m. on February 6, 2021.
After they parked, Greyblood and J.G. continued to argue in the SUV. Greyblood
testified that J.G. hit him “really hard” “with a closed fist” on “the back of” and “the top
of” his head. Greyblood put his arms up and held them around his head “to lessen the
blows.” J.G. hit Greyblood’s throat “directly in the center,” which obstructed his ability to
breathe for “a short time.” J.G. had never hit him with a closed fist before. She told him
that she hoped he would die.
Greyblood testified that he “felt like [he] was going to die” and that he “just wanted
her to stop hitting” him. He “put [his] hands on her shoulders up against her neck to hold
her back.” J.G. “stopped screaming, . . . her hand dropped, ” and her body went “limp.”
Greyblood let go of J.G. and said her name, but J.G. did not answer. He then unbuckled his
seatbelt, got closer to J.G., and “noticed that she wasn’t breathing.” He “tilted [J.G.’s] seat
back . . . [and] tr[ied] to do CPR.”3 After “repeat[ing CPR] three times,” Greyblood “put
[his] ear on [J.G.’s] chest to see if her heart was beating, and [Greyblood] found that
[J.G.’s] heart was still beating, but [J.G.] still wasn’t breathing.” He “resumed trying to do

3 Greyblood testified that he tried to close J.G.’s nose, breathe into her mouth, and do chest
compressions.
4
CPR again.” Greyblood then “put [his] ear down on [J.G.’s] chest once more and [J.G.’s]
heart wasn’t beating.”
Two days after he killed J.G., Greyblood gave a videotaped statement to law
enforcement that described how he responded when J.G. hit him. Greyblood’s recorded
statement was received into evidence. He stated:
When we were in the driveway, we were arguing still, she
started hitting me again. Really hard and she hit me in the
throat. I couldn’t breathe. And she was screaming at me,
please, just die. Just die. I don’t want to be with you. Just die.
And I couldn’t breathe, and it felt like the longest ten seconds
of my life. And as soon as I could breathe again, she started
hitting me again. So I grabbed—so I grabbed her and I held
her down. And then she still kept hitting me. And I pushed her
back and I held her. M y hands were on her throat and I held
her, and I please—said please stop— stop hitting me. Just stop
hitting me. I just want you to stop hitting me. And she kept,
like, swinging and swinging, and I just held —and I was just
holding her there. And it’s like just please stop. And then her
hands, like, dropped. I let go. And she wasn’t breathing. So—
so I tried—I tried to give her mouth to mouth. I tried— I tried
waking her up because I—I didn’t mean to. I didn’t mean to. I
tried to (inaudible). And I—I didn’t think she —I didn’t think
she couldn’t breathe. I just was holding her . . . . I listened to
her heart stop beating. I wasn’t even holding her throat. I don’t
know why she wasn’t breathing (inaudible) . . . . And I knew.
I knew what I just did. I didn’t try to. I just wanted her to stop
hitting me. I just—I just—that’s all I wanted.

(Emphasis added.) During the same recorded statement, Greyblood showed how he placed
his hands on J.G.
Greyblood testified that, after he realized J.G.’s heart was not beating, he panicked
because of “the thought . . . that [he’s] not going to see [his] kids anymore, and [he’s] going
to go to jail, and [he’s] not going to be able to see [J.G.] anymore.” Without exiting the
5
SUV, Greyblood moved J.G. from the driver’s seat to the passenger seat and got into the
driver’s seat. The neighbor’s security camera recorded the SUV leaving the driveway at
about 12:57 a.m. Greyblood testified that he “ended up at the Swan River Bridge” and
placed J.G. “on the ice” below the bridge and “on the side” or bank of the river.
Greyblood drove to A.R.O.’s house. A.R.O. testified that she was with friends when
Greyblood arrived between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m. A.R.O. also testified that Greyblood’s
“demeanor was very off.” A.R.O. noticed that Greyblood “was shaking, he couldn’t really
talk,” and that he had scratches on his face. Greyblood asked A.R.O. “if [J.G.] was there.”
A.R.O. testified that Greyblood stated that J.G. “had requested that he drop her off at Pine
Grove Park, she attacked him and then she got out of the vehicle.” Greyblood also told
A.R.O. that J.G. had said that she did not want to be married to him anymore. A.R.O.
estimated that Greyblood left her house after about “a half hour to 45 minutes.” The
neighbor’s security camera recorded the SUV parking in Greyblood’s driveway at 2:20
a.m. and one person walking into the home.
On February 6, Greyblood arrived at work around 8:30 or 8:45 a.m. B.M., who was
Greyblood’s employer, testified that he noticed Greyblood had “abrasions on his face.”
Greyblood told B.M. that he dropped J.G. off at Pine Grove and left the park to get her a
jacket, but when he returned, she was gone.
Later that day, Greyblood reported to local law enforcement that J.G. was missing.
Law enforcement and the public searched for J.G. at the park— about four miles away from
the Swan River Bridge. Greyblood testified that he posted on social media the same day
and asked for help in finding J.G. At trial, Greyblood admitted that he lied by saying J.G.
6
was missing—in his social-media post and to A.R.O., his family, law enforcement, and
J.G.’s children from an earlier marriage. When law enforcement searched Greyblood’s
home, they found a note that Greyblood wrote to J.G ., which stated, “If you come home,
please message me . . . I love you!!–Jon.”
Greyblood had recorded interviews with law enforcement on February 6 and 7. In
the second interview, as described above, Greyblood admitted that he killed J.G. and told
officers where he left her body. On February 7, law enforcement recovered J.G.’s body just
below the Swan River Bridge.
The state charged Greyblood with second -degree intentional murder under Minn.
Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2020), and second-degree unintentional murder while
committing domestic assault by strangulation under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1)
(2020). The complaint alleged that Greyblood caused the death of J.G. by committing
domestic assault by strangulation.
The district court held a 13-day jury trial in October 2021. The evidence is
summarized above. The medical examiner who performed J.G.’s autopsy testified that she
watched Greyblood’s videotaped interview and that the injuries on J.G.’s neck were
“compatible” with Greyblood’s demonstration of how he placed his hands on J.G.’s neck.
The medical examiner also testified that a person could lose consciousness after 10 to 12
seconds of pressure on the throat and that, if the pressure is not released, the person will
die.
After the parties rested, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of the
two charged offenses —along with second- degree manslaughter at Greyblood’s request.
7
The district court also gave instructions—at Greyblood’s request — on “defense of self or
others” unintentionally resulting in death and “defense of self or others” involving the
“justifiable intentional taking of a life.” 4 The jury found Greyblood not guilty of
second-degree intentional murder, guilty of second-degree unintentional murder, and
guilty of second-degree manslaughter. In December 2021, the district court entered a
judgment of conviction for second-degree unintentional murder and imposed a sentence of
180 months in prison.
Greyblood did not file a direct appeal. In September 2023, Greyblood petitioned for
postconviction relief, arguing that the state’s evidence was insufficient “to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt he ‘intentionally’ impeded [J.G.]’s breathing.” The district court denied
the petition.
Greyblood appeals.
DECISION
The jury found Greyblood guilty of second- degree unintentional murder. Under
Minnesota law, someone who “causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect
the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other
than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a
drive-by shooting” is guilty of second-degree unintentional murder. Minn. Stat. § 609.19,
subd. 2(1) (emphasis added). The felony alleged here is domestic assault by strangulation.
Under Minnesota law, “whoever assaults a family or household member by strangulation

4 The jury instructions given were substantially similar to the pattern jury instructions. See
10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.13, .15 (Supp. 2020).
8
is guilty of a felony,” where strangulation means “intentionally impeding normal breathing
or circulation of the blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the
nose or mouth of another person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2247 (2020) (emphasis added). Thus,
Greyblood’s argument focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove domestic
assault by strangulation.
On appeal, Greyblood “does not dispute that the state proved he applied pressure on
[J.G.’s] throat or neck.” He argues that the issue is “whether the state met its burden of
proving he did so with the specific intent to impede her ability to breathe.” The state
contends that it proved Greyblood “acted with the intent to produce the specific result of
impeding normal breathing.”
The parties agree that the appellate standard of review for a postconviction
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is the same standard that the appellate court
would apply in a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction. See Fordyce v. State,
994 N.W.2d 893, 896, 903 (Minn. 2023). Both parties also agree that the
circumstantial-evidence test applies. Greyblood points out that the state offered
circumstantial evidence to prove his intent to assault J.G. by strangulation. Circumstantial
evidence is evidence from which the jury “can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or
did not exist” and, therefore, “always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted).
We agree that the heightened standard of review for circumstantial evidence applies
to the issue raised in this appeal because Greyblood’s argument focuses on the state’s
9
evidence of intent. See State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010) (applying
“heightened scrutiny” to “state of mind” evidence). “[I]ntent is a state of mind that is
usually proved with circumstantial evidence.” State v. Balandin, 944 N.W.2d 204, 217
(Minn. 2020); accord State v. Johnson , 616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000) (“A state of
mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor
both before and after the incident.”). To prove strangulation, the state must show that
Greyblood “intentionally imped[ed] normal breathing.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2247.
‘“Intentionally,’” for purposes of Minnesota Statutes chapter 609, “means that the actor
either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act
performed by the actor, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 9(3) (2020).
If circumstantial evidence is used to prove an element of the conviction challenged
on appeal, appellate courts apply a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594,
598 (Minn. 2013). In the first step, an appellate court must “identify the circumstances
proved.” Id. In doing so, appellate courts “defer to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of
these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the State.” Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). Appellate courts
also “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.” State v.
Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). “Stated differently, in determining the
circumstances proved, [appellate courts] consider only those circumstances that are
consistent with the verdict . . . because the jury is in the best position to evaluate the
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credibility of the evidence even in cases based on circumstantial evidence.” Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599 (citation omitted).
In the second step, appellate courts must “determine whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “review the circumstantial evidence not
as isolated facts, but as a whole,” and “examine independently the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Id. (quotation omitted). If
an alternative hypothesis is “untied to the evidence before the jury,” that hypothesis is
“wholly speculative” and does not warrant reversal. State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 475
(Minn. App. 2019). “[I]nconsistencies in the state’s case or possibilities of innocence” do
not require reversal so long as the evidence as a whole “makes such theories seem
unreasonable.” Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858.
We consider Greyblood’s arguments about this two-step analysis in turn.
A. The circumstances proved are consistent with Greyblood’s intent to
strangle J.G.

Greyblood “agrees that a jury could reasonably infer from the circumstances proved
that he, although not intending to kill [J.G.], intended to impede her breathing or
circulation.” Still, we consider this step because we must identify the circumstances proved
to go to the second step.
The circumstances proved that are relevant to Greyblood’s conviction are as
follows. On February 5, 2021, Greyblood and J.G. went out with friends, ate, and drank
alcohol over several hours. While at a house party, Greyblood looked at a meme on a
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friend’s phone, and his friend showed it to J.G., who became upset, swore, and told
Greyblood that they were leaving, which they did. As they drove home from their friend’s
house, J.G. was angry and upset; she screamed, hit Greyblood, and said that she no longer
wanted to be married to him.
At 12:35 a.m., they parked in the driveway of their home. They continued to argue
in the SUV. J.G. began to hit Greyblood with a closed fist. Greyblood “put [his] hands on
[J.G.’s] shoulders up against her neck to hold her back,” “grabbed her[,] . . . held her
down[,] . . . pushed her back and . . . held her,” with his hands “on her throat.” Greyblood
released his hands from J.G.’s neck after J.G.’s hand dropped and she went limp.
Greyblood realized that J.G. was not breathing and attempted CPR. J.G.’s heart stopped
beating.
At 12:57 a.m., Greyblood backed out of the driveway and drove to the Swan River
Bridge. He left J.G.’s body on the bank of the frozen river. That night, Greyblood lied and
told friends that J.G. asked him to drop her off at a park and that she was missing. The next
day, Greyblood lied and told his employer and law enforcement, among many others, that
J.G. was missing. Law enforcement searched the park and the nearby area, which was four
miles away from the Swan River Bridge.
During a February 7 recorded interview with law enforcement, Greyblood admitted
that he killed J.G., demonstrated how he placed his hands on J.G., and admitted that he
disposed of her body. Law enforcement recovered J.G.’s body from the location Greyblood
described. The medical examiner testified that J.G.’s injuries were “compatible” with
Greyblood’s demonstration of how he placed his hands on J.G.’s neck. The medical
12
examiner also testified that a person could lose consciousness after 10 to 12 seconds of
pressure on the throat and that, if the pressure is not released, the person will die.
We conclude that, based on the circumstances proved, a jury could reasonably infer
that Greyblood intended to strangle J.G. or intended to impede J.G.’s breathing based on
evidence that he applied pressure to her throat or neck, which caused her to stop breathing
and led to her death, without intending to effect her death. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19,
subd. 2(1), .2247.
B. The circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
other than Greyblood’s intent to strangle J.G.

Greyblood’s “sole argument is that the circumstances proved are also not
inconsistent with a reasonable inference that he accidentally, rather than intentionally,
impeded [J.G.’s] breathing.” Greyblood relies, in part, on his own testimony about his
intent. During direct examination, Greyblood agreed, first, that he did not try to stop J.G.
from breathing, and second, that he had no intention of trying to stop her breathing. He
added that he wanted J.G. “to stop hitting” him. The state contends that Greyblood’s
alternative hypothesis rests on “unreasonable” inferences.
Caselaw guides our analysis of what inferences are reasonable from the
circumstances proved. “In reaching its conclusion, the jury may infer that a person intends
the natural and probable consequences of his actions and a defendant’s statements as to his
intentions are not binding on the jury if his acts demonstrated a contrary intent.” State v.
Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179, 181 (Minn. 1997) (affirming appellant’s conviction for
first-degree murder and rejecting argument that circumstantial evidence did not prove
13
premeditation or intent). In Cooper, the Minnesota S upreme Court reasoned that the jury
had rejected Cooper’s testimony that he shot the victim “in one burst” and had credited
other witness testimony and that, therefore, the jury “easily concluded that the only
reasonable inference was that Cooper, in firing twelve separate shots into [the victim] as
[he] crawled away, intended to kill him.” Id. at 179. We note, however, that the supreme
court in Cooper did not apply the two-step circumstantial-evidence test discussed in
Silvernail because Cooper predated the supreme court’s adoption of the two-step test in
State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010).
We also consider this court’s analysis in State v. McCoy to be persuasive though
nonprecedential. No. A11-575, 2012 WL 539140 (Minn. App. Feb. 21, 2012), rev. denied
(Minn. May 15, 2012). After a jury trial, McCoy appealed his conviction for felony
domestic assault by strangulation and argued that the circumstantial evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction. Id. at *2. McCoy contended that the circumstantial
evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally impeded the
victim’s breathing by applying pressure to her throat. Id.
We affirmed the conviction based on the two-step circumstantial-evidence test, even
though the victim testified that McCoy did not intend to impede her breathing. Id. at *4.
The victim testified that McCoy “was angry with her and physically assaulted her, then
repositioned her body and put his knee or leg on her throat so that she could not breathe for
several seconds.” Id. We noted that a “jury may infer that a person intends the natural and
probable consequences of his actions” before concluding that the “circumstantial evidence,
taken as a whole, makes [McCoy]’s theory that he was merely repositioning [the victim]
14
in an attempt to end their struggle and accidentally put pressure on her neck unreasonable.”
Id. (quotation omitted). We also observed that additional circumstances proved supported
McCoy’s conviction; for example, McCoy pulled the victim off the couch and on to the
floor, McCoy kicked her, straddled her, and “jumped on her stomach with his knees three
or four times .” Id. at *1. McCoy repositioned her body before placing his knee on her
throat. Id.
Because we consider the circumstantial evidence “as a whole ,” Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599, and because it is reasonable to infer that “a person intends the natural
and probable consequences of his actions,” Cooper, 561 N.W.2d at 179, we conclude that
Greyblood’s alternative hypothesis is not rational because it rests on unreasonable
inferences. The “imped[iment of] normal breathing or circulation of the blood” was the
natural and probable consequence of Greyblood applying pressure to J.G.’s neck. Minn.
Stat. § 609.2247. The medical examiner testified that a person could lose consciousness
after only 10 to 12 seconds of pressure to the neck. Greyblood testified that he placed his
hands on J.G.’s neck and held her down until she lost consciousness and stopped breathing.
After Greyblood realized that J.G.’s heart stopped beating, he drove her body to a frozen
river and disposed of it. Therefore, the circumstances support only the reasonable inference
that Greyblood intended to strangle J.G. by placing his hands around her neck and
impeding her breathing. We conclude that Greyblood’s “statements as to his intentions”
did not bind the jury because “his acts demonstrated a contrary intent.” Cooper,
561 N.W.2d at 179.
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Greyblood argues that, when examining the record evidence of his intent, this court
should not rely on several circumstances proved that “relate[d] to the events leading up to
[J.G.’s] death.” For example, Greyblood criticizes the postconviction order because it
points out that Greyblood could have walked away from the fight with J.G., claiming it is
“irrelevant” to whether he intentionally impeded J.G.’s breathing. Greyblood also urges us
not to consider his behavior after J.G.’s death as evidence of his intent because “even a
person who unintentionally strangles their wife during an argument will feel guilty and fear
being held criminally responsible.” Both arguments lack merit.
We consider all evidence “in a light most favorable to the conviction,” State v.
Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 791 (Minn. 1999) , including evidence before and after the
killing,
5 Davis v. State, 595 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Minn. 1999). Appellate courts “review the
circumstantial evidence not as isolated facts, but as a whole.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at
599. “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as
a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable
doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quotation
omitted). For example, the circumstances before and after J.G.’s death are highly relevant
to Greyblood’s intent because, along with Greyblood’s testimony describing how he killed
J.G., they “form a complete chain” pointing only to his guilt. Id. Given that Greyblood lied

5 Even if we were to set aside evidence about Greyblood’s ability to walk away from his
fight with J.G., the circumstances under which he disposed of J.G.’s body, and his repeated
lies about what happened, we would still conclude that the only reasonable inference is that
Greyblood intended to strangle J.G. Greyblood’s own testimony about his actions in the
SUV supports only one reasonable inference—his intent to strangle J.G.
16
about what he did, the jury may infer that he lied about his intent. See State v. Taylor,
869 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2015) (holding that attempt to manufacture false alibi was
relevant to both credibility and consciousness of guilt).
Greyblood also criticizes the postconviction order’s conclusion that accidental
strangulation was “not plausible” because Greyblood would have had to apply “a
significant amount of pressure” “to control someone who is struggling and lashing out.”
Greyblood argues that applying “a significant amount of pressure” does not necessarily
require the inference that he did so with the intent to impede J.G.’s breathing. As we have
noted in a nonprecedential opinion, “strangulation requires only the impediment of ‘normal
breathing or circulation of blood,’ . . . not the full cessation of breathing or blood
circulation.” State v. Coleman, No. A10-667, 2011 WL 781088, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 8,
2011) (emphasis omitted) (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 1(c) (2008)). The record
evidence shows that Greyblood applied pressure to J.G.’s neck until she went limp, stopped
breathing, and her heart stopped . This evidence supports the reasonable inference that
Greyblood did so intentionally to impede J.G.’s breathing.
Thus, we affirm Greyblood’s conviction because the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and the reasonable inference that he intended to strangle J.G. and
inconsistent with any rational alternative hypothesis.
Affirmed.