State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0105

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joe Cecil Sistrunk,
Appellant.

Filed December 16, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-14159

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
On direct appeal from judgments of conviction of domestic assault and threats of
violence, appellant argues that the district court erred by (1) allowing the state to introduce
prejudicial relationship evidence; (2) admitting a prior statement of the victim; and
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(3) convicting appellant of threats of violence based on legally inconsistent jury verdicts.
Because the district court acted within its discretion by admitting relationship evidence,
and because any error resulting from the admission of the prior statement was harmless,
we affirm appellant’s domestic-assault conviction. But because appellant’s
threats-of-violence conviction was based on legally inconsistent verdicts, we reverse his
threats-of-violence conviction and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Joe Cecil Sistrunk with felony
domestic assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2022), and threats of
violence in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2022). The following facts derive
from Sistrunk’s jury trial.
On July 5, 2023, J.B. and Sistrunk picked up a takeout supper and returned to J.B.’s
home. When they returned, Sistrunk threatened to hit J.B. with a thermos. Sistrunk went
to the bathroom, and J.B. called 911 but ended the call before making a report because
Sistrunk returned. J.B. was scared, believing that Sistrunk would be mad if he found out
that she called the police. Sistrunk learned that J.B. had called the police, contemplated
leaving, but decided that the two should go into the bedroom. In the bedroom, they got
into bed and Sistrunk told J.B. that he would kill her before police arrived. Officers arrived,
found a bread knife between the mattress and boxspring, and arrested Sistrunk.
Over Sistrunk’s objection, the state introduced evidence of an order for protection
(OFP) that J.B. had previously obtained against Sistrunk for the purpose of demonstrating
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the nature and extent of their relationship. J.B. testified that Sistrunk violated the OFP by
continuing to contact her.
The district court also allowed the state to present to the jury a redacted version of
an audio-recorded statement that J.B. provided to police the morning after the incident, as
a prior consistent statement.
The jury found Sistrunk guilty of domestic assault and threats of violence. The jury
returned two threats-of -violence guilty verdicts based on separate legal theories: that
Sistrunk intended to terrorize J.B. and that he acted in reckless disregard of the risk of
causing that result. 1 The district court convicted Sistrunk of domestic assault and threats
of violence. The district court sentenced Sistrunk to 33 months’ imprisonment for the
domestic-assault conviction. No sentence was pronounced for threats of violence.
Sistrunk appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court acted within its discretion by allowing the state to introduce
relationship evidence.

Evidence of previous crimes or other bad acts by a defendant is generally
inadmissible at trial. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2022),
[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or

1 Sistrunk argued intoxication as a defense. The district court and counsel agreed to give
the jury two verdict forms because intoxication is a defense to threats of violence based
upon a theory of intent to terrorize but not reckless disregard. See State v. Torres, 632
N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 2001) (noting that intoxication is only a defense to specific-intent
crimes); see also State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 57-58 (Minn. App. 2009) (determining
that the jury did not need to receive an intoxication instruction because terroristic threats
made with reckless disregard is not a specific-intent crime).
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household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

The district court’s decision to admit evidence under section 634.20 in a domestic- abuse
prosecution is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161
(Minn. 2004).
Before trial, the state moved to introduce evidence of similar conduct by Sistrunk
as relationship evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Specifically, the state wanted to
present the facts which led to J.B. obtaining an OFP against Sistrunk as well as the facts
regarding his subsequent violation of that OFP. The district court determined that the
evidence “shed[s] light on the relationship of the parties, and . . . falls within the definition
of domestic conduct[,]” and it did not “find anything unfairly prejudicial” about the
evidence.
Evidence of the facts which led to the issuance of a prior OFP as well as evidence
that Sistrunk subsequently violated the OFP is probative evidence of the history of his
relationship with J.B. See State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 553 (Minn. 2010)
(concluding that the district court acted within its discretion by admitting evidence of 12
incidents of domestic violence as relationship evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20);
see also State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that OFP violations
were probative evidence of the history of the relationship). Sistrunk disagrees, claiming
that there was no need “to illuminate the parties’ relationship or place the charged offenses
in any meaningful cont ext,” and, therefore, the evidence was not needed. “The need for
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section 634.20 evidence is naturally considered as part of the assessment of the probative
value versus prejudicial effect of the evidence,” but a district court is not required to
independently address the state’s need for the evidence. Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 639-40
(concluding that “the trial court did not err when it admitted [634.20] evidence . . . without
first addressing the state’s need for the evidence.”). Rather, this evidence is admissible as
long as the “ probative value is [not] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. As the district court found, the facts that led to the
issuance of the prior OFP and Sistrunk’s subsequent violations is probative evidence of the
nature of their relationship.
We also agree with the district court that the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. A cautionary instruction can reduce “the
probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” State v. Benton, 858
N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). The district court gave a limiting
instruction before J.B. testified about the OFP violations.
Members of the jury, you are about to hear evidence of
conduct by the defendant on one or more separate occasions.
This evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationship
between the defendant and the witness in order to assist you in
determining whether the defendant committed those acts with
which the defendant is charged in this case.

This evidence is not to be used to prove the character of
the defendant or that the defendant acted in conformity with
such character. The defendant is not being tried for, and may
not be convicted of, any behavior other than the charged
offenses. You are not to convict the defendant on the basis of
conduct on a separate occasion.

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And the district court gave a similar instruction before the jury deliberated. The district
court therefore acted within its discretion by allowing the state to introduce evidence that
led to J.B. obtaining an OFP as well as evidence of Sistrunk’s OFP violations pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
II. Any error resulting from the presentation to the jury of J.B.’s prior
audio-recorded statement to law enforcement was harmless.

Appellate courts review the admission of a hearsay statement pursuant to an
exception to the hearsay rule for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d
281, 291 (Minn. 2019). “A defendant claiming error in the district court’s reception of
evidence has the burden of showing both the error and the prejudice resulting from the
error.” Holt v. State, 772 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
“Hearsay” is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). J.B.’s statement was admitted as a prior-consistent statement pursuant to
Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), which provides that:
A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he declarant testifies at the
trial . . . and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the
declarant’s testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in
evaluating the declarant’s credibility as a witness.

Sistrunk does not challenge whether J.B.’s credibility had been attacked. See State v. Nunn,
561 N.W.2d 902, 909 (Minn. 1997) (noting that “before the statement can be admitted, the
witness’ credibility must have been challenged”). He argues instead that J.B.’s prior
recorded statement was not consistent with her testimony at trial.
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In her interview with law enforcement, J.B. claimed that Sistrunk monitored her
bank account, became upset that she had transferred money, and accused her of cheating
on him. J.B. also said that Sistrunk told her that he had previously “made the news” for
doing something bad and would “make the news” for doing something bad again, and that
he “stood over [her]” while she went to the bathroom.
J.B. did not testify to any of these statements at trial. But we need not determine
whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting the prior recorded statement
because appellate courts will not reverse if the error in admitting the evidence was
harmless. State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024). That is, we “generally will
not reverse a verdict even when improper [evidence] is presented to the jury unless there
is a ‘reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
verdict.’” State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted).
To determine whether an error significantly influenced the jury’s decision, we
“examine the entire record.” Id. at 474. We consider: “(1) the manner in which the party
presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the
party who offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense
effectively countered the evidence.” State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2020).
“This analysis is fact-specific, and not all the factors are relevant or persuasive in every
case.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54-55.
Manner Presented
We consider the manner in which the evidence was presented to determine whether
it significantly impacted the jury’s verdict. Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505. J.B.’s
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audio-recorded statement to law enforcement was played for the jury during an officer’s
testimony and after J.B. testified, and the officer was only briefly questioned about the
statement. Therefore, the audio recording was not given undue prominence at trial. Thus,
this factor weighs in favor of concluding that the error was harmless.
Persuasive Value
“[W]e also consider whether the inadmissible evidence was highly persuasive.”
Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 56-57 (quotation omitted). During the audio recording, J.B.
described behavior that made the circumstances of the incident at issue more likely to be
believed by the jury. For example, J. B. told law enforcement that Sistrunk monitored her
bank account and got angry over certain transactions and that he had previously accused
her of cheating. We are not convinced that the evidence had no persuasive value and, thus,
this factor weighs in favor of concluding that the error was not harmless.
Use in Closing Argument
Appellate courts “also consider whether and how the offering party used the
erroneously admitted evidence in closing argument.” Id. at 59. The state referenced J.B.’s
statement to law enforcement once in 17 transcript pages of closing argument. The state
did not rely on the statement to make their closing argument but, instead, focused on her
trial testimony. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of concluding that the error was
harmless.
Effectively Countered
Whether the defendant “effectively countered the evidence[,]” is also a
consideration that we must take into account. Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505; see also Bigbear,
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10 N.W.3d at 59. Because J.B. did not testify to some of the statements she made during
the interview with law enforcement, defense counsel was not able to cross-examine her
about the statements. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 59. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of
concluding that the error was not harmless.
Evidence of Guilt
Finally, “[s]trong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive value of wrongly
admitted evidence.” Id. (quoting Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505). The statements made to law
enforcement generally explain why J.B. was afraid of Sistrunk. The state presented other
evidence demonstrating what caused J.B. fear, including her testimony that Sistrunk
threatened to hit her with a thermos and that he threatened to kill her. The state did not
rely on the statements J.B. made to law enforcement during closing but instead focused on
her trial testimony.
After balancing the for egoing factors, Sistrunk has not met his burden of proving
that there is reasonable probability that admitting J.B.’s prior audio-recorded statement
significantly affected the jury’s verdict.
III. Sistrunk’s threats-of-violence conviction is based on legally inconsistent
verdicts.

“The question of whether verdicts are legally inconsistent is a question of law,
which we review de novo.” State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 325 (Minn. 2005). “Verdicts
are legally inconsistent when proof of the elements of one offense negates a necessary
element of another offense.” State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 50 (Minn. 1996).
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Sistrunk argues, and the state agrees, that the threats-of-violence verdicts are legally
inconsistent. The threats-of-violence statute permits liability under two mutually exclusive
mental-state theories. A person who “threatens . . . to commit any crime of violence with
purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror”
is guilty of making threats of violence. Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (emphasis added).
The jury found Sistrunk guilty of threats of violence based first upon a theory of
reckless disregard and second upon a theory of intent to cause fear. These verdicts are
legally inconsistent because one cannot act both recklessly and intentionally at the same
time. Tichich v. State, 4 N.W.3d 114, 123 (Minn. 2024) (“Because it is impossible to cause
another’s death with premeditation and intent and, at the same time, through negligent or
reckless conduct, we concluded that proof of an element of first -degree premeditated
murder negates a necessary element of second-degree manslaughter.”). We, therefore,
reverse Sistrunk’s threats-of-violence conviction and remand for further proceedings on
that count. See State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 1990) (remanding for a new
trial following legally inconsistent verdicts).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.