In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. V. R., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1966

In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. V. R., Child.

Filed August 5, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-JV-23-1849

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian M. Mortenson, Rice County Attorney, Sean R. McCarthy, Assistant County
Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for appellant state)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent M.V.R.)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
The state received a report that a 16 -year-old boy had intercourse with a 13 -year-
old girl. There was no allegation of force, coercion, or bodily harm. The state promptly
investigated the allegation, but it did not file a charge against the boy in juvenile court until
nearly two years later, after he had turned 18. The state requested presumptive certification

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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for prosecution in adult court, asserting that the presumptive sentence for the offense on
conviction in adult court would be an executed term of imprisonment. The juvenile court
dismissed the charge under Minn. R. Juv. Del inq. P. 6.08, which authorizes the court to
dismiss a petition based on unnecessary prosecutorial delay in bringing the respondent to
trial. Because the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in doing so, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 26, 202 3, appellant State of Minnesota filed a juvenile petition charging
respondent MVR with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The juvenile
petition set forth the following allegations as a basis for the charge:
On or about July 8, 2021, Detective Carstensen of the
Faribault Police Department received a report that an unknown
16-year-old male from Albert Lea snuck into the bedroom of
13-year-old JUVENILE VICTIM . . . and engaged in sexual
intercourse with her on the night of July 8, 2021. JUVENILE
VICTIM lives in the City of Faribault, County of Rice, and
allegedly met the male, later identified as [MVR] (DOB:
11/06/2004), on Snapchat.

On July 9, 2021, Det. Carstensen met with JUVENILE
VICTIM and her mother at the Faribault Police Department.
Det. Carstensen spoke with J UVENILE VICTIM privately in
an interview room. JUVENILE VICTIM made the following
statements:

• I’m here because of that guy. His name is [M] . He is
from Albert Lea.

• [M] wanted to come over to my house. I thought he was
joking.

• He came over. This was two days ago.

• [M] is 16. I know [M] from Snapchat. I saw him on
someone’s story and I added him.
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• We started talking on Wednesday. He asked me what I
looked like and if he could come over. At first I said I
didn’t know.

• He came over at 3:30 in the morning.

• I am 13. I know [M] is for sure 16 because he can drive.
I told him I was 13 and going to be l4 soon.

• [M] didn’t give me a reason for why he wanted to come
over. We didn’t really talk about it before he came over.
He said he was going to come over and hang out.

• He got in my house through my window. He told me he
drove to my house.

• Right away we were just lying in my bed watching a
movie. He made the first move, I told him he could.

• He had everything off (clothing). I had a t-shirt and bra
on. I had my pants off.

• We did it once and then we stopped. We did it again and
then he had to go.

• “Did it” means having sex.

• It was in there. His [penis] was in my vagina.

• He did not have a condom on. . . .

• The first time lasted 10 minutes maybe. The second
time was 15.

• Something came out of his penis after the first time. It
was white.

• I gave him a towel to clean it up with. When it came
out it went on the towel.

• The second time he just had to go, nothing came out.

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. . . .

• The towel was a clean towel from my laundry basket. It
was blue and still at my house. I did not wash it.

• His name in Snapchat is saved as [M].

. . . .

• [M] is my height with brown hair.

• He left at about 4:40 a.m.

• The blue towel is on my floor somewhere.

JUVENILE VICTIM showed Det. Carstensen her
phone and Snapchat account to confirm [M’s] identity. Det.
Carstensen observed a profile by the name of [MN] in the chat
feature. JUVENILE VICTIM confirmed this was the male she
had sex with. JUVENILE VICTIM also told Det. Carstensen
that she had [M] on her Instagram and showed her a profile
with a username of [ m.n.]. Det. Carstensen observed a photo
on the account depicting [M] sitting on the trunk of a black
vehicle with Minnesota license plate . . . , which registered to
a [MLJ] of Albert Lea, MN.

Det. Carstensen observed JUVENILE VICTIM had a
photograph of herself on her phone that was captioned “lost the
v card” that was time-stamped Thursday (7/8/21) at 4:46 a.m.
Det. Carstensen observed a Snapchat message conversation
between JUVENILE VICTIM and another user, in which
JUVENILE VICTIM talked about how she didn’t want to live
because she “did something bad,” and continued by saying she
had sex with someone and talked about how it was the first
time she had met him.

Det. Carstensen collected the following as evidence
from JUVENILE VICTIM’s residence: sweatshirt, blue towel,
dark blue towel, black bed sheet, bedding/comforter.

JUVENILE VICTIM was seen at the District One
Hospital Emergency Room for a [sexual-assault] examination.
The sexual assault and urine kits collected at District One
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Hospital along with the blue towel collected from the residence
were sent to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(BCA) for further testing.

Det. Carstensen performed an internet search for [MN]
in Albert Lea, MN, and was able to positively identify [MVR]
and his mother, [EN]. Det. Carstensen also located an in-house
record for [ MVR] indicating Faribault Police Officers had
contact with [MVR] on July 9, 2021 at Teepee Tonka Park at
2:06 a.m., at which time he was located in the park after hours
with a different juvenile female and cited for curfew violation.
[MVR] provided Faribault Officers on scene information for
his parents [N] and [J] (reg istered owner of the vehicle in
Instagram photograph).

On or about May 25, 2022, a search warrant was
executed for [MVR’s] DNA. A buccal swab of [MVR’s] DNA
was sent to the BCA for testing.

On or about November 22, 2022, the BCA issued a
report confirming that semen from the blue towel collected
from JUVENILE VICTIM ’s residence was a match to
[MVR’s] DNA.

At the time of this incident, JUV ENILE VICTIM was
l3 years old and [MVR] was 16 years old and 34 months older
than JUVENILE VICTIM.

On September 22, 2023, over two years after the incident was reported to the police,
the state moved for presumptive certification, seeking to prosecute respondent as an adult
and imposition of an executed prison sentence.
Respondent moved the juvenile court to dismiss the charge based on “unnecessary
delay in investigation, charging, and other matters.” He cited three grounds for a delay-
based dismissal: (1 ) Minn. R. Juv. Del inq. P. 6.08, which authorizes dismissal based on
unnecessary delay in bringing a respondent to trial, (2) due process, and (3) the interests of
justice.
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On October 13, 2023, the juvenile court held a hearing on respondent’s motion to
dismiss. The juvenile court heard testimony from respondent and his mother regarding his
history of epilepsy, seizures, anxiety, learning difficulties during COVID, and the denial
of his application to college. Respondent and his mother also testified that respond ent
appealed the denial, was accepted to college, and moved into a dormitory. However, once
respondent learned that the underlying charge had been filed, he was anxious, dropped out
of college, and returned home.
On December 4, 2023, the juvenile court dismissed the charge against respondent
based on Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 6.08. The juvenile court reasoned that the charging delay
in this case was unnecessary and that respondent had been prejudiced by the delay in two
ways: (1) the available juvenile dispositional options had been “extremely limited” as a
result of respondent aging out of the juvenile system during the delay and (2 ) respondent
had suffered physical, mental -health, and educational setbacks as a result of the charging
delay.
The state appeals.
DECISION
The state may appeal a pretrial order only if the order has a “critical impact” on its
ability to prosecute. See In re Welfare of L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn. 1999) ( “In
the absence of critical impact we will not review a pretrial order. ”). Because the juvenile
court dismissed the charge against respondent, the critical-impact standard is satisfied. See
State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (stating that critical impact is present
if suppression of evidence leads to dismissal of charge).
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I.
The state contends that the juvenile court erred in dismissing the charge against
respondent, arguing that the court “abused its discretion by misapplying the law.”
The juvenile court dismissed the charge under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 6.08, which
simply states: “ If there is unnecessary delay by the prosecution in bringing a respondent
to trial, the court may dismiss the petition, citation or indictment.”1 Because rule 6.08 uses
“may,” it gives the juvenile court discretion to dismiss a juvenile charging document. See
State v. Gowan, 214 N.W.2d 228, 231 ( Minn. 1973) (noting that “may” is “discretionary
in nature”). We therefore review the dismissal for an abuse of discretion. A court “abuses
its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Bender v.
Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Unnecessary Delay
A dismissal under rule 6.08 requires “unnecessary delay.” The parties do not
dispute the meaning of that phrase. The term “unnecessary” is commonly understood to
mean “needless.” See ; Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Minn. App. 2014) (applying
the dictionary definition and common meaning of the term “primary residence” in a family-
law dispute where the term was not defined in statute).
The juvenile court determined that the charging delay in this case was unnecessary.
The following dates are undisputed and relevant to that determination.
• On July 8, 2021, the alleged offense occurred and was reported to the police.

1 The state does not contest that rule 6.08 applies to pre-charging delay.
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• On July 9, 2021, an investigator interviewed the complaining witness.

• On July 12, 2021, law enforcement received a report regarding the
complaining witness’s sexual -assault examination and analyzed the
complaining witness’s cell phone.

• On July 15, 2021, law enforcement received surveillance footage of the
complaining witness’s residence.

• On July 19, 2021, respondent did not attend a scheduled interview with law
enforcement; respondent ’s mother indicated respondent would not
participate in a police interview.

• On December 19, 2021, the BCA completed a report regarding the toxicology
results of a urine sample submitted by law enforcement.

• On March 31, 2022, the BCA completed a report regarding its examination
of physical evidence submitted by law enforcement, indicating that DNA
extraction and quantitation had been performed on various items, would be
performed on one additional item, and r equesting a DNA sample from
respondent.

• On May 24, 2022, law enforcement obtained a search warrant authorizing
the collection of a DNA sample from respondent.

• On May 25, 2022, law enforcement executed the warrant and obtained a
DNA sample from respondent.

• On November 6, 2022, respondent turned 18 years old.

• On November 22, 2022, the BCA completed a report indicating that the DNA
profile of sperm cell fractions obtained from physical evidence matched
respondent’s DNA.

• On June 26, 2023, the state filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging
respondent with third-degree criminal sexual conduct.

• On September 22, 2023, the state filed a motion to prosecute respondent as
an adult.

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As to its determination that the charging delay was unnecessary, the juvenile court
explained:
Not only is there no explanation on why evidence collected on
December 19, 2021, and having created a report on November
22, 2022 was not cha rged until June 26, 2023, nor any
explanation on why this evidence was necessary given the
specific facts of this case. The [s]tate sets forth a timeline from
the incident, the investigative procedures, and the results. All
of these alleged events occurred post-COVID. The first report
of the incident came in on July 12, 2021. What is clear is that
a significant amoun t of time passed after investigation was
completed that left this matter in limbo prior to being charged
out on June 26, 2023.

The juvenile court noted that “the state has not put forth any explanation as to the
necessity behind the delay that stretched for approximately seven months after the BC A’s
provision of the DNA report in November 2022.” The record supports that observation.
Instead of explaining the charging delay to the juvenile court , the state argued that “[t]he
standard for dismissal for unnecessary delay requires [respondent] to establish substantial
prejudice and improper state motive” and that because respondent failed to meet this
burden, the “[c]ourt must deny [his] motion.” The state also argued that the delay was
within its discretion.
The state has not changed its approach on appeal to this court and does not explain
why the delay was necessary . Instead, it reiterate s its insistence that dismissal was
improper absent a showing of substantial prejudice and improper motive, and it relies on
its charging discretion, stating that although the BCA provided a report regarding the DNA
testing in November 2022, “The [s]tate, in its discretion, did not file the petition charging
[r]espondent with the offense until June 2023.”
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On this record, we discern no basis to reverse the juvenile court’s determination that
the charging delay in this case was unnecessary , that is , needless. It is supported by the
undisputed facts in the record. As respondent notes, “the undisputed evidence establish[ed]
a nearly two -year total delay in charging,” including a “seven-month delay in filing the
charge following the completion of the investigation,” and the state fails “to even attempt
to provide a justification as to why the delay took place.”
Prejudice Requirement
Instead of explaining why the charging delay was necessary, the state contends that
a dismissal under rule 6.08 requires a showing of prejudice and improper motive and that
the juvenile court erred in finding prejudice sufficient to justify dismissal. The state argues
that Minn. R. Juv. Del inq. P. 6 .08 must be read and applied consistently with a
corresponding rule of criminal procedure, Minn. R. Crim. P. 30.02, on which rule 6.08 was
based. See Report and Proposed Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Juv enile
Delinquency Procedure, No. CX-01-926 (Minn. May 10, 2010) (explaining that the rules
committee “discussed and approved” adding rule 6.08 “to provide for a dismissal procedure
similar to that in the Rules of Criminal Procedure”).
Rule 30.02 provides: “ The court may dismiss the complaint, indictment, or tab
charge if the prosecutor has unnecessarily delayed bringing the defendant to trial.” In State
v. Banks, this court held that rule 30.02 “applies to claims of pre-charge delay” and that to
obtain a dismissal under rule 30.02 based on a claim of unnecessary pre-charge delay, “a
defendant must demonstrate that he has suffered prejudice by the delay.” 875 N.W.2d 338,
11
341 (Minn. App. 2016), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 19, 2016) and ord. granting rev. vacated
(Minn. Sept. 28, 2016).
The state argues that the juvenile court erred by dismissing in the absence of a
showing of prejudice as required under Banks. Respondent counters : (1 ) the plain
language of rule 6.08 does not require a showing of prejudice, (2) there is no caselaw
requiring a showing of prejudice when applying rule 6.08, and (3) an interpretation of a
corresponding rule of criminal procedure is irrelevant. Respondent argues that “a district
court is not required to find prejudice prior to dismissing a petition because of unnecessary
delay under [r]ule 6.08” and that even if a showing of prejudice is required, the juvenile
court correctly determined that respondent had been prejudiced by the unnecessary
charging delay.
The parties’ arguments raise an issue regarding the meaning of rule 6.08. The
Minnesota Supreme Court recently explained how to interpret a rule of juvenile
delinquency procedure in In re Welfare of D.J.F.-D.:
We interpret procedural rules de novo. Our
interpretation must comply with the rules of grammar and give
words and phrases their common and approved usage. If the
rule’s meaning is plain and unambiguous, we must interpret the
rule in accordance with its plain language. A rule is ambiguous
if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.

3 N.W.3d 266, 271 (Minn. 2024) (quotations and citations omitted).
The juvenile rule at issue in D.J.F.-D. was Minn. R. Juv. Del inq. P. 20.01, subd.
7(A), which governs dismissal of a juvenile proceeding when a child is found incompetent
to proceed. Id. at 267 -68. The supreme court declined to read th at juvenile rule in the
12
context of a corresponding rule for adult criminal defendants, upon which the juvenile rule
was based, explaining , “ Because different policy interests inform the rules of juvenile
delinquency procedure on the one hand, and the rules of criminal procedure on the other,
we decline to read [r]ule 20.01 in light of the criminal rules. ” Id. at 275 (citing Minn. R.
Juv. Delinq. P. 1.02).
In D.J.F.-D., t he supreme court announced its interpretation of Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 7(A), which is not relevant here. Id. at 278. But the supreme court
also directed the Juvenile Rules Advisory Committee to propose amendments to rule 20.01,
subdivision 7( A), “that will promote clear, consistent practice and procedures in these
juvenile court cases.” Id. Significantly, the supreme court stated that the rules committee
“is not, however required to propose amendments to [r]ule 20.01 that reflect our pre sent
interpretation if it concludes that other amendments would best serve the applicable policy
interests, including, but not limited to, those mentioned above.” Id.
The supreme court’s approach in D.J.F.-D. recognizes the unique policy interests
that underl ie the juvenile system as compared to the adult criminal system . And the
supreme court’s deference to the juvenile-rules committee on issues of policy was
significant: the supreme court did not direct the committee to propose amendments that
reflect its interpretation of rule 20.01. Instead, it invited the committee to propose other
amendments that would best serve the applicable policy interests.
The supreme court’s approach in D.J.F.-D. influences our decision here. As
explained in the next section, even if we assume, without deciding, that rule 6.08 require s
a showing of prejudice, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
13
the showing of prejudice in this case was sufficient. Thus, we need not determine whether
a dismissal under rule 6.08 requires a showing of prejudice. Instead, we limit our analysis
to whether the prejudice on which the juvenile court relied was sufficient under rule 6.08
given the facts and circumstances of this case , assuming, without deciding, that prejudice
is required. This approach will give the Juvenile Rules Advisory Committee an
opportunity to consider, in the first instance, whether a showing o f prejudice is required
under rule 6.08, consistent with the preference shown in D.J.F.-D. See id.
II.
The state contends that, assuming that a showing of prejudice is required under 6.08,
the juvenile court erred by determining that respondent had demonstrated sufficient
prejudice to obtain relief under rule 6.08. The state argues that the juvenile court “made
no proper finding of prejudice in this case, and instead improperly relied upon potential
sentencing concerns and [r]espondent’s subjective feelings of anxiety over the possibility
of facing charges.”
The juvenile court essentially relied on two type s of prejudice: dispositional (i.e.,
reduced time for treatment in the juvenile system) and personal (i.e., physical, mental -
health, and educational). We address only the first type of prejudice because, to the extent
that a finding of prejudice was required, the dispositional prejudice in this case justified
dismissal under rule 6.08.
“Sentencing” Concerns
The state argues that the juvenile court “improperly relied upon potential sentencing
concerns.” T he state is incorrect. The juvenile court did not rely on any “sentencing”
14
concerns. The juvenile court relied on the “extremely limited dispositions based upon the
extreme delay thereby prejudicing [respondent] in this matter.”
The state uses the words “sentence” and “disposition” interchangeably. That
approach is fundamentally flawed.2 A “sentence” is governed by statute and the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines. Upon conviction of a felony , the district court may sentence the
defendant to a term of imprisonment, payment of a fine, payment of court -ordered
restitution, and payment of a local correctional fee . Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1 ( 2022)
(listing available sentences for felony convictions). Presumptive sentences are set forth in
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the purpose of which is to “establish rational and
consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that
sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional to the severity of the offense of
conviction and the extent of the offender’s criminal history.” State v. Barthman , 938
N.W.2d 257, 269-70 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
The purpose of guidelines sentencing in the adult criminal system is very different
than the purpose of dispositional planning in the juvenile-justice system.
The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or
adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety and
reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the
substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing
individual responsibility for lawful behavior. This purpose

2 We recognize that term “disposition” is used in the adult criminal system when referring
to sentencing outcomes, such as whether a presumptive prison sentence is stayed or
executed. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1. (2020) (“The court may depart from the
presumptive disposition or duration provided in the Guidelines, and stay or impose a
sentence that is deemed to be more appropriate than the presumptive sentence.”). Our
discussion of the term “disposition” refers to the me aning of that word in the juvenile -
justice context.
15
should be pursued through means that are fair and just, that
recognize the unique characteristics and needs of children, and
that give children access to opportunities for personal and
social growth.

Minn. Stat. § 260B.001 , subd. 2 (2022). “T he laws relating to juvenile courts shall be
liberally construed to carry out [that] purpose.” Id., subd. 3 (2022); see, Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 1.02 (using the same language as Minn. Stat. § 260B.001, subd. 2).
Consistent with the pursuit of the purpose of the juvenile -justice system “ through
means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique characteristics and needs of children,
and that give children access to opportunities for personal and social growth ,” Minnesota
Statutes section 260B.198 (2022) authorizes multiple dispositional options to address the
needs of a juvenile who has violated a criminal law. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd.
1(a) (setting forth dispositional options such as counseling the juvenile or transferring
custody of the juvenile for out-of-home placement).
In addition, the procedural rules governing juvenile dispositions direct the
consideration of the following “established principles”:
(1) Necessity. It is arbitrary and unjust to impose a
disposition that is not necessary to restore law abiding
conduct. . . .
(2) Best Interests. A disposition must serve the best
interests of the child, but this does not supersede the
requirement that the disposition be necessary. The promise of
benefits in a disposition, or even the suggestion that a particular
disposition is best for the child, does not permit a disposition
that is not necessary.
(3) Out-of-Home Placement. Public policy mandates
that the best interests of the child are normally served by
parental custody. Where an out -of-home placement is being
considered, the placement should be suitable to the child ’s
16
needs. A placement that is not suited to the actual needs of the
child cannot serve the child’s best interests.
(4) Sanctions. Sanctions, such as post -adjudication
placement in a secure facility, are appropriate where such
measures are necessary to promote public safety and reduce
juvenile delinquency, provided that the sanctions are fair and
just, recognize the unique characteristics and needs of the child
and give the child access to opportunities for personal and
social growth. . . .
(5) Local Dispositional Criteria. The disposition should
reflect the criteria used for determining delinquency
dispositions in the local judicial district.

Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2(B).
In sum, a “sentence” is not the equivalent of a “disposition.” They are separate and
distinct. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.130 , subd. 4(a) (2022) (stating that i f an extended
jurisdiction juvenile prosecution results in a guilty plea or finding of guilt, the court shall
“impose one or more juvenile dispositions ” and “an adult criminal sentence ”).
Recognizing that distinction is important in this juvenile proceeding, and the distinction is
supported by policy interests different than those underlying the adult criminal system.
D.J.F.-D., 3 N.W.3d at 275 (stating that “different policy interests inform the rules of
juvenile delinquency procedure on the one hand, and the rules of criminal procedure on the
other”).
Dispositional Prejudice
Turning to the juvenile court’s reliance on dispositional prejudice, such prejudice is
obvious when one considers the impact of the state’s unnecessary charging delay in the
context of its request for presumptive certification. Minnesota’s laws and procedures
governing the prosecution of juvenile crime have evolved over time and currently provide
17
three options for such prosecutions: delinquency prosecution, extended-jurisdiction-
juvenile (EJJ) prosecution, and criminal prosecution, that is, certification of a charge
against a juvenile for prosecution under the laws and procedures governing crimes
committed by an adult. See State v. Thompson , 995 N.W.2d 415, 419 -20 (Minn. App.
2023). Each of those options results in radically different outcomes if the offender is found
guilty. We recently summarized those options as follows:
The district court has original jurisdiction in all civil and
criminal cases. However, [Minnesota statutes] ca rve out a
narrow category of cases from the subject matter jurisdiction
of district courts and vest that jurisdiction exclusively in the
juvenile court . Except as provided in sections 260B.125
(governing certification ) and 260B.225 (governing traffic
offenses), the juvenile court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child who is alleged
to be delinquent. . . .

. . . .

Unless terminated by the juvenile court and under
certain circumstances discussed below, the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court shall continue until the individual becomes 19
years of age if the court determines it is in the best interest of
the individual to do so.

However, if an offender is convicted as an extended
jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ), the juvenile court’s jurisdiction may
extend until the offender becomes 21 years of age. . . . If an
EJJ prosecution results in a finding of guilt, the court shall
impose both a juvenile disposition and a stayed adult criminal
sentence.

The juvenile court may also certify a proceeding
involving a child alleged to have committed an offense for
action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult
criminal violations. . . . If the juvenile court certifies an alleged
18
violation, the prosecuting authority shall proceed with the case
as if the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never attached.

Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
A violation of law by a child before becoming 18 years of age is not a crime unless
the juvenile court: (1) certifies the matter for adult prosecution, (2) transfers the matter to
a court under a statute governing juvenile traffic offenders, or (3) convicts the juvenile as
an EJJ and subsequently executes the juvenile’s stayed adult sentence . Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.255, subd. 1 (2022).
In sum, if a juvenile is successfully prosecuted as a delinquent, he receives only a
juvenile disposition and may be on probation until age 19. But he does not receive a
criminal conviction. If a juvenile is successfully prosecuted as an EJJ, he receives both a
juvenile disposition and a stayed adult criminal sentence, and he may be on probation until
age 21. But he does not receive a criminal conviction unless he violates probation and his
stayed adult sentence is executed. Finally, if a juvenile offense is certified and the juvenile
is successfully prosecuted as an adult, he receives the same sentence that a similarly
situated adult would receive, including an executed prison sentence. He also receives a
criminal conviction, as well as the stigma and negative collateral consequences that stem
from a conviction.
Procedurally, t here are several different ways to obtain certification or EJJ
prosecution. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260B.125 (setting forth certification methods) (2022);
19
260B.130 (setting forth EJJ prosecution methods) (2022). In this case, the state requested
presumptive certification.3 As is relevant here, the governing statute provides:
It is presumed that a proceeding involving an offense
committed by a child will be certified if:

(1) the child was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the
offense; and
(2) the delinquency petition alleges that the child
committed an offense that would result in a presumptive
commitment to prison under the Sentencing Guidelines and
applicable statutes . . . .

If the court determines that probable cause exists to
believe the child committed the alleged offense, the burden is
on the child to rebut this presumption by demonstrating by
clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in
the juvenile court serves public safety. If the court finds that
the child has not rebutted the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence, the court shall certify the proceeding.

Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3. “If the juvenile court decides not to order certification in
a case in which the presumption described in subdivision 3 applies, the court shall designate
the proceeding an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution . . . .” Id., subd. 8(b).
Given the certification process that the state selected, respondent had the
opportunity to show that retaining his case in the juvenile system for an EJJ prosecution
served public safety. If he were successful in doing so, he would have had the opportunity
to avail himself of a juvenile disposition designed to restore him to law -abiding conduct

3 In juvenile court, respondent’s counsel questioned w hether the circumstances here
satisfied the requirements for presumptive certification. Because that issue is not raised in
this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that the state’s motion for presumptive
certification was valid.
20
while addressing his unique needs as a juvenile. More importantly, he would have had the
opportunity to avoid an executed prison sentence and a criminal conviction.
When considering whether to certify a proceeding for adult prosecution and whether
a juvenile has rebutted a presumption of certification, the juvenile court must consider and
balance certain “public safety” factors. Id., subds. 4 (stating that in determining whether
the public safety is served by certifying the matter, the court shall consider certain public-
safety factors); 8(b) (“If the juvenile court decides not to order certification in a case in
which the presumption . . . applies, the court shall designate the proceeding an extended
jurisdiction juvenile prosecution and include in its decision written findings of fact and
conclusions of law as to why the retention of the proceeding in juvenile court serves public
safety, with specific reference to the factors listed in subdivision 4.”).
The statutory public-safety factors are as follows:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child ’s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;
(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child ’s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

21
Id., subd. 4. “In considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the
seriousness of the alleged offense and the child ’s prior record of delinquency than to the
other factors listed in this subdivision.” Id.
Factors five and six are often considered together, and both are impacted by the
juvenile’s current age. 4 “Insufficient time for rehabilitation under the juvenile system is
an appropriate consideration ” when determining whether to certify a case for adult
prosecution. In re Welfare of U.S. , 612 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Minn. App. 2000) . Thus, we
consider how the charging delay in this case impacted the time available for rehabilitation
in the juvenile system.
Respondent was born on November 6, 2004. He will turn 21—the age at which EJJ
jurisdiction and supervision would end—on November 6, 2025. Respondent was 16 years
and 8 months old on the date of the alleged offense in this case: July 8, 2021. As to the
maximum time remaining for rehabilitation under the juvenile system (i.e., respondent’s
twenty-first birthday), a comparison between the July 8, 2021 alleged offense date and the
June 26, 2023 charging date is telling.5

4 A common example of this approach is found in In re Welfare of T.D.B., No. A17-0813,
2017 WL 5661605, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov. 27, 2017) , rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2018).
In that case, t he district court addressed the fifth factor, the adequacy of punishment or
programming available in the juvenile-justice system, in conjunction with the sixth factor,
the dispositional options available for the child. T.D.B., 2017 WL 5661605, at *4 . The
district court compared the punishment and treatment available in the adult and juvenile
systems, as well as the amount of time that would likely remain for supervision under an
EJJ prosecution. Id. The district court emphasized its primary concern: “there would not
be enough time for adequate punishment and programming in the juvenile system.” Id.
5 We recognize that an alleged offense is normally not charged on the offense date. We
use the offense date as one end of the spectrum for illustrative purposes because that date
22
At the time of the alleged offense, approximately four years and four months
remained until respondent’s 21st birthday. But by the time the state filed its charges against
respondent on June 26, 2023, respondent was over 18 years and 7 months old. At that
point, only approximately two years and four months remain ed until respondent’s 21st
birthday. The state’s decision to move for presumptive certification was discretionary and
likely based on respondent’s advanced age at the time of charging. Moreover, two years
of potential rehabilitative programming in the juvenile -justice system under EJJ
supervision had been lost as a result of the charging delay. That passage of time prejudiced
respondent’s chance of demonstrating that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court
would serve public safety. As the juvenile court reasoned, for individuals over the age of
18, juvenile “treatment options are limited and require special waivers.”
In this case, the stakes were high for respondent. As charged, he faced presumptive
certification, a criminal conviction, and a presumptive prison sentence. If respondent
rebutted the presumption and demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that retaining
the proceeding in the juvenile court would serve public safety, he would have received a
juvenile disposition, including both punishment and rehabilitative programming specific

is undisputed. It is also undisputed that within 11 days of the alleged offense date, law
enforcement had interviewed the complaining witness, received the results of the
complaining witness’s sexual-assault examination, analyzed the complaining witness’s cell
phone, received surveillance footage of the complaining witness ’s residence, obtained
identifying information regarding the suspect, identified respondent as the suspect, and
communicated with respondent’s mother in an attempt to interview respondent regarding
the alleged offense.
23
to his needs as a juvenile. And he could have avoided an executed prison sentence, as well
as a criminal conviction.
The record does not tell us whether respondent had a prior history of delinquent
behavior. Although there was no reason to put such information before the court in the
limited proceeding below, nothing in the record suggests that respondent has had
behavioral problems at home, in school, or in the community —other than a reference to a
curfew citation in the charging document . But the record contains testimony —which the
district court credited —describing respondent’s history of epilepsy, a grand mal seizur e
when he was younger, on-going mini-seizures, anxiety, and educational challenges during
COVID, as well as his efforts to overcome those issues, including his admission to college.
On this record, public-safety factors five and six could have weighed in favor of an
EJJ prosecution . But the state’s unnecessary charging delay significantly reduced the
amount of time available for respondent to be supervised on EJJ probation and to receive
rehabilitative programing in the juvenile system. The state’s unexplained and unnecessary
two-year charging delay indisputably prejudiced respondent’s ability to avoid presumptive
certification. We therefore reject the state’s assertion that “there was no tactical advantage
gained by the [s]tate based on the timing of the filing of the petition in this case.” To be
clear, we do not suggest that the state intentionally delayed charging to obtain a tactical
advantage. But the charging delay did in fact benefit the state’s attempt to achieve
presumptive certification in a way that unfairly prejudiced respondent.
The state argues that “the juvenile court’s focus upon the disposition options
available to [r]espondent is contrary to law.” But as the state notes, there is no precedential
24
authority applying or interpreting rule 6.08. And the plain language of the rule does not
require a showing of prejudice. In addition, the supreme court recently emphasized that a
juvenile rule is not necessarily read in the context of a comparable criminal rule “[b]ecause
different policy interests inform the rules of juvenile delinquency procedure on the one
hand, and the rules of criminal procedure on the other .” D.J.F.-D., 3 N.W.3d at 275. We
therefore fail to discern how the juvenile court’s approach could be “contrary to law.”
Instead, the juvenile court’s approach is consistent with the purpose underlying the juvenile
system, which emphasizes juvenile rehabilitation “through means that are fair and just, that
recognize the unique characteristics and needs of children, and that give children access to
opportunities for personal and social growth.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.001, subd. 2; Minn. R.
Juv. Delinq. P. 1.02.
The state also argues that we must give “substantial deference to the state’s decision
regarding when to initiate criminal charges.” The state cites State v. F.C.R. (In re Welfare
of F.C.R.) as support, in which the supreme court held that “[u] nder the facts and
circumstances, an eight -month delay in prosecution was not an abuse of prosecutorial
discretion on which the juvenile court could base its dismissal of the prosecution ’s adult
[certification] motion.” 276 N.W.2d 636, 637 (Minn. 1979). For the reasons that follow,
F.C.R. is not analogous to this case.
First, t he rulings in F.C.R. were not based on rule 6.08 : the F.C.R. respondent
argued that the charging delay violated his right to due process. See id. at 638 (“Respondent
claims that the eight-month delay denied him due process . . . .”). In this case, the juvenile
25
court’s ruling was based on rule 6.08, and not on due process. 6 Indeed, the supreme court
in F.C.R. did not consider application of Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 6.08 because that rule
was not promulgated until 2010, some 30 years later. Promulgation of Amendments to the
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure , No. ADM10-8003 (Minn. Nov. 19,
2010).
Second, the supreme court’s decision in F.C.R. predates the legislature’s adoption
of Minnesota’s current presumptive-certification and EJJ statutory scheme, which did not
take effect until 199 5. See 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 576 , at 934 -85 (providing for
“presumptive certification to adult court for juveniles over age 16 alleged to have
committed other prison -level felonies . . . ; authorizing the court or the prosecutor to
designate a juvenile an extended jurisdiction juvenile; authorizing adult felony sentences
for extended jurisdiction juveniles; extending juvenile court jurisdiction to age 21 for
extended jurisdiction juveniles; limiting certification to adult court to felony offenses”); In
re Welfare of B.C.G., 537 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. App. 1995) (“The 1994 amendments
to the juvenile statutes and rules govern actions commenced or arrests made after January
1, 1995.”).

6 For that reason, we do not address the state’s assertion that a showing of improper motive
was necessary to justify dismissal. See F.C.R. , 276 N.W.2d at 639 (“To establish a
violation of the due process clause due to pre -indictment delay, a defendant must prove
both actual prejudice and an improper state purpose.”).

26
When F.C.R. was decided, the law regarding certification for adult prosecution —
then called “reference” —did not provide for presumptive certification or EJJ, nor did it
require the juvenile court to balance today’s public-safety factors when ruling on a
certification motion under the current statutory scheme. 7 Minn. Stat.

7 Minn. Stat. § 260.125 (1976) provided:
REFERENCE FOR PROSECUTION. Subdivision 1.
When a child is alleged to have violated a state or local law or
ordinance after becoming 14 years of age the juvenile court
may enter an order referring the alleged violation to the
appropriate prosecuting authority for action under laws in force
governing the commission of and punishment for violations of
statutes or local laws or ordinances. The prosecuting authority
to whom such matter is referred shall within the time specified
in such order of reference, which time shall not exceed 90 days,
file with the court making such order of reference notice of
intent to prosecute or not to prosecute. If such prosecuting
authority files notice of intent not to prosecute or fails to act
within the time specified, the court shall proceed as if no order
of reference had been made. If such prosecuting authority files
with the court notice of intent to prosecute the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court in the matter is terminated.
Subd. 2. The juvenile court may order a reference only
if
(a) A petition has been filed in accordance with
the provisions of section 260.131
(b) Notice has been given in accordance with the
provisions of sections 260.135 and 260.141
(c) A hearing has been held in accordance with
the provisions of section 260.155, and
(d) The court finds that the child is not suitable
to treatment or that the public safety is not served under
the provisions of laws relating to juvenile courts.
Subd. 3. When the juvenile court enters an order
referring an alleged violation to a prosecuting authority, the
prosecuting authority shall proceed with the case as if the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never attached.

27
§ 260.125, subd. 1 (1976) ; see F.C.R., 276 N.W.2d at 638 (revie wing the dismissal of an
“adult reference motion”) . Thus, the dispositional prejudice on which the juvenile court
relied in this case was simply not an issue when F.C.R. was decided. Given the extremely
different legal landscape at the time of the supreme court’s decision in F.C.R., that case is
not relevant regarding the issue presented here.
We recognize that “[g]enerally, a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of
the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation -of-powers doctrine, a court
should not interfere with the prosecutor ’s exercise of that discretion.”8 State v. Foss, 556
N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996) . But a prosecutor must be mindful of the purpose of the
juvenile system, which focuses on public safety and dispositional planning to reduce
delinquent behavior and restore law-abiding behavior. The ability to achieve those goals
without compromising public safety is inevitably impacted by the amount of time available
for rehabilitation in the juvenile system . Although a prosecutor has broad charging
discretion, it must be exercised consistently with the purpose of that system and the time
constraints affecting that purpose. That did not occur here.
In conclusion, there is no basis to hold that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in dismissing the charge against respondent under rule 6.08. There is no dispute regarding
the relevant facts, and the juvenile court applied the plain language of rule 6.08 consistently
with the purpose of the statutes and rules governing the prosecution of juveniles. The
juvenile court’s approach, which did not rely on the corresponding rule of criminal

8 Although the state repeatedly refers to its charging discretion, it does not assert a
separation-of-powers violation.
28
procedure and associated caselaw, was not an abuse of discretion. See D.J.F.-D., 3 N.W.3d
at 275.
We appreciate and regret that the complaining witness will not receive justice as a
result of the state’s unnecessary charging delay. And we acknowledge that the DNA
evidence strengthened the state’s case against respondent. But we fail to discern—and the
state has not explained —why it was necessary to wait seven months after the DNA test
results were available before charging respondent. We also fail to discern —and the state
does not explain—why the charge was not filed pending the results of the DNA testing, as
is often done. Juvenile -delinquency prosecutions are like criminal prosecutions in one
respect: the vast majority of cases are settled with plea negotiations. Had the state charged
this case in a timelier fashion, it could have been resolved using the full array of
dispositional options available in juvenile court. It is unfortunate that the state failed to do
so, and the result is not fair to the complaining witness and her family. But we are obligated
to follow the law.
Assuming without deciding that a showing of prejudice is required to obtain a
dismissal under rule 6.08, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the
charge against respondent based on the state’s unnecessary two-year charging delay, which
significantly reduced the amount of time remaining to rehabilitate respondent in the
juvenile system and therefore prejudiced respondent’s ability to rebut the state’s motion
for presumptive certification.
Affirmed.