In re the Custody of: C. R. P. and G. P. P.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0026

In re the Custody of: C. R. P. and G. P. P.

Filed August 19, 2024
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge *

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-FA-21-552

Kimberly Rose Wangsness, Albert Lea, Minnesota (pro se appellant -mother)

Jacob Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for
respondent-father)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE , Judge
In this custody dispute, appellant, acting pro se, argues that the district court abused
its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence and awarding respondent
sole legal and sole physical custody of the parties’ children. Because we see no abuse of
discretion, we affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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DECISION
“Appellate review of custody determinations is limited to whether the [district] court
abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly
applying the law.” Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). “A [district]
court has broad discretion in making custody decisions; there is scant room if any for this
court to question a district court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.” In re Welfare
of C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 19, 2019). “[A] district court needs great leeway in making a custody decision that
serves a child’s best interests, in light of each child’s unique family circumstance.”
Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019).
Appellant-mother and respondent -father are the parents of a daughter, C.P., born in
January 2014, and a son, G.P ., born in December 2015. In February 2021, appellant
removed the children from the parties’ home without telling respondent .1 In April 2021,
respondent, who had no contact with the children after their removal, petitioned the district
court for sole legal and sole physical custody; in May 2021, appellant filed a counter -
petition for sole legal and sole physical custody. In November 2021, respondent was
granted two hours of supervised parenting time weekly; his motions for expanded parenting
time were denied in February 2022 and August 2022.

1 Appellant also applied for and was granted an order for protection (OFP) against
respondent. Respondent challenged the order, which was affirmed by this court. In re
Wangsness v. Penkert , No. A21- 0896, 2022 WL 274748, *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 31, 2022) ,
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2022).

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Following a nine -day trial on the parties’ motions for sole legal and sole physical
custody, the district court issued an order , supported by 198 findings , that granted
respondent sole legal and sole physical custody and granted appellant 25% parenting time,
subject to certain requirements. 2 Appellant moved for amended findings; her motion was
granted with respect to some findings, but the custody award was not changed. By
November 2023, when the amended findings were issued, the children had been
exclusively in appellant’s custody for almost three years.
“The district court’s observations of the parties’ demeanor, sincerity, and credibility
are integral to its balancing of the best-interests considerations. . . .” Id. at 796. Throughout
its order, the district court reiterated that appellant was not a credible witness.
There are several inconsistencies or omissions between
[appellant’s] testimony in this trial and the [OFP] hearings.
These inconsistencies are important in the court’s analysis of
[appellant’s] credibility. Based on the entirety of [appellant’s
testimony, in light of all the other evidence, the Court does not
find [her] credible.

The district court specified numerous instances in which appellant’s testimony was
not credible, including appellant’s: (1) account of respondent’s sexual activity in a room
where the children were sleeping; (2) “unsupported allegations of [respondent’s] abuse” of
the children when appellant sought the OFP; (3) report to a detective that C .P. was
experiencing every sign and symptom of abuse that appellant had found on an internet
search engine; (4) claim that respondent had put cameras up in the home and was watching

2 Neither party challenges appellant’s parenting-time award.
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her; (5) insistence that C.P. was sexually abused despite the lack of any evidence of abuse;
(6) reports of respondent’s sexual abuse of the children to a witness, which conflicted with
both appellant’s reports to law enforcement and her testimony at the OFP hearing; (7) claim
that respondent had anger issues ; (8) claim that appellant had a videotape of her mother
speaking to respondent, although no such videotape existed ; (9) account that she told a
witness that respondent told the children that he was goi ng to kill appellant ;
(10) explanation that she told a witness that respondent was emotionally and mentally
unstable and that he tried to induce appellant’s panic attacks; and (11) claim to a witness
that respondent threatened to kill her and the children and abused C .P. while G.P. was in
the next room and could hear what was happening.
The district court also repeatedly observed that respondent’s testimony was credible.
Particular instances included respondent’s testimony concerning: (1) appellant’s daily
drinking; (2) appellant’s belief that the parties’ house was haunted by demons ;
(3) appellant’s claim that respondent slammed G.P.’s head on the floor; (4) respondent’s
having slept with C .P. on vacation because appellant w as then breastfeeding G .P.; and
(5) respondent’s intention to continue the children’s mental-health services if the providers
would communicate with him. Thus, the district court furnished support for its conclusion
that respondent was a significantly more credible witness than appellant.
“In evaluating the best interests of the child[ren] for purposes of determining issues
of custody and parenting time, the [district] court must consider and evaluate all relevant

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factors . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2022) (listing the 12 best -interest factors).
In its memorandum, the district court considered all 12 factors and concluded that, except
for the third factor, the children’s reasonable preferences, which was neutral because they
were too young to have reasonable preferences, the factors favored respondent .
The first factor is t he physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other needs of the
children. Id., subd. 1(a)(1). The district court found that respondent, now a business owner,
has worked consistently since 2000 and can provide the children with a stable home, while
appellant “worked on and off in a part -time fashion” and moved the children about nine
times before she settled down, which dysregulated their behavior. The district court also
found it “very likely that [appellant] has worked to aliena te the children from
[respondent],” based on February 2021 recordings appellant made of her conversations
with C.P. in which “[C.P.] very clearly states that [respondent] did not touch her
inappropriately, but [appellant] continued to question [C.P.] with extremely leading
questions and place[d] ideas into [CP’s] head that are not founded in reality. . . . This
interview shows that [appellant] cannot appropriately handle the children’s emotional
needs.”
As to the second factor, the c hildren’s mental health and e ducational needs, the
district court found that the children were “on their third therapist in two years,” the
therapists had “allowed [appellant] to be in the room for almost all of the sessions,” the
children never disclosed any of the sexual abuse that appellant said occurred, and appellant
would not sign releases so that respondent could speak to the therapists. The district court

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also found that, although appellant had said she had been homeschooling the children since
2020, there was little evidence of their progress and their “schooling ha[d] been non-
existent to inconsistent at best” while they lived with appellant, while respondent said that,
if the children lived with him, he would enroll them in the l ocal public school system.
As to the fourth factor, d omestic abuse, the district court did not “find [appellant’s]
allegations [of respondent ’s sexual abuse of her and the children] credible based on the
evidence presented at trial.” The district court noted that C.P. had disclosed no sexual
abuse to any of the three therapists who had treated her, and that neither the sheriff’s office
nor the department of human services, both of w hich investigated the matter, saw any
evidence of sexual abuse. The district court also found that appellant’s allegation that
respondent slammed G.P.’s head on the floor was not supported by the evidence because
appellant was not in the room when it happened . G.P. hit his head after falling two to four
inches from a mattress on the floor and there was no evidence of any injury.
As to the fifth factor, the parents’ physical-, mental -, or chemical-health issues , the
district court relied on the psychological evaluations of the parties done by Dr. D.E. Dr.
D.E. observed that: (1) appellant’s test results were of “questionable validity due to the
possibility of random responding” and “suggest[ed] a proneness to embellish experience
with fantasies and projection”; (2) appellant said she attempted suicide as a teenager and
picked up a gun and contemplated suicide in 2020; (3) appellant’s diagnosis included panic
disorder, unspecified personality disorder with dramatic features, history of multiple
trauma, and manipulative behavior in the service of her goals; and (4) appellant’s anxiety

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or panic attacks and suicidal ideation would “clearly have an effect on the children’s safety
and developmental needs.” Dr. D.E. recommended that appellant complete D ialectical
Behavioral Therapy (DBT). Although appellant testified that she is seeing a therapist, the
therapist did not respond to requests for records, and whether the therapist offers DBT is
not known. Appellant’s history also included excessive drinking, to the point where she
passed out, and the use of marijuana, causing the district court to observe that her
“untreated chemical dependency problems, . . . if left untreated could impact the safety and
development of the children.”
Dr. D.E. found that respondent “displayed distinct avoidance of self -disclosure” but
showed no psychopathy, irrationality, or psychosis, and that he did “not have mental health
or chemical dependency concerns that would impact his ability to provide for the safety
and development of the children.”
As to the sixth factor, the history of the children’s care, the district court found that,
prior to the children’s departure in February 2021, respondent shared in their care, making
dinner after work, playing with them, bathing them, and putting them to bed , and noted
that “[appellant] even admit ted that [respondent] was a good father to the children.”
Appellant was the sole caretaker after she took the children from the home, and she
adequately provided them with food and housing. However, while G.P. was in her care
and she was watching him, he suffered a sledding accident in which he broke both his arms,
and a playground accident that resulted in a head wound for which he w as airlifted to the
Mayo Clinic in Rochester.
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As to the seventh factor, the parents ’ willingness and ability to me et the children’s
needs, the district court found that r espondent believes that, while the children need both
parents in their lives , appellant should deal with her mental health concerns before her
contact with the children is unrestricted. The district court also found that appellant
(1) “has been adamant that [respondent] should not have parenting time or that if he does
it should continue to be supervised,” (2) appellant has refused to sign releases to enable the
children’s care providers to communicate with respondent; (3) although the parties had not
decided on a particular church in which they wished to raise their children, appellant began
taking them to a church without telling respondent ; (4) appellant’s homeschooling of the
children has been intermittent; (5) although appellant says both children would need
Individual Education Plans (IEP’s) if they went to school, she does not explain how her
homeschooling accommodates their individual needs.
As to the eighth factor, the effect on the children of changes to the ir home, school
and community, the district court contrasted the parties. Appellant has moved the children
eight to ten times to different residences and types of residences all over the state ; she is
unemployed, and she says she would like to move out of the state but doesn’t know where.
Respondent’s home, from which the children were taken in February 2021, has been and
continues to be a constant in their lives ; respondent is gainfully employed, financially
stable, and “expressed a credible desire to enroll the children in school and remain in the
same community that [they] are familiar with.” The district court agreed with the custody
evaluator’s view that attending school would be a positive change for the children because
it would provide contact with other children.
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As to the ninth factor, the effect of a change of custody on the children’s significant
relationships, the district court found that, s ince appellant removed them from the home in
February 2021, the children have had minimal contact with the ir parents’ families.
Appellant’s parents have not seen them for almost two years, and respondent’s parents
have not seen them since late 2020. Prior to that time, the children had contact with
members of both families. The district court wrote that, “[i]f [appellant] were given sole
legal and physical custody . . . the children will never see or have an ongoing relationship
with their biological family members.” Appellant would not allow respondent to bring
family members with him to his supervised visitation, and she “use[s] . . . church members
as replacement family members for those that the children already have.” Respondent said
he would foster the children’s relationship with appellant’s parents, with whom he has no
problem, and with his own extended family.
As to the tenth factor, the effect of maximizing or limiting parenting time on the
children, the district court noted that the children missed respondent since they were taken
away from him and enjoy their visitation time with him, playing games or watching
movies. In contrast, “the children have become co- dependent on [appellant ] to an
unhealthy degree”; for example, when G .P. is questioned, he looks at appellant for the
response. Having less time with appellant, after three years spent almost exclusively with
her because they were not in school and did not see family members , would not be
detrimental to them.

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As to the eleventh factor, the disposition of each parent to support the children’s
relationship with the other parent, the district court pointed out that appellant “told every
service provider and therapist that she did not want [respondent] to be involved in [the
children’s] lives” and “referred to [respondent] as a pedophile when speaking to [Dr.
D.E.].” The district court concluded that appellant is not likely to support the children’s
relationship with respondent . Conversely, respondent testified that he would support the
children’s relationship with appellant once she addressed her mental -health issues, and he
did support that relationship prior to her taking the children from the home.
As to the twelfth factor, the parents’ ability to cooperate in rearing the children, the
district court said that it did “not believe that [appellant] would be able to cooperate in
rearing the minor children with [respondent ],” given her behavior in: (1) telling providers
that she does not feel respondent should have a relationship with the children after what he
did to them, (2) refusing to sign releases of information that would let respondent be
involved in their therapy, and (3) refusing to let re spondent bring them presents when he
had parenting time with them. The district court also found that r espondent independently
enrolled in and completed a co-parenting class, respondent thinks the children should have
appellant in their lives, and respondent “has demonstrated that he is able to cooperate with
[appellant] in rearing the children.”
Thus, the district court concluded that, except for the children’s preference, the best-
interest factors favored respondent and awarded him sole legal and sole physical custody .
Particularly because the parties’ credibility is “integral to [the district court’s] balancing of
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the best -interests considerations” and a custody award is given “great deference,” we
affirm. See Thornton, 333 N.W.2d at 796. 3
Affirmed.

3 The district court also considered the rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody is in
the best interests of the children, see Minn. Stat. § 518.17(b)(9) (2022), and concluded that,
“[g]iven the concerns with [appellant’s] ongoing mental and chemical health and inability
to provide for the children’s needs in a consistent manner” and the fact that she is not “in
the right frame of mind to make important decisions regarding the children’s health and
education,” the presumption was r ebutted.