State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0097

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Paul James Steichen,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2024
Reversed in part and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-11827

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing
that his Norgaard plea was not supported by a strong factual basis and that the district court
erred by imposing a ten-year conditional-release term. Because appellant’s guilty plea was
2
not supported by an adequate factual basis and was therefore invalid, we remand to allow
appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. And because it was not authorized, w e reverse the
district court’s imposition of a ten-year conditional-release term.
FACTS
On June 7, 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Paul James
Steichen with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The state and Steichen
agreed that Steichen would enter a plea of guilty to an amended count of fifth -degree
criminal sexual conduct and that the state would dismiss the remaining count. Steichen
waived his trial rights orally and submitted a petition to plead guilty, along with a Norgaard
addendum. Steichen testified that he was “considerably drunk” on the day of the offense,
that he did not remember the circumstances of the offense, that there was a substantial
likelihood that a jury would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if the state’s
evidence were presented at trial, and that he did not make any claim that he was innocent.
After discussing Steichen’s petition to plead guilty and Norgaard addendum, the
prosecutor questioned Steichen to establish a factual basis for his guilty plea. The district
court reserved its acceptance of the guilty plea and scheduled the matter for sentencing.
When the matter came before the district court for sentencing, the district court
accepted the guilty plea, entered a judgment of conviction, sentenced Steichen to a stayed
14-month prison term, and placed him on probation for three years. The district court also
imposed a ten-year term of conditional release following any executed prison sentence.
Steichen appeals.

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DECISION
I.
Steichen contends that his Norgaard plea was invalid because it was not supported
by a sufficient factual basis.
“A defendant is free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and
contend that the record made at the time the plea was entered is inadequate . . . .” Brown
v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). The validity of a plea is a question of law
that this court reviews de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “[The
defendant] has the burden of proving that his plea was invalid.” State v. Epps, 977 N.W.2d
798, 801 (Minn. 2022). A “manifest injustice exists where a guilty plea is invalid.” State
v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea
must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
“The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more
serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.”
Id. “A proper factual basis must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate.” State v.
Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). “Ordinarily, an adequate factual basis is
established by questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in his or her
own words the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Williams v. State , 760 N.W.2d 8,
12 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). Although
“the [district court] judge need not personally interrogate the defendant prior to acceptance
of a guilty plea if defense counsel and the prosecutor have established an adequate factual
4
basis,” it is the district court judge’s responsibility “to ensure that an adequate factual basis
has been established in the record.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716.
Steichen’s guilty plea was a Norgaard plea. “A plea constitutes a Norgaard plea if
the defendant asserts an absence of memory on the essential elements of the offense but
pleads guilty because the record establishes, and the defendant reasonably believes, that
the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12. It
is “particularly important that a factual basis for the plea be established” in the context of
a Norgaard plea because “the plea is not supported by the defendant’s admission of guilt.”
Id. (quotation omitted). For a Norgaard plea, “an adequate factual basis consists of two
related components: a strong factual basis and the defendant’s acknowledgment that the
evidence would be sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 12-13. “[T]he [district] court must affirmatively ensure an adequate factual
basis has been established in the record.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717. A “strong factual
basis and the defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction
provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability
that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.”
Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 13 (quotation omitted) . The district court “should accept a
Norgaard plea with caution.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717.
Steichen pleaded guilty to fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3451, subd. 1 (2022). “A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth
degree if the person engages in nonconsensual sexual penetration.” Minn. Stat.
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§ 609.3451, subd. 1. Penetration is defined to include fellatio. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd.
12(1) (2022).
The following factual basis was offered to support Steichen’s plea:
THE COURT: And does somebody want to put in a factual
basis, then, to support the facts of the—go ahead.

[PROSECUTOR]: I can do that quickly.

Q: Sir, I understand you—you don’t recall the date in question,
right?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And the evidence you talked about reviewing with
your attorney would establish, though, that on June 5 th of this
year, you were in Richfield, Hennepin County, when you
encountered a male with the initials of C.T., and at some point
the two of you engaged in sexual penetration. Specifically, you
put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or resisted in
some way, making that nonconsensual . You understand that
that’s the evidence that the State would present in this case?

A: Yes.

Q: All right. And that’s the evidence that you are, through
your Norgaard waiver, are not contesting and accepting as
sufficient for the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt?

A: Yes.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. I believe that’s sufficient, Your
Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I think it is too. . . .

(Emphasis added.)
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Steichen cites Theis for the proposition that a factual basis to support a Norgaard
plea “must at a minimum describe the evidence the state intended to introduce at trial” such
that the district court could “‘independently conclude’ there was a strong probability that
the defendant would be found guilty at trial.” 742 N.W.2d at 649. He notes that “the plea
record does not contain even a summary description of the evidence the state intended to
introduce at [Steichen’s] trial , much less any physical or tes timonial evidence
demonstrating [Steichen’s] guilt ,” and instead indicates that “the state possessed
unspecified pieces of evidence.” Steichen argues that the district court could not have
made an independent conclusion that there was a strong possibility that he would be found
guilty “ without knowing what evidence the state would have presented at trial.” He
therefore asserts that the plea was inaccurate, invalid, and constitutes a manifest injustice.
Two Minnesota Supreme Court decisions inform our review. In Theis, the supreme
court articulated several ways in which a factual basis can be established when a defendant
pleads guilty while maintaining his innocence. 742 N.W.2d at 648-49. The supreme court
stated: “[T]he better practice is for the factual basis to be based on evidence discussed with
the defendant on the record at the plea hearing,” possibly “through an interrogation of the
defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would likely be presented at
trial,” or by “the introduction at the plea hearing of witness statements or other documents,
or the presentation of abbreviated testimony from witnesses likely to testify at trial,” or
through “a stipulation by both parties to a factual statement in one or more documents
submitted to the court at the plea hearing.” Id.
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In State v. Goulette, another case in which a defendant pleaded guilty even though
he denied his guilt, the supreme court stated that a factual basis that “consisted of a
recitation by defense counsel, in summary form, of some of the key evidence which the
prosecutor would have offered” was sufficient . 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977).
However, the Goulette court cautioned against using such recitations in summary form:
In future similar cases, especially those involving major
felonies, a better practice would be the introduction, by the
prosecutor, of statements of witnesses or other items from his
file which would aid the court in its determination . In
appropriate cases, the prosecutor might even consider calling
some of the state’s witnesses for the purpose of giving a
shortened version of what their testimony would be were the
case to go to trial.

Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
The best practices set forth in Theis and Goulette were not utilized in this case. 1
Failure to do so does not necessarily render a guilty plea invalid. But those practices
underscore the need to include at least some information regarding the evidence indicating
guilt so the district court can meet its obligation to “independently conclude that there is a
strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he

1 The guilty pleas in Theis and Goulette were Alford pleas, an atypical guilty plea in which
a defendant maintains his innocence but reasonably believes, and the record establishes,
that the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. Although Steichen’s guilty
plea was a Norgaard plea, and not an Alford plea, the supreme court has cautioned that the
district court should not cavalierly accept either type of plea , stating that “[a]s in the case
of [an Alford] plea, a [district] court should accept a Norgaard plea with caution” and “must
affirmatively ensure an adequate factual basis has been established in the record.” Ecker,
524 N.W.2d at 716-17. The reason for a heightened factual basis requirement is the same
for either type of plea: “An adequate factual basis ensures the plea is voluntary and
represents an intelligent choice of the alternative courses of action available.” Id. at 716
(quotation omitted).
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pleaded guilty.” Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 13 (quotation omitted) . In the context of a
Norgaard plea, “the [district] court must affirmatively ensure an adequate factual basis has
been established in the record.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717.
Admittedly, as the state argues, Steichen acknowledged the elements of the offense
when providing a factual basis. But when a defendant pleads guilty while maintaining
innocence, more is required. See Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12 (stating that it is “particularly
important that a factual basis for the plea be established” in the context of a Norgaard plea
because “the plea is not supported by the defendant’s admission of guilt” (quotation
omitted)). Again, at the plea hearing, the state summarized its evidence of nonconsensual
sexual penetration as follows: “you put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or
resisted in some way , making that nonconsensual.” (Emphasis added.) This is the only
evidence of nonconsensual sexual penetration described at the plea hearing, and the
italicized portion leaves us wondering what the alleged victim actually reported. On this
record we cannot independently conclude that there is a strong probability that S teichen
would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.2
The state argues that no case “holds that the prosecutor in this case was required to
state ‘Victim would testify that . . .’ before summarizing the facts of the case in order to
satisfy the factual basis requirement.” The state further argues that “as an error correcting

2 Although some of the state’s evidence is described in the charging document, when
“determining the accuracy of a guilty plea, the reviewing court does not consider
allegations in the complaint unless the truthfulness and accuracy of the allegations have
been expressly admitted to by the defendant.” Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 302
(Minn. App. 2021). Because that did not happen here, we do not consider the allegations
in the complaint.
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court,” we “should not reverse based on the absence of those four words in the plea hearing
transcript . . . because that would set forth a new rule of law which this Court cannot do.”
To be clear, we are not setting forth a new rule of law. We are simply applying the
well-established rule that before the district court accepts a guilty plea that is not supported
by an admission of guilt, it must “independently conclude that there is a strong probability
that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty .” Id. at
13 (first emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
The state also argues that “there is no manifest injustice” to correct because Steichen
“was charged with two counts of third -degree criminal sexual conduct and pleaded guilty
to only one amended, lesser charge of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.” We have no
quarrel with the state’s argument that Steichen was the benefi ciary of a favorable plea
agreement, but that is immaterial here. The state does not cite, and we are not aware of ,
any authority suggesting that the benefits of a plea agreement eliminate a manifest injustice
resulting from an invalid guilty plea.3
In sum, because we are not able to determine —de novo and based on the plea
hearing record—that there is a strong probability that Steichen would be found guilty of
fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, his guilty plea is invalid. He must therefore be

3 Nor are we aware of any authority suggesting that a defendant’s compliance with
conditions of probation is relevant to a determination regarding the validity of an
underlying guilty plea. Yet the state’s brief includes a footnote stating , “[n]otably, eight
months after [the district court] imposed [Steichen’s] sentence, probation filed a report
alleging six serious probation violations and requested a warrant for [Steichen’s] arrest.”
That information is wholly irrelevant to the issues before us on appeal.
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allowed to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice, and we remand to give him an
opportunity to do so.
II.
Steichen contends that the district court erred by imposing a ten -year
conditional-release term. The state agrees.
Under Minnesota law,
when a court commits an offender to the custody of the
commissioner of corrections for a violation of section 609.342,
609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.3453, or 609.3458, the court
shall provide that, after the offender has been released from
prison, the com missioner shall place the offender on
conditional release for ten years.

Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2022). Steichen was convicted of fifth -degree criminal
sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.3451 (2022), which is not one of the enumerated
crimes for which a ten-year conditional-release period is authorized. See id.; see also Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.342 (first -degree criminal sexual conduct ), .343 (second -degree criminal
sexual conduct), .344 (third-degree criminal sexual conduct), .345 (fourth-degree criminal
sexual conduct) , .3453 (criminal sexual predatory conduct) , .3458 (sexual extortion)
(2022).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that if a crime is not enumerated in Minn.
Stat § 609.3455, subd. 6, the district court is not authorized to impose a ten -year
conditional-release term under that statute. State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn.
2016) (holding that the plain language of the statute does not authorize a ten -year
conditional-release term for attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct because doing
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so “would require us to read in additional language . . . or an additional enumerated
statute . . . , which is forbidden by our rules of statutory construction”).
Because the fifth -degree criminal -sexual-conduct crime for which Steichen was
convicted is not enumerated in Minn. Stat § 609.3455, subd. 6, the district court did not
have the authority to impose a conditional -release term of ten years under the plain
meaning of the statute. See id. Again, the state concedes that the district court did not have
such authority.
We therefore reverse the district court’s imposition of a ten-year conditional-release
period and remand for the district court to amend its sentencing order. We also remand to
give Steichen an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
Reversed in part and remanded.