In re the Custody of: O. J. M.-P.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1975

In re the Custody of: O. J. M.-P.

Filed September 30, 2024
Remanded
Harris, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-FA-22-1991

Anthony Toepfer, Waite Park, Minnesota (attorney for appellants Carmen and Charles B.
McCoy)

Blake D. Lubinus, Ed Shaw Law, Brainerd, Minnesota (attorney for respondents Charles
M. and Donna McCoy)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this third-party custody action, appellants argue that the district court abused its
discretion because the district court’s findings do not support its determination to award
sole physical and sole legal custody to respondents. While the district court made findings
of fact on each statutory best-interest factor, the findings do not explain how each factor

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
led the district court to its determination and are not sufficient to permit appellate review,
and therefore, we remand for additional findings.
FACTS
The facts are not disputed. 1 Appellants Carmen and Charles B. McCoy (aunt and
uncle) challenge the district court’s third- party custody determination, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion by awarding sole legal and sole physical custody to
respondents Charles M. and Donna McCoy (grandparents).
This case arises from respondents’ third -party custody petition seeking sole legal
and sole physical custody of their grandchild, O.J.M. -P., following the death of their
daughter, the child’s mother. The child was four-and-one-half years old at the time of the
custody hearing. The child’s father never had custody of the child and was incarcerated at
the time of the custody hearing. The child’s mother was diagnosed with cancer shortly
after the child was born. As her health deteriorated, mother made plans for the custody of
the child in the event of her passing. Mother executed a last will and testament. The will
nominated mother’s husband, the child’s stepfather, as the child’s guardian and
conservator, in the event of mother’s death. If stepfather was not able to serve as the child’s
guardian, mother nominated appellants. The child had a close relationship with her
stepfather and referred to him as “dad.” Mother was also actively seeking a termination of
father’s parental rights, so that the child could be adopted by the stepfather.

1 Appellants did not order a transcript from the evidentiary hearing. The facts recited here
are derived from the record, exhibits, and the district court’s findings of fact in its order,
filed November 9, 2023.
3
Mother passed away in June 2022. Appellants did not take any action to become
the child’s guardians under the will because they were under the impression that
respondents were working with an attorney to have the stepfather awarded guardianship of
the child. Respondents sought custody of the child without informing appellants or others.
In November 2022, respondents petitioned for third-party custody. Following an ex parte
motion, the district court awarded respondents temporary sole legal and temporary sole
physical custody of child. Then, respondents invited extended family members out to
dinner and announced they had obtained custody of the child and would take the child from
stepfather if they had to do so.
In May 2023, appellants filed a motion to intervene, and respondents filed a
responsive motion in opposition. The district court granted the motion to intervene. The
parties could not resolve the dispute via mediation and the matter proceeded to an
evidentiary hearing. During a two- day evidentiary hearing, the district court heard
testimony from several witnesses, including appellants, respondents, and several of the
child’s family and community members. Father was self-represented and did not testify.
The parties submitted written proposed orders and the district court took the matter under
advisement. The district court filed a written order granting sole legal and physical custody
of the child to respondents. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Generally, the district court has broad discretion in resolving third- party custody
disputes. In re Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Minn. 2002). Minnesota Statutes
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chapter 257C outlines the procedure generally used for third-party custody actions. To
establish that they were interested third parties, the parties had the burden to:
(1) show by clear and convincing evidence that one of the
following factors exist:
(i) the parent has abandoned, neglected, or otherwise
exhibited disregard for the child’s well- being to the
extent that the child will be harmed by living with the
parent;
(ii) placement of the child with the individual takes
priority over preserving the day-to -day parent-child
relationship because of the presence of physical or
emotional danger to the child, or both; or
(iii) other extraordinary circumstances;

(2) prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the
best interests of the child to be in the custody of the interested
third party; and

(3) show by clear and convincing evidence that granting the
petition would not violate section 518.179.

Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(a) (2022) (emphasis added).
When determin ing an interested third-party’s petition, the district court must
consider eight factors, including the “presence or involvement of other interested third
parties.” Id., subd. 7(b) (2022).2

2 Here, the district court determined that both parties established by clear and convincing
evidence that they are interested third parties and that granting relief to either party would
not violate section 518.179. See Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(a) (outlining requirements
petitioner must establish to meet petitioner’s burden of proof) . On appeal, neither party
disagrees with this determination or the district court’s findings. The parties disagree
whether the district court’s findings are sufficient to support its determination to award sole
legal and sole physical custody to respondents.
5
If two or more parties seek custody of a child, the district court must consider and
evaluate all relevant factors to determine the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat.
§ 257C.04, subd. 1(a) (2022). The district court must consider:
(1) the wishes of the party or parties as to custody;
(2) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preference;
(3) the child’s primary caretaker;
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each party
and the child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with
a party or parties, siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child’s best interests;
(6) the child’s adjustment to home, school, and
community;
(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity;
(8) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home;
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved . . . ;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give
the child love, affection, and guidance, and to continue
educating and raising the child in the child’s culture and
religion or creed, if any;
(11) the child’s cultural background; and
(12) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser,
if related to domestic abuse . . . that has occurred between the
parents or the parties.

Id.
The district court “must make detailed findings on each of the [best-interests] factors
and explain how the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination of the best
interests of the child.” Id., subd. 1(b) (2022). And the district court “may not use one
factor to the exclusion of all others.” Id.
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A. The district court failed to sufficiently explain the connection between
its findings of fact and its conclusions of law necessary to allow for
meaningful appellate review.

Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law
because the district court relied on one best-interests factor to the exclusion of all others
and the findings of fact “so overwhelmingly favor [appellants’] position that no reasonable
person could have applied the facts to the best interests factors and yielded the same result
as the [district] [c]ourt .” We do not conclude that the only way to interpret the district
court’s findings is to award custody to appellants. However, due to the district court’s
multiple conflicting findings, we are unable to determine why the district court made its
custody determination, and thus whether it abused its discretion.
For meaningful appellate review, “it is especially important that the basis for the
[district] court’s decision be set forth with a high degree of particularity.” Wallin v. Wallin,
187 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Minn. 1971). The district court must explain both its decision and
why it made its decision to “(1) assure consideration of the statutory factors by the family
court; (2) facilitate appellate review of the family court’s custody decision; and (3) satisfy
the parties that this important decision was carefully and fairly considered by the family
court.” Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976).
Here, the district court determined “that the best interest and other factors tip slightly
in favor of [respondents].” The district court reasoned that, “[respondents’] home and the
family who frequently visit the home will provide [the child] with the most satisfactory
environment.” In reaching its decision, the district court made findings on all best-interests
7
factors, but did not expressly weigh each factor. 3 We recognize that a district court’s
findings of fact regarding credibility and other matters can be implicit. See Pechovnik v.
Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that district court’s findings
“implicitly indicate[d]” it found certain evidence credible); Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d
698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that “[w]e may treat statutory factors as addressed
when they are implicit in the findings”). However, “an order does not permit meaningful
appellate review if it does not identify the facts that the district court has determined to be
true and the facts on which the district court’s decision is based.” In re Civ. Commitment
of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App. 2014).
Because the district court made several findings inconsistent with awarding sole
legal custody and sole physical custody to respondents and did not adequately describe the
facts on which its decision is based, we are unable to address whether the district court
abused its discretion. For example, the district court found that the child is part of a large,
extended family, that respondents often have members of the extended family over to their
house, and that it is not in the child’s best interests for her time with appellants to be limited.
However, it also found that respondents have not facilitated or prioritized the child’s
continued relationship with appellants and her cousin, and that appellants would be more
likely to facilitate the child’s relationship with respondents and stepfather.

3 For factor seven, the district court did expressly determine that “[the child’s] familiarity
with and comfort in [respondents’] home weighs heavily in favor of maintaining this living
environment.” Minn. Stat. § 257C.04, subd. 1(a)(7).
8
The district court found that appellants have not been actively engaging with the
extended family for some time due to concerns about respondents permitting two family
members, who are convicted sex offenders, to frequently be around children at
respondents’ home.4 The district court found that, “[respondents’] casual attitude toward[]
the risk these persons pose to children is a concern.” It further found that “the incongruity
between the [respondents’] willingness to permit members of the extended family who are
sex offenders to be around child and the [respondents’] hostility towards [appellants]
because [appellants] are defying [respondents] by seeking custody of [the child] and
deviating from the familial norm by not having the child around the sex offenders is an
additional concern.” The district court further found that respondents and other members
of the extended family talk about this custody dispute in the child’s presence, which is not
in the child’s best interest. Yet, the district court did not explain or weigh these concerns
against awarding custody to respondents.
We also note that the district court suggested multiple times in its order that either
party could meet the child’s needs. The district court found that the child has a close,
connected relationship with both parties; both parties are part of a large extended family;
both parties are in favor of the child not attending public school; both parties are able to
provide the child with a stable, satisfactory environment and either home would be
beneficial to the child ; both homes are likely to undergo significant changes over time;

4 The district court made a finding of fact that the sex-offender relative was not permitted
to be around minors unless the contact is approved by his probation agent and that the sex
offender relative’s victims were a niece and nephew of respondent (grandmother) who
were approximately the same age as O.J.M.-P.
9
both parties are “capable and disposed to giving [the child] love, affection and guidance
and to continue raising her appropriately”; and that the parties reside on adjacent properties.
And other findings seem to suggest that joint custody would be in the child’s best
interest, either now or in the future. For example, for factor 3 —the child’s primary
caretaker—the district court found “[the child] does not have a primary caretaker. She has
a large extended family of people who love her and care for her. Her caretakers include
[respondents] as well as [appellants]. This collaborative care is in [the child’s] best
interest.” (Emphasis added.) And the district court decided,
It is important that both the home and family, including Uncle
and Aunt, be a source of stability for [child]. The sense of
safety and security that comes with maintaining this continuity
is particularly important for [child] given what she has gone
through. This specifically means [child] should be free to
spend substantial time at Uncle and Aunt’s home. It is not in
[child’s] best interests for her time with Uncle, Aunt and
[cousin] to be limited to weekend family gatherings reasonably
deemed unsafe by Uncle and Aunt.

Yet, the district court did not analyze the joint-custody factors or award any custody or
parenting time to appellants. See Minn. Stat. § 257C.04, subd. 2 (2022) (stating factors the
district court must consider when joint custody is sought, and that “if the court awards joint
legal or physical custody over the objection of a party, the court must make detailed
findings on each of the factors”). Accordingly, given these conflicting findings and the
limited explanation for awarding custody to respondents, we are unable to understand why
the district court determined that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding
10
custody to respondents or whether the district court abused its discretion by using factor
seven5 to the exclusion of all others.
Because the district court’s order fails to sufficiently explain the connection between
its findings and its conclusions, a remand is necessary to allow for meaningful appellate
review.
B. Appellants met their burden to obtain appellate relief.
We also conclude that appellants met their burden to obtain relief on appeal.
Generally, to obtain relief on appeal, a complaining party must show that the district court
erred, that the complaining party was prejudiced by the error, and that the prejudice to the
complaining party arising from the error was substantial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring
harmless error to be ignored); Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008).
A lack of particularized findings prejudiced appellants because it limits their ability to
“facilitate appellate review of the family court’s custody decision,” and be satisfied that
“this important decision was carefully and fairly considered by the family court.”
Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d at 171.
The lack of particularized findings in this instance results in substantial prejudice
because this order may be subject to modification in the future. Here, the district court

5 Factor seven is “the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.” Minn. Stat. § 257C.04, subd. 1(a)(7). The
district court determined that the child has resided with respondents for a significant portion
of her young life and that respondents will provide the child with the most satisfactory
environment. But because the district court did not tie any additional findings of fact to its
custody determination, we are unable to conclude whether the district court abused its
discretion. See Wallin , 187 N.W.2d at 631 (stating that “a change of custody involving
small children will be disruptive to some degree in almost all cases”).
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stated, “[e]ven more helpful for [the child’s] development would be if the parties could,
after the conclusion of this litigation, work to repair their relationship so that [the child]
can establish and maintain a strong and consistent relationship with both parties.” And
“[i]f the family can repair the rift created by the present dispute, either home would be an
excellent environment in which to raise [the child].” In a custody modification, the burden
is on the movant to “establish on a preliminary basis that there has occurred a significant
change of circumstances from the time when the original or amended custody order was
issued.” Spanier v. Spanier, 852 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Minn. App. 2014). To adequately
evaluate a claim of changed circumstances, there must be a sufficiently detailed
understanding of why the district court initially found that the best interests of the child
favored respondents. See Maschoff v. Leiding, 696 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Minn. App. 2005)
(stating in the child-support context that “[u]nless a support order provides a baseline for
future modification motions by reciting the parties’ then-existing circumstances, the
litigation of a later motion to modify that order becomes unnecessarily complicated
because it requires the parties to litigate not only their circumstances at the time of the
motion, but also their circumstances at the time of the order sought to be modified”).
In sum, we are unable to determine from the district court’s order why it awarded
sole legal and sole physical custody to respondents. “If there are inconsistent facts or
testimony in the record, as in this case, such an explanation is particularly important.”
Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 811. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the district court to
make detailed findings. See id. (stating that remand is required when a district court fails
to sufficiently explain the connection between its findings and its conclusions).
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Furthermore, the district court must explain how each best-interests factor led to its
determination. W e recognize that the district court is in the best position to review the
evidence and make credibility determinations when deciding this difficult case, and the
district court has discretion to determine whether it is necessary to reopen the record upon
remand.
Remanded.