State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0052

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Charles Todd Bragg,
Appellant.

Filed April 14, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-08-1964

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Corey J. Haller, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Joseph J. Walsh, Assistant County Attorney,
Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles Todd Bragg, Bayport, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order finding him to be a frivolous litigant
within the meaning of Minnesota Rule of General Practice 9.01 and imposing preconditions
on his ability to file claims, motions, and requests for relief related to his 2009 convictions.
2
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant is a
frivolous litigant, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2009, a jury found appellant Charles Todd Bragg guilty of eight counts
of criminal sexual conduct involving his juvenile daughters. The district court convicted
Bragg of each count and sentenced him to 360 months in prison. On direct appeal, this
court affirmed Bragg’s convictions. State v. Bragg, No. A09-2319, 2010 WL 5154137, at
*9 (Minn. App. Dec. 21, 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011).
Since his direct appeal, Bragg has filed frequent requests for relief with the district
court related to his 2009 conviction. He has made hundreds of filings in the span of 13-plus
years, including petitions for postconviction relief, petitions for writs of mandamus,
motions to compel disclosure of evidence , motions to correct his sentence, motions to
suppress, motions to dismiss, subpoena requests, and motions to hold various individuals
in contempt. Bragg’s theories for relief consist of challenges to the sufficiency of the
state’s evidence, arguments based on jury instructions, alleged errors in the calculation of
his criminal-history score, claims that he received multiple convictions based on one
behavioral incident, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, among others. Bragg
has also requested on multiple occasions that the district court or state disclose various
articles of evidence from his criminal case. The district court has never granted any of
Bragg’s requests for relief, beyond issuing an order in January 2014 providing that Bragg
“shall receive a copy of his court file without charge.”
3
Through numerous appeals and petitions, Bragg has sought relief from this court.
In each instance, this court has either affirmed the district court or dismissed Bragg’s
appeal or petition because of jurisdictional defects. Bragg v. State, No. A13- 0413,
2013 WL 6223556 (Minn. App. Dec. 2, 2013) (Bragg I) (affirming district court’s denial
of Bragg’s petition for postconviction relief and motion to correct sentencing), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 18, 2014); State v. Bragg, No. A12-2006, 2013 WL 6723210 (Minn. App.
Dec. 23, 2013) (affirming the district court’s denial of Bragg’s request for a writ of
mandamus), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2014); Bragg v. State, No. A14-1345 (Minn. App.
Aug. 20, 2014) (order) (dismissing Bragg’s appeal as taken from a nonappealable order
concerning his motions to compel discovery), petition for rev. dismissed (Minn. Jan. 14,
2015); Bragg v. State, No. A15-0263 (Minn. App. Feb. 13, 2015) (order) (same), petition
for rev. dismissed (Minn. May 15, 2015); Bragg v. State , No. A15-0558 (Minn. App.
Apr. 16, 2015) (order) (dismissing Bragg’s appeal as taken from a nonappealable order
concerning his petition to dismiss and/or vacate judgment), rev. denied (Minn. June 16,
2015); Bragg v. State, No. A15-0981 (Minn. App. Feb. 5, 2016) (order op.) (affirming
district court’s denial of Bragg’s motion to correct his sentence based on single-behavioral-
incident argument), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2016); State v. Bragg (In re Bragg),
No. A16-1777 (Minn. App. Nov. 16, 2016) (order) (denying Bragg’s petition for a writ of
mandamus from the court of appeals); State v. Bragg (In re Bragg), No. A17-1319 (Minn.
App. Sept. 12, 2017) (order) (same); State v. Bragg (In re Bragg), No. A18-0874 (Minn.
App. June 8, 2018) (order) (same); Bragg v. State, No. A21-0189, 2022 WL 151932 (Minn.
App. Jan. 7, 2022) (Bragg II) (order op.) (affirming the denial of Bragg’s postconviction
4
petition ), petition for rev. dismissed (Minn. Mar. 17, 2022). The supreme court has denied
all of Bragg’s petitions for review of decisions of this court.
In September 2023, Bragg filed his most recent request for relief with the district
court, titled “Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence not Authorized by Law
Pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subd. 9.” The district court
ordered a hearing to be held in October 2023. In its order for hearing, the district court
notified Bragg and respondent State of Minnesota that the court, on its own initiative, was
moving “for a finding that [Bragg] is a frivolous litigant within the meaning of [r]ule 9”
and “to sanction [Bragg] in the form of imposing preconditions on his service or filing of
any new claims, motions, or requests.” The district court noted that Bragg “has not stopped
filing documents in this matter” since the supreme court declined to review his direct
appeal in 2011. The district court also noted that Bragg’s September 2023 motion was an
“incomprehensible array of various state, federal, and common law recitations” and “bears
no resemblance to a cognizable claim for relief.”
At the hearing, after concluding that Bragg had waived his request for counsel, the
district court heard argument from Bragg and the state on whether the court should sanction
Bragg. In general, Bragg argued that his filings were a legitimate effort to prove his own
innocence and to secure a complete record of the state’s evidence so that he could contest
his convictions. The state argued in support of the district court’s motion to impose
sanctions.
In December 2023, the district court entered an order declaring Bragg a frivolous
litigant and imposing preconditions on his ability to file further requests for relief relating
5
to his 2009 convictions. The preconditions require Bragg to file a one-page form, titled
“Request to File Document,” before submitting other supporting documents. On the form,
Bragg must provide details of the particular relief being requested, other efforts to obtain
the same or similar relief, and his theory on how the law supports the requested relief,
including a list of relevant cases. The district court can then either reject or grant Bragg’s
request to file additional documents in support of his claim. The order does not apply to
matters outside of Bragg’s 2009 convictions. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Bragg, who is self- represented, argues that the district court’s imposition of
preconditions was an abuse of discretion and that the district court violated his
constitutional rights in ordering them.
1 Before addressing the substance of Bragg’s
arguments, we discuss the principles that guide our determination of appeals involving
self-represented parties.
We generally hold self-represented parties to the same standard as attorneys.
State v. Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d 289, 299 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. May 16,
2006). A self -represented party is not “relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately
communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom.”
Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987). And “[a]n assignment
of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in
appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is

1 The state did not file a response, and so this case “shall be determined on the merits.”
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
6
obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted). While we are sympathetic to the challenges that Bragg faces as a
self-represented litigant, Bragg must adequately communicate his requests for relief and
provide legal argument in support of those requests.
We now turn to Bragg’s arguments on appeal. Although we understand Bragg’s
primary arguments to relate to the district court’s imposition of sanctions, Bragg’s brief
also contains substantive arguments regarding his 2009 convictions and hints at numerous
other issues. To the extent that we do not address some of the arguments raised by Bragg,
we conclude that those arguments are inadequately briefed or beyond the scope of this
appeal, which concerns only the district court’s frivolous -litigant determination and the
imposition of sanctions. With that in mind, we first address whether the district court
abused its discretion by imposing preconditions on Bragg filing further requests for relief
related to his 2009 convictions. We then turn to Bragg’s constitutional arguments.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing preconditions on
Bragg filing further requests for relief related to his 2009 convictions.

We review a district court’s frivolous-litigant determination for an abuse of
discretion. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007) (noting
that the district court’s failure to apply the proper frivolous-litigant standard found in
Minnesota Rule of General Practice 9.01 was an abuse of discretion). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record. ” Griffin v. State, 961 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted).
7
Rule 9 of the Minnesota Rules of General Practice concerns frivolous litigation.
Under that rule, a district court, “on its own initiative and after notice and hearing,” may
enter an order “imposing preconditions on a frivolous litigant’s service or filing of any new
claims, motions or requests.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.01. At such a hearing, the district
court “shall consider such evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavit, as may be
material to the ground of the motion.”2 Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(a).
In determining whether sanctions are appropriate, the district court must consider
seven factors:
(1) the frequency and number of claims pursued by the
frivolous litigant with an adverse result;
(2) whether there is a reasonable probability that the
frivolous litigant will prevail on the claim, motion, or request;
(3) whether the claim, motion, or request was made for
purposes of harassment, delay, or vexatiousness, or otherwise
in bad faith;
(4) injury incurred by other litigants prevailing against
the frivolous litigant and to the efficient administration of
justice as a result of the claim, motion, or request in question;
(5) effectiveness of prior sanctions in deterring the
frivolous litigant from pursuing frivolous claims;
(6) the likelihood that requiring security or imposing
sanctions will ensure adequate safeguards and provide means
to compensate the adverse party;
(7) whether less severe sanctions will sufficiently
protect the rights of other litigants, the public, or the courts.

2 Bragg appears to assert that the district court did not provide him with the evidence that
it relied on in making its frivolous-litigant determination. It is unclear from Bragg’s brief
what evidence Bragg contends was not provided to him. And according to our review of
the record, the district court’s determination was based solely on Bragg’s previous filings
in this matter.
8
Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b). If the district court determines that sanctions are appropriate,
the district court must state the reasons supporting its determination on the record. Minn.
R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(c).
Here, the district court analyzed each of the rule 9.02(b) factors and determined that
all seven factors support the imposition of preconditions on Bragg filing documents related
to his 2009 convictions. Bragg argues that the district court abused its discretion in its
consideration of the first three factors. Bragg does not dispute the district court’s
determinations regarding the remaining factors. We address each of the first three factors
in turn.
Factor One
The first factor requires the district court to consider “the frequency and number of
claims pursued by the frivolous litigant with an adverse result.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac.
9.02(b)(1). The district court found that Bragg, despite filing numerous requests and
supporting documents, has never achieved a favorable ruling on any of his substantive
requests for relief.
Bragg asserts that he has only “filed 11 appeals” and “7 of the 11 appeals and
motions file[d] with the district court and court of appeals [were] to attempt to receive a
copy of the court file.” This argument is not persuasive. First, while Bragg argues that he
filed only 11 appeals, he does not dispute that he received an adverse result on every
substantive aspect of his appeals and petitions. Second, Bragg’s argument ignores his
filings in district court. As the district court noted, this case has amassed more than 60 0
filings, “with the vast majority of those filings made by [Bragg], as a pro se litigant, after
9
the opinion issued on his direct appeal.” By focusing only on appeals, Bragg understates
the frequency and number of claims that he has pursued in this matter. For these reasons,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that factor one weighs in favor
of imposing sanctions.
Factor Two
The second factor requires the district court to assess “whether there is a reasonable
probability that the frivolous litigant will prevail on the claim, motion, or request.” Minn.
R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b)(2). In addressing this factor, the district court observed that
the sentence [Bragg] challenges has repeatedly been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, and [Bragg’s] challenges to his
sentence have largely been based on matters well outside the
scope of post-conviction review; namely, the sufficiency of the
state’s evidence, allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings at
trial, and repeated and disposed of claims regarding [Bragg’s]
criminal history score and predatory offender status.

The district court also noted that “the numerous filings by [Bragg] have adhered to no
judicially recognized process and are without any conceivable probability of success.”
On appeal, Bragg focuses his argument on his most recent filing —“Motion for
Correction or Reduction of Sentence not Authorized by Law Pursuant to Minnesota Rule
of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subd. 9.” He argues that he “should prevail” on certain issues
raised in his motion , such as whether his crimes constitute a “single course of conduct.”
But this court has already determined that Bragg waived the issue and that the issue is
procedurally barred. Bragg I, 2013 WL 6223556, at *2; Bragg II, 2022 WL 15193 2, at
* 2. Bragg fails to point to any novel sentencing arguments raised in his motion that are
not either procedurally barred or time-barred. Instead, he continues his attempts to
10
relitigate issues that have already been finally decided. The district court therefore did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the second factor weighs in favor of imposing
sanctions.
Factor Three
Under the third factor, the district court must consider “whether the claim, motion,
or request was made for purposes of harassment, delay, or vexatiousness, or otherwise in
bad faith.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b)(3). The district court found that Bragg made
“numerous filings in this matter” in bad faith. The district court emphasized that Bragg
continues to file requests for relief on bases that have already been addressed: “[Bragg]
received the benefit of appointed trial counsel, appointed appellate counsel, a direct appeal
of the verdicts with numerous challenges contained therein, and several thorough appellate
opinions analyzing each and every one of [Bragg’s] assigned errors.” The district court
found that Bragg’s “continued pursuit of his unobtainable relief is demonstrative of a bad
faith motive.”
Bragg argues that his numerous filings were not made in bad faith, and that he is
instead “fighting for [his] freedom.” Bragg adds that the sheer number of documents he
has filed has been for the district court’s “convenience,” and not “to burden the courts or
bog them down with additional paper.” We are not persuaded. Bragg’s repeated filing of
claims for relief based on issues that have been adversely determined against him ,
particularly where the claims lack legal and factual support, places his conduct within the
realm of bad faith. See Liedtke v. Fillenworth, 372 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Minn. App. 1985)
(affirming district court’s award of attorney fees based on self- represented litigant’s “bad
11
faith bringing of frivolous, vexatious claims”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1985). The
district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by determining that the third factor
weighs in favor of imposing sanctions.
We conclude that the district court’s imposition of preconditions on Bragg’s ability
to file requests related to his 2009 convictions was reasonable under the circumstances of
this case. These preconditions adequately address the district court’s concerns while still
permitting Bragg to request relief in a more tailored format than his previous filings. The
district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that Bragg is a frivolous
litigant nor by imposing preconditions for filing further requests related to his 2009
convictions.
II. The district court’s order did not otherwise violate Bragg’s constitutional
rights.

Bragg also asserts that the district court’s imposition of preconditions violated his
constitutional rights. Specifically, Bragg argues that he was denied his right to counsel at
the rule 9 hearing and that the application of rule 9 sanctions to an incarcerated person
violates the Due Process Clause.
Right to Counsel
Bragg argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel at the rule 9
hearing. At the hearing, Bragg asked the court for appointment of counsel. Observing that
Bragg had not filed a request for appointed counsel, despite one-month’s notice of the
hearing, the district court determined that Bragg had waived any request for appointed
12
counsel. Bragg contends that the district court’s ruling deprived him of counsel at a
“critical stage,” in violation of the Constitution.
Although criminal defendants enjoy the right to counsel at “critical stages of the
proceedings,” State v. Maddox, 825 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation
omitted), the right to counsel extends only “for one review of a criminal conviction,
whether by direct appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding,” Francis v. State,
781 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. 2010) (quotations omitted). Bragg cites no authority in
support of his assertion that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel in a trial extends to a
frivolous-litigant hearing more than a decade after the conviction and after having already
had the benefit of counsel on direct appeal in 2010. As a result, Bragg has not demonstrated
a violation of his right to counsel.
Due Process
Bragg also appears to argue that the district court’s imposition of sanctions under
rule 9 violates his due- process rights. Bragg cites a number of constitutional provisions
but provides no analysis of how those provisions support his due-process claim. And “[a]n
assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 915 (quotation
omitted).
“Prison inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts that derives from
the right to due process of law.” Kristian v. State, 541 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. App.
1996), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 1996). Although the district court’s ruling limits the
13
form by which Bragg may request relief relating to his 2009 convictions, the ruling does
not preclude Bragg from filing claims or foreclose his access to the courts. Additionally,
rule 9 expressly provides that “[r]elief under this rule is available in any action or
proceeding pending in any court of this state.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.01 (emphasis added);
see also Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 1.01 (“These rules shall apply in all trial courts of the state.”).3
We therefore discern no obvious prejudicial error and conclude that Bragg’s due-process
argument is forfeited.
Affirmed.

3 Although Bragg correctly points out that no appellate court has directly addressed the
applicability of rule 9 sanctions to an incarcerated person, we have recognized the existence
of a frivolous-litigant finding against an incarcerated person. See Murphy v. State,
No. A13-2332, 2014 WL 4176080, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Aug. 25, 2014) (concluding that
previous order designating appellant a frivolous litigant was not a valid basis for recusal);
Murphy v. State, No. A16-1049, 2017 WL 957716, at *4 (Minn. App. Mar. 13, 2017)
(noting that appellant’s postconviction petition was rejected for failing to comply with his
“frivolous-litigant restrictions”), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2017).