State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0093

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Aidan Bebee Lauseng,
Appellant.

Filed December 9, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-20-1499

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Scott Springer, Assistant County Attorney,
Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Andrew C. Wilson, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, appellant Aidan Bebee Lauseng argues that (1) the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress his non-Mirandized statement to law enforcement officers, (2) the
2
district court abused its discretion by rejecting the parties’ plea agreement due to the
downward dispositional sentencing departure contemplated by the plea agreement, and
(3) the district court abused its discretion by denying Lauseng’s motion for a downward
dispositional departure following trial. We conclude that the district court did not err by
denying Lauseng’s suppression motion because Lauseng was not in custody when he gave
his statement to law enforcement officers and thus was not entitled to a Miranda warning.
We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the plea
agreement or denying the downward-dispositional-departure motion. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
On August 1, 2020, Sergeant Ellis and Deputy Wilson of the Mower County
Sheriff’s Office responded to Lauseng’s residence after receiving a report that Lauseng had
sexually abused a relative who lived in the same home and was under 16 years of age.
Lauseng was 19 years old on August 1, 2020, and was 18 to19 years old during the time of
the reported abuse.
Upon arriving at the residence, the officers observed Lauseng and his mother getting
out of a vehicle. 1 Lauseng then entered the residence. Shortly thereafter, the victim came
out of the residence. Deputy Wilson and the victim went into his squad car, where he spoke
with her for approximately 20 to 30 minutes.

1 Lauseng’s biological mother is the victim’s stepmother. According to the victim, her
biological father, who is married to Lauseng’s mother, is Lauseng’s adoptive father. This
opinion refers to these individuals as Lauseng’s mother and father.
3
While Deputy Wilson was speaking with the victim, Sergeant Ellis spoke with
Lauseng’s mother and father outside the residence. According to Sergeant Ellis, Lauseng’s
father retrieved Lauseng from the residence. Sergeant Ellis escorted Lauseng behind his
squad car. There, Sergeant Ellis interrogated Lauseng without providing a Miranda
warning. During that questioning, Lauseng admitted to engaging in oral sex and sexual
intercourse with the victim on multiple occasions. Lauseng stated that the first act occurred
in October or November 2019 and the most recent act occurred the previous week. 2
After the officers discussed with each other their conversations with Lauseng and
the victim, they arrested Lauseng.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Lauseng with one count of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct—penetration— victim under 16—significant relationship—
multiple acts. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1 (h)(iii) (Supp. 2019). 3 Lauseng moved to
suppress the incriminating statements that he made to Sergeant Ellis. The district court
denied Lauseng’s motion.
While the motion to suppress was pending, the parties informed the district court
that they had reached a plea agreement. Lauseng agreed to plead guilty to the charged
offense. In exchange, the state agreed to a downward dispositional departure from the
presumptive 144-month prison sentence, staying execution of the sentence provided that

2 The victim gave a similar timeline but stated that the acts of physical sexual abuse started
in mid-September 2019.

3 Because the district court found that the relevant acts began in August 2019, this opinion
references the 2019 supplement to the Minnesota Statutes, where applicable.
4
Lauseng successfully complete sex-offender treatment, remain law abiding, cooperate with
the presentence-investigation process, return to the district court for sentencing, and abide
by any other probationary terms and conditions imposed. After Lauseng pleaded guilty, the
district court deferred acceptance of the plea and required Lauseng to file a motion for a
dispositional departure, which he did. The district court then denied Lauseng’s motion for
a dispositional departure, rejected the plea agreement, allowed Lauseng to withdraw his
plea, and set the case for trial.
Lauseng waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a stipulated-
evidence trial pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 3. The
district court found Lauseng guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct as charged.
Lauseng again moved for a downward dispositional departure. The district court denied the
motion and sentenced Lauseng to the guidelines sentence of 144 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by denying Lauseng’s motion to suppress his non-
Mirandized incriminatory statements because Lauseng was not in custody
when he made them.

Lauseng argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence of the incriminating statements that he made to Sergeant Ellis without having
received a Miranda warning. We disagree.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution requires Miranda warnings as a
procedural safeguard for protecting a suspect’s right against self-incrimination when police
subject the suspect to a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439,
5
444 (1966); see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) . In the absence of a
Miranda warning, statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation are not
admissible at trial. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 30 (Minn. 2016). Here, the state does
not dispute that Lauseng was interrogated for purposes of Miranda. The question is
whether Lauseng was in custody.
“The issue of whether a suspect is in custody and therefore entitled to a Miranda
warning presents a mixed question of law and fact . . . .” State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162,
167 (Minn. 2013) (quotations and citation omitted). Appellate courts review the district
court’s “findings of historical fact relating to the circumstances of the interrogation
pursuant to the clearly erroneous test but make[] an independent review of the [district]
court[’]s determination regarding custody and the need for a Miranda warning.” Id. at 167-
68 (quotation omitted). Further, appellate courts “grant considerable, but not unlimited,
deference to a [district] court’s fact-specific resolution of such an issue when the proper
legal standard is applied.” Id. at 168 (quotation omitted).
Custodial interrogation occurs when, “based on all the surrounding circumstances,
‘a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police
custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.’” State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485,
491 (Minn. 2010) (quoting State v. Champion, 533 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. 1995)); see also
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011). “[N]o factor alone is determinative”
under this totality-of- the-circumstances test. Thompson , 788 N.W.2d at 491. When
determining whether the person being interrogated is in custody, courts “should focus
6
primarily on the perspective of the suspect, rather than the subjective intent of the police.”
State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 725 (Minn. 1998).
The following factors are indicative of custody:
police interviewing the suspect at the police station; the officer
telling the individual that he or she is the prime suspect;
officers restraining the suspect’s freedom; the suspect making
a significantly incriminating statement; the presence of
multiple officers (six); and a gun pointing at the suspect.

State v. Staats, 658 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Minn. 2003). The following factors, on the other
hand, may indicate that the suspect was not in custody:
questioning taking place in the suspect’s home; police
expressly informing the suspect that he or she is not under
arrest; the suspect leaving the police station at the close of the
interview without hindrance; the brevity of questioning (fifteen
minutes); the suspect’s freedom to leave at any time; a
nonthreatening environment; and the suspect’s ability to make
phone calls.

Id. at 212. Together, these factors are sometimes called the Staats factors. E.g., Thompson,
788 N.W.2d at 492.
A. Relevant Facts
We begin our analysis by describing in more detail the relevant facts surrounding
the interrogation, relying primarily on court testimony and audio recordings.
When the officers responded to the report of abuse, Sergeant Ellis first spoke with
Lauseng’s parents outside the residence while Deputy Wilson spoke with the victim.
Lauseng’s mother informed Sergeant Ellis that Lauseng was wondering what was going
on. In response, S ergeant Ellis stated, “If you want to . . . I can talk to [Lauseng] and let
him know what’s going on . . . . [A]t some point we’re going to have to talk to him
7
anyway.” Sergeant Ellis added, “If you want to go get him, I’d be more than happy to speak
with him.” Lauseng’s father then retrieved Lauseng from the residence.
After Lauseng came out of the residence, Sergeant Ellis told him, “If you want, I
can step back here and talk to ya so that whatever you want to tell me or I’ll advise you of
what’s going on, okay.” After Lauseng responded, “Okay,” Sergeant Ellis said, “Okay, step
back here.” Sergeant Ellis added, “Just so you know, you’re not going anywhere.” Sergeant
Ellis then escorted Lauseng behind his squad car, which was parked in the driveway.
While they were standing in the yard by the squad car, Sergeant Ellis explained to
Lauseng that someone had made allegations of “inappropriate stuff between [Lauseng] and
[the victim], as far as sexually.” Sergeant Ellis then questioned Lauseng about the
allegations. Lauseng acknowledged that he engaged in sexual conduct with his minor
relative.
Sergeant Ellis testified that he did not give Lauseng a Miranda warning “[b]ecause,
at that time, [he] had no knowledge that the crime had occurred.” After Sergeant Ellis
finished speaking with Lauseng, Sergeant Ellis had Lauseng enter the squad car, telling
him, “I got to talk to my partner here. I’m going to have you have a seat right here. You’re
not under arrest. I want you to be aware of that.” Sergeant Ellis and Deputy Wilson then
consulted each other about their conversations with Lauseng and the victim. After that
discussion, Sergeant Ellis and Deputy Wilson arrested Lauseng.
B. Custody Analysis
We turn to the application of law to these facts. The district court found that Lauseng
was not in custody, reasoning that:
8
(1) [Lauseng] voluntarily initiated contact with the police as
the stepfather retrieved him and Sgt. Ellis asked him to come
out to the yard behind his squad car; (2) Interrogation was
outside [Lauseng’s] home; (3) The questioning period was
approximately 12 minutes long (relatively brief); (4) Sgt. Ellis
did not expressly inform [Lauseng] that he was under arrest;
(5) [Lauseng] was able to leave at any time as there is no
evidence that the location restricted [ Lauseng’s] movement;
(6) Sgt. Ellis is the only officer that questioned [Lauseng].

Lauseng first challenges the district court’s factual finding that Sergeant Ellis “did
not ask to speak with” Lauseng; instead, he asserts, Sergeant Ellis “directed” Lauseng’s
father to retrieve Lauseng from the home. Lauseng cites Sergeant Ellis’s testimony that,
when speaking to Lauseng’s father at the residence, Sergeant Ellis said, “Go ahead and get
[Lauseng], and I’ll tell him why we’re here.” But, when the full conversation is considered,
the statement is more akin to an offer to speak with Lauseng than a demand. Sergeant Ellis
mentioned talking with Lauseng only after Lauseng’s mother told Sergeant Ellis that
Lauseng was wondering “what was going on.” Sergeant Ellis then said he would be happy
to speak with Lauseng if his parents wanted to go get him. On this record, the district court
did not clearly err by finding that the officer did not ask to speak with Lauseng. See
Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 167.
Lauseng next argues that the totality of the circumstances indicates that Lauseng
was in custody. He emphasizes that there was more than one officer present, that the
officers were in uniform, that they parked their squad cars in a manner that prevented any
car from leaving the residence, that Sergeant Ellis told Lauseng that he was accused of
sexual wrongdoing, that the interrogation occurred near a police car outside his home, that
Sergeant Ellis never told him he was not required to answer any questions or that he was
9
free to leave, and that the officers arrested Lauseng “immediately” after he spoke with
Sergeant Ellis.
We begin our review by considering the extent to which the Staats factors that are
indicative of custody are present. First, Sergeant Ellis interrogated Lauseng in his yard, not
at a police station. Second, Sergeant Ellis’s statement to Lauseng that someone made
allegations of Lauseng’s sexual misconduct with the victim falls short of him telling
Lauseng that there was a crime of which Lauseng was the prime suspect. Third, there is no
indication that Sergeant Ellis physically restrained Lauseng during the interrogation or
otherwise prevented Lauseng from walking away. The fact that Sergeant Ellis told Lauseng
to take a seat in the squad car after the interrogation is irrelevant to this analysis. 4 Fourth,
though Deputy Wilson overheard a portion of Lauseng ’s statements, Lauseng primarily
made them to a single officer— Sergeant Ellis. Fifth, neither officer pointed a gun at
Lauseng. Finally, although the fact that Lauseng made incriminating statements points to
custody, a significantly incriminating statement does not automatically convert a
noncustodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation. State v. Heden, 719 N.W.2d 689,
695 (Minn. 2006).

4 Lauseng’s argument that the officers arrested him immediately after the interrogation
does not affect the custody analysis. “[A]n officer’s unarticulated decision not to let the
suspect leave at the end of the interrogation has no bearing on the question of whether a
suspect was in custody; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the
suspect’s position would have understood the situation.” Champion, 533 N.W.2d at 43.
Further, the record does not support Lause ng’s argument that the officers arrested him
immediately after the interrogation because, after Sergeant Ellis finished interrogating
Lauseng, Sergeant Ellis explicitly told Lauseng that he was not under arrest as he had him
enter the squad car.
10
We next turn to the Staats factors that may indicate a suspect was not in custody.
First, though the interrogation did not occur inside Lauseng’s residence, it did occur in the
yard outside his residence, which was a familiar location to Lauseng. Second, Sergeant
Ellis’s statement to Lauseng before the interrogation started that Lauseng was “not going
anywhere,” in context conveyed that, at that time, Lauseng was not under arrest. Third, the
questioning lasted under 13 minutes, which is within the 15-minute period that the supreme
court has suggested is brief. See State v. Hince, 540 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn. 1995). Fourth,
while Sergeant Ellis never told Lauseng that he was free to leave, Lauseng was not in
handcuffs or in Sergeant Ellis’s squad car during the interrogation. Fifth, while we
recognize that a police interrogation may feel threatening to the person being interrogated,
the environment here was largely nonthreatening because Sergeant Ellis never raised his
voice or threatened Lauseng.
In sum, only one Staa ts factor meaningfully points to custody and multiple factors
indicate that Lauseng was not in custody when he made the non-Mirandized statements.
Based on our independent review, a reasonable person in Lauseng’s place would not have
believed that they were in police custody to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See
Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 492. As a result, Lauseng was not in custody during the
interrogation and the district court did not err by admitting his non-Mirandized statements.
11
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the parties’ plea
agreement.

Lauseng argues that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the parties’
plea agreement on the basis of the agreement’s downward dispositional departure in
sentencing. We disagree.
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to reject a plea agreement for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Klug, 839 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. App. 2013). Likewise ,
appellate courts review a district court’s decision not to depart from the sentencing
guidelines under the abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08
(Minn. 2014) . “A district court abuses its discretion when it s decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Mikell,
960 N.W.2d 230, 256 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). Because district courts have
significant discretion in imposing sentences, appellate courts rarely reverse decisions not
to depart from the sentencing guidelines. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn.
App. 2018); see Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 305, 307-08.
“The district court must order the presumptive sentence provided in the sentencing
guidelines unless ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ warrant a departure.” State v.
Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Cameron, 370 N.W.2d
486, 487 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 29, 1985)); see Minn. Stat. § 609.11,
subd. 8(a) (2018). “Substantial and compelling circumstances are those circumstances that
make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.” State v. Olson, 765
12
N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn.
1985)).
A downward dispositional departure “places the offender in a different setting than
called for by the presumptive guidelines sentence,” such as a stay of execution of a
sentence. State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). Because the plea agreement
called for a stay of execution of the presumptive 144-month prison sentence for someone
with Lauseng’s offense and no criminal history, a downward dispositional departure is at
issue in this case. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.B (Supp. 2019).
The sentencing guidelines provide a non-exhaustive list of factors that district courts
may use as reasons for departing from a presumptive sentence, including whether “[ t]he
offender is particularly amenable to probation.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3(a)(7)
(Supp. 2019). State v. Trog sets forth several factors for evaluating whether the defendant
is particularly amenable to probation, including “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his
remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or
family.” 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). The district court need not discuss all the Trog
factors before imposing the presumptive sentence. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 254. Even if a
defendant is particularly amenable to probation, the law does not require that the district
court impose a downward dispositional departure. Olson, 765 N.W.2d at 664-65.
In challenging the district court’s decision, Lauseng contends that the district court
abused its discretion by finding that Lauseng “ha[d] not made a showing of remorse and
provide[d] no evidence of family support adequate to prevent a re-offense.” Lauseng also
argues that the district court relied on an erroneous view of the law in denying the motion
13
because it addressed the propriety of granting a dispositional departure in terms of whether
Lauseng’s family would support the victim, rather than Lauseng.
Lauseng’s arguments are unconvincing. The district court’s order shows that the
district court reviewed relevant information, such as a psychosexual evaluation of Lauseng,
Lauseng’s presentencing-investigation report , and a statement from the victim. It then
relied upon that information in determining that Lauseng was not particularly amenable to
probation based on, among other factors, a lack of remorse, a lack of necessary familial
support to prevent reoffense, and a risk of reoffense. A lack of necessary familial support
is a relevant factor under Trog. 323 N.W.2d at 31. Even if Lauseng had showed some
remorse, as he argues, the presence of remorse alone does not require the district court to
grant his motion for a downward dispositional departure. See Olson, 765 N.W.2d at 665
(holding that a district court is not required to grant a motion for a downward dispositional
departure even if the defendant is particularly amenable to probation). There is no
indication that the district court based its decision on an “erroneous view of the law” or
that the decision “is against logic and the facts in the record.” Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 256
(quotation omitted).
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lauseng’s
first departure motion. For the same reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by rejecting the parties’ plea agreement.
14
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lauseng’s departure
motion when sentencing him after trial.

Lauseng argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure following his trial and conviction. We disagree.
Again, we review a district court’s decision to not depart from sentencing guidelines
for an abuse of discretion. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. The same principles discussed in
the preceding section regarding sentencing departures apply here.
Lauseng argues that the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision on
an erroneous view of the law—specifically, by considering the nature of the offense,
particularly the duration of the abuse, in denying the motion. Lauseng relies in part on State
v. Johnson, in which the supreme court stated that “it would be unfair” to consider the
victim’s age as an aggravating factor supporting an upward durational departure when the
legislature had already taken the age of the victim into account by adding it as an element
of the crime. 327 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1982). The offense of which Lauseng was
convicted includes the following element: “the sexual abuse involved multiple acts
committed over an extended period of time.” Minn. Stat. § 609.342.1(h)(iii) (emphasis
added). Lauseng argues that, because the district court stated, “This isn’t a one-time deal.
This is grooming over a period of time,” the district court improperly considered an element
of the crime in denying the departure motion.
Lauseng also relies on State v. Solberg, in which the supreme court noted that a
dispositional departure “typically focuses on characteristics of the defendant that show
whether the defendant is particularly suitable for individualized treatment in a probationary
15
setting.” 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Lauseng argues that
the district court improperly focused its inquiry on the characteristics of the offense rather
than the characteristics of the offender in denying a dispositional departure.
We are not convinced. Regarding Johnson, the district court here did not rely on an
element of the crime as a basis for imposing an upward durational departure from the
sentencing guidelines. Rather, in considering whether Lauseng was particularly amenable
to probation—and thus whether a downward dispositional departure was warranted —the
district court considered facts that showed that Lauseng did not have a one-time lapse in
judgment. In doing so, the district court did not unfairly consider an element of the offense
as an aggravating factor justifying an upward departure in sentencing.
Moreover, Lauseng provides no authority for the proposition that a district court
may not take into account an offender’s conduct in determining whether the offender is
particularly amenable to probation. In Solberg, the supreme court was evaluating a
durational departure, which, it explained, “must be based on the nature of the offense, not
the individual characteristics of the offender. ” Id. at 625. While the supreme court also
explained that a dispositional departure “typically focuses” on the characteristics of the
offender, id. at 623, Solberg does not hold that an offender’s behavior cannot be considered
in evaluating the offender’s particular amenability to probation.
Finally, the record here shows that the district court did not focus only on Lauseng’s
behavior but also considered other information, including Lauseng’s psychosexual
evaluation, in finding that Lauseng was not particularly amenable to probation. And, in any
16
event, even if Lauseng was particularly amenable to probation, the district court was not
obligated to impose a downward dispositional departure. See Olson, 765 N.W.2d at 665.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lauseng’s motion for a
downward dispositional departure.
Affirmed.