State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0038

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Angela Rena Cloar,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2024
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-22818

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stacy A. Woods, New Hope City Attorney, Melanie P. Persellin, Assistant City Attorney,
Jensen Sondrall Persellin & Woods, P.A., Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Rachel F. Bond,
Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A police officer stopped Angela Cloar for running a stop sign and learned that she
possessed no valid driver’s license or car insurance. The jury in Cloar’s trial on the
consequent stop-sign, licensure, and insurance charges viewed without objection some of
the officer’s body-camera footage. This footage allegedly included audio of insurance-
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company representatives informing the officer that Cloar’s policies had expired , the
officer’s mentioning Cloar’s other offenses, and Cloar’s passenger urging the officer to
allow Cloar to purchase insurance on the spot. Cloar appeals from her convictions, arguing
that admitting the camera footage violated her right to a fair trial under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary rule prohibiting character
evidence. We hold that Cloar has failed to meet her burden on appeal to provide a record
establishing that the jury heard the allegedly violative portions of the camera footage. We
also hold that the passenger’s statements were nontestimonial and the alleged plain error
of allowing the jury to hear the footage could not have significantly affected the verdict.
We therefore affirm.
FACTS
New Hope police officer Mike Keithahn was on patrol in November 2022 and saw
a car enter an intersection without stopping at the stop sign. Officer Keithahn stopped the
car and asked the driver, Angela Cloar, to present her driver’s license and proof of
insurance. Cloar said that she had not seen the stop sign and answered “no” when the officer
asked if her license was valid. She volunteered that she was in the driver diversion program.
Officer Keithahn inquired through a law-enforcement database and confirmed that Cloar’s
driver’s license had been revoked.
Cloar provided Officer Keithahn with insurance information that she claimed
covered her car. Officer Keithahn returned to his police cruiser and telephoned the two
insurance companies that Cloar had identified—Progressive and Bristol. Representatives
from those companies each told the officer that Cloar’s policies had lapsed. Officer
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Keithahn approached to arrest her. A passenger in Cloar’s car told the officer that Cloar
was at that time trying to purchase car insurance. Officer Keithahn told Cloar that he was
arresting her for gross-misdemeanor driving without insurance because “[she’d] had
priors.” Throughout the traffic stop, Officer Keithahn’s body-worn and squad-car cameras
were recording the interaction visually and audibly.
Officer Keithahn cited Cloar for gross-misdemeanor driving without insurance,
misdemeanor driving after license revocation, and petty- misdemeanor failure to stop at a
stop sign. Before trial, the state amended the driving-without-insurance citation from a
gross misdemeanor to a misdemeanor. The attorneys agreed that no testimony about
Cloar’s prior offenses, convictions, or prior driving conduct would be introduced at trial.
To avoid introducing this evidence and to avoid potential hearsay statements from the
insurance representatives, the attorneys agreed not to play selected portions of the
recordings at trial.
Only Officer Keithahn testified at the jury trial. The prosecutor introduced two video
exhibits during this testimony: the dash-camera footage showing Cloar’s car failing to stop
at the stop sign and the officer’s body-camera footage. Cloar’s attorney did not object to
the introduction or playing of these recordings. The prosecutor started playing the body-
camera video near its beginning and stopped it after the segment when Officer Keithahn
began the arrest. The prosecutor stopped and started the video multiple times within this
range, questioning the officer during pauses. The record does not indicate at which points
the video was incrementally stopped or at what points it was re started. Officer Keithahn
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testified that he had determined that Cloar’s insurance policies were not valid and that he
observed her trying to purchase insurance.
The jury found Cloar guilty on all three charges. The district court entered
corresponding convictions and sentenced Cloar to 60 days in jail and stayed execution for
all but five days.
Cloar appeals.
DECISION
Cloar challenges her convictions based on two principal arguments. She argues first
that the district court erroneously admitted the parts of the recordings that included
statements from the insurance representatives and Cloar’s passenger. She argues second
that the district court erroneously failed to provide a cautionary instruction or strike the
parts of the recordings that included Officer Keithahn’s statements about her past offenses.
We have carefully considered Cloar’s arguments and conclude that, for the following
reasons, none leads us to reverse.
I
We are not persuaded by Cloar’s contention that the district court erroneously
admitted parts of the body-camera footage because the record is insufficient for us to
properly analyze this argument on the merits. Cloar never objected when the prosecutor
introduced the video or played parts of it for the jury, so we can review only for plain error.
Under this standard Cloar has the burden to “demonstrate both that error occurred and that
the error was plain.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). But in light of
material gaps in the record on appeal, Cloar cannot show that any error occurred.
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The state asserts that the portions of the video footage about which Cloar now
complains (those parts where insurance representatives spoke with Officer Keithahn and
where he references Cloar’s past offenses) were never presented to the jury during trial
because they were intentionally skipped during the officer’s testimony. “[T]he party
seeking review has the duty to see that the appellate court is presented with a record which
is sufficient to show the alleged errors.” Truesdale v. Friedman, 127 N.W.2d 277, 279
(Minn. 1964). Neither party described on the record which parts of the footage were played
and which parts were skipped when the prosecutor played the video during trial. The
transcript offers little help, clearly indicating only that portions were played beginning at
3 seconds and ending at 38 minutes and 45 seconds, with five pauses and fast-forwarding
and resumptions at points indiscernible to us on review. In short, Cloar failed to produce a
record sufficient to show that the jury heard the allegedly violative hearsay and character
evidence captured by the officer’s body-worn camera.
Our combing the record does not help Cloar’s position on appeal. The record
informs us that the prosecutor and defense counsel made considerable efforts to avoid
referencing the insurance representatives or their statements. Cloar’s attorney had
seemingly agreed before trial that the state could play the video to the jury if it omitted
“those points where the officer returns to the squad car” and “portions where the officer is
at Ms. Cloar’s window and he has a third-party, an insurance company . . . on the phone,
which would be hearsay about the v[e]racity of what they’re saying.” This understanding
may explain why Cloar’s attorney did not object during trial while the video was played to
the jury. And although the prosecutor urged the jury during closing argument to closely
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consider portions of the officer’s body-camera footage that did not implicate hearsay
evidence, she avoided any direct reference to the insurance representatives’ statements.
She emphasized that the jury could “observe on the body camera that . . . Officer Keithahn
while in his squad car attempted to determine whether or not her driver’s license was valid.”
In contrast, the prosecutor used only the passive voice to describe the insurance
verification, seeming to intentionally avoid revealing the statements of the insurance
representatives: “Ms. Cloar provided the police officer with information regarding a
Progressive Insurance policy which it was determined had been -- was not valid due to
nonpayment . . . . She provided a subsequent policy . . . which again was indicated as being
invalid due to nonpayment.” ( Emphasis added.) The prosecutor also referred to the
officer’s inquiries about insurance vaguely as “research regarding the insurance” and
“run[ning] that [insurance] information.” It is true that Officer Keithahn stated during
cross-examination, “I remember the Bristol saying that the -- The insurance policy wasn’t
active.” But this sole reference does not sufficiently indicate that he received information
from an insurance representative.
We likewise cannot say that the jury ever heard the portion of the body-camera
video where Officer Keithahn referenced Cloar’s prior offenses. The attorneys agreed
before trial that character evidence would not be admitted. The prosecutor never mentioned
Cloar’s other offenses during her opening statement or closing arguments, and Officer
Keithahn never mentioned them during his testimony. Cloar has failed to demonstrate that
any portion of the body-camera video showing Officer Keithahn’s statements about Cloar’s
offenses was presented to the jury. We hold that Cloar has failed to meet her burden to
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show any error, let alone a plain error, in the district court’s failure to strike or redact the
body-camera footage.
We are not persuaded otherwise by the fact that the entire body-camera video was
admitted into evidence. Although the jury had the option to access the entire body-camera
video during deliberations, the record informs us that they did not do so. The attorneys had
requested that the jury be allowed to access the video during deliberations only after asking
and receiving the district court’s permission. The record includes no jury request to view
the footage during their deliberations. Because Cloar has not met her burden to provide a
record reflecting that the relevant portions of the body-camera video were seen by the jury
we cannot conclude that the district court erred by failing sua sponte to strike or redact the
video.
We add alternatively that, even had Cloar shown that the jury viewed the entire
video and that failing to prevent it established a plain error, her appeal would nevertheless
fail. We will not consider reversing a plain evidentiary error unless the appellant also shows
that the error affected her substantial rights. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn.
2016). That is, we would not reverse if the error was harmless, meaning that there is no
“reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on
the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). We are confident that the alleged error here did
not affect Cloar’s substantial rights.
Insurance Representatives’ Statements
Cloar argues unconvincingly that the erroneous admission of the insurance
representatives’ statements violated her substantial rights because, without them, the state
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had no evidence that Cloar lacked insurance. Officer Keithahn testified that he verified that
Cloar’s insurance policies were inactive. And his testimony did not state or imply that he
reached his conclusion based on hearsay. We recognize that a police officer generally may
not testify relaying hearsay under the guise of describing an investigation. State v. Fields,
679 N.W.2d 341, 348 (Minn. 2004). But alleged errors not raised in an appellate brief are
forfeited, State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn
Aug. 5, 1997), and Cloar did not object to the officer’s testimony at trial on hearsay grounds
and has not directly argued on appeal that the district court erred by admitting the
testimony. The prosecutor did not explicitly reference the insurance representatives’
statements in closing arguments. And as we conclude below, the jury also permissibly saw
the body-camera video and heard Cloar trying to buy car insurance before Officer Keithahn
arrested her. The jury had ample evidence of Cloar’s lack of insurance coverage apart from
the allegedly erroneous footage of the representatives’ statements. She has not shown that
the district court ’s failure to strike or redact those hearsay statements affected her
substantial rights.
Cloar’s Other-Acts Evidence
Cloar likewise unconvincingly maintains that failing to exclude Officer Keithahn’s
statements on video about her past infractions affected her substantial rights. Again we are
assuming for the sake of argument that the jury saw footage of the officer explaining to
Cloar that he was arresting her f or gross-misdemeanor driving without insurance because
“[she’s] had priors . . . priors for the same thing . . . failures to appear, pay fine, tickets
that’s what [she’s] revoked for along with the other one.” In a harmless-error analysis, we
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consider the manner in which evidence was presented, its persuasive value, whether it was
used in the proponent’s closing argument, and how effective the defense was at countering
it. Townsend v. State, 646 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 2002). The statements about Cloar’s
criminal history here were brief and vague and were not testified to by Officer Keithahn.
The prosecutor did not mention Cloar’s criminal history in opening statements or closing
arguments. And the jury received uncontested and compelling evidence of her guilt,
including video footage of Cloar’s failing to stop for the stop sign, her on-scene admission
that her license was invalid, and the officer’s testimony that he heard her trying to purchase
insurance during the stop. There is no reasonable possibility that the district court’s failure
to provide a cautionary instruction or strike references to Cloar’s other acts had a
substantial impact on the verdict.
II
We are similarly unconvinced by Cloar’s contention that the district court violated
her Confrontation Clause right to confront witnesses and violated the evidentiary rules
prohibiting hearsay by admitting the recording of her passenger’s statements about Cloar
trying to purchase insurance. The state does not expressly contend on appeal that the
passenger’s statements were not played for the jury. We therefore address Cloar’s argument
on its merits.
Cloar argues that statements of the passenger, who did not testify at trial, amount to
testimonial hearsay. We review de novo whether evidence admission is contrary to the
protections of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. State v. Caulfield, 722
N.W.2d 304, 308 (Minn. 2006). The district court violates a criminal defendant’s
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Confrontation Clause rights when it admits testimonial out- of-court statements without
affording the defendant a chance to cross-examine the speaker. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). The Supreme Court has said that t estimonial statements include
those “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial .” Id. at 51– 52. We
examine the context of a conversation to determine whether the primary purpose of a
purportedly testimonial statement is to create an “out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.” Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245 (2015) (quotation omitted). We apply this
standard to consider the passenger’s statements.
The passenger’s statements are not testimonial because they were not objectively
made within a context that had the primary purpose of developing evidence. The body-
camera video depicts Officer Keithahn approaching Cloar while she was on a phone call
to inform her that she was under arrest. Cloar’s passenger announces to the officer, “She’s
talking to the insurance company.” And after Officer Keithahn asked Cloar to exit the car
and told the passenger that Cloar’s car cannot be driven without insurance, the passenger
asked, “Can she finish getting insurance?” As the Supreme Court has explained, “[T]he
most important instances in which the [Confrontation] Clause restricts the introduction of
out-of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of -
court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S.
344, 358 (2011). The passenger did not make his inquiry and statement in response to
police questioning. He instead made them spontaneously. His statements also narrate a
present and ongoing occurrence rather than relay “past events potentially relevant to future
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criminal prosecution,” a feature that tends to reflect a testimonial statement. See Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). The context and structure of the passenger’s
statements do not indicate that their purpose would be for testimony in future criminal
prosecution.
Cloar’s reliance on State v. Sutter does not change our mind because that case is
readily distinguished. 959 N.W.2d 760 (Minn. 2021). The Sutter court held that a
nontestifying co-conspirator’s statements constituted testimonial hearsay even though they
were an exculpatory false narrative to police. Id. at 763–64, 768. The supreme court so held
because the challenged statements were made to police in response to questioning to
establish past events for a criminal prosecution. Id. at 768. As we have already explained,
the statements here neither resulted from questioning nor described past events. Cloar
offers other, less persuasive reasons urging us to conclude the passenger’s statements are
testimonial; these warrant no discussion. Because the passenger’s statements were not
testimonial, Cloar’s Confrontation Clause argument fails.
Affirmed.