State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1967

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nathan Christopher Braun,
Appellant.

Filed October 7, 2024
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-23-188

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Nathan Braun threatened to “f---ing kill” a fellow Facebook user and pleaded guilty
in a Norgaard plea to making threats of violence. Braun now argues on appeal that he
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the factual basis for his plea met
the elements demonstrating his guilt under the threats- of-violence statute and because he
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adequately acknowledged that the state’s evidence was sufficient for a jury to find him
guilty, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Nathan Braun in January 2023 with making threats of violence
after he sent voice recordings through Facebook under the alias “Ally Sorenson” to another
Facebook user threatening to “f---ing kill [him]” and informing the user that Braun knew
where he lived. Braun and the state reached a plea agreement. In exchange for Braun’s
pleading guilty to the charged offense, the parties agreed to an 18-month prison sentence.
The state questioned Braun at the plea hearing to establish a factual basis for his
guilty plea. Braun admitted that he had a Facebook account with a false identity, that he
used the account to comment on a newspaper article referencing a criminal matter of his,
that the victim user likewise commented on the article, and that Braun eventually reached
out to that user through Facebook’s private-messenger feature. But when asked whether
Braun remembered sending threatening voice messages to the victim using that feature, he
responded, “No.” The prosecutor therefore focused on the elements of a valid Norgaard
plea.
To establish a factual basis for Braun’s Norgaard plea, the prosecutor recounted the
evidence the state would present at trial:
And you understand that if we went to trial the State would call
specifically [the victim]. He would testify that he got into an
argument with you over his St. Cloud Times comments on
Facebook.

He would then testify that after that you had sent him some
voice messages on his personal messaging on Facebook. And
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he would testify specifically that you left him a message that
you know where he lives and also saying that the “next time I
f---ing see you, I am gonna f---ing kill you, you f---ing piece
of shit.” [The victim] would testify that he believed it was you.

The State would also call the [department of corrections]
agents who would testify that they went to your house and
collected several electronic devices. They would testify that
when they opened your device they saw the Facebook account
for Ally Sorenson . . . open.

They would also testify that they played those messages in
your presence and that you told them that that was you leaving
those threatening messages on [the victim’s] Facebook.

The prosecutor concluded by asking, “So do you believe that if the State offered all of that
evidence at trial there would be a substantial likelihood that a jury would find you guilty
of threats of violence beyond a reasonable doubt?” Braun responded, “I do believe so.”
The district court found that the factual basis was sufficient and accepted Braun’s guilty
plea. It entered judgment of conviction of making threats of violence and imposed the
parties’ agreed-to 18-month prison sentence. Braun appeals.
DECISION
Braun contends that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because it is
inaccurate. Defendants have “no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea” but may do so
when necessary to avoid a manifest injustice, including when the plea is invalid because it
is inaccurate. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93–94 (Minn. 2010). A guilty plea is
inaccurate when it lacks a sufficient factual basis. Id. at 94. Because Braun entered a
Norgaard plea, which occurs when a defendant claims to lack memory about the offense’s
circumstances, State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961), the
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factual basis supporting his plea differs from that of a common guilty plea. While the
factual basis for a common guilty plea is usually established by asking the defendant to
explain the circumstances surrounding the crime, a Norgaard plea requires “a strong
factual basis,” and the defendant must agree that the state’s evidence is likely sufficient for
a jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12
(Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 2009). We review a plea’s validity de novo.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Our de novo review leads us to affirm Braun’s guilty plea.
Braun offers two arguments to support his contention that his guilty plea is
inaccurate. He argues first that the factual basis underlying his Norgaard plea fails to
satisfy the elements outlined in Minnesota’s threats- of-violence statute. And he argues
second that he did not adequately acknowledge that the state’s evidence was sufficient for
a jury to convict him for making threats of violence. Neither argument warrants reversing.
We are unconvinced by Braun’s argument that the proffered facts do not satisfy the
elements required for a threats-of -violence conviction. Braun pleaded guilty to making
threats of violence under Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1 (2022), which
makes it a crime for a person to “threaten[], directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of
violence with purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of
causing such terror.” Braun fails to identify which element was allegedly not supported by
the factual basis established at the plea hearing, but we construe his argument as implicitly
contending that the factual basis failed to include evidence of the victim’s apprehension
that Braun would follow through with his threat to kill him.
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We reject Braun’s implied contention that the factual basis omitted evidence that
the victim feared that Braun would follow through with his threat. This is because the
supreme court has already held that the victim’s apprehension is not an element of the
offense: “The effect of a terroristic threat on the victim is not an essential element of”
section 609.713. State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975); see also State v.
Marchand, 410 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1987).
And if Braun is challenging the remaining elements required for a threats-of-violence
conviction, the challenge fails. The factual record developed at the plea hearing
demonstrating that Braun threatened to kill the other user and that he knew where the user
lived established that Braun engaged in threatening a crime of violence under the statute.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (referring to Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d) (2022),
listing crimes qualifying as crimes of violence); Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d) (listing
all of Minnesota’s murder, manslaughter, and criminal-vehicular -homicide statutes).
Braun’s statement that he knew where the victim lived provides the context that he either
intended to terrorize the victim or that he recklessly disregarded the risk of causing the
victim terror. The factual basis supporting Braun’s plea satisfies section 609.713.
Braun argues second that he did not “adequately” acknowledge that the evidence
was sufficient to convict him of threatening a crime of violence. He points to his response
of “I do believe so” when the prosecutor asked whether there was a “substantial likelihood”
that the jury would find him guilty of making threats of violence beyond a reasonable doubt
based on the state’s evidence. The supreme court has explained that, when developing the
factual basis for Norgaard pleas, defendants must specifically acknowledge on the record
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that the state’s evidence is “sufficient” for the jury to find the defendant guilty under the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007);
see also State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Minn. 1994). The Theis court applied that
standard and held that a defendant’s acknowledging that “there is a risk that he could be
convicted” does not result in an accurate plea. 742 N.W.2d at 650. Braun relies on that
holding in Theis as the basis of his argument that he did not adequately acknowledge that
the state’s evidence was sufficient for a guilty verdict.
We are not convinced by Braun’s contention that the prosecutor’s asking whether
there is a “substantial likelihood” of a conviction was insufficient to make his plea accurate.
Braun likens the prosecutor’s use of “substantial likelihood” to the “risk” language from
Theis. But we have already held that agreeing to a “substantial likelihood” of a conviction
satisfies the supreme court’s accuracy test. In Williams, the prosecutor asked the defendant,
“[W]ould it be fair to say that there is a substantial likelihood that you would be found
guilty . . . ?” 760 N.W.2d at 14. We held that the defendant’s affirmative response
demonstrated that she “pleaded guilty based on probable guilt and on her awareness of the
likelihood a jury would convict her.” Id. Braun’s argument fails under Williams.
We are similarly unconvinced by Braun’s argument that his “I do believe so”
acknowledgment made his plea inaccurate. He analogizes guilty pleas with jury-bias
questioning during voir dire, pointing out that the supreme court has found phrases like
“yes, I guess,” “I don’t think so,” and “I don’t know” to be insufficient to rehabilitate a
prospective juror who revealed a bias. See State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 625 (Minn.
2015). Apples and oranges; a juror’s equivocation and seeming uncertainty about whether
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she can be fair and impartial differs fundamentally from Braun’s seemingly certain
statement, “I do believe so,” as to whether it was substantially likely that a jury would find
him guilty. And in context, it seems apparent that he used the “believe” language because
that is what the prosecutor asked, not because his answer was equivocal. The prosecutor,
after recounting the evidence the state planned to introduce at trial, asked Braun, “So do
you believe that if the State offered all of that evidence at trial there would be a substantial
likelihood that a jury would find you guilty of threats of violence beyond a reasonable
doubt?” To this Braun responded, “I do believe so.” Braun’s contention fails.
Affirmed.