In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1979

In re the Marriage of:

Jacob Juta, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Fte-Hudani Achinge,
Respondent.

Filed August 26, 2024
Affirmed; motions granted
Frisch, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-21-4909

Gary A. Debele, Sydnie M. Peterson, Messerli & Kramer, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Danielle DiFiore, Anderson DiFiore, PLLC, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Following the district court’s judgment and decree dissolving the parties’ marriage,
appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) awarding respondent
temporary spousal maintenance, (2) determining that an asset was marital property, and
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(3) awarding respondent need-based attorney fees. Respondent also moves for attorney
fees incurred in this appeal. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in its
judgment and decree, we affirm. And we grant respondent’s motions for attorney fees.
FACTS
Appellant Jacob Juta and respondent Fte-Hudani Achinge were married in Nigeria
in October 2014. The y have three minor children. In August 2021, Juta petitioned for
dissolution of the marriage. In 2023, the dissolution case was tried before a referee over
ten days. The parties agreed on custody and parenting time, and their agreement was
approved by the district court. The disputed issues at trial included spousal maintenance,
division of property, and attorney fees. At trial, both parties testified and submitted
documentary evidence about their marriage, assets, income, and living expenses.
In 2014, shortly after the parties married, Achinge moved to the United States from
Nigeria on an F1 student visa. The parties lived in Iowa where Juta was a surgical fellow.
Achinge had a bachelor’s degree from an institution in Nigeria. She testified that upon
moving to Iowa, she was largely dependent on Juta to meet her needs as she could not work
full-time while on a student visa, and she did not have independent income or
transportation. While in Iowa, Achinge pursued prerequisite courses to enter a nursing
program. But when the parties moved to Minnesota, she enrolled in a new program. In
2017, Achinge began a licensed practical nurse (LPN) program. Juta did not support
Achinge’s educational pursuits and did not pay her tuition after he learned that she enrolled
in the LPN program. Achinge did not attend school during the spring 2017 semester after
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the parties’ first child was born. She returned to school that fall and graduated from her
LPN program in June 2018.
In summer 2020, Achinge began a bachelor of science in nursing (BSN) program.
The program was virtual at the time due to the COVID -19 pandemic, and she attended
classes from home while also caring for the parties’ children. Achinge received her BSN
degree in summer 2021. At the time of trial, Achinge was enrolled in a postgraduate
program to pursue either a d octor of nursing practice or family nurse practitioner degree.
Achinge was financing her education through student loans, including $27,334 in loans
during the two years of enrollment in the postgraduate program. The district court found
that Achinge’s student-loan debt will increase as she completes her postgraduate program.
Achinge will likely graduate in summer 2025.
Achinge was intermittently employed during the parties’ marriage. Achinge
testified that she missed work on several occasions to care for the parties’ children.
Because of these attendance issues, Achinge resigned from one position and was
terminated from another. Much of Achinge’s employment history was in pursuit of clinical
requirements for degree programs or to gain admission into other programs. Achinge
testified that one of her positions was “PRN” or “casual” and that she would work primarily
overnight to accommodate the children’s schedules. While working as a registered nurse
(RN), her highest level of education at the time of the trial, Achinge earned an hourly wage
between $32 and $52.
On August 7, 2023, the referee issued a 57 -page recommended judgment and
decree, which was approved by a district court judge. The judgment and decree includes
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findings regarding spousal maintenance, property division, and attorney fees. Relevant to
this appeal, the district court ordered that Juta pay Achinge (1) temporary spousal
maintenance of $8,000 per month for two years, (2) $503,298.30 as an equalization
payment reflecting property and asset division, and (3) attorney fees of $120,765.51.
On August 22, Juta moved to correct clerical mistakes and miscalculations in the
August 7 order. On September 6, Juta moved for amended findings or, in the alternative,
a new trial. Juta’s pertinent requests include to correct a bank-account valuation affecting
the equalizer payment, to vacate its findings and award for spousal maintenance, and to
vacate its award of attorney fees. Following a motion hearing, the district court denied
Juta’s motion to correct clerical mistakes, granted in part his motion for amended findings,
and denied his request for a new trial. The district court amended its findings regarding
the bank-account valuation and reduced the equalizer payment accordingly. The district
court declined to amend its findings regarding Achinge’s need for spousal maintenance
and attorney fees.
In the judgment and decree, the district court made multiple findings of fact
concerning both parties’ income and expenses. The district court found that Juta’s monthly
gross income is $76,607.70 and his reasonable monthly living expenses are $13,520.39.
The district court found that Achinge was unemployed at the time of trial, had an ability to
earn a gross monthly income of approximately $1,375.64, and had reasonable monthly
living expenses of approximately $6,887. Achinge’s approximate monthly living expenses
exceed her approximate imputed income by $5,511.36.
Juta appeals.
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DECISION
On appeal, Juta argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) awarding
Achinge temporary spousal maintenance, (2) determining that Juta failed to meet his
burden to show that certain monies are nonmarital, and (3) awarding Achinge need-based
attorney fees. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Achinge temporary
spousal maintenance.
Juta argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting Achinge’s request
for spousal maintenance for three reasons. He argues that (1) Achinge did not demonstrate
that she needed spousal maintenance, (2) the district court did not make the findings
required by Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2022), 1 to support the amount and duration of
the maintenance award and that the findings the district court did make are not supported
by the record, and (3) the district court improperly based the maintenance award on marital
misconduct. We disagree and address each issue in turn.
We review the district court’s award of spousal maintenance for an abuse of its
broad discretion. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). A district court
abuses its discretion regarding maintenance if it “makes findings unsupported by the

1 Minn. Stat. § 518.552 was amended effective August 1, 2024. 2024 Minn. Laws. ch. 101,
art. 2, §§ 1-8; see Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (2022) (providing that each act “takes effect on
August 1 next following its final enactment, unless a different date is specified in the act”).
We cite to the 2022 version of the statute because it is the version of the statute that was in
effect at the time of the district court’s judgment and decree and order amending the
judgment and decree.
6
evidence,” or “it improperly applies the law.” Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 265
(Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
Achinge needed spousal maintenance under Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 1.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Achinge needed
spousal maintenance. “A party has a need for spousal maintenance if, considering the
standard of living during the marriage, the party is unable to provide for his or her
reasonable expenses through employment income or investment income or a combination
of both.” Backman v. Backman, 990 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1, and Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 251-52 (Minn. 2016)). “A
district court’s determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact and
is not set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn.
App. 2004). And we review the district court’s choice of income-imputation method for
an abuse of discretion. See Butt v. Schmidt, 747 N.W.2d 566, 577 (Minn. 2008) (analyzing
the predecessor statute to Minn. Stat. § 518A.32 (2022)).
Juta argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that Achinge
was, as Juta summarizes, “incapable of self-support considering her marital property
settlement and ability to become gainfully employed.” We are not persuaded for two
reasons.
First, the district court’s findings regarding Achinge’s need for spousal maintenance
are supported by the record. The district court found that Achinge was unemployed, had
an ability to earn a monthly income of approximately $1,375.64, and had reasonable
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monthly living expenses of approximately $6,887. It appears that the district court
determined Achinge’s potential income based on the method set forth in Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.32, subd. 2(3), which authorizes a district court to calculate potential income based
on the amount the party “could earn working 30 hours per week at 100 percent of the
current federal or state minimum wage, whichever is higher .” A district court may also
calculate potential income using “employment potential, recent work history, and
occupational qualifications in light of prevailing job opportunities and earnings levels in
the community.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 2(1). We do not agree with Juta that the
district court abused its discretion in choosing to calculate Achinge’s potential income
without considering her employment potential and history. A district court calculates
potential income using a method “as appropriate.” Id., subd. 2. Although the district court
had information related to Achinge’s prior work history and wages, the district court also
had information about the temporary and uncertain nature of that prior work history. For
example, the record shows that Achinge’s childcare responsibilities significantly affected
her ability to maintain consistent employment, that Achinge’s past employment income
was related to program requirements, and that she was engaged in educational pursuits at
the time of trial. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its
exercise of discretion to choose the appropriate method to calculat e Achinge’s potential
income.
Second, we reject Juta’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
concluding that the property resulting from the parties’ equalization payment eliminated
Achinge’s need for spousal maintenance. We are unaware of any Minnesota authority
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suggesting that a district court abuses its discretion in declining to consider the principal
of an equalization payment in the determination of need for spousal maintenance. See
Honke, 960 N.W.2d at 268 (stating that “a district court cannot require a maintenance-
seeking spouse to invade the principal of their marital property for self-support” (citing
Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 254)).
Achinge’s imputed monthly income as determined by the district court is more than
$5,000 less than her reasonable monthly living expenses. As such, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by concluding that Achinge made a “sufficient showing of need”
for spousal maintenance. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount
and duration of spousal maintenance under Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 2.
Juta argues that even if Achinge demonstrated a need for spousal maintenance, the
district court abused its discretion in determining the amount and duration of the
maintenance award because it failed to make findings regarding the statutory factors set
forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2, and because the findings it made were not supported
by the record.
If the party seeking spousal maintenance has “made a sufficient showing of need,”
a district court will consider “the amount and duration of a maintenance award.” Id. The
award “shall be in amounts and for periods of time, either temporary or permanent, as the
court deems just . . . after considering all relevant factors.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2.
The legislature has identified eight nonexclusive factors for a district court to consider
when setting the amount and duration of spousal maintenance. See id.
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As a threshold matter, Juta failed to raise this argument before the district court and
it is therefore forfeited. See Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A
reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented and considered by the trial court . . . .” (quotation omitted)). In his posttrial
motions, Juta raised no concerns regarding the manner in which the district court
considered, or failed to consider, the subdivision 2 statutory factors. On appeal, Juta argues
that his argument related to the absence of itemized subdivision 2 findings is a “more
refined version” of his posttrial argument. We are not persuaded. While Juta made a broad
assignment of error in his posttrial motions, he may not “obtain review by raising the same
general issue litigated below but under a different theory.” Id.
But even if we were to consider Juta’s argument regarding the quality of the district
court’s findings related to the subdivision 2 factors, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the district court in setting the amount and duration of spousal maintenance. The eight
nonexclusive factors a district court considers in setting the amount and duration of spousal
maintenance are:
(a) the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to the
party, and the party’s ability to meet needs independently,
including the extent to which a provision for support of a child
living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment, and the probability, given the party’s
age and skills, of completing education or training and
becoming fully or partially self-supporting;
(c) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) the duration of the marriage and, in the case of a
homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the
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extent to which any education, skills, or experience have
become outmoded and earning capacity has become
permanently diminished;
(e) the loss of earnings, seniority, retirement benefits, and
other employment opportunities forgone by the spouse seeking
spousal maintenance;
(f) the age, and the physical and emotional condition of
the spouse seeking maintenance;
(g) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet needs while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
(h) the contribution of each party in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in the amount or
value of the marital property, as well as the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker or in furtherance of the other party’s
employment or business.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2.
As Juta argues, we may remand a spousal-maintenance award when a district court
fails to make “[p]articularized findings” that “show that the relevant statutory
considerations have been considered.” Kroening v. Kroening, 390 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Minn.
App. 1986). We agree that such findings are necessary for our review, but we conclude
that the district court’s copious factual findings sufficiently demonstrate that it considered
the relevant factors under subdivision 2.2 And to the extent that the district court’s findings
lack particularity, any such error is harmless because Juta has not satisfied his burden to
demonstrate prejudice. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring a reviewing court to disregard

2 Juta cites to Stevens v. Stevens, in which we remanded a spousal- maintenance award
because the district court “failed to make any of the findings required to support an award.”
501 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. App. 1993). In that case, the district court made none of the
required findings and we concluded that “[e]ven where the record supports the trial court’s
decision, the failure to make specific findings compels a remand.” Id. Unlike the
circumstances in Stevens, here the district court made findings related to each statutory
factor.
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harmless error); Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 175-77 (Minn. App. 2020) (affirming the
district court’s denial of a motion for amended findings on an order modifying spousal
support where the district court made two clearly erroneous findings, but the obligor spouse
did not show that the error was prejudicial).
The district court found that Achinge needed spousal maintenance under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 1, and made significant findings regarding her need of “temporary
financial support” to meet her monthly budget. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a). The
district court also discussed Achinge’s educational pursuits, student-loan debt, and her
inability to support herself at the time of trial, finding that Achinge was likely to graduate
from her program in 2025, and limited the temporary maintenance award to that time
period. See id., subd. 2(b).
The district court also considered the standard of living during the marriage, finding
that “[t]he standard of living during the marriage was comfortable consistent with the
parties’ significant income.” The district court discredited Juta’s characterization of the
parties’ standard of living as “modest working class,” specifically noting that the parties
purchased land, built, and then lived in a custom home with high-end finishes. The district
court found that the parties’ standard of living was “comfortable,” consistent with their
significant income. See id., subd. 2(c). The district court also considered Achinge’s
employment and education history, finding that she faced significant setbacks to
accommodate Juta’s career and provide childcare to the parties’ children. See id.,
subd. 2(e). The district court found that “[Achinge] is in good health.” See id., subd. 2(f).
And the district court considered Juta’s ability to pay the maintenance award, noting that
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Juta “continued to enjoy a high standard of living during the proceedings” and made
“numerous and significant purchases” upwards of $80,000 on a new drone hobby. See id.,
subd. 2(g). Finally, the district court considered Achinge’s contribution as a homemaker
and in furtherance of Juta’s employment, discussing Achinge’s role as “the primary
caretaker for the children” and that she “car[ed] for [Juta] and [Juta’s] needs.” See id.,
subd. 2(h). And, as previously mentioned, the district court noted that these responsibilities
often interfered with Achinge’s education and employment pursuits. See id.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record and sufficient to
demonstrate that it considered each factor set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2. Thus,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount and duration of the
maintenance award.
C. The district court did not improperly base its maintenance award on
Juta’s marital misconduct.
Juta also argues that the district court abused its discretion by improperly basing its
maintenance award on findings reflecting his marital misconduct in contravention of
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (stating that the district court must determine the amount
and duration of a maintenance award “without regard to marital misconduct”). We do not
agree that the district court’s findings regarding the history of the parties’ relationship relate
to the maintenance award. We instead read the district court’s findings regarding Achinge
being left alone, not having access to marital funds, Juta’s view of marital funds as
belonging to him, the effect of Juta’s decisions and actions, the parties’ relocation, and the
need for childcare on Achinge’s educational pursuits and employment, and the finding
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related to Juta’s purchase of drones as relating to his ability to pay maintenance as relevant
under Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a), (e), (g), (h). None of the district court’s findings
regarding marital discord or the relationship resulted in a punitive consideration of
maintenance.3
II. The district court did not err by determining that Juta failed to meet his
burden to show that certain monies are nonmarital.
Juta next argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining he failed
to meet his burden to trace monies that he claims are nonmarital.
Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law which we review
de novo, but we defer to the district court’s underlying findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018). “All property acquired
by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property . . . .” Id. at 302
(quotation omitted). To overcome this presumption, Juta bore the burden of proving by a

3 The caselaw Juta cites regarding improper maintenance awards based on spousal
misconduct does not support his argument that the district court abused its discretion. In
Gales v. Gales, the supreme court reversed a permanent maintenance award that appeared
to be based in part on the district court’ s finding that one spouse “suffered emotional
distress since the time of the separation.” 553 N.W.2d 416, 421 (Minn. 1996). The Gales
court determined that such a finding should not be sufficient “by itself [to] provide the
foundation for a permanent maintenance award.” Id. Here, the court did not discuss any
emotional distress and made significant other findings related to a temporary spousal-
maintenance award. In Martini v. Martini, we affirmed the district court’s denial of a
spousal-maintenance award where the spouse seeking maintenance argued they
“experienced a severe hardship” due to the marriage. No. A14-0500, 2014 WL 7011260,
at *2-3 (Minn. App. Dec. 15, 2014). We concluded that this hardship argument was
unavailing in part because marital misconduct “is not a proper basis for a maintenance
award.” Id. at *2. Neither of these cases are apposite because we do not read the district
court’s order as awarding maintenance based upon stress or hardship associated with the
parties’ separation or misconduct.
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preponderance of the evidence that the property is nonmarital. Id. “For nonmarital
property to maintain its nonmarital status, it must either be kept separate from marital
property or, if commingled with marital property, be readily traceable.” Olsen v. Olsen,
562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). “A spouse seeking to trace an asset to a nonmarital
source is not held to a strict tracing standard, but need only show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the asset was acquired in exchange for nonmarital property.” Doering v.
Doering, 385 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. App. 1986) (quotation omitted).
Juta claimed that $72,000 held in a Bank of America savings account is his
nonmarital property. He argued that the funds were from the sale of his home before the
parties’ marriage and thus nonmarital. The record reflects a balance of $181,393.97 in
another one of Juta’s bank accounts, a Bank of the West account, before the parties were
married. The record also reflects two transfers totaling $72,000 from the Bank of the West
account to a Bank of America checking account in August and September 2015. The record
shows that $77,000 was then transferred from that checking account to a Bank of America
savings account. The Bank of America accounts were the parties’ operating accounts, had
deposits and withdrawals throughout the parties’ marriage, and were used to pay bills. The
record reflects that the balance of the Bank of America savings account balance did not fall
below $72,000 from December 25, 2019, until the day after the initial case management
conference (ICMC) valuation date. The record does not include statements for the Bank
of America savings account between the transfer from the Bank of America checking
account and December 25, 2019. Juta testified that the balance held in the Bank of America
checking account did not drop below $72,000 during the parties’ marriage.
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Juta asserts that, on appeal, we can review documentary evidence in tracing
nonmarital claims without deference to the district court’s findings. But the district court’s
“findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (emphasis added). Regardless of the
type of evidence, we decline to set aside the district court’s findings of fact with regard to
nonmarital assets because they are not clearly erroneous. The documentary evidence in
the record does not demonstrate that the balance of the Bank of America savings account
was always above $72,000. And the only other evidence in support of Juta’s nonmarital
claim was his testimony, which the district court expressly discredited. 4 We defer to the
district court’s credibility determination. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988). Because the evidence did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
$72,000 was nonmarital property, the district court did not err by concluding that Juta failed
to meet his burden and thus denying his nonmarital claim.

4 To the extent that Juta relies on caselaw affirming a district court’s nonmarital property
determination where the award was based only or substantially on a party asserting a
nonmarital claim’s testimony, these cases do not support his argument. See, e.g., Danielson
v. Danielson, 392 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. App. 1986) ( affirming an award of nonmarital
property based largely on testimony); Kottke v. Kottke, 353 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. App.
1984) (same), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1984); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain , 615
N.W.2d 405, 414 (Minn. App. 2000) (same), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). These
cases demonstrate that an award can be supported by the record where it is based only or
substantially on such testimony but do not support Juta’s argument that the district court
erred by declining to reach the same conclusion where it discredited his testimony.
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Achinge’s request
for need-based attorney fees.
Juta argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that Achinge’s
fees were necessary for the good-faith assertion of her rights and that she did not have the
means to pay the fees. The district court awarded Achinge need-based attorney fees under
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022), which states that the court “shall award attorney fees”
if it finds:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith
assertion of the party’s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay
them.

We review a district court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Gully
v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999). Juta does not dispute his ability to pay the
attorney-fee award.
As for Achinge’s need for the fee award in asserting of her rights in good faith under
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1(1), the district court noted the “lengthy and litigious” nature
of the dissolution proceeding. And the district court determined that multiple motion
hearings in the case led to high fees for the parties. These findings are supported by the
record and are not clearly erroneous. Achinge testified that she unsuccessfully sought to
use alternative methods of resolution and that Juta contributed to the length of the
17
proceeding through changes in counsel and changes in positions during negotiations. And
the record reflects that Juta sought several continuances throughout the proceedings.
The district court also found that Juta used and paid for several experts and that he
acknowledged that Achinge could not afford to hire her own expert witnesses based on her
earnings alone. These findings are not clearly erroneous. And Achinge testified that she
could not defend herself in the dissolution matter without Juta’s contribution and could not
hire expert witnesses because she could not afford them.
In considering Achinge’s ability to pay her attorney fees, the district court
determined that Achinge could not pay her fees because her income alone did not cover
her fees. Juta argues that the district court clearly erred in determining that Achinge could
not pay her attorney fees because it erred in calculating her income. As discussed, the
district court did not err in calculating Achinge’s income and resulting need regarding
spousal maintenance. The same is true here . And Juta’s argument that the district court
abused its discretion by not considering the equalization payment in assessing Achinge’s
ability to pay her attorney fees is similarly unavailing because the district court was not
compelled to require Achinge to invade the principal of the payment to pay her attorney.
See Beck v. Kaplan , 566 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. 1997) (affirming award of need- based
attorney fees on the ground that obligee otherwise “would be required to deplete the limited
capital assets available to her” and noting the parties’ “disparate financial circumstances”
supported affirming the maintenance award (quotation omitted)).
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Achinge need-
based attorney fees.
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IV. Achinge’s motions for attorney fees on appeal are granted.
By two separate motions, Achinge seeks $33,532.50 and $7,125, totaling
$40,647.50, in appellate attorney fees. The procedure for motions for appellate attorney
fees is governed by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.05, which provides for applications for
awards of fees “[w] here allowed by law.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.05, subd. 3.
Generally, when a statute provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in district court,
additional fees may be available on appeal for time spent defending the favorable judgment
to avoid dilution of the district court’s award. Hughes v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc., 375 N.W.2d
875, 879 (Minn. App. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 389 N.W.2d
194, 200 (Minn. 1986). Achinge—the prevailing party in district court—spent time
defending the favorable judgment, which we now affirm. An award of appellate attorney
fees is necessary to avoid dilution of the district court’s award.
Juta argues that Achinge’s fees should be reduced by nearly half because she is
claiming “unnecessary fees.” We have scrutinized the itemized request for fees and
conclude that $2,605.50 of the request relate to matters arising in district court or otherwise
unrelated to the appeal. Juta’s arguments regarding the necessity of the remaining fees
lack merit. 5 We therefore grant Achinge’s motion and award appellate attorney fees of
$38,052.
Affirmed; motions granted.

5 As for Juta’s argument that Achinge’s fees represent an unreasonable hourly rate for her
attorney and her attorney’s paralegal, this argument is not well-taken given that Juta’s
counsel stated at oral argument that his hourly rate is nearly $200 greater than the rate
charged by Achinge’s counsel.