State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0062

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Emilio Andres Trevino,
Appellant.

Filed December 16, 2024
Reversed
Johnson, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-21-1450

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Corey J. Haller, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Emilio Andres Trevino was convicted after a stipulated-evidence court trial of
unlawful possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. His conviction is based on
evidence that police officers found a handgun during a warrantless search of his vehicle.
2
Trevino moved to suppress the evidence of the handgun, but the district court denied the
motion. We conclude that the officers did not have probable cause for a warrantless search
of Trevino’s vehicle because the facts and circumstances known to the officers were not
sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that Trevino’s vehicle contained contraband.
Therefore, we reverse the district court’s denial of Trevino’s motion to suppress , and we
reverse Trevino’s conviction.
FACTS
On July 20, 2021, Mille Lacs Band police officers Cook and Gadbois drove past a
house that was known by law-enforcement officers to be a place where drug trafficking
often occurred. The officers saw an unfamiliar vehicle parked in an unusual position on or
near the driveway with an occupant in the driver’s seat, which led them to believe that a
passenger was making a short visit to the house. The officers saw the vehicle drive away
minutes later. They noticed that the vehicle had a piece of paper taped onto it in lieu of
license plates. In addition, a large object was hanging from the rearview mirror, and the
driver failed to signal a turn.
The officers initiated a traffic stop. Officer Cook approached the driver’s side of
the vehicle and asked the driver, Trevino, for a driver’s license, proof of insurance, and
vehicle registration. Trevino provided a Wisconsin driver’s license and an Arizona
vehicle-registration document. He explained that his license plates had been stolen in
Arizona.
Two passengers were in Trevino’s vehicle when it was stopped. T he back -seat
passenger, H.B., informed Officer Gadbois that she was Trevino’s girlfriend and had just
3
flown from Arizona to the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport to visit him. Officer Cook asked
Trevino why he was in Mille Lacs County, 120 miles from the airport. Trevino stated that
he and H.B. were visiting A.W., a friend of H.B.’s brother who lived nearby in the city of
Garrison. The officers were familiar with A.W. , whose house also was known by law-
enforcement officers as a place where drug trafficking often occurred. The front-seat
passenger, J.J., also was known to the officers as someone associated with drugs and with
the house where Trevino’s vehicle was first seen. Trevino and H.B. stated that they first
met J.J. earlier that day at A.W.’ s house and were asked to give her a ride to the house
where Trevino’s vehicle was first seen. Trevino also stated that he was driving back to
A.W.’s house when officers stopped his vehicle.
The officers asked Trevino to exit the vehicle while they searched a database for his
driver’s license. He complied. Approximately 14 minutes after the initiation of the traffic
stop, the officers asked Trevino for consent to search his vehicle. He declined. The officers
asked for consent a second time approximately two minutes later, and Trevino again
declined.
Officer Gadbois then saw the outline of a methamphetamine pipe in a pocket of
Trevino’s cargo shorts. Officer Gadbois asked Trevino what was in his pocket. Trevino
emptied two other pockets but did not remove the pipe. Officer Gadbois patted Trevino’s
pocket and confirmed that it contained a methamphetamine pipe. Trevino removed the
pipe from his pocket and handed it to Officer Gadbois, who inspected it and saw that it was
clean. Officer Cook continued questioning Trevino by asking whether there was any
marijuana or other drugs in the vehicle. Trevino responded in the negative. Officer Cook
4
asked Trevino whether there were any weapons in the car. Trevino again answered in the
negative.
Approximately 21 minutes after the traffic stop began, Trevino began breathing
heavily and sweating profusely. Trevino asked the officers for a cup of soda that was in
his vehicle. Officer Gadbois retrieved the cup and gave it to Trevino. The officers
questioned Trevino about what was causing him to sweat so much.
Approximately 24 minutes after the traffic stop began, Trevino became unsteady on
his feet. According to Officer Cook, Trevino “looked like he was going [to] vomit, and
then almost tipped over.” Officer Cook assisted Trevino by lowering him to a seated
position on the ground . Officer Cook told Officer Gadbois to search Trevino’s vehicle.
Trevino asked Officer Cook why they were going to search his vehicle. Officer Cook
responded by saying, “Because we have probable cause; that’s why.” As Officer Gadbois
walked toward the driver’s door to start searching, Trevino said to Officer Cook, “There’s
a weapon in the car.” Officer Gadbois searched the vehicle and found a handgun, several
marijuana cartridges, and drug paraphernalia with a small amount of methamphetamine
residue that was not weighed.
The state charged Trevino with unlawful possession of a firearm by an ineligible
person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b (2020). In November 2021, Trevino
moved to suppress the evidence of the handgun and to dismiss the complaint. In February
2022, the district court conducted an omnibus hearing at which three persons testified:
Trevino, Officer Cook, and Officer Gadbois. Trevino filed a memorandum in which he
argued that the officers expanded the scope of the stop without reasonable suspicion and
5
conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle without probable cause. In November 2022,
the district court denied Trevino’s motion. The district court reasoned that the officers
lawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop and lawfully conducted a warrantless search
of Trevino’s vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
In July 2023, Trevino waived his right to a trial by jury. See Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 1(2)(a). The parties agreed to try the case on the basis of documentary exhibits
and Trevino’s stipulation to prior convictions. The parties also agreed that the ruling on
Trevino’s pre-trial motion would be dispositive of the case and that a trial would be
unnecessary. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. After trial, t he district court filed an
order in which it found Trevino guilty. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months
of imprisonment but stayed execution of the sentence, placed Trevino on probation, and
ordered him to serve six months in the county jail. Trevino appeals.
DECISION
Trevino argues that the district court erred by denying his pre- trial motion to
suppress evidence and to dismiss. Trevino’s argument has two parts. First, he argues that
the officers did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when they
questioned him during the traffic stop and that the officers unreasonably ex panded the
duration of the traffic stop. Second, he argues that the officers did not have probable cause
to believe that contraband was in his vehicle when they conducted a warrantless search of
the vehicle. We confine our analysis to the second part of Trevino’ s argument, which is
dispositive of the appeal.

6
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Minnesota Constitution contains substantially the same
language. Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
A warrantless search generally is presumed to be unreasonable and a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011); State v. Edstrom,
916 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. 2018). A warrantless search may be deemed reasonable,
however, if a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
applies. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013); State v. Rohde, 852 N.W.2d 260,
263-64 (Minn. 2014).
One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. Under
that exception, “police may search a car without a warrant, including closed containers in
that car, if there is probable cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence
or contraband.” State v. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted).
A warrantless search may be justified under the automobile exception because it often is
“not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
7
The determination of whether a warrantless search of a vehicle is supported by
probable cause is “an objective inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances in
each case. ” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) ; see also State v.
Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 173 (Minn. 2023). Probable cause exists if “there are facts
and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe that the
vehicle contains contraband.” Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771 (quotation and alteration
omitted). This determination is “a common-sense, nontechnical concept that involves the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). “The probable
cause necessary to support a warrantless search of a motor vehicle ‘must be based on
objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely
on the subjective good faith of the police officers.’” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128,
136 (Minn. 1999) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982)). This court
applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s determination that a warrantless
search was supported by probable cause. Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771.
In this case, the district court reasoned that the search of Trevino’ s vehicle was
justified because the following circumstances provided the officers with probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contained contraband:
(1) the vehicle ’s presence in the driveway of a known drug
house that is home to an individual with active felony warrants
for drug trafficking offenses, (2) the front passenger was
known to the officers to have an extensive history with
controlled substance use and has been associated with
numerous drug overdoses in recent months, (3) the individual
that Defendant and the other occupants stated they were going
8
to meet also resided at a residence known to the officers to be
a drug house, (4) Defendant and the other occupants were
breathing heavily and appeared anxious, (5) Defendant once
informed of the impending search of his vehicle began
profusely sweating, (6) Defendant nearly collapsed prior to his
detention, and (7) Defendant was in possession of a pipe
primarily used to smoke methamphetamine.

Trevino contends that these circumstances do not establish probable cause to believe
that contraband would be found in his vehicle . He asserts that the circumstances of this
case are different from other cases in which probable cause was present because of a
confidential informant ’s tip, furtive movements indicating a consciousness of guilt,
contraband in plain view, or the odor of controlled substances. See, e.g., State v. Mosley,
994 N.W.2d 883, 893 (Minn. 2023) (corroborated informant’s tip); State v. Willis, 320
N.W.2d 726, 728 (Minn. 1982) (handgun in plain view); State v. Gallagher, 275 N.W.2d
803, 805-08 (Minn. 1979) (furtive gestures of occupants); State v. Wicklund, 205 N.W.2d
509, 510-11 (Minn. 1973) (odor of burnt marijuana).
In response, the state cites only one precedential opinion in support of its argument
that the warrantless search was supported by probable cause: State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d
346 (Minn. 2012). But Smith is a case concerning reasonable suspicion, not probable
cause. Id. at 348. The reasonable-suspicion standard is a “less demanding” standard than
the probable-cause standard. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011) (quotation
omitted). Accordingly, Smith does not support the state’s argument that the officers had
probable cause to believe that contraband was inside Trevino’s vehicle.
The state also cites one nonprecedential opinion: State v. Allinder, No. A08-0068,
2009 WL 304879 (Minn. App. Feb. 10, 2009). In that case, this court concluded that
9
officers had probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle because an officer noticed
“an extremely strong pungent odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle’s interior,”
the driver admitted to smoking marijuana while driving and to having a marijuana pipe in
his pocket, and t he pipe contained a small amount of burnt marijuana. Id. at *2. Such
circumstances are absent from the record in this case. Officers Cook and Gadbois
specifically testified that there was no odor of drugs or alcohol coming from Trevino’s
vehicle. Trevino did not admit to using drugs while driving and exhibited no signs of being
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The pipe in Trevino’s pocket was clean .
Accordingly, Allinder is easily distinguishable. Our independent research has not revealed
any caselaw supporting the state’s argument that the facts and circumstances of this case
establish probable cause for a warrantless search of Trevino’s vehicle.1
The district court relied on multiple circumstances for its conclusion that the officers
had probable cause for a warrantless search of Trevino’s vehicle. Each of those
circumstances, by itself, is “weak evidence of drug possession.” See State v. Burbach, 706
N.W.2d 484, 490 (Minn. 2005). Trevino’s front-seat passenger was known by the officers
to be associated with drugs. But mere association with a person who is a known drug user
typically does not satisfy even the lower reasonable-suspicion standard, let alone the

1The state does not argue that Trevino’s statement to Officer Cook about the weapon
in his car supports the district court’s probable-cause determination. Likewise, the state
did not make such an argument to the district court, and the district court did not mention
Trevino’s statement in its probable- cause analysis. The absence of such argument and
analysis may be due to the fact that Trevino made the statement after the officers decided
to search his vehicle and after Officer Cook stated to Trevino that probable cause was
present. Thus, we do not consider Trevino’s statement in our probable-cause analysis.
10
probable-cause standard. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 844. Trevino’s vehicle was traveling
between two known drug houses. But mere presence in a high-crime area also falls short
of the lower reasonable-suspicion standard. See State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 890
(Minn. 1998); State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992); see also Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 (1979). Trevino possessed a methamphetamine pipe, but it was
clean, which indicates that it had not been used recently, thus distinguishing this case from
those in which an occupant of a vehicle possessed a pipe encrusted with drug residue. See,
e.g., State v. Veigel , 304 N.W.2d 900, 901-02 (Minn. 1981); Thiel, 846 N.W.2d at 609,
611; Allinder, 2009 WL 304879, at *2-3. Trevino became light-headed and nearly fainted.
But a suspect’s nervousness or shaking usually is insufficient to satisfy the lower
reasonable-suspicion standard. See Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 490-91; State v. Wiegand, 645
N.W.2d 125, 128, 137 (Minn. 2002); State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App.
2003); cf. Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 352-54.
The circumstances identified by the district court are not just weak in isolation but
also “weak in the aggregate.” See Burbach , 706 N.W.2d at 490. In other cases with
multiple weak indicators of criminal activity, the supreme court has concluded that the
circumstances did not satisfy the reasonable- suspicion standard, which, again, is a lower
standard than the probable-cause standard. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 (passenger’s
prior drug sales and possibly furtive actions in vehicle and defendant’s remaining in
vehicle); Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 490-91 (defendant’s nervousness, fidgetiness,
talkativeness, stale unsubstantiated tip, and speeding); Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 137
(defendant’s evasiveness, nervousness, glossy eyes, and vaguely suspicious actions). In
11
some situations, multiple similar circumstances may satisfy the reasonable-suspicion
standard. See State v. Garding, 12 N.W.3d 697, 699-701, 706 (Minn. 2024) (defendant’s
suspicious behavior, passenger’s suspicious explanations, physical indicia of passenger’s
“prolonged drug use,” and officer’s observation of plastic bag possibly containing drugs);
State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 487-88 (Minn. 2016) (defendant’s vehicle leaving known
drug house, defendant’s recent arrest for drug possession, defendant’s untruthful statement,
and defendant’s incriminating statement). But, again, the reasonable-suspicion standard is
a “less demanding” standard than the probable-cause standard. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843.
Regardless of whether the circumstances of this case could satisfy the lower
reasonable-suspicion standard, there is a conspicuous absence of caselaw indicating that,
under a totality- of-the-circumstances analysis, the circumstances of this case satisfy the
probable-cause standard. In the absence of such caselaw, we conclude that the f acts and
circumstances are insufficient to justify a belief by a reasonably prudent person that
Trevino’s vehicle contained contraband. See Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771.
Thus, the district court erred by denying Trevino’s pre-trial motion to suppress
evidence and to dismiss the complaint.
Before concluding, we must determine the appropriate appellate remedy. The
parties agree that Trevino’s guilt was determined in a stipulated- evidence court trial
pursuant to rule 26.01, subdivision 4, of the rules of criminal procedure. In such a trial,
“the parties agree that the court’s ruling on a specified pretrial issue is dispositive of the
case” and that “a trial will be unnecessary if the defendant prevails on appeal.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(a), (c). In light of the parties’ agreement, our conclusion that the
12
district court erred in its pre-trial ruling is dispositive of the case, without the need for a
remand for further proceedings. See State v. Galvan-Contreras , 980 N.W.2d 578, 582,
586-87 (Minn. 2022) (reversing conviction without remand after concluding that district
court erred by denying pre-trial motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause in case tried
pursuant to rule 26.01, subdivision 4); State v. Yang, 814 N.W.2d 716, 718, 722-23 (Minn.
App. 2012) (reversing conviction without remand after concluding that district court erred
by denying pre-trial motion to suppress evidence in case tried pursuant to rule 26.01,
subdivision 4). Therefore, we reverse Trevino’s conviction without a remand.
Reversed.