State of Minnesota v. Paul James Steichen
Opinion text
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A24-0097
Court of Appeals Hennesy, J.
Dissenting, McKeig, Moore, III, JJ.
State of Minnesota,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: June 17, 2026
Office of Appellate Courts
Paul James Steichen,
Respondent.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarity, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota for
appellant.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant State
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1. To satisfy the accuracy requirement for a valid guilty plea, a Norgaard plea,
like an Alford plea, requires a strong factual basis sufficient to allow a district court to
independently conclude that there is a strong probability that a defendant is guilty of the
charge to which they are pleading guilty.
1
2. Because the State did not describe the evidence it would present at trial to
convict respondent of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, respondent’s Norgaard plea
was not supported by a strong factual basis from which a district court could
independently conclude that there was a strong probability that respondent was guilty of
fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Affirmed.
OPINION
HENNESY, Justice.
The State charged respondent Paul James Steichen with two counts of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct. After the district court accepted his Norgaard plea1 to fifth-
degree criminal sexual conduct, Steichen appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that
the plea was constitutionally invalid because it was not supported by a strong factual
basis. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for Steichen to withdraw the plea,
determining that the State had failed to provide an adequate factual basis from which the
district court could have concluded that there was a strong probability that Steichen
would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial. The State
petitioned for further review, arguing that the court of appeals erred by requiring
1
A Norgaard plea is a type of guilty plea in which a defendant pleads guilty despite
having no recollection of the incident that led to the criminal charges. See State ex rel.
Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Minn. 1961).
2
Steichen’s Norgaard plea to meet the “strong factual basis” standard required for a valid
Alford plea2 and concluding that Steichen’s plea did not meet that standard.
We hold that, to be valid, a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, requires a strong
factual basis which, at minimum, must include a description of the State’s evidence that is
sufficient for a district court to find that there is a strong probability that a defendant is
guilty of the charge to which they are pleading guilty. Based on the record in this case, we
conclude that Steichen’s Norgaard plea was not supported by a strong factual basis
because the factual inquiry conducted at Steichen’s plea hearing did not include any
description of the evidence the State would have presented at trial to secure a conviction
of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.
FACTS
The State charged respondent Paul James Steichen with two counts of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct for forcing a vulnerable adult to engage in oral sex with him.
Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(a), (b). Two days before trial, Steichen filed notice of an
intoxication defense. On the day of trial, pursuant to plea negotiations, Steichen entered a
Norgaard guilty plea to an amended charge of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct in
exchange for the State dismissing the remaining third-degree criminal sexual conduct
count. At the plea hearing, Steichen’s attorney reviewed Steichen’s petition to enter a
guilty plea and a Norgaard plea addendum with him on the record. Steichen indicated
2
An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty when that defendant is
“unwilling or unable to admit” to participating in the acts constituting the crime. North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
3
that he could not remember the events alleged because he was drunk on the day of the
offense. He acknowledged that he had reviewed the evidence that the State would offer
against him if he had a trial. Steichen agreed that there was a substantial likelihood that a
jury would find him “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” of the offense to which he was
pleading guilty and confirmed that he was making no claim that he was innocent of the
charge. The prosecutor asked the following questions to establish a factual basis for
Steichen’s plea:
PROSECUTOR: Sir, I understand you—you don’t recall the date in
question, right?
STEICHEN: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And the evidence you talked about reviewing
with your attorney would establish, though, that on June 5th of this year, you
were in Richfield, Hennepin County, when you encountered a male with the
initials of C.T., and at some point the two of you engaged in sexual
penetration. Specifically, you put your penis in his mouth and he either said
no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual. You understand that
that’s the evidence that the State would present in this case?
STEICHEN: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: All right. And that’s the evidence that you are, through
your Norgaard waiver, are not contesting and accepting as sufficient for the
State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
STEICHEN: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. I believe that’s sufficient, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I think it is too. And so we’ll receive, then, the
Norgaard plea document. And at this time, Mr. Steichen, I am finding that
you have made a knowing waiver of your trial rights, sir, in this matter, and
you have been advised of those rights thoroughly by your lawyer…. In
addition, I’m finding that—that there are sufficient facts that have been
averred to support your Norgaard plea of guilty to the amended Count 1 of
4
criminal sexual conduct in the 5th degree occurring on or about June 5th of
2023.
I’m not going to accept that plea at this time. Instead, we’re going to schedule
this matter for sentencing.
The district court subsequently accepted Steichen’s plea and sentenced him to 14 months
in prison but stayed the prison sentence conditioned upon his successful completion of
three years of probation.
Steichen appealed, arguing to the court of appeals that his Norgaard plea was not
valid because it was not supported by a strong factual basis. Relying on its decision in
Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12–13 (Minn. App. 2009), the court of appeals stated
that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea requires two components: “a strong
factual basis and the defendant’s acknowledgment that the evidence would be sufficient
for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Steichen,
No. A24-0097, 2024 WL 4927659, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 2, 2024) (quoting Williams,
760 N.W.2d at 12–13). These components, the court reasoned, “provide the court with a
basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would
be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.” Id. (quoting Williams,
760 N.W.2d at 13). Here, the court of appeals determined that the record did not provide
a basis for it to “conclude that there [was] a strong probability that Steichen would be
found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.” Id. at *3. As a result, the court of
appeals concluded that Steichen’s Norgaard plea was invalid and reversed and remanded
to allow Steichen to withdraw his plea. Id. at *4. We granted the State’s petition for
review.
5
ANALYSIS
We first consider whether a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, must be supported
by a strong factual basis. We then consider whether Steichen’s plea meets the applicable
standard. A plea’s validity is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Schwartz,
957 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Minn. 2021).
I.
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Here, Steichen challenges
only the accuracy of his plea. The purpose of the accuracy requirement “is to ensure that
the defendant is in fact substantively culpable for the crime of conviction.” State v.
Paulson, 22 N.W.3d 144, 151 (Minn. 2025). Accordingly, it is the plea’s accuracy that
prevents a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious charge than that of which the
defendant could be found guilty at trial. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn.
1994).
For a guilty plea to be accurate, the district court must ensure that a proper factual
basis supports the plea.3 State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007). “In a typical
plea, where the defendant admits his or her guilt, an adequate factual basis is usually
3
We have previously observed that the factual basis requirement also “provides a
means by which the trial court can test whether the plea is being intelligently entered,
since an Alford-type plea could hardly be accepted as an intelligent, rational plea if there
were an insufficient factual basis offered to support it.” State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d
758, 761 (Minn. 1977). Here, however, the parties do not challenge the intelligence of
Steichen’s plea or his acknowledgment that he believed the State had sufficient evidence
to convict him of the crime to which he pleaded guilty.
6
established by questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in his or her
own words the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. The
district court must then determine whether the “defendant’s admissions of the relevant
facts and circumstances of his conduct establish that he committed the offense charged or
an offense at least as serious as the offense to which he is tendering his plea.” State v.
Hoaglund, 240 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1976). The district court may not accept a typical
guilty plea unless there are “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that
defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Kelsey v.
State, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. 1974).
There are, however, two types of pleas that allow a defendant to plead guilty
without admitting the facts or circumstances constituting a crime: Alford4 and Norgaard
pleas. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. In an Alford plea, a defendant may plead guilty
while maintaining innocence. See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn.
2015); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding that express
admission of guilt is not a constitutional requisite to a valid guilty plea and that an
individual “may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of
a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime”). In a Norgaard plea, a defendant pleads guilty despite claiming
4
In Minnesota, Alford pleas are sometimes referred to as Goulette pleas, based on
our holding in State v. Goulette that a district court “may accept a plea of guilty by an
accused even though the accused protests that he is innocent.” 258 N.W.2d 758, 761
(Minn. 1977); see State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716 (stating that Alford pleas are
sometimes referred to as Goulette pleas in Minnesota). We use the term “Alford pleas” in
this opinion.
7
an inability to remember the circumstances of the offense due to intoxication, amnesia, or
other reason. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. In a typical guilty plea, a defendant’s admission
of the facts constituting the crime assures the plea’s accuracy. But because Alford and
Norgaard pleas do not require such an admission, a court must ensure the plea’s accuracy
by other means.
We have held that an Alford plea’s accuracy is assured where a “strong factual
basis and the defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his
conviction provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong
probability that the defendant would be found guilty” at trial. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649;
see Alford, 400 U.S. at 26–27 (allowing a guilty plea to stand despite defendant’s refusal
to admit committing the acts constituting the crime because the record “contain[ed]
strong evidence of actual guilt”). We have not, however, expressly decided whether a
Norgaard plea also requires a heightened factual basis to be constitutionally valid.
Steichen argues that it does. For the reasons that follow, we agree and explain what this
standard requires.
A.
We begin by surveying our prior decisions on Norgaard and Alford pleas. We first
recognized that a guilty plea could be valid despite a defendant’s inability to remember
the circumstances of the offense in State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872
(Minn. 1961). When taking Norgaard’s guilty plea to second-degree assault, the
prosecutor described “the events and circumstances which formed the basis of the
information pertaining to the alleged assault.” Id. at 868–69. But when the State asked
8
Norgaard whether the facts alleged in the information were true, he said he could not
remember but “had been told what happened by others.” Id. at 869. Nevertheless,
Norgaard persisted in his desire to plead guilty, and the district court ultimately accepted
his guilty plea to second-degree assault. Id. On appeal, we concluded the plea was valid,
observing the following:
[i]f we were to say under the record here that reversible error was committed,
we would be ruling in effect that no matter how obvious the crime or how
anxious the accused might be to plead guilty, if he said he did not recall what
happened, the court should not under any conditions accept such a plea.
Id. at 872. Because Norgaard did not challenge the factual basis in his case, we did not
address what constitutes a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea when a defendant
cannot remember committing the offense.
Over 30 years later, in State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717, we observed that
although Alford and Norgaard pleas present “two unique situations in which a defendant
may plead guilty without unequivocally admitting his or her guilt,” a district court should
accept a Norgaard plea with the same caution as an Alford plea and “affirmatively ensure
an adequate factual basis.” Id. at 716–17. In Ecker, we considered whether there was a
sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea that was not clearly an Alford or a Norgaard plea.
Id. at 716. Ecker pleaded guilty to intentional felony murder, but during his plea colloquy
told the court that he could not remember “pulling the trigger, although he remembered
going into the gas station and robbing it.” Id. at 715. On appeal, Ecker argued that his
plea was inaccurate because he had not acknowledged he had an intent to kill. Id. at 716.
We did not determine whether the defendant’s plea was an Alford or a Norgaard plea
9
before assessing whether the factual basis was sufficient. Instead, we equated the two
types of pleas in observing that a district court must accept both “with caution” after
“affirmatively ensur[ing] an adequate factual basis has been established.” Id. at 716–17.
We held that Ecker’s plea met “the requirements established by” Alford and State v.
Goulette, as well as Norgaard, because the record showed Ecker’s plea was “based on his
probable guilt and the likelihood a jury would convict him[.]” Id. at 717. We did not,
however, directly address what constitutes a sufficient factual basis for an accurate plea
because we were focused on whether the record established that Ecker reasonably
believed the State had sufficient evidence to convict him.5 See id.
We clarified the accuracy requirement for an Alford plea in State v. Theis, holding
that an Alford plea must be supported by both a “strong factual basis and the defendant’s
agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction[.]” 742 N.W.2d at 649.
We observed that these dual requirements provide the district court “a basis to
independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be
found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of
innocence.” Id. But we did not expressly decide whether this heightened factual basis
standard should also apply to Norgaard pleas.
5
In Ecker, we observed that we “discourage the use of leading questions to
establish a factual basis” because “the defendant should be encouraged to state in his or
her own words why he or she is willing to plead guilty notwithstanding a claim of
innocence or a claimed loss of memory.” 524 N.W.2d at 717. In addition, because it was
unclear from the record whether the defendant’s plea was an Alford or Norgaard plea, we
emphasized the importance of clearly indicating the type of plea a defendant is entering
and confirming that the defendant understands the legal implications of such a plea. See
id.
10
Against this backdrop, the State argues that a Norgaard plea does not require a
district court to ensure the strong factual basis required in an Alford plea, because the two
pleas differ in one significant respect: In an Alford plea, a defendant’s guilty plea “is
actually contradicted by his claim of innocence,” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649, while a
defendant entering a Norgaard plea makes no claim of innocence. According to the State,
because a defendant can enter a Norgaard plea without claiming innocence, it does not
implicate the internal contradiction inherent in an Alford plea.
For purposes of the accuracy requirement, however, this is a distinction without a
difference. In Alford, the United States Supreme Court observed that there was no
perceptible “material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the
criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
Because “an express admission of guilt” is “not a constitutional requisite to the
imposition of criminal penalty,” the Supreme Court concluded that “[a]n individual
accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. (emphasis added). While defendants
who enter Alford pleas may maintain their innocence because they are “unwilling” to
admit committing the crimes alleged, Alford recognized that some defendants may
choose to plead guilty because they are unable to admit the acts constituting a crime. Id.
Here, for example, Steichen professed he was unable—rather than unwilling—to
admit to specific facts that satisfied the elements of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Steichen acknowledged that he was not making any claim that he was innocent, but
11
indicated he was unable to remember the circumstances leading up to the alleged offense
due to intoxication. Regardless of whether a defendant pleads guilty because they are
unwilling or unable to admit committing an offense, the requirement that a defendant
admit facts and circumstances of the offense protects against the risk that the defendant
will plead guilty to a crime more serious than that of which they could have been
convicted at trial. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. Because the risks are the same in both
Alford and Norgaard pleas, we do not see any reason this accuracy requirement should be
different for a Norgaard than for an Alford plea.6
6
The dissent asserts that the United States Supreme Court in Alford and this court in
Theis “implied … that the factual basis for an Alford plea must be heightened above the
‘adequate factual basis’ required for other types of pleas because the defendant claims
innocence.” Infra at D-4. We disagree. To the contrary, the Alford Court implied that the
constitutional concerns are the same whether a defendant refuses to admit guilt or
maintains innocence. 400 U.S. at 35. In Alford, considering for the first time whether it is
constitutional for a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence, the Court
looked to its reasoning in Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926), a case in which
it had determined that the constitution allows a defendant to be sentenced to prison for “a
plea of nolo contendere, a plea by which a defendant does not expressly admit his guilt,
but nonetheless waives his right to a trial.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 35. The Court observed
that “[t]he fact that [Alford’s] plea was denominated a plea of guilty rather than a plea of
nolo contendere is of no constitutional significance with respect to the issue now before
[the Court], for the Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences, not the
formal categorizations, of state law.” Id. at 37. The Court further stated that an express
admission of guilt is “not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty.
An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent
to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, too, we must
consider whether the Constitution requires something different of a plea in which a
defendant does not expressly admit his guilt from a plea in which a defendant maintains
his innocence. Consistent with Alford, we conclude that constitutional accuracy requires
the same of both—a strong factual basis to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a
crime more serious than that of which they could have been convicted at trial.
12
We also reject the State’s argument that Ecker and Theis established two distinct
standards for the factual bases required for Alford and Norgaard pleas. According to the
State, Ecker requires only that the factual basis for a Norgaard plea be “adequate,”
524 N.W.2d at 717, as opposed to the “strong” factual basis Theis requires for an Alford
plea. 742 N.W.2d at 649. The State’s argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, we did not characterize the plea in Ecker as a Norgaard plea. See Ecker,
524 N.W.2d at 717. Because Ecker claimed both lack of memory and lack of intent, we
relied on our cases on both Alford and Norgaard pleas. See id. at 716–17. We observed
that while a district court must accept a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, “with
caution[,] … Alford, Goulette and Norgaard, and the cases that have followed, allow
Ecker to plead guilty without expressing the requisite intent so long as he believed the
state’s evidence was sufficient to convict him.” Id. at 717. As such, our conclusion that
there was an adequate factual basis to support Ecker’s guilty plea did not address whether
the factual basis requirement for a valid Norgaard plea is different from the requirement
for a valid Alford plea.
Second, while the State is correct that in Ecker we said that “an adequate factual
basis” is necessary to ensure a plea’s accuracy, we did not define what constitutes “an
adequate factual basis.” Id. at 716. In fact, we did not explicitly state what constitutes an
adequate factual basis for either a Norgaard or an Alford plea until 13 years after Ecker,
in Theis, where we stated that an Alford plea must be supported by a “strong factual
basis.” 742 N.W.2d at 649. Thus, prior to today, we have not expressly determined the
standard for the factual basis required to ensure a Norgaard plea’s accuracy.
13
Because a defendant entering an Alford plea will not, and a defendant entering a
Norgaard plea cannot, attest to facts proving guilt, we hold that both pleas must be
supported by a strong factual basis in addition to a defendant’s agreement that the
evidence is sufficient to support conviction. These dual requirements allow a district
court to reach a conclusion—independent of the defendant’s own assessment of the
strength of the case against them—as to whether there is a strong probability the
defendant would be found guilty at trial of the offense to which they are pleading guilty.
See id.
B.
In addition, we hold that to establish a strong factual basis, the State must, at
minimum, describe the type of evidence it would present at trial. This is consistent with
our discussion in Theis about how the State should establish a strong factual basis.
742 N.W.2d at 649. There we observed that “the better practice” is to discuss the facts
with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing:
This discussion may occur through an interrogation of the defendant about
the underlying conduct and the evidence that would likely be presented at
trial, the introduction at the plea hearing of witness statements or other
documents, or the presentation of abbreviated testimony from witnesses
likely to testify at trial, or a stipulation by both parties to a factual statement
in one or more documents submitted to the court at the plea hearing.
Id. In determining whether there is a strong factual basis for an Alford or a Norgaard plea,
a district court is tasked with ensuring that a defendant who enters either plea is protected
from “pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to
insist on his right to trial.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
14
protection is fortified by requiring that the factual basis for either an Alford or a Norgaard
plea constitute more than a general affirmation that the alleged conduct meets the
elements of the crime—it requires a description of the evidence the State would present at
trial sufficient for the district court to independently conclude that there is a strong
probability that the defendant is guilty of the elements of the crime to which they are
pleading guilty.7
II.
Having concluded that both Alford and Norgaard pleas must be supported by a
strong factual basis, we now consider whether the factual basis for Steichen’s Norgaard
plea meets this requirement.
Steichen pleaded guilty to fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, which requires
that (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration with the victim, and (2) the sexual
penetration occurred without the victim’s consent. Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1. The
State argues that even if we apply a heightened factual basis standard to Steichen’s case,
the prosecutor’s summary description of the incident during Steichen’s plea hearing
established a strong factual basis to support Steichen’s guilt. We disagree.
At his plea hearing, Steichen stated that he had been drunk on the day of the
offense and could not remember what happened. The entirety of the factual basis for the
plea derives from a single question the prosecutor asked Steichen:
And the evidence you talked about reviewing with your attorney would
establish, though, that on June 5th of this year, you were in Richfield,
7
The dissent contends that we should clarify here that this rule does not apply
retroactively. The question of retroactivity, however, is not before us.
15
Hennepin County, when you encountered a male with the initials of C.T., and
at some point the two of you engaged in sexual penetration. Specifically, you
put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way,
making that nonconsensual. You understand that that’s the evidence that the
State would present in this case?
The State did not provide any description of the type of evidence it would offer to show
that Steichen engaged in nonconsensual sexual penetration with C.T. Nevertheless, the
State argues that this is a sufficient factual basis even under the strong-factual-basis
standard.
Neither the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alford nor ours in Goulette
supports the State’s assertion. The pleas in each of those cases were supported by stronger
factual bases than submitted here. In Alford, the United States Supreme Court held there
was a strong factual basis for a plea to second-degree murder after multiple witnesses,
including a police officer, testified during a “summary presentation” of the State’s case.
Alford, 400 U.S. at 28. Although no eyewitnesses testified, the testimony “indicated that
shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stated his intention to kill
the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing.” Id.
The Court reasoned that when viewing Alford’s plea “in light of the evidence against
him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a
means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered,” its
validity could not be seriously questioned. Id. at 37–38.
In Goulette, we held that there was a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea
where defense counsel “recited in summary form some of the key evidence which the
prosecution would have offered … to prove first-degree murder if the case had gone to
16
trial.” 258 N.W.2d at 761. The summary in Goulette included not only reviewing ten
witnesses’ anticipated testimony, but also Goulette’s own affirmation of the statement he
made to police.8 See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. While we upheld the factual basis for
Goulette’s pleas, we also observed the following:
In future similar cases, especially those involving major felonies, a better
practice would be the introduction, by the prosecutor, of statements of
witnesses or other items from his file which would aid the court in its
determination. In appropriate cases, the prosecutor might even consider
calling some of the state’s witnesses for the purpose of giving a shortened
version of what their testimony would be were the case to go to trial.
Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761.
Contrary to the records supporting the defendants’ valid pleas in Alford and
Goulette, the factual basis offered to support Steichen’s plea included no evidence beyond
Steichen’s affirmative answer “yes” to the State’s question: “[Y]ou put your penis in [the
victim’s] mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that
nonconsensual. You understand that that’s the evidence that the State would present in
this case?” While Steichen acknowledged that there was a substantial likelihood that a
jury would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of fifth-degree criminal sexual
conduct at trial based on his review of the State’s evidence with his attorney, the single
question the prosecutor posed was not strong evidence of Steichen’s actual guilt.
Steichen’s acknowledgment amounted to him simply agreeing that the State could
8
The court in Goulette did not describe the content of this evidence in analyzing
whether the factual basis was sufficient; in Theis, however, we reviewed the appellate
record in Goulette that supported the factual basis for Goulette’s pleas. See Theis,
742 N.W.2d at 647. This recitation comes from Theis’s review of Goulette’s appellate
record. See id.
17
establish the elements of the offense charged. Although the prosecutor indicated he was
seeking to confirm Steichen’s understanding of “the evidence” the State would present at
trial, nowhere in questioning Steichen (or anywhere else in the record) did the State
submit, identify, or describe any evidence—testimony or exhibits—it possessed and
intended to introduce to prove Steichen’s conduct satisfied those elements. Steichen was
thus not presented with—and did not agree to—a factual basis that would have allowed
the district court to independently conclude that he was not pleading guilty to a crime
more serious than the facts would support or that he did not commit. At minimum, the
State needed to describe key evidence it would have presented at trial to secure a fifth-
degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. We therefore conclude that Steichen’s
Norgaard plea was invalid because it was not supported by a strong factual basis to allow
the district court to independently conclude that there was a strong probability that
Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
18
DISSENT
MCKEIG, Justice (dissenting).
For putting his penis in the mouth of a vulnerable adult, Paul James Steichen was
charged with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 609.344,
subd. 1(a)–(b). After consulting with his attorney, Steichen accepted a plea negotiation.
The State agreed with Steichen’s request to enter a Norgaard plea to a lesser charge of
fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1, in exchange for
dismissal of the second count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.1 And Steichen did
just that. At the plea hearing, Steichen agreed that the State would present evidence
showing that Steichen put his penis in the victim’s mouth and the victim either said no or
resisted. He agreed that the State would show that he engaged in nonconsensual sexual
penetration. Steichen thus agreed to facts establishing the elements of fifth-degree
criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1. He repeatedly and
expressly affirmed, both in writing and on the record, that he was not claiming to be
innocent of this crime. By taking advantage of this plea bargain, Steichen pleaded guilty
to a felony that carried only a presumptive probationary sentence, in contrast to the
1
A conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct carries a much harsher
statutory maximum sentence and collateral consequences than fifth-degree criminal
sexual conduct: the maximum statutory sentence for third-degree is 15 years and requires
mandatory conditional release after prison, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.344, subd. 2(1), 609.3455,
subd. 6; the maximum statutory sentence for fifth-degree is two years, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.351, subd. 3(a), with no mandatory conditional release.
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presumptive 53–74-month executed prison sentence he faced if convicted for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct.2
The court nonetheless determines that Steichen may withdraw his guilty plea
because he claims for the first time on appeal that his plea was inaccurate and therefore
invalid. To do so, the court today determines that a valid Norgaard plea requires a
heightened factual basis in line with an Alford plea and concludes Steichen’s plea was
invalid under this heightened standard. But neither our precedent nor the U.S. Supreme
Court’s requires the strong factual basis standard the court adopts today for Norgaard
pleas. And, given the well-reasoned basis for treating Norgaard pleas and Alford pleas
differently, I disagree with the court’s decision to adopt that heightened standard for
Norgaard pleas. I would thus hold that Steichen’s plea satisfies the adequate factual basis
standard required for Norgaard pleas. I would also hold that Steichen’s plea meets even
the heightened standard reserved for Alford pleas. And I would further clarify that the
court’s newly announced rule does not apply retroactively. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.
A.
A constitutionally valid guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). A plea that fails to meet any of these
requirements is invalid. Id. The accuracy requirement serves a protective purpose:
2
Given Steichen’s criminal history score and the severity of the third-degree
criminal sexual conduct offense, Steichen’s presumptive sentence for the offense under
the sentencing guidelines was anywhere from 53–74 months.
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ensuring a defendant does not plead guilty to a more serious charge than the defendant
could be convicted of at trial. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). To meet
the accuracy requirement, a proper factual basis must be established. Id. To determine
whether a plea is supported by “an adequate factual basis, we examine whether there are
sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within
the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Lussier v. State, 853 N.W.2d
149, 154 (Minn. 2014) (citation modified).
For nearly 50 years, Minnesota has recognized three types of guilty pleas: typical
pleas, Alford pleas, and Norgaard pleas. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. In a typical
case where a defendant admits guilt, “an adequate factual basis is usually established by
questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in [the defendant’s] own
words the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Id. at 716. This approach, however,
does not work in “two unique situations in which a defendant may plead guilty without
unequivocally admitting [the defendant’s] guilt”: Alford pleas and Norgaard pleas. Id. at
716–17. In Alford pleas, first adopted by this court in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758
(Minn. 1977), the defendant “maintains [their] innocence” but “reasonably believes, and
the record establishes, the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Ecker,
524 N.W.2d at 716; see also Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. By contrast, in Norgaard pleas,
first authorized by this court in State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867 (Minn.
1961), the defendant “claims a loss of memory, through amnesia or intoxication,
regarding the circumstances of the offense,” and the record “establish[es] that the
evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and [the
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defendant’s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime
charged.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. When accepting either an Alford or a Norgaard
plea, a district court must do so with caution and “affirmatively ensure an adequate
factual basis has been established in the record.” Id. at 717.
As the court notes, we determined in Theis that a district court must apply a
heightened factual basis standard to Alford pleas. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (citing North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970)). That is because “[a]n Alford plea is not
supported by the defendant’s admission of guilt, and is actually contradicted by his claim
of innocence; precedent therefore requires a strong factual basis for an Alford plea.” Id.
We noted that the U.S. Supreme Court held that a “strong factual basis for the plea” was
enough to “substantially negate[] [Alford’s] claim of innocence.” Id.; see Alford, 400 U.S.
at 37–38. Thus, we implied, if not held, that the factual basis for an Alford plea must be
heightened above the “adequate factual basis” required for other types of pleas because
the defendant claims innocence. We then continued that this “strong factual basis and the
defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support [the defendant’s]
conviction” together give the court “a basis to independently conclude that there is a
strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which [the
defendant] pleaded guilty, notwithstanding [the defendant’s] claims of innocence.” Theis,
742 N.W.2d at 649. This is the heightened factual basis standard.
The court asserts that the Supreme Court’s discussion of nolo contendere pleas in
Alford supported the strong factual basis standard for Alford pleas and now supports the
court’s new heightened factual basis standard for Norgaard pleas. Supra at 12 n.6
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(quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 35–37). But the Supreme Court considered its holding that
nolo contendere pleas are constitutional to support its holding that Alford pleas are also
constitutional. Alford, 400 U.S. at 35–37. The Court’s statement that a defendant “may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if [the defendant] is unwilling or unable to admit [the defendant’s]
participation in the acts constituting the crime” goes to the general constitutionality and
validity of those pleas—not the factual bases they require. Id. at 37. Thus, the court’s
contention that the Supreme Court’s nolo contendere discussion supports a particular
factual basis for either Alford or Norgaard pleas is incorrect.
The court also incorrectly contends that in Ecker “we equated” Alford and
Norgaard pleas. Supra at 10 (quoting Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17). In Ecker, we
described both types of pleas as applying in “two unique situations”—unique not only
from a typical plea, but also from each other—and explained Alford and Norgaard pleas
in two separate paragraphs, including what the record must establish for each type of plea
to be accurate. 524 N.W.2d at 716–17 (emphasis added). While we noted that district
courts must exercise caution and ensure that adequate factual bases exist when accepting
either type of plea, we neither equated the pleas nor suggested that the factual basis
required for each plea was the same. That we discussed the plea standards together when
applying them in Ecker was not because the plea standards were the same; it was because
the issue presented in that case was whether a sufficient factual basis for the plea required
the defendant to have acknowledged that he intended to kill the victim as part of his
guilty plea. Id. at 717. The answer was the same regardless of the type of plea the
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defendant submitted: the defendant could “plead guilty without expressing the requisite
intent so long as he believed the state’s evidence was sufficient to convict him.” Id. The
defendant’s belief that the state’s evidence is strong enough to result in a conviction is a
feature of both factual basis standards, but it is not the only requirement of either
standard. Id. at 716–17 (noting Alford pleas require both that the defendant believe and
that the record establish that “the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction,” and
Norgaard pleas require that “the record must establish that the evidence … is sufficient to
persuade the defendant and [the defendant’s] counsel that the defendant” is either “guilty
or likely to be convicted” or both). To describe Ecker as equating Alford and Norgaard
pleas oversimplifies and stretches our analysis in that case past its breaking point.
The court states that we have not expressly decided the factual basis required to
ensure the accuracy of a Norgaard plea, where the defendant does not maintain their
innocence. But the answer is readily available in our case law. Under Ecker and Fisher,
the record in a Norgaard plea “must establish that the evidence against the defendant is
sufficient to persuade the defendant and [the defendant’s] counsel that the defendant is
guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17;
State v. Fisher, 193 N.W.2d 819, 820 (Minn. 1972). And under Lussier and Kelsey, an
“adequate factual basis” for a guilty plea exists when there are “sufficient facts on the
record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which
[defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Lussier, 853 N.W.2d at 154 (citation modified);
Kelsey v. State, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. 1974). In Kelsey, we specifically noted that
this holding “is in no way inconsistent with our prior holdings in cases such as State v.
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Fisher.” 214 N.W.2d at 237; see Fisher, 193 N.W.2d at 820 (upholding the district court’s
acceptance of the defendant’s Norgaard plea when the defendant “claimed not to recall
the events of the crime” but “did not dispute the evidence which implicated him”).
It is a short step, then, to hold that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea
is one that “establish[es] that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade
the defendant and [the defendant’s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be
convicted of the crime charged” and “support[s] a conclusion that defendant’s conduct
falls within the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Ecker,
524 N.W.2d at 716–17; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at 237. I would take this opportunity to so
hold.
This holding would also be consistent with the rationale behind different proper
factual basis standards for Norgaard pleas and Alford pleas. To submit a Norgaard plea,
the defendant claims to not recall the circumstances surrounding the offense but does not
maintain innocence; to submit an Alford plea, the defendant maintains their innocence.
See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. As we noted in Theis, a “strong factual basis” is
necessary for Alford pleas because of “the inherent conflict in pleading guilty while
maintaining innocence.” 742 N.W.2d at 649 (emphasis added). This “inherent conflict” is
not present for Norgaard pleas—the defendant does not maintain their innocence and
instead is convinced by the State’s evidence that “the defendant is guilty or likely to be
convicted of the crime charged.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716 (emphasis added); see also
Fisher, 193 N.W.2d at 820. Because a defendant submitting a Norgaard plea does not
D-7
maintain their innocence, a heightened standard is not necessary, and an “adequate factual
basis” is sufficient for Norgaard pleas. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717.
Despite this clear differentiation, the court characterizes the defendant’s claim of
innocence as “a distinction without a difference” between Norgaard and Alford pleas.
Supra at 11. To support this assertion, the court cites the Supreme Court’s observations in
Alford that there is no “material difference between a plea that refuses to admit
commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence.”
400 U.S. at 37. The Court also held that a defendant may plead guilty “even if [the
defendant] is unwilling or unable to admit [the defendant’s] participation in the acts
constituting the crime.” 400 U.S. at 37. But while we have incorporated similar language
in Theis regarding an Alford plea, we have never incorporated this language into our
Norgaard cases. Contrast Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647 (noting scenarios where “a defendant
could decide that a guilty plea is the best available course of action despite [the
defendant’s] inability to admit guilt or [the defendant’s] affirmative belief in [their]
innocence”), with Norgaard, 110 N.W.2d 867, and Fisher, 193 N.W.2d 819, and Ecker,
524 N.W.2d 712. Additionally, Alford involved a defendant who did not admit to conduct
constituting a crime because he maintained he did not commit the crime; the Court was
not required to determine whether the defendant could plead guilty despite failing to
recall whether he engaged in criminal conduct. 400 U.S. at 27. Thus, to the extent that my
colleagues rely on any of the Court’s statements as applying to a defendant who cannot
remember the offense, they are relying on unpersuasive dicta. See State v. Bonnell,
31 N.W.3d 527, 542 & n.15 (Minn. 2026) (noting that a statement in a different Supreme
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Court opinion was “obiter dicta because it went beyond the facts before the Court and
was not necessary or essential to the Court’s analysis”).
Furthermore, we recognized Norgaard pleas in 1961, several years before the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized Alford pleas. When we later adopted Alford pleas in Goulette
in 1977, we expressly stated that it was the “first time” this court was confronted with the
issue of whether “a trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the
accused protests that he is innocent.” Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761. We did not cite
Norgaard in Goulette. This means that we did not consider lack-of-memory pleas and
claim-of-innocence pleas to be the same.
The court now decides that a Norgaard plea and an Alford plea are functionally the
same: they both must be supported by the same heightened factual basis. This decision
flies in the face of decades of precedent distinguishing Norgaard and Alford pleas based
on a well-reasoned rationale to treat them differently. I would hold, consistent with our
case law, that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea exists when the record
“establish[es] that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the
defendant and [the defendant’s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be
convicted of the crime charged,” and there are “sufficient facts on the record to support a
conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which [the defendant]
desires to plead guilty.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at 237. Thus, I
dissent.
Also, I would not prescribe a specific procedure for the district court to obtain a
factual basis for a Norgaard plea, as the court does. We have long held that for all guilty
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pleas—typical, Norgaard, and Alford—to be accurate, they must have a proper factual
basis—not a specific procedure. See Lussier, 853 N.W.2d at 154; Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at
716–17; Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761; Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. While we have
provided guidance, or “better practice[s],” for entering factual bases for Alford pleas, we
have never prescribed how the State must do this before today. See Goulette, 258 N.W.2d
at 761; Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. Because neither our case law nor the facts of this case
compel us to do so here, I also respectfully dissent from this part of the court’s opinion.
B.
I would hold that Steichen’s Norgaard plea satisfied the adequate factual basis
standard that I articulated above. I would also hold that the plea satisfied even the strong
factual basis standard that the court now requires.
Steichen reviewed the State’s evidence with his counsel and, based upon that
evidence, believed there was a “substantial likelihood” that he would be found guilty and
convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial. Accordingly, Steichen and his
defense counsel entered his Norgaard plea. The record reflects that the evidence against
Steichen persuaded him that he was either guilty or likely to be convicted. The State then
confirmed that Steichen agreed that the evidence would present the following facts at
trial, “sufficient to prove [the State’s] case beyond a reasonable doubt”: on June 5, 2023,
in Hennepin County, Steichen sexually penetrated C.T. by putting his penis in C.T.’s
mouth, and C.T. “either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual.”
These facts, stated on the record, fulfilled the elements necessary to find Steichen guilty
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of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.3451, subd. 1, 609.341,
subd. 12(1).
The plea satisfied both pieces of the adequate factual basis standard. Steichen was
persuaded that the State’s evidence was likely to result in a guilty verdict for fifth-degree
criminal sexual assault, and the facts in the record supported a conclusion that Steichen’s
conduct fell within that charge. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at
237.
Likewise, Steichen’s plea also met the heightened factual basis standard. The facts
constituted a strong factual basis for fifth-degree criminal sexual assault, and Steichen
agreed to the evidence’s sufficiency such that the district court could independently
conclude that there was a strong probability that Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-
degree criminal sexual assault at trial. Steichen’s plea is unlike the defendant’s plea in
Theis, which we held did not establish a strong factual basis. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649–
50. In Theis, we held that the defendant’s Alford plea did not meet this standard because
the defendant failed to acknowledge that the evidence “would be sufficient for a jury to
find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 650 (noting that the
defendant acknowledged only a “mere ‘risk’ that [the defendant] would be found guilty”).
Here, Steichen agreed there was a “substantial likelihood” that he would be found guilty
of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial. Additionally, the plea colloquy in Theis
did not contain any of the facts that the evidence would prove. Id. Here, Steichen agreed
that the State would present evidence that he encountered C.T. in Hennepin County, that
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Steichen put his penis in C.T.’s mouth, and that this conduct was nonconsensual.3 Thus,
the district court properly accepted Steichen’s Norgaard plea under either the adequate
factual basis or heightened standard. Accordingly, I dissent.
C.
The court does not address whether the new rule that it articulates today applies
retroactively or prospectively. To avoid an improper application of the rule that would
lead to an onslaught of postconviction petitions asserting inaccurate Norgaard pleas, I
would specifically note that this holding does not apply retroactively. See State v.
Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Minn. 2002) (expressly applying the new rule of law to
that case and prospectively “[g]iven the purposes to be served, the extent of reliance by
the parties and courts on previous standards, and the effect of retroactivity on the
administration of justice,” despite the parties’ apparent lack of briefing or argument on
retroactive versus prospective application). Generally, a new rule of law applies to “cases
pending on direct appeal at the time of the new rule’s announcement” and “cases arising
3
The court asserts that by acknowledging that the State “would establish” these
facts, Steichen was “simply agreeing that the State could establish the elements of the
offense charged.” Supra at 17–18 (emphasis added). The court’s characterization is
incorrect and misleading. Steichen agreed that the State “would”—not that the State
“could”—establish facts necessary to fulfill the elements of fifth-degree criminal sexual
misconduct. “Would” is definitive—if the case went to trial, the State “would establish”
facts that would fulfill the necessary elements and, in doing so, prove Steichen guilty of
the charged offense. If Steichen only agreed that the State “could” establish those facts,
that leaves open the possibility that the State also could not establish those facts. See
Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 650 (holding that the defendant’s Alford plea did not meet the
heightened standard because the defendant did not acknowledge that the evidence “would
be sufficient for a jury to find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”
(emphasis added)).
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after the rule is announced.” State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 283 (Minn. 2014). A new
rule “do[es] not apply to defendants whose convictions were final at the time the new rule
was announced.” Id. There are only two exceptions to this general rule of applicability:
we apply a new rule retroactively if it (1) “places certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe”;
or (2) “requires the observance of those procedures that are … implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,” in other words, “watershed rules of criminal procedure.” Chambers v.
State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 323 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307,
311 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Neither of these exceptions applies
here—the new heightened standard for Norgaard pleas does not place primary or private
individual conduct beyond what “the criminal law-making authority [can] proscribe,”
and, while the heightened standard is a stark and unnecessary departure from our
adequate factual basis standard, it is hardly a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure.”
Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
I would state explicitly that this general rule of applicability controls here, and that
the new heightened factual basis standard for Norgaard pleas applies only to this case,
cases pending on direct appeal, and future cases.
* * *
Steichen agreed, on the record, that the State would present evidence showing that
Steichen put his penis in C.T.’s mouth, and C.T. either said no or resisted. Steichen agreed
that the State would show that he engaged in nonconsensual sexual penetration, fulfilling
the elements of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.3451,
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subd. 1. Steichen pleaded guilty because the lesser charge, while still a felony, carried
only a presumptive probation sentence, in contrast to the likely 53–74-month sentence he
faced for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. This was a voluntary, accurate, and
intelligent guilty plea that satisfied the adequate factual basis standard: the evidence
against Steichen was sufficient to persuade him that he was guilty or likely to be
convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the record included sufficient facts
to support a conclusion that Steichen’s conduct constituted fifth-degree criminal sexual
conduct. Because I would hold that Norgaard pleas require an adequate factual basis and
that Steichen’s plea satisfied that standard, I would reverse the court of appeals. I would
also reverse because Steichen’s plea satisfied the heightened factual basis standard
previously reserved only for Alford pleas. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
MOORE, III, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice McKeig.