State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0014

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dakota Daniel Thorstenson,
Appellant.

Filed December 30, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-22-2488

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
On direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct and kidnapping, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion
by admitting evidence that appellant had previously physically and sexually assaulted
another woman. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2022, respondent State of Minnesota filed a complaint alleging that
appellant Dakota Daniel Thorstenson physically and sexually assaulted L.F . The state
charged Thorstenson with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping to facilitate felony sexual assault, and
third-degree assault . See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.223, subd. 1, .25, subd. 1(2), .342,
subd. 1(c)(ii), .343, subd. 1(c)(ii) (2022). Thorstenson pleaded not guilty, and the case
proceeded to trial.
L.F.’s Trial Testimony
L.F. testified that she met Thorstenson through an online-dating app and learned
they both lived in the Duluth area. The two met up a handful of times and had consensual
sexual intercourse at Thorstenson’s residence in Superior, Wisconsin. In August 2021,
Thorstenson invited L.F. to go bowling with him and some of his friends. L.F. agreed to
join them. Thorstenson picked her up at her residence and drove her to the bowling alley.
At the bowling alley, Thorstenson and his friends ordered shots of alcohol.
Thorstenson, who had been drinking with his friends before picking up L.F., told L.F. that
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he wanted her to take three shots “to match their energy,” but L.F. did not want to drink.
Thorstenson and his friend implored L.F. to take the shots, and L.F. eventually yielded to
their pressure. L.F. consumed more than five shots of alcohol at the bowling alley, enough
to become intoxicated. Thorstenson was also intoxicated.
Around 11:00 p.m., Thorstenson and L.F. left the bowling alley. Once they were in
his car, Thorstenson asked L.F. whether she wanted to go home or to his residence. L.F .
told Thorstenson that she wanted to go home because she had to work in the morning.
Thorstenson and L.F . talked while Thorstenson drove. At some point, Thorstenson
“aggressive[ly]” grabbed L.F. by the back of her neck. Angered, L.F. told Thorstenson
that he was making her feel uncomfortable and he should never touch her like that. In
response, Thorstenson slapped L.F . in the face. L.F . started yelling and Thorstenson
slapped her again. Soon after, Thorstenson’s car struck a fire hydrant on the side of the
road.
Thorstenson pulled his car over, exited, opened the passenger-side door, and pulled
L.F. out of the car, dragging her to the ground beside his car. There, Thorstenson started
punching L.F. in the face and stated that it was her fault that he crashed his car.
Thorstenson then strangled L.F. with both his hands. L.F. could not breathe and began to
lose consciousness. After someone approached Thorstenson’s car with a spotlight,
Thorstenson picked up L.F., placed her back in the vehicle, and drove away. At this point,
L.F. was barely conscious.
As he drove away, Thorstenson unbuckled his pants, grabbed the back of L.F .’s
head, and told her to “come here.” L.F. then unwillingly placed her mouth around
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Thorstenson’s penis. L.F. testified that she did not want to put Thorstenson’s penis in her
mouth, but she was scared and “was just doing what [she] had to do.”
According to L.F., the next thing she remembers is waking up naked in
Thorstenson’s bed the following morning. Thorstenson was sitting on the edge of the bed
with his hands in his face. He told L.F., “I don’t even know why I did that to you. You’re
not even my girlfriend.” According to L.F., Thorstenson was “freaking out” and panicking
“like he [did not] know what [he was] going to do.” L.F . asked Thorstenson if they had
sex. Thorstenson replied yes. Thorstenson then repeatedly told L.F. to shower. L.F .
declined, stating that she had to get to work. Thorstenson told L.F. that was impossible
and that she needed to go to the hospital.
When she sat up, L.F . felt “instant pain” in her shoulder. L.F. looked at her
reflection in a mirror and saw her hair was “ragged” with bald spots, and her “face was
completely swollen” with one eye swollen shut. In addition, her shoulder “didn’t look
normal.”
L.F. texted her sister that she had been “kidnapped and raped.” L.F. told her sister
that she was at Thorstenson’s residence, but that she did not know where he lived. L.F .
shared her location with her sister via an app on her phone. Her sister then contacted the
police.
Law-enforcement officers located Thorstenson’s residence in Superior, Wisconsin.
When Thorstenson’s roommate let the officers in the home, Thorstenson told L.F. to lock
the door to his second-floor bedroom. Police knocked on Thorstenson’s door and
threatened to break the door down. L.F. unlocked the door, and police helped her
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downstairs. After speaking with an officer, L.F . was transported to a hospital in an
ambulance.
Healthcare-Professional Testimony
The jury also heard testimony from the doctor and nurse who treated L.F. in the
emergency room. The doctor testified that, during his examination of L.F., he observed
“contusions about both eyes,” “bruises on her body,” “tenderness in her clavicle,” and
“bleeding under the whites of her eyes.” The doctor also testified that L.F. exhibited
petechiae, which are “tiny hemorrhages from ruptured blood vessels” often seen in
individuals who had been choked or hanged. On cross-examination, Thorstenson’s
attorney asked whether petechiae can be observed in an individual involved in a car
accident. The doctor testified that he had not observed such an injury resulting from a car
accident, but he could not say “that it [is] not possible.”
The nurse testified that she performed a sexual-assault exam on L.F., during which
she collected swabs from L.F.’s vagina for forensic testing. Thorstenson’s attorney asked
the nurse on cross-examination whether petechiae can be caused by both “intentional acts
or unintentional acts.” The nurse answered, “that is correct.”
Forensic-Scientist Testimony
A DNA forensic scientist with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension examined
samples collected from Thorstenson and L.F. The forensic scientist testified that her testing
of L.F.’s vaginal swabs showed “genetic material that’s consistent with semen and . . . this
DNA profile was interpreted as originating from one male individual, . . . [Thorstenson].”
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M.C.’s Testimony
The state’s final witness was Thorstenson’s ex-girlfriend, M.C. Before trial, the
state moved to admit M.C.’s testimony about Thorstenson’s prior abuse against her under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). The state argued that M.C.’s testimony would rebut
any assertion that L.F .’s injuries were caused by the car accident rather than by
Thorstenson’s assaults . The district court determined that M.C.’s testimony was
admissible for that purpose.
At trial, M.C. testified about two occasions when Thorstenson assaulted her. The
first incident occurred in December 2021, when M.C. and Thorstenson were having drinks
at a bar in Superior. M.C. testified that they were arguing in the bar, they went outside to
“get some fresh air,” and they started “tussling” in the parking lot but ended up leaving
together in Thorstenson’s vehicle. Once in the vehicle, he started hitting, slapping, and
choking M.C. Thorstenson then drove to an empty parking lot where he engaged in more
hitting and punching of M.C. He then exited the car, opened the passenger door, and
dragged M.C. out of the car onto the ground. Thorstenson continued to strike and kick
M.C. while she was on the ground before putting M.C. back in the car. M.C. managed to
get out of the car and fled on foot, but Thorstenson chased her down, pushed her to the
ground, and “shoved [her] back into the car.” After that, M.C. did not try to get out of the
car again. Thorstenson then brought M.C. to his apartment in Superior, where they fell
asleep.
The second incident occurred in July 2022. Thorstenson and M.C. were not on good
terms at the time, but they decided to go to a bar in Duluth together. While at the bar,
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Thorstenson saw M.C. dancing with another man and “was pretty upset.” Thorstenson and
M.C. argued outside the bar before leaving together in Thorstenson’s vehicle. M.C.
testified that Thorstenson drove her “all the way down to the dead end of [her] street and
turned around.” M.C. got out of the car and tried to run home, but Thorstenson tackled her
to the ground. M.C. blacked out after her head hit the curb. When M.C. regained
consciousness, Thorstenson was dragging her toward the car, where he “stuffed” her back
into the car. Thorstenson then took M.C. to his apartment in Superior. At his apartment,
Thorstenson choked M.C. with sufficient force that she passed out. When M.C. regained
consciousness, Thorstenson was carrying her up the stairs into his room. There,
Thorstenson tied up M.C. and vaginally penetrated her with his penis. The following
morning, Thorstenson took M.C. to the hospital for her injuries.
The district court gave the following instruction to the jury before M.C. testified:
This evidence is not to be used to prove the character of
[Thorstenson] or that [he] acted in conformity with such
character. [Thorstenson] is not being tried for and may not be
convicted of any offenses, other than those which are charged
in the Complaint that we are trying today. You are not to
convict [Thorstenson] on the basis of occurrences on
December 24, 2021, and July 27, 2022. To do so might result
in unjust double punishment.

The district court provided a similar instruction to the jury before closing arguments.
Thorstenson’s Closing Argument
As part of Thorstenson’s closing argument, defense counsel argued that L.F .’s
injuries fit those associated with a car accident and emphasized that L.F. did not know
whether her injuries were from the car accident or from Thorstenson. Counsel also
8
highlighted the medical professionals’ testimony that they could not rule out the car
accident as the source of some of L.F.’s injuries. Counsel asserted that the jury therefore
could not presume that Thorstenson caused L.F.’s injuries.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all five counts. The district court entered
convictions on one of the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct counts and the kidnapping
count. The district court imposed concurrent executed sentences of 306 and 129 months.
Thorstenson appeals.
DECISION
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the testimony of M.C., who testified about Thorstenson’s prior physical and
sexual abuse against her.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of another crime,
wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith.” But such evidence may be admissible “for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Evidence offered for one of these other
purposes is called Spreigl evidence. State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 780 n.1
(Minn. 2005) (citing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 1965)). For Spreigl
evidence to be admissible, the following five requirements must be met:
(1) notice is given that the state intends to use the evidence;
(2) the state clearly indicates what the evidence is being
offered to prove; (3) the evidence is clear and convincing that
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the defendant participated in the other crime, wrong, or act;
(4) the Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state’ s
case; and (5) the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is not
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.

McLeod, 705 N.W.2d at 787 (quotation omitted). We review a district court’s ruling on
Spreigl evidence for an abuse of discretion. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
Thorstenson limits his argument on appeal to the fourth and fifth requirements for
admission of Spreigl evidence. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting M.C.’s testimony because it was not relevant and any probative value was
outweighed by its risk of unfair prejudice. We are not persuaded.
Relevance
In determining whether the relevance requirement for admission is met, “the district
court must identify the precise disputed fact to which the Spreigl evidence would be
relevant.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). “This
entails isolating the consequential fact for which the evidence is offered, and then
determining the relationship of the offered evidence to that fact and the relationship of the
consequential fact to the disputed issues in the case.” Id. One common purpose for Spreigl
evidence is to show the absence of accident or mistake. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
The record reflects that the district court identified the precise disputed fact that
M.C.’s testimony was relevant for—to rebut any suggestion that L.F.’s injuries were
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caused by a car accident. 1 On appeal, Thorstenson challenges this determination by the
district court, arguing that “whether Thorstenson mistakenly engaged in the alleged
conduct was not the issue.” He asserts that the only issue at trial was one of credibility,
“i.e., did Thorstenson, as L.F. claimed, physically and sexually assault her, or, as
Thorstenson claimed, did he not.” The record belies this argument.
The trial record establishes that Thorstenson’s attorney argued, and suggested
through cross-examination, that the source of L.F .’s injuries was the car accident. For
instance, defense counsel cross -examined the doctor and nurse who treated L.F . on the
source of L.F.’s injuries, specifically asking them both whether L.F.’s ruptured blood
vessels could have resulted from an accident. Neither the doctor nor the nurse foreclosed
that possibility. And during closing argument, defense counsel focused on the facts that
(1) L.F. could not remember how she received many of her injuries, (2) L.F .’s fractured
nose and shoulder were injuries consistent with a car accident, and (3) the medical
professionals did not rule out the accident as a source of L.F.’s injuries. In sum, the record
shows that one of Thorstenson’s defenses at trial was that L.F.’s injuries were caused by
the car accident rather than by any purported assault.

1 The state argues that M.C.’s testimony was also relevant to prove a common scheme or
plan. Evidence of a prior bad act that bears a marked similarity in modus operandi to the
charged conduct can be admissible as Spreigl evidence to prove that the charged conduct
“actually occurred or to refute the defendant’s contention that the victim’s testimony was
a fabrication or a mistake in perception.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 688. The state asserts that
we should affirm the district court’s ruling on this alternate basis for the admissibility of
M.C.’s testimony. Because we conclude that the district court properly admitted M.C.’s
testimony to rebut Thorstenson’s accident defense, we need not address the state’s
argument on whether M.C.’s testimony was alternatively admissible to prove a common
scheme or plan.
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Because there was a fact dispute as to whether L.F.’s injuries were caused by an
accident, evidence tending to show her injuries were not caused by an accident was relevant
to rebut Thorstenson’s defense. Our decision in State v. Nelson, 562 N.W.2d 324 (Minn.
App. 1997), supports this conclusion. In Nelson, the defendant was on trial for assault after
her seven-year-old daughter reluctantly told a teacher that a bruise under her right eye was
caused by the defendant hitting her. 562 N.W.2d at 325. The defendant “claimed [the
victim’s] injury was the result of [the victim] falling down, rather than her striking [the
victim].” Id. at 327. We held that evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction of
disorderly conduct arising from the defendant striking another daughter with a wooden
spoon was admissible in the case involving the seven-year -old daughter “as evidence that
the injury received by [the seven-year-old] did not occur as a result of an accident.” Id. at
325, 327.
Just as the defendant in Nelson maintained that something other than her alleged
criminal conduct caused the victim’s injuries, Thorstenson contended that L.F.’s facial and
shoulder injuries were caused by an accident—his car’s collision with a fire hydrant —
rather than an assault. M.C. testified about instances of Thorstenson’s physical abuse that
closely resembled L.F.’s testimony. M.C. described Thorstenson’s physical abuse of her
both inside and around Thorstenson’s vehicle that ultimately resulted in her hospitalization
for her injuries. The similarities between M.C.’s and L.F.’s testimony made Thorstenson’s
accident defense less likely and was therefore relevant, like the prior conviction in Nelson.
Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it identified the
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relevant purpose for the admission of M.C.’s testimony as showing the absence of mistake
or accident.
Balancing Test
To be admissible, Spreigl evidence must also meet the requirement that the
probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). “When balancing the probative value against the potential
prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging
evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving
one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006).
The district court determined that M.C.’s testimony was probative for the reasons
discussed above and further determined that its probative value was not outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice. In reaching this conclusion, the district court explained that
the jury would be instructed on the proper use of M.C.’s testimony and “could only use it
for that purpose during the course of th[e] trial.” At trial, the district court did just that,
instructing the jury that it could not punish Thorstenson for the acts described by M.C. nor
use M.C.’s testimony to prove Thorstenson’s propensity to act in a particular way.
Thorstenson argues that the district court abused its discretion in its weighing of the
probative value of the evidence, arguing that probative value of M.C.’s testimony “was
minimal because the state did not need it.” Specifically, Thorstenson contends that the
state did not need the Spreigl evidence because L.F. “promptly reported the alleged offense,
was found by police in Thorstenson’s bedroom, had well- documented physical injuries,
made several reports to police and medical staff about the alleged off ense, and testified at
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trial generally consistently with her prior statements.” Courts may consider the state’s need
for contested Spreigl evidence when balancing its probative value against its risk for unfair
prejudice. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 690. But while the state’s evidence of Thorstenson’s guilt
was strong, L.F.’s intoxication and lapse in memory created a specific need for evidence
probative of the source of her injuries given Thorstenson’s car-accident theory. As
discussed earlier, M.C.’s testimony was relevant to this disputed fact, and the state
consequently had a need for it. Contrary to Thorstenson’s position, the state’s need for the
evidence therefore enhanced, rather than diminished, the probative value of M.C.’s
testimony.
Regarding the potential for unfair prejudice, Thorstenson argues that M.C.’s
testimony “was extremely graphic and thus had great potential for unfair prejudice.” While
we recognize the testimony contained graphic details, we are satisfied that the district court
considered the nature of M.C.’s allegations and took measures to limit the risk for unfair
prejudice. For example, the district court ruled that the state could not introduce photos or
medical records related to M.C.; only M.C.’s testimony would be admitted. And, at trial,
the district court gave a limiting instruction just before M.C. testified, telling the jury that
it could not use M.C.’s testimony to prove Thorstenson’s character for committing similar
acts or punish Thorstenson for his conduct involving M.C. And the district court gave a
similar limiting instruction before closing arguments.
Appellate courts have routinely upheld the admission of Spreigl evidence when
accompanied by such a limiting instruction. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385,
392 (Minn. 1998) (determining that a limiting instruction “lessened the probability of
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undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence”); State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257,
268 (Minn. 2019) (noting that the district court’s limiting instruction supported the
conclusion that the Spreigl evidence was not unfairly prejudicial). And we presume that
the jury followed the district court’s instructions. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262
(Minn. 2016). For these reasons, Thorstenson has not persuaded us that the district court
abused its discretion by determining that the probative value of M.C.’s testimony was not
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
Conclusion
The district court identified the disputed fact to which M.C.’s testimony was
relevant and properly determined that the testimony’s probative value on that disputed fact
was not outweighed by its risk for unfair prejudice. We therefore conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting M.C.’s testimony as Spreigl evidence.
Affirmed.