Brooke Lea Simpson and OBO Minor Child, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0145

Brooke Lea Simpson and OBO Minor Child,
Appellant,

vs.

Joceleyne Maldanado,
Respondent.

Filed December 23, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-23-1046

Brooke Simpson, New Brighton, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Joceleyne Maldanado, New Brighton, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of her petition for a harassment
restraining order against respondent neighbor. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 19, 2023, appellant Brooke Lea Simpson petitioned the district court
for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against her neighbor, respondent Jocelyne
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Maldonado,1 on her own behalf and on behalf of her service dog. In her petition, Simpson
alleged that Maldonado records her, watches her, and shines lights at her, especially when
Simpson arrives home. Simpson claimed that Maldonado has admitted to the police that
she monitors Simpson’s social media and YouTube pages, has given police false
information, and has made false complaints about Simpson’s service dog. Simpson also
claimed that she is afraid to enter or exit her home because of Maldonado’s actions.
The district court denied Simpson’s petition for an ex parte HRO and scheduled a
hearing on her petition. At the hearing, both parties appeared pro se, and Simpson
presented several videos as evidence that Mald onado had stared at Simpson , record ed
Simpson, flashed lights at Simpson, and exited her home when Simpson arrived home. The
district court found, from the bench, as follows:
So first the biggest issue as I see it [is] . . . who’s
watching who and the reality is I think both of you are watching
each other. There is an incredible amount of footage from you,
Ms. Simpson, of Ms. [Maldonado] and I think that Ms.
[Maldonado] as she’s indicated is concerned about not
knowing why you’re watching her and you know from your
own experience and what you’ve testified to that the idea of
someone watching you whether it’s true or not, right, that idea
is frightening. . . . And so the conversation that the two of you
had was certainly not the most civil of conversations. You both
can do better, but I don’t find that it rises to the level of
harassment. And because you are both equally participating
it doesn’t appear to be unwanted.
The second issue is about the lights, and you both live
in a manufactured home community and there are no apparent
streetlights. So it does appear that both of you, all residents are

1 The record indicates that respondent’s name is spelled Jocelyne Maldonado and that it is
spelled incorrectly in the case caption. We use the correct spelling in the opinion. But, we
do not change the case caption. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01 (directing that the title
of the action not be changed on appeal).
3
at the mercy of house lights, car lights, ambient light,
flashlights, but you’re going to have to use and depend on other
lights to figure out or see what’s going on. And you’ve
pointed, Ms. Simpson, to multiple exhibits that show the
shining of a flashlight and so that you’ve established. But the
second piece of that is whether or not that unwanted act is one
that is substantially adverse or has a substantially adverse
effect on you. You have testified that it is frightening to you,
but there is no evid ence that Ms. [Maldonado] is using her
light in the way that you describe. From what I’ve seen in the
video, Ms. [Maldonado] did not come onto your property.
There’s no indication she’s even coming onto the sidewalk in
front of your property. There’s no indication that she’s come
up to your car or even within an arm’s length of you. And so
to the extent that she is using her flashlight, it’s not clear that
she’s using her flashlight to look at you. I believe you believe
this, so your testimony I find t hat what you are saying that I
don’t think you’re making it up, okay? I believe what you’re
saying that you think that Ms. [Maldonado] is using her light
to shine it at you. But I don’t find that to be reasonable . . .
absent her shining the light at you, which I didn’t see in those
videos and being . . . the full property line away from you,
coming in and out of her door that I don’t find that her behavior
rises to a level of harassment.

. . . .

So based on that I am going to find that you haven’t met
your burden of proof and I am going to dismiss this petition.

(Emphasis added.) On December 27, 2023, the district court filed an order stating: “IT IS
ORDERED that the matter is dismissed.”
Simpson appeals the district court’s dismissal of her petition for an HRO.2

2 Respondent did not file a brief in this case. This court ordered that the case shall be
determined on the merits under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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DECISION
Simpson contends that the district court erred in dismissing her petition for an HRO.
She submitted an informal pro se brief extensively describing the testimony and exhibits
presented at the HRO hearing, in which assignments of error were interspersed throughout.
“The function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then
correcting them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). This court may
not “usurp[] the role of the [district] court by reweighing the evidence and finding its own
facts.” Id. This court does not “weigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo.” In re
Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (emphasis omitted)
(quotation omitted).
Moreover, “on appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear
affirmatively before there can be reversal. . . . [T]he burden of showing error rests upon
the one who relies upon it.” Loth v. Loth , 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quotation
omitted). Additionally, issues that are not adequately briefed are waived. See Melina v.
Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (“This issue was not argued in the briefs and
accordingly must be deemed waived.”). “An assignment of error based on mere assertion
and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will
not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”
Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
Some of Simpson’s assignments of error are supported by adequate legal argument
and authority, and are otherwise adequately briefed. Others are not, and we do not consider
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them.3 See Melina, 327 N.W.2d at 20; Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135. We review only the
issues that are adequately briefed by Simpson, which are whether the district court: (1)
clearly erred in making certain findings of fact , (2) made defective credibility
determinations, and (3) abused its discretion in concluding that Maldonado’s alleged
conduct did not rise to the level of harassment.
I.
Simpson contends that the district court clearly erred by making findings of fact that
are inconsistent with the evidence she presented at the HRO hearing. Specifically, she
argues that the district court erred by finding facts that are inconsistent with her evidence
that Maldonado shined lights at her, that Maldonado only comes out of her home when
Simpson arrives or leaves, that Maldonado “record[ed] herself antagonizing” Simpson, and
that Maldonado’s behavior is unwanted.
A district court may make oral findings of fact from the bench. Minn. R. Civ. P.
52.01. “A district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous . . . .” Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous “when they are manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a
whole.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted). “In applying the clear -error

3 We also do not consider Simpson’s descriptions of “[e]xhibits that were not accepted or
played.” Our review is limited to the record, which includes “ documents filed in the
[district] court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 110.01. To the extent Simpson asserts that the district court abused its discretion
by not accepting or viewing certain exhibits, those assertions are not adequately briefed.
See Melina, 327 N.W.2d at 20; Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135.
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standard, we view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings.” Id. This court does
not “weigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo,” and we will not conclude that the
district court erred unless “we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quotation s omitted). Finally, a finding is
not clearly erroneous simply because the evidence might support a contrary finding. See
Stiff v. Associated Sewing Supply Co., 436 N.W.2d 777, 779-80 (Minn. 1989) (stating that
“[a]lthough the record also contains testimony which, if believed, would support different
findings of fact more favorable to the respondent, when the record contains credible
evidence to support the fact findings and those findings support the [district] court ’s
conclusion,” an appellate court may not reverse just because it might have found the facts
differently in the first instance).
In its findings of fact, the district court described the evidence in detail, stating that
Simpson provided “an incredible amount of footage”; that Simpson presented “multiple
exhibits that show the shining of a flashlight”; that based on what the district court saw “in
the video, Ms. [Maldonado] did not come onto [Simpson’s] property”; that “to the extent
that [Maldonado] is using her flashlight, it’s not clear that she’s using her flashlight to look
at [Simpson]”; that the district court did not see Maldonado shining a light at Simpson in
Simpson’s video evidence; that in “all of those videos ” it appears that Maldonado “is the
full property line away from” Simpson; and that if, hypothetically, “every single time that
a car pulls up that Ms. [Maldonado] is looking for a family member, a friend, or a guest,”
that behavior is not impermissible.
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Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the findings, the findings are reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole , and we are not left with a definite, firm conviction
that a mistake was made. Thus, Simpson has not established that the district court clearly
erred in its findings.
II.
Simpson challenges the district court ’s credibility determinations, specifically, its
determinations that Maldonado was credible and that Simpson was not credible.
We do not “decide issues of witness credibility” because such issues “are
exclusively the province of the factfinder.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik , 765 N.W.2d 94, 99
(Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted) ; see Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the [district] court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.”). A district court’s credibility determinations may be
implicit. See Pechovnik , 765 N.W.2d at 99 (“The district court’s findings implicitly
indicate that the district court found respondent’s testimony credible. We defer to this
credibility determination.”).
The district court made several findings that touch on the credibility of Simpson’s
and Maldonado’s testimony at the HRO hearing . The court stated that it thought that
Simpson was “telling [the district court] the truth” but that it did not find Simpson’s beliefs
about Maldonado’s purpose in shining the flashlight “to be reasonable.” The court stated
that it found Maldonado credible when she said she was u sing her phone as a light. The
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court said it did not “think [it is] true” that Maldonado comes outside every single time”
that Simpson drives up to her home.
Because “the court of appeals is not a trier of fact,” it may not substitute its judgment
for that of the district court . Nelson v. Schlener , 859 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Minn. 2015).
“[District] courts stand in a superior position to appellate courts in assessing the credibility
of witnesses . . . .” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Minn. 1990). There
is no basis for us not to apply our usual deference to the district court’s explicit and implicit
credibility determinations in this case. We t herefore do not disturb the district court’s
credibility findings.
III.
Simpson contends that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that
Simpson’s allegations against Maldonado—even if true—do not show harassment.
The district court “may” issue an HRO if certain requirements are met, including
that “the court finds at the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
respondent has engaged in harassment. ” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b) (2022). As is
relevant here, harassment is defined to include “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted
acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a
substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the
relationship between the actor and the intended target.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2022).
Harassment “requires both objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of
the harasser and an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to
harassing conduct.” Dunham v. Roer , 708 N.W.2d 552 , 567 (Minn. App. 2006), rev.
9
denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). Conduct that “goes beyond an acceptable expression of
outrage and civilized conduct, and instead causes a substantial adverse effect on another’s
safety, security or privacy” is objectively unreasonable. See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846.
“Ultimately, the issuance of an HRO is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Peterson
v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion
by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Bender v. Bernhard ,
971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
As explained in section I of this opinion, Simpson has not shown that the district
court’s factual findings are erroneous . Nor are we persuaded that the district court
misapplied the law or made a decision that is against logic and the facts. Again, harassment
“requires both objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser and
an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to harassing conduct .”
Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 567. The district court explained that , because Simpson and
Maldonado were “both equally participating, [Maldonado’s conduct] doesn’t appear to be
unwanted.” That explanation indicates that the district court did not believe Simpson’s
claim that she was frightened by Maldonado’s conduct. Indeed, as to Simpson’s beliefs
about Maldonado’s conduct, the district court stated, “I don’t find that to be reasonable.”
The district court impli citly found that Maldonado’s conduct does not extend
“beyond an acceptable expression of . . . civilized conduct ,” instructing Simpson to
“[a]ssume for argument that Ms. [Maldonado] has come out every single time that you
drove up. . . . I’m not saying she is and I’m not saying that’s true, but there’s nothing
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wrong with that behavior” ; “it is not an abnormal nor an untoward behavior to look out
your window, and to the extent that [ Maldonado] does so she’s welcome to do that.” See
Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846. The district court further explained,
Ms. [Maldonado] is welcome to, just as you are, she’s welcome
to come and go as she pleases. She can sit on her steps. She
gets to use her car. She can use her phone. She can use her
flashlight or not use her flashlight that is up to her, and her
behavior is not abno rmal. It’s simply behavior of somebody
who lives in the neighborhood just like you. You come and go
as you please. You stand outside as you want. You use your
car as you want. You use your phone, your lights, your
cameras just as you wa nt and . . . as you are telling me right
now, you wouldn’t say there’s anything wrong with the way
that you’re acting, and to that extent there’s nothing wrong
with the way that Ms. [Maldonado] is acting.

(Emphasis added.)
In the absence of a finding of an “objectively reasonable belief” on Simpson’s part
and “objectively unreasonable conduct or intent” on Maldonado’s part, harassment was not
established under Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). See Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 567.
In sum, Simpson has not shown reversible error. The district court scheduled an
evidentiary hearing on Simpson’s petition for a n HRO, heard the evidence, listened to the
arguments, explained what evidence was and was not persuasive , and explained why
Simpson’s allegations did not establish that Maldonado had engaged in harassment, as
defined in statute and caselaw. The district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
Affirmed.