A231827 Precedential Considered and decided by the court without oral argument Processed

Joshua Chiazor Ezeka, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent

Minnesota Supreme Court · Filed February 5, 2025

Opinion text

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A23-1827

Hennepin County Gaïtas, J.

Joshua Chiazor Ezeka,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: February 5, 2025
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________

Nico Ratkowski, Ratkowski Law PLLC, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________

SYLLABUS

The district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying appellant’s

petition for postconviction relief because, even if the facts alleged in the postconviction

petition were proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, appellant is conclusively

entitled to no relief.

Affirmed.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

1
OPINION

GAÏTAS, Justice.

In 2018, a Hennepin County jury found Joshua Chiazor Ezeka guilty of first-degree

premeditated murder, first-degree attempted murder, and second-degree assault for killing

Birdell Beeks in the presence of her granddaughter while shooting at a rival gang member.

The district court sentenced Ezeka to life in prison without the possibility of release for the

first-degree murder offense and to consecutive prison terms of 360 months for first-degree

attempted murder and 36 months for second-degree assault. On direct appeal, we affirmed

Ezeka’s convictions but remanded for resentencing on the attempted first-degree murder

offense because the sentence for that offense exceeded the statutory maximum sentence.

After resentencing, Ezeka filed a timely petition for postconviction relief in 2022, and the

district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Ezeka now appeals

the district court’s summary denial of his postconviction petition. Because Ezeka is

conclusively entitled to no relief even if the facts alleged in his postconviction petition were

proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, we affirm.

FACTS

Ezeka received a phone call from F.S., a fellow member of the gang “the Lows,” on

May 26, 2016. F.S. warned Ezeka that a member of “the Highs” gang—D.G.—was driving

near Ezeka’s residence and planned to shoot someone at the home. After receiving this

phone call, Ezeka exited his house and walked to a nearby vacant lot located at an

intersection. Beeks and her teenage granddaughter, both innocent bystanders, were in a

parked van at the same intersection. As D.G.’s car approached the intersection, Ezeka fired

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nine shots from a .380-caliber gun. Beeks was struck and killed by one of those shots.

Ezeka then fled in a vehicle driven by F.S.

Police soon identified Ezeka as a suspect in the shooting. On June 2, 2016, while

Ezeka was in custody for a probation violation, police questioned him after providing a

Miranda warning. Ezeka requested counsel, but the police continued to question him.

Over the course of this interrogation, Ezeka maintained his innocence, and he was

ultimately released from jail.

Months later, police arrested Ezeka for Beeks’s murder. During a second custodial

interrogation on January 23, 2017—and following a Miranda warning and Ezeka’s waiver

of his Miranda rights—Ezeka admitted to receiving the phone call from F.S., leaving his

house with a gun, firing nine bullets toward D.G.’s car, and fleeing the scene.

A grand jury indicted Ezeka for first-degree premeditated murder of Beeks,

Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2016), attempted first-degree premeditated murder of D.G.,

Minn. Stat. § 609.17 (2016), Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1), and second-degree assault of

Beeks’s granddaughter, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016), among other charges.

Ezeka moved to suppress his statements to police, and the district court denied his request

to suppress his post-Miranda statements. The case proceeded to a jury trial.

At trial, Ezeka introduced his January 2017 confession into evidence and waived

his constitutional right to testify. His attorney argued to the jury that the State’s evidence

failed to establish that Ezeka premeditated and intended to kill D.G., and thus, Ezeka was

not guilty of the murder charges.

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The district court instructed the jury regarding all the charged offenses and also

provided an instruction for a lesser-included offense—second-degree unintentional murder

while committing a felony. See Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2016). Following

deliberations, the jury found Ezeka guilty of all charges, including first-degree

premeditated murder for killing Beeks, attempted first-degree premeditated murder as to

D.G., and second-degree assault of the granddaughter. The district court sentenced Ezeka

to life imprisonment without the possibility of release for the first-degree murder

conviction and imposed separate consecutive sentences for the convictions relating to D.G.

and the granddaughter.

On direct appeal to this court, Ezeka made several challenges to his first-degree

murder and attempted first-degree murder convictions. State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393

(Minn. 2020). Ezeka contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the statements he made to the police. Among his challenges to the statements, he

argued that the second police interrogation—in January 2017—violated his right to counsel

under Article I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution, and thus, his resulting confession

was involuntary. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 401–404. Ezeka also argued that the district court

committed plain error in its jury instructions by (1) incorporating elements of aiding and

abetting liability into its instruction on first-degree premeditated murder and (2) failing to

provide the jury with an instruction on the requirement for corroboration of accomplice

testimony. Id. at 407–08.

We affirmed Ezeka’s convictions. Regarding the voluntariness of Ezeka’s January

2017 confession, we held that the Minnesota Constitution provides no greater protection

4
than the United States Constitution, under which “a 14-day break in custody ends the

protection of an individual’s invocation of the right to counsel.” Id. at 403; see Maryland

v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010). Because Ezeka’s confession in January 2017 was

made after a break in custody of more than 14 days, and because there was nothing to

suggest that his will was overborne when he confessed, we affirmed the district court’s

denial of Ezeka’s pretrial motion to suppress. Id. at 403–07. We also concluded that the

errors in the district court’s jury instructions were not plain errors that affected Ezeka’s

substantial rights. Id. at 407–10. However, we reversed and remanded for resentencing on

the attempted first-degree premeditated murder conviction because, as both parties agreed,

the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory maximum sentence for that offense. See id.

at 410.

Ezeka petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review of our

decision. The Court denied his petition. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.

934 (2020).

In 2022, after his resentencing, Ezeka filed a petition for postconviction relief in the

district court and requested an evidentiary hearing. Ezeka’s petition asserted seven primary

claims: (1) the district court committed reversible error when it denied his pretrial motion

to suppress his statements to the police because another provision of the Minnesota

Constitution—Article I, Section 6—is more expansive than the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel under the federal constitution; (2) newly discovered evidence of invidious

discrimination by the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) and the Hennepin County

Attorney’s Office (HCAO) creates an inference that Ezeka was deprived of equal

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protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 2, of the Minnesota Constitution; (3) newly discovered

evidence of prejudicial practices by the MPD and the HCAO revealed that the State

withheld material evidence that was favorable to Ezeka’s defense in violation of his right

to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) the

Minnesota Government Data Practices Act is unconstitutional; (5) the district court plainly

erred by failing to grant Ezeka’s requests at trial for lesser-included-offense instructions

on third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter; (6) trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance of counsel; and (7) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance

of counsel.

The district court rejected each of Ezeka’s claims without holding an evidentiary

hearing. It concluded that, even if the facts alleged in the postconviction petition were

proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, Ezeka’s claims were meritless.

Additionally, it concluded that all claims, except the ineffective-assistance-of-

appellate-counsel claims, were procedurally barred because they were known or should

have been known to Ezeka at the time of his direct appeal and raised during that proceeding.

ANALYSIS

We review a summary denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion and

will not reverse the district court unless it erred in its application of the law or made

factual findings that were clearly erroneous. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422

(Minn. 2018). “Although doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing are

resolved in favor of the petitioner,” a district court may summarily deny the petition

6
without holding an evidentiary hearing when “the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are

legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.” State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585,

602–03 (Minn. 2024) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If, taking the

facts alleged in the light most favorable to the petitioner, the petition and the files and

records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the

[district] court may dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing.” Fox v. State,

913 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Minn. 2018) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024)).

When, as here, a criminal defendant has had a direct appeal, “all claims raised in the

direct appeal and all claims that were known or should have been known but were not

raised in the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 626

(Minn. 2015) (emphasis in original). This principle is often referred to as the Knaffla rule

because it is rooted in our decision in State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).

For unraised claims, there are two exceptions to the Knaffla procedural bar: “(1) if a novel

legal issue is presented; or (2) if the interests of justice require review.” Gilbert v. State,

2 N.W.3d 483, 487 (Minn. 2024).

In Ezeka’s appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, he has abandoned some

of the claims he raised in his postconviction petition, including his constitutional challenge

to the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. See Minn. Stat. ch. 13 (2022). The

claims that remain fall into three categories: (1) legal claims based on alleged new

evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. We consider the claims in each of these categories below.

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A.

In his postconviction petition, Ezeka asserted several claims based on evidence that

was allegedly unavailable to him at the time of his trial and direct appeal. When raised in

a timely filed postconviction petition, newly discovered evidence claims are governed by

the four-prong test announced in Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997).

Caldwell v. State, 976 N.W.2d 131, 138 n.8 (Minn. 2022). To be entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on a timely filed claim of newly discovered evidence, “a petitioner must allege

facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy all four prongs

[of the test announced in] Rainer.” Tichich v. State, 4 N.W.3d 114, 121 (Minn. 2024)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Rainer test, the petitioner

must prove the following:

(1) that the evidence was not known to the defendant or his/her counsel at the
time of trial;
(2) that the evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence
before trial;
(3) that the evidence is not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and
(4) that the evidence would probably produce an acquittal or a more
favorable result.

Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695. A district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the

facts alleged, if true, are legally insufficient to entitle the petitioner to the requested relief.

Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012).

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1.

Ezeka first argues that newly discovered evidence—a Minnesota Department of

Human Rights (MDHR) report, 1 a United States Department of Justice (DOJ) report, 2 a

news article concerning the police killing of an arrestee in an unrelated incident, 3 a law

journal article, 4 filings and decisions from unrelated criminal cases, 5 records concerning

the misconduct of MPD Officer J.N. (a witness at Ezeka’s trial), 6 and Facebook activity by

1
The MDHR report was published on April 27, 2022, and was not available to Ezeka
at trial or at the time of his direct appeal. The MDHR report’s overarching finding was
that “there is probable cause that the City [of Minneapolis] and MPD engage in a pattern or
practice of race discrimination.” It also found that “[p]olice misconduct complaints . . . are
inadequately investigated” and “[a]s a result, officers who have engaged in misconduct are
often not appropriately disciplined.”
2
The DOJ report was published on June 16, 2023, and was not available to Ezeka at
trial or at the time of his direct appeal. The DOJ report found that the MPD “unlawfully
discriminates against Black and Native American people when enforcing the law.”
3
The news article concerning the police killing of arrestee J.C. was published on
March 30, 2016, and was available to Ezeka at the time of his trial and direct appeal.
4
The article from the Minnesota Journal of Law and Inequality was published in
March 2021 and was not available to Ezeka at trial or at the time of his direct appeal.
5
The legal filings and decisions concerning unrelated criminal cases included copies
of complaints, sentencing orders, and news coverage, some of which were not available to
Ezeka at trial or at the time of his direct appeal.
6
The records regarding Officer J.N.’s misconduct were from 2013 and earlier, and
reported that he took Jell-O shots at a bar without paying for them and attempted to abuse
his position as an officer during the same incident. These records existed before Ezeka’s
trial.

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another Minneapolis police officer 7—show that Ezeka was “invidiously discriminated

against by Minneapolis police officers and/or the HCAO during their investigation and

prosecution.” According to Ezeka, this discrimination violated his right to equal protection

under the federal and state constitutions. Ezeka acknowledges that the statistical data

described in the newly discovered evidence is insufficient by itself to establish a

discriminatory purpose under the equal protection clauses of the federal and state

constitutions. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Nunn v. State,

868 N.W.2d 230, 233–34 (Minn. 2015). And Ezeka further acknowledges that none of the

facts alleged in the newly discovered evidence involve conduct that was directed toward

him personally or committed in connection with the police investigation or prosecution of

his case. Nevertheless, Ezeka claims that he had a right to a postconviction evidentiary

hearing where he would have asked the MDHR and DOJ investigators “whether any of the

data leading to their conclusions arose from [Ezeka’s] case files.”

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

the facts alleged in support of Ezeka’s equal protection claim, even if proven by a fair

preponderance of the evidence, failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the Rainer test—which

requires a petitioner to prove that the new evidence would “probably produce an acquittal

7
The submitted evidence was screenshots of Facebook activity by MPD Officer
T.C.—who has no connection to Ezeka’s case—including Officer T.C.’s 2017 comment
regarding a post about Ezeka’s case. This evidence was likely available to Ezeka at the
time of his trial and direct appeal.

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or a more favorable result.” 8 Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695. The new evidence that Ezeka

presented in support of his postconviction petition may show that the MPD engaged in

general discriminatory practices, but none of the information directly concerns Ezeka or

his case. Any general discrimination by the MPD or the HCAO would not have impacted

the result of Ezeka’s trial. Ezeka’s defense at trial was not that he was wrongly targeted

by the police or prosecution. Instead, his defense was that when he shot and killed Beeks,

he did so without premeditation or the intent to kill. Ezeka does not explain how evidence

of general racial discrimination would have affected the jury’s decision regarding his state

of mind at the time of the killing. And although Ezeka’s brief suggests that racial

discrimination by the MPD impacted his decision to confess, he does not allege that his

confession was false or explain how discrimination produced his confession. Thus, even

if the facts alleged in the newly discovered evidence were proven by a preponderance of

the evidence at an evidentiary hearing, they would not produce a more favorable outcome

as required under the Rainer test for new evidence.

8
Ezeka argues that the postconviction court erred in applying the Rainer test for
newly discovered evidence and that we should instead apply the test from State v. Warren.
592 N.W.2d 440, 450 (Minn. 1999) (requiring “(1) that the evidence was not known to [the
defendant], (2) that his failure to learn of it before trial was not due to the lack of diligence,
(3) that the evidence is material * * *, and (4) that the evidence will probably produce
either an acquittal at a retrial or results more favorable to the petitioner” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although Warren uses
different language in identifying the third element of the test, we have stated that the Rainer
and Warren tests are functionally equivalent. See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373,
389 n.6 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that the truncated recitation of the test in Warren “does
not remove ‘not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful’ from what must be proved”).
Moreover, the new evidence that Ezeka presented does not satisfy the fourth element of
Rainer or Warren.

11
As to Ezeka’s claim that he had a right to use a postconviction evidentiary hearing

as a means of deposing the MDHR and DOJ investigators to determine whether there was

information that might cure the acknowledged deficiencies in his equal protection claim,

we have previously held that the postconviction remedy provided under Minnesota statutes

was “not devised . . . to permit a petitioner to embark upon unlimited and undefined

discovery proceedings.” Thompson v. State, 170 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Minn. 1969). In the

absence of any specific allegations that MDHR and DOJ investigators relied on data from

Ezeka’s case files to reach their conclusions, we conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in rejecting Ezeka’s claim that he had a right to use a postconviction

evidentiary hearing to depose the MDHR and DOJ investigators. 9

Furthermore, Ezeka does not clarify the remedy that he seeks for the alleged equal

protection violation. And he cites no authority for the proposition that a new trial is

warranted when there is a general allegation that racial discrimination exists within a police

department or prosecutor’s office.

Because the facts alleged to support Ezeka’s equal protection claim, even if proven

by a preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing, were legally insufficient to

9
Ezeka’s reliance on Bobo, 820 N.W.2d at 519, to argue that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to discover presently unknown evidence is misplaced. In Bobo, the
defendant specifically alleged that an alternative perpetrator had confessed. Id. We held
that the defendant in Bobo was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because there was a
possibility the alternative perpetrator “would confirm his alleged confession at [the]
evidentiary hearing.” Id. (emphasis added).

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satisfy the Rainer test, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ezeka’s

equal protection claim without a hearing. 10

Based largely on the same evidence that Ezeka alleged in support of his equal

protection claim, he argues that the State’s failure to turn over the evidence to the defense

violated his constitutional right to due process. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV (providing a

right to due process in criminal prosecutions). Ezeka’s due process argument relies on the

United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Brady addresses the prosecution’s failure to

turn over exculpatory evidence, holding that suppressing evidence that is “favorable to

an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to

guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

373 U.S. at 87. And in Giglio, the Supreme Court extended the Brady rule to material

evidence that could be used to impeach a witness’s credibility. 405 U.S. at 154.

To establish a Brady due process violation, a defendant must show three

elements: (1) the evidence is “favorable to the defendant because it would have been either

exculpatory or impeaching”; (2) the evidence was “suppressed by the prosecution,

intentionally or otherwise”; and (3) the evidence is “material—in other words, the absence

of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant.” Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d

10
The postconviction court also concluded that Ezeka’s equal protection claim is
barred under the Knaffla rule. Because we conclude that the claim fails on the merits, we
do not address this alternative analysis.

13
213, 216 (Minn. 2010). “Evidence is material ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.’ ” Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2005) (quoting United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is one that is

‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at

682). We consider whether evidence is material under Brady de novo because this issue

presents questions of law and fact. Id.

Ezeka argues that the prosecution’s failure to disclose the discriminatory practices

within the MPD and the HCAO violated Brady. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The district

court concluded that the evidence, even if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence,

was not material. Applying de novo review, we agree with the district court’s

determination.

Even if the jury had known about the alleged general discriminatory practices, there

is no reasonable probability that the outcome of Ezeka’s trial would have been different.

At the trial, Ezeka challenged the State’s evidence of his premeditation and intent to kill

D.G. Beyond purely speculative assertions, Ezeka fails to explain how the evidence of

discriminatory practices would have affected the jury’s consideration of these issues. Thus,

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the evidence of

discriminatory practices—even if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence—was

legally insufficient to satisfy the Brady materiality requirement.

Ezeka also argues that the prosecution should have disclosed the information about

Officer J.N.’s disciplinary violation—taking Jell-O shots without paying and attempting to

14
abuse his position as a police officer at a bar—which Ezeka then could have used to

impeach Officer J.N.’s credibility. 11 According to Ezeka, the prosecution’s failure to

disclose the disciplinary infraction violated his right to due process under the Giglio

decision. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154.

We likewise conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily

denying this claim. The Brady decision applies when the prosecution fails to disclose

impeaching evidence for a witness whose reliability “may well be determinative of guilt or

innocence.” Pederson, 692 N.W.2d at 460 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). To warrant

a new trial under these circumstances, however, the evidence must be “material.” Id.

Impeachment evidence is material when there is “a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed . . . , the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The evidence concerning Officer J.N.’s disciplinary violation may have reflected on

Officer J.N.’s credibility. But it was not material impeachment evidence when considered

in the context of Ezeka’s trial. Officer J.N. testified that he was one of the first officers

called to the scene after Beeks was shot. He told the jury about his observations when he

arrived. And he testified about the statement he took from Beeks’s granddaughter. Ezeka’s

trial defense focused entirely on whether the state’s evidence proved that he acted with

premeditation and intent when he fired a gun at D.G. Officer J.N.’s testimony had no

11
Ezeka also presented various unsubstantiated complaints against police officers and
instances of misconduct that are unrelated to his case. We conclude that the district court
did not err in determining that these complaints would not have been admissible at trial.

15
bearing on Ezeka’s state of mind at the time of the shooting. Thus, there is no reasonable

probability that impeaching Officer J.N.’s testimony with the evidence of his disciplinary

violation would have changed the outcome of Ezeka’s trial. We therefore agree with the

district court that Ezeka’s Giglio claim failed because, even if the facts alleged in the

postconviction petition were proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, they were

legally insufficient to satisfy the materiality element of Brady.

There is no reasonable probability that the new evidence that Ezeka alleged in his

postconviction petition, even if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would have

impacted the outcome of his trial. Accordingly, any failure of the prosecution to disclose

the evidence did not violate Ezeka’s due process rights. We therefore conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily rejecting these claims.

Ezeka’s final claim based on alleged new evidence is that the district court erred at

trial by denying his request for jury instructions on the lesser-included offenses of

third-degree murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) (2016), and second-degree manslaughter,

Minn. Stat. § 609.205, subd. 1 (2016). In support of this claim, Ezeka submitted an

affidavit from one of the jurors who served at his trial. According to the juror’s affidavit,

the jurors were confused about the jury instructions and may have reached a different result

if the district court had provided the lesser-included offense instructions that Ezeka

requested.

The district court correctly determined that the juror’s affidavit did not satisfy the

requirements of newly discovered evidence because it was inadmissible in any proceeding

16
as a matter of law. See Miles v. State, 840 N.W.2d 195, 203 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the

district court properly rejected a claim of newly discovered evidence because the evidence

was substantively inadmissible). We have long held that “a jury’s deliberations must

remain inviolate and its verdict may not be reviewed or set aside on the basis of affidavits

or testimony concerning that which transpired in the course of those deliberations.”

Colbert, 870 N.W.2d at 626; see also State v. Domabyl, 272 N.W.2d 745, 746

(Minn. 1978); State v. Hoskins, 193 N.W.2d 802, 812 (Minn. 1972). The Minnesota Rules

of Evidence bar the admission of juror testimony or affidavits concerning “any matter or

statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations” or “concerning the juror’s

mental processes in connection [with deliberations],” subject to a few exceptions. Minn.

R. Evid. 606(b). None of those exceptions apply to the juror’s statements in the affidavit.

See id. (providing a limited list of exceptions to the general prohibition on juror testimony,

including testimony regarding extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence on

the jury’s deliberations, testimony about threats of violence, evidence that a juror falsely

answered voir dire questions to conceal bias, and testimony concerning errors in notating

a verdict).

Moreover, we agree with the postconviction court that Ezeka cannot now raise a

claim regarding the district court’s denial of his requested jury instructions because this

claim was known to him at the time of his direct appeal. Because Ezeka knew of the claim

when he directly appealed his convictions to this court and failed to raise the claim in his

direct appeal, the claim is now barred. See Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741.

17
Finally, even if we were to consider the merits of Ezeka’s claim that the district

court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the offenses of third-degree murder and

second-degree manslaughter, his claim would fail. That is because, setting aside the

inadmissible affidavit of the individual juror, the record shows that Ezeka was not

prejudiced by the district court’s ruling. A defendant must show that any error in the

court’s failure to give requested instructions caused prejudice. State v. Harris, 713 N.W.2d

844, 850 (Minn. 2006). Given the jury’s guilty verdict for first-degree premeditated

murder, Ezeka cannot make that showing. We have held that, when a jury has found a

defendant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, rather than the lesser-included

offense of second-degree intentional murder, the district court’s failure to instruct on

additional lesser-included offenses for causing the death was not prejudicial. That is

because the jury’s verdict itself—finding that the defendant caused the death with

premeditation and intent while rejecting the theory that the killing was intentional but

without premeditation—demonstrated that the jury would not have found the defendant

guilty of any other lesser-included offenses for causing the death. See State v. Dahlin,

695 N.W.2d 588, 599 (Minn. 2005) (citing cases). Ezeka’s jury was instructed on the

lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder and nonetheless found Ezeka

guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. This verdict shows that the jury found, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that Ezeka premeditated and intended the killing. It also indicates that

the jury would not have found Ezeka guilty of any other lesser-included offenses for the

death that he caused. Thus, the district court’s decision not to instruct on the offenses of

third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter did not prejudice Ezeka.

18
Ezeka’s claim that the district court erred in denying his request for jury instructions

on lesser-included offenses fails as a matter of law because the juror’s affidavit is

inadmissible evidence, the claim is procedurally barred, and the claim lacks merit.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the claim.

Next, we turn to Ezeka’s claims concerning the performance of his trial attorney.

Ezeka contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel without an evidentiary hearing. “[W]e review the denial

of postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo

because such claims involve mixed questions of law and facts.” Sardina-Padilla,

7 N.W.3d at 602.

“[T]o be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the appellant must allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the

evidence, would satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington . . . .” Id.

at 603 (citing 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Under the Strickland test, the petitioner must show “(1) that his counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable

probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” Id.

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If one prong is not met, we need

not consider the other.” Id.

“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an

attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney

19
would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266

(Minn. 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We begin with “a

‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable.” Griffin v.

State, 883 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 2016).

Ezeka argues that his trial counsel provided deficient representation because counsel

failed to argue, in support of his motion to suppress Ezeka’s confession, that the confession

was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article I, Section 6, of the Minnesota Constitution. These constitutional provisions

guarantee the right to counsel during “critical stages” of proceedings after a criminal

prosecution has been initiated. State v. Zaldivar-Proenza, 957 N.W.2d 93, 96–97

(Minn. 2021) (citing Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; U.S. Const. amend. VI); see also State v.

Ronnebaum, 449 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. 1990) (stating that the initiation of the criminal

prosecution is “usually [marked] by the filing of the complaint”). An interrogation

occurring after the complaint has been filed is considered a critical proceeding. State v.

Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 725 (Minn. 2014).

The district court concluded that, even if proven by a fair preponderance of the

evidence, the facts alleged in support of this claim would fail to establish either prong of

the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that Ezeka’s claim fails on the

first prong of Strickland.

In Ezeka’s direct appeal, we determined that he validly waived his right to counsel

under the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution when

20
he made his post-Miranda confession in January 2017. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 403–07.

And we previously have recognized that “the validity of a waiver of the right to counsel

under either the Sixth or Fifth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] is judged by

essentially the same standard.” State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 337 (Minn. 2007) (citing

State v. Kivimaki, 345 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 1984)). Given this precedent, Ezeka has

not shown that, in failing to challenge his January 2017 confession under the Sixth

Amendment and Article I, Section 6, of the Minnesota Constitution, his trial counsel’s

performance was objectively unreasonable. Moreover, Ezeka’s brief offers no principled

basis for us to deviate from our precedent. See State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 690

(Minn. 2015) (outlining bases for deviating from the United States Supreme Court’s

interpretation of the federal constitution in our interpretation of the Minnesota

Constitution). Beyond speculation, Ezeka does not explain how he could have prevailed

in a challenge to his confession under the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 6, of the

Minnesota Constitution.

Ezeka did not allege any facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the

evidence, would show that his trial counsel’s failure to pursue suppression of his confession

under his alternative theory was objectively unreasonable. Thus, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying his postconviction claim on this basis.

When a petitioner fails to establish one prong of the Strickland test, a court need not

consider the other prong. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 603. Because the facts alleged by

Ezeka are legally insufficient to satisfy the performance prong of Strickland, we do not

address the prejudice prong of the test.

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2.

Ezeka also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel

by failing to search for the new evidence that gave rise to the previously discussed

Brady and Giglio due process claims. The district court determined that “[u]nder the

circumstances, a failure to thoroughly investigate various complaints against testifying law

enforcement witnesses was a reasonable exercise of professional judgment.” And it further

determined that “the evidence against Ezeka was so strong that any errors did not prejudice

him.”

We have already determined that none of the new evidence that Ezeka alleges would

have changed the outcome of his trial given Ezeka’s trial theory. Thus, Ezeka cannot

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to discover the evidence. We conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Ezeka’s claim based on trial

counsel’s failure to investigate because Ezeka has not alleged any facts that, if proven by

a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.

Ezeka argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request self-defense

and defense-of-others jury instructions. The district court determined that “Ezeka did not

have the requisite basis to establish a self-defense or defense of others claim,” and therefore

trial counsel’s failure to request the jury instructions did not constitute ineffective

assistance.

To succeed on a self-defense or defense-of-others claim, Ezeka would have had to

establish

22
(1) [t]he absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he [or another]
was in imminent danger of . . . great bodily harm; (3) the existence of
reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the absence of a reasonable
possibility of retreat to avoid the danger. 12

State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 35 (Minn. 2024) (alteration in original) (emphasis

removed) (quoting State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1997)). See Minn. Stat.

§ 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2016).

At Ezeka’s trial, the evidence showed that Ezeka fired nine shots at a moving vehicle

from across an intersection. There was no evidence that any shots were fired toward Ezeka,

his family, or his home. Ezeka was the first and only aggressor in the incident. Given

these factual circumstances, which would not support the affirmative defenses of

self-defense or defense-of-others, it was not objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to

forgo these defenses. And given the trial evidence, these defenses likely would have failed,

even if pursued. Thus, the postconviction court did not err in rejecting Ezeka’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law based on trial counsel’s failure to pursue

these affirmative defenses.

In sum, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Ezeka’s claims

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel failed as a matter of law. The district court did not

abuse its discretion by summarily rejecting these claims without an evidentiary hearing.

12
When acting in defense of another, a defendant does not have a duty to retreat. State
v. Valdez, 12 N.W.3d 191, 198 (Minn. 2024). Instead, the defendant “must subjectively
believe that the person in peril has no reasonable possibility of safe retreat, and that belief
must be objectively reasonable based on the information available to the defendant at the
time that they use force to defend the person in peril.” Id. at 199.

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C.

Finally, Ezeka argued in his postconviction petition that he received ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel because his appellate counsel failed to challenge the

performance of his trial counsel. The district court rejected this argument, determining

that, because Ezeka’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not meritorious,

Ezeka’s appellate counsel reasonably decided not to pursue them, and Ezeka was not

prejudiced by appellate counsel’s decisions regarding those claims. In other words, the

district court determined that the facts alleged by Ezeka, even if proven by a fair

preponderance of the evidence, were legally insufficient to satisfy either Strickland prong.

We agree. “When an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is based on

appellate counsel’s failure to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the

[petitioner] must first show that trial counsel was ineffective.” Fields v. State, 733 N.W.2d

465, 468 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted). Ezeka argues that he “adequately established

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel” and “[t]hus, the court abused its discretion in

holding [he] failed to establish ineffective-assistance-of-appellate counsel.” But we have

determined that Ezeka’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims fail as a matter of

law. Thus, his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel predicated on the

performance of trial counsel likewise fail. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

summarily rejecting those claims. 13

13
Ezeka also argued in his postconviction petition that appellate counsel provided
deficient representation by failing to argue on appeal that the district court erred in denying
his requests for jury instructions on the lesser-included offenses of third-degree murder and

24
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.