In re the Guardianship of: Doris Anita Seward.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1971

In re the Guardianship of: Doris Anita Seward.

Filed February 3, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-GC-PR-21-588

Taylor Lars Florin-Clemants, Minnetonka, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Patricia J. Stotzheim, Messick Law, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Judith
Yess)

Melanie A. Engh-Liska, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Doris Anita Seward)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Taylor Lars Florin-Clemants is the adult grandson of respondent Doris
Anita Seward, who is a person subject to guardianship. Seward’s guardian and daughter,
respondent Judith Yess, imposed restrictions on Florin- Clemants’s contact with Seward
and the assisted-living facility where Seward lived. On a petition by Florin-Clemants, the
district court modified the guardian’s restrictions, permitting Florin- Clemants to visit his
grandmother on weekdays during set hours, prohibiting him from asking facility staff about
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his grandmother’s care, and prohibiting him from initiating phone calls to his grandmother
or the facility. Florin-Clemants challenges the modified restrictions. We affirm.
FACTS
This is Florin- Clemants’s third appeal to this court in connection with his
grandmother’s guardianship. See In re Guardianship of Seward, No. A23-0533, 2024 WL
3093501, at *1 (Minn. App. June 24, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2024); Seward v.
Florin-Clemants, No. A23-1445, 2024 WL 2890843, at *1 (Minn. App. June 10, 2024),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2024). Regarding the dispute at issue in this appeal, the
following facts are relevant.
Seward is a 93-year -old woman with advanced neurological disease. Between
approximately 2019 and July 2022, Florin-Clemants resided in Seward’s home, where he
provided her with in-home care as her medical condition progressed. At one point during
that period, when Seward had surgery and spent about two months in a care facility,
Florin-Clemants was appointed Seward’s limited emergency guardian. In June 2022,
following the expiration of his appointment as emergency guardian, Florin-Clemants and
Yess entered into a stipulation that Yess would serve as Seward’s guardian, and the district
court entered an order appointing Yess as guardian.
On July 19, 2022, Yess moved Seward from her residence to an assisted-living
facility. Nine days later, Yess filed a notice restricting Florin- Clemants’s visiting hours
with Seward to business hours when administrative staff were available, on the ground that
Seward was interfering with care staff and jeopardizing Seward’s care and continued
residence at the facility.
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On June 26, 2023, Yess filed another notice restricting Florin-Clemants’s visits with
Seward. The new restrictions fully prohibited Florin-Clemants from visiting Seward at the
facility and from communicating by telephone with Seward or facility staff. In the notice,
Yess stated that she believed the restrictions were “necessary because . . . Florin-Clemants
poses a significant risk to [Seward’s] physical, psychological, and financial security” and
that “no other means” existed to avoid that risk of harm.
Three days after Yess filed the notice, Florin-Clemants filed a petition with the
district court to remove or modify the restrictions. In October, the district court held a trial
on Florin-Clemants’s petition. Florin-Clemants testified in support of his petition. He
described his concerns with Seward’s level of care at the assisted-living facility and his
interactions with facility staff.
In opposition to the petition, Yess testified regarding her decision to impose
restrictions. She stated that, on multiple occasions, when Florin-Clemants was told by staff
that he could not enter the facility late in the evening because Seward was sleeping, he
snuck into the facility and went to her room anyway; that he “intimidated and interrogated”
facility staff “on a regular basis”; and that he videotaped and took pictures at the facility.
Yess also testified about a residential meeting at which Florin- Clemants displayed
“uncalled for” “body language, . . . tone of voice, [and] . . . aggressive attitude” toward the
facility’s group leaders. Yess stated that “the last straw” was when group leaders said that
they would not attend future residential meetings if Florin-Clemants were there; Yess then
decided it was necessary to place restrictions on Florin-Clemants.
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Yess also called as witnesses the executive director of the assisted- living facility
and a family member named S.A. The executive director testified about her interactions
with Florin-Clemants, her concerns that his behaviors at the facility were “inappropriate,”
and the fears that facility staff had expressed to her related to Florin-Clemants’s visits. She
also testified that she believed lesser restrictions could be imposed if Florin-Clemants could
“follow parameters” related to the relationship between staff and Seward. On cross-
examination, she stated that she had “never restricted a visitor in [her] entire tenure” at the
facility. The family member S.A. , who is a retired physical therapist, testified regarding
her visits with Seward. She testified that Seward was receiving quality care and was “doing
great” at the facility. She said that the restrictions imposed on Florin-Clemants’s visits had
caused no negative effect on Seward and that staff were “perhaps more relaxed.” S.A. also
testified that she regularly avoided Florin- Clemants when he visited Seward because his
unpredictability and anger “makes [her] uncomfortable.”
Following trial, the district court filed an order granting, to some extent,
Florin-Clemants’s petition to modify the restrictions on his visits with Seward. In the order,
the district court concluded that Yess had not abused her discretion as Seward’ s guardian
by imposing a total restriction on Florin- Clemants’s visit s because she had “acted
appropriately to take measures to keep [Seward] safe.” The district court concluded that
the evidence proved that Florin-Clemants posed a “risk of significant harm” to Seward,
specifically because Florin-Clemants’s “unpredictable and threatening behavior” impacted
other visitors, which may have prevented Seward from being able to “freely engage with
other loved ones, family members, or friends.” But the district court determined that the
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risks posed by Florin- Clemants’s behavior could be mitigated by allowing him to visit
Seward during “peak business hours when supervisory staff is present” and by informing
Seward’s friends and family of the hours that Florin-Clemants would be permitted to visit.
It ordered that Florin- Clemants be allowed to visit Seward at the facility on weekdays
between 2 and 4 p.m. (The district court later modified the timeframe of Florin-Clemants’s
permitted visits to weekdays between 10 a.m. and 12 p.m. in response to a request
submitted by Yess, which was unobjected to by Florin- Clemants.) The district court also
prohibited Florin- Clemants from asking staff questions about Seward’s care, and it
continued the total restriction on his phone calls to the facility.
Florin-Clemants appeals.
DECISION
“We review a district court’s determination of the terms of a guardianship for an
abuse of discretion.” In re Guardianship of O’Brien, 847 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn. App.
2014). The district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not
supported by the evidence, misapplies the law, or decides the case in a manner that is
contrary to logic and the facts in the record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506
(Minn. 2022). We review questions of law de novo, including questions of statutory
interpretation and the district court’s application of law. See In re Guardianship of Wells,
733 N.W.2d 506, 509 ( Minn. App. 2007) (regarding statutory interpretation), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 18, 2007) ; Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568
(Minn. 2016) (regarding application of law). We review a district court’s factual findings
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for clear error. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; In re Guardianship of Pates, 823 N.W.2d 881, 885
(Minn. App. 2012).
I. The district court did not err in its application of guardianship law.

Florin-Clemants, who is self-represented, argues that the district court erred in its
application of guardianship law. We discern two arguments from his brief.
First, Florin-Clemants argues that the district court’s “leniency towards [the
guardian’s] actions contradicts statutes meant to safeguard vulnerable adults’ rights,” citing
Minnesota Statutes section 524.5-313 (2024). That section describes the powers and duties
that a district court may grant a guardian. Minn. Stat § 524.5-313. The district court may
grant these powers and duties as “necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the
person subject to guardianship.” Id. (b). But the statute limits when a guardian may place
restrictions on the civil rights and personal freedoms of a person subject to guardianship:
A guardian may not restrict the ability of the person subject to
guardianship to communicate, visit, or interact with others,
including receiving visitors or making or receiving telephone
calls, . . . unless the guardian has good cause to believe
restriction is necessary because interaction with the person
poses a risk of significant physical, psychological, or financial
harm to the person subject to guardianship, and there is no
other means to avoid such significant harm.

Id. (c)(6). Florin-Clemants argues that the district court misapplied this subdivision. We
disagree.
In the order granting Florin-Clemants’s petition to modify restrictions, the district
court—citing section 524.5-313—determined that “there was clear and convincing
evidence that . . . Florin-Clemants posed a risk of significant physical and psychological
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harm to [Seward]” at the time that Yess imposed restrictions on Florin-Clemants’s visits
and communications. The district court also determined that, based on the evidence in the
record, Yess took appropriate measures to keep Seward safe and that the restrictions “were
necessary to prevent a risk of significant . . . psychological harm to [Seward]” because
“Florin-Clemants posed a risk to [Seward’s] well-being due to his escalating behavior.”
The district court further determined that “lesser restrictions should be attempted,
as it appears there are other means to avoid risk of significant harm,” partly based on the
testimony of the assisted-living facility’s executive director. The district court stated that
modifying the guardian-imposed restrictions to limit the timeframe of Florin- Clemants’s
visits “would mitigate any significant risk of harm,” so long as family and friends were
made aware of his visitation hours and those hours took place “during peak business hours
when supervisory staff is present.” Citing Minnesota Statutes section 524.5-317 (2024),
which authorizes the district court to “make any . . . order that is in the best interests of the
person subject to guardianship,” the district court modified the restrictions on
Florin-Clemants’s visits, permitting him to visit Seward every weekday within a two-hour
timeframe during the facility’s business hours.
In sum, the district court determined that, based on the evidence, there was good
cause for Yess’s belief that the restrictions imposed were necessary at the time they were
made and that less-restrictive means were appropriate to avoid a risk of future harm. The
district court modified the restrictions accordingly. See Minn. Stat. §§ 524.5-313(c)(6),
.5-317(b). The district court did not misapply section 524.5-313, subd. (c)(6).
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Second, Florin-Clemants argues that the district court misapplied guardianship law
when it “fail ed to consider relevant provisions in the bill of rights of persons subject to
guardianship.” See Minn. Stat. § 524.5 -120 (2024). He argues that the district court
“wrongly penalized him” for actions that he took “to respect and protect” the rights
guaranteed to Seward under section 524.5-120.
Section 524.5-120 guarantees the rights of a person subject to guardianship. It
provides that a person subject to guardianship “retains all rights not restricted by court
order.” Id. These rights include the right to “communicate, visit, or interact with others.”
Id. (10). But the statute provides that, if a guardian “has good cause to believe restriction
is necessary because interaction with the person poses a risk of significant physical,
psychological, or financial harm to the person subject to guardianship, and there is no other
means to avoid the significant harm,” the guardian may restrict these rights. Id. If a
guardian determines that the only means to avoid a risk of significant harm is by imposing
restrictions, section 524.5-120(10) requires the guardian to give written notice of those
restrictions “to the court, to the person subject to guardianship, and to the person subject to
restrictions.”
Though the district court’s order modifying restrictions does not expressly address
section 524.5-120, the order demonstrates compliance with that statute. As noted above,
the district court applied Minnesota Statutes section 524.5-313(c)(6) in the modification
order. That section provides that a guardian who “has good cause to believe restriction is
necessary because interaction with the person poses a risk of significant physical,
psychological, or financial harm to the person subject to guardianship” may impose
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restrictions when “there is no other means to avoid such significant harm.” Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-313(c)(6). This language from section 524.5- 313 parallels the language in the
relevant provision of section 524.5-120. For the same reason that the district court did not
misapply section 524.5-313(c)(6), it did not misapply section 524.5-120.
II. The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous.

Florin-Clemants generally challenges the district court’s factual findings, arguing
that they are improperly “partial[]” to Yess . But Florin-Clemants seems to specifically
challenge the district court’s findings in support of its determination that Florin -Clemants
poses a risk of harm to Seward, arguing that the evidence in the record was insufficient to
support that determination.
When reviewing district court findings for clear error, appellate courts must “view
the evidence in a light favorable to the findings.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963
N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts must not make
independent factual findings, reweigh the evidence, or reconcile conflicting evidence. Id.
If “the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the
record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findi ngs to the contrary.”
Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). Appellate courts defer to the fact-finder’s determinations of
witness credibility. See Pates, 823 N.W.2d at 885.
Here, the district court based its findings about the risk of harm posed by
Florin-Clemants to Seward on witness testimony and exhibits at trial. The district court
cited the testimony of the assisted-living facility’s executive director regarding
Florin-Clemants’s “bizarre” behavior during visits with Seward, including his filming of
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staff and residents, his “demanding and verbally aggressive” behavior, and his threats to
subpoena staff members. The district court found that the executive director’s testimony
was “both credible and persuasive.” The district court also cite d two exhibits—past
correspondence from Florin-Clemants to his grandmother —in which Florin-Clemants
expressed how frustrated and angry he becomes when Seward asks him repeated questions.
In one of those letters, he wrote, “I fear that if you are unable to comply with my wishes I
will get angry, mad, frustrated and will yell and scream.” The district court determined that
“this behavior makes him an unsafe person to be allowed to visit with [Seward].” The
record amply supports the district court’s findings that Florin -Clemants poses a risk to
Seward’s safety.
III. The district court did not a buse its discretion by deciding not to lift all
restrictions on Florin-Clemants’s visitation and communication with Seward.

Florin-Clemants argues that, because he did not cause actual harm to Seward, the
district court should have lifted all restrictions that Yess placed on his visits with Seward .
He also argues that the district court abused its discretion by making “illogical findings”
that are unsupported by the evidence.
A district court abuses its discretion by misapplying the law, making factual findings
that are unsupported by the record, or resolving the matter in a way that is contrary to logic
and the facts in the record. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506.
Florin-Clemants appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion because
section 524.5-313(c)(6) requires a guardian to first determine that a person actually caused
harm to a person subject to guardianship before the guardian may impose restrictions on
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that person’s visits or communications with the person subject to guardianship. But the
plain language of the section provides that, to impose restrictions, a guardian must have
good cause to believe restriction is necessary because the person poses “a risk of significant
. . . harm.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(6) (emphasis added). The district court correctly
interpreted the statute , as demonstrated by its determination that “there was clear and
convincing evidence that . . . Florin-Clemants posed a risk of significant . . . harm” to
Seward.
Florin-Clemants also argues that the district court lacked “substantial material
evidence” to demonstrate that he harmed Seward and that the district court found that he
did not cause Seward the harm of which Yess accused him. But, again, the district court
was not required to find that Florin-Clemants actually caused harm to Seward; instead, it
was required to make findings to support its determination that the guardian had good cause
to believe that he posed a risk of causing significant harm to her. And, as explained in the
previous section, the district court’s factual findings regarding the risk of harm that
Florin-Clemants posed to Seward are supported by the record.
Finally, though Seward characterizes the district court’s factual findings as
“illogical,” he fails to persuade us that the district court decided this matter in a manner
contrary to logic or the facts in the record.
Because the district court properly interpreted and applied the law, made findings
that are supported by the record, and did not decide the matter in a manner that is contrary
to logic or the facts in the record, it did not abuse its discretion.
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IV. We do not reach Florin-Clemants’s statutory and constitutional arguments
raised for the first time on appeal.

Florin-Clemants raises on appeal five statutory and constitutional arguments that
were not raised in his petition before the district court. He argues that the district court
misapplied or misinterpreted (1) Minnesota Statutes section 144.6512 (2024), regarding
retaliation for the good-faith reporting of a complaint regarding nursing-home conditions;
(2) the Minnesota Vulnerable Adults Act—specifically, the definitions section found at
Minnesota Statutes section 626.5572 (2024); (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act, at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2018 & Supp. IV 2022); (4) a federal law regarding conspiracies
against rights, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2018); and (5) the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). Based on our review of
the record, we determine that Florin-Clemants did not raise any of the five arguments that
are noted above and that, as a result, he failed to properly preserve those arguments for
appeal. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that Florin- Clemants forfeited these arguments
and we decline to address them.
Affirmed.