State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0183

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Andre Antonio Walker Hansbrough,
Appellant.

Filed January 21, 2025
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-12752

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this direct appeal from judgments of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm and second-degree assault, appellant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient
to prove that he unlawfully possessed a firearm and (2) that he is entitled to a new trial
2
because the district court failed to provide a specific unanimity instruction. In addition,
appellant advances several pro se arguments in a supplemental brief. Because none of
appellant’s contentions warrant reversal, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Andre Antonio Walker
Hansbrough with unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2020), and second-degree assault, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdivision 1 (2020). The matter proceeded to a jury
trial. The following recitation of facts is based on the trial evidence and is described in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
Relevant Trial Evidence
In late June 2022, the owner of a Minneapolis restaurant encountered S.F., the
mother of Hansbrough’s children, ordering food in the owner’s establishment. The owner’s
granddaughter—who was cashiering—informed S.F. that her food would be ready about
20 minutes from the time that S.F. had placed her order.
While S.F. was waiting, Hansbrough walked into the restaurant and asked, “what
the f--k is taking so long for the motherf-----g food.” The granddaughter responded that the
restaurant did not serve fast food and that the meal would take some time to prepare. The
owner asked S.F. if she wanted to continue waiting, and S.F. responded that she did.
Hansbrough, however, expressed frustration about the delay. He and the owner began
arguing about the language Hansbrough used to convey his impatience. In response to the
owner’s statement that Hansbrough could leave if he did not like being in the restaurant,
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Hansbrough told the owner: “I’ll show you what I can do, I’ll show you what I’m about.”
Hansbrough then left the restaurant. Although S.F. had initially declined a refund, she
ultimately asked the owner for her money back. Hansbrough reentered the restaurant and
the owner saw that he had a firearm in his front pocket. He said that he “could air this place
out if he wanted to,” which the owner took to mean that Hansbrough “would shoot it up.”
As Hansbrough was yelling and screaming, the owner observed him with his hand on the
firearm.
Surveillance cameras located both inside and outside the restaurant captured the
incident. The interior video shows Hansbrough leave the restaurant and later reenter with
an object in his pocket. Hansbrough then remains by the front door while S.F. waits for her
refund. When S.F. heads toward the door, Hansbrough removes the object from his pocket
and holds it at his side. Hansbrough then puts the object back in his pocket and leaves the
restaurant. The exterior video depict s the incident beginning with S.F. exiting the front
passenger side of a vehicle and rounding the street corner to enter the restaurant. About
five minutes later, Hansbrough exits the driver’s side of the vehicle and walks to the
restaurant. He reemerges a little over a minute later and can be seen opening the passenger-
side door of the vehicle. Hansbrough appears to grab something from the passenger side of
the vehicle, closes the door, and walks back into the restaurant.
During his trial testimony, Hansbrough conceded that he did grab something after
he opened the passenger side door of his vehicle outside the restaurant. But he claimed that
the object he retrieved from the vehicle was a BB gun and that the BB gun was in his pocket
when he reentered the restaurant.
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After Hansbrough and S.F. left the restaurant, the owner called 911 to report the
incident. Several customers mentioned to the owner that they recognized Hansbrough and
that he might be headed to a nearby liquor store. The owner closed the restaurant for the
day and went to the liquor store, where she saw Hansbrough. Again calling 911, the owner
reported Hansbrough’s location and described Hansbrough, his vehicle, and the vehicle’s
license plate number.
Officer A.A. responded to the liquor store. Upon arrival, the officer observed a
vehicle and a male who matched the description that Officer A.A. had received from the
911 dispatcher. The officer approached the male, who was later identified as Hansbrough.
After he detained Hansbrough in the back of his squad car, the officer asked Hansbrough
if there was a firearm in Hansbrough’s vehicle. Hansbrough repeatedly denied having a
firearm in the vehicle. When Officer A.A. asked if he could look inside Hansbrough’s
vehicle, Hansbrough became hesitant. Hansbrough eventually told the officer that he could
ask the passenger, S.F., for permission to look inside the vehicle. Additional officers
arrived on scene and requested that S.F. exit the vehicle. After an officer asked S.F. if there
were any weapons in the vehicle, S.F. responded that she had a firearm in her bag on the
passenger side. According to S.F. , she bought the firearm in the spring of 2022 and had a
permit to carry it. In his trial testimony, Hansbrough admitted that he was prohibited from
possessing firearms because of a 2016 felony conviction and claimed that he did not know
S.F. had a weapon.
Officer P.X. searched the front passenger area of Hansbrough’s vehicle and found
a white bag with a firearm inside. The officer also searched the passenger’s side door but
5
discovered no other weapons in the vehicle. Officer J.H. likewise searched the back
passenger side of the vehicle and located no other weapons.
Jury Instructions, Verdict, and Sentencing
Based on Hansbrough’s testimony that he had possessed a BB gun, defense counsel
requested that the district court instruct the jury on threats of violence as a lesser-included
offense of second-degree assault. The state separately asked that the district court instruct
the jury on both actual and constructive possession of a firearm. The district court granted
both requests. As to the unlawful- possession charge, the district court instructed the jury
that they “may find that the element of possession . . . is present if [they] find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive possession.” The district
court also instructed the jurors that each of them must agree with the verdict and that their
verdict must be unanimous.
During her closing argument, the prosecutor maintained that the state had proven
that Hansbrough had both actual and constructive possession of a firearm. The prosecutor
asserted that Hansbrough had actual possession when he brandished the weapon in the
restaurant and that he constructively possessed the weapon in the vehicle when he was
arrested at the liquor store.
The jury found Hansbrough guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and of
second-degree assault, but acquitted Hansbrough of the threats-of-violence charge. The
district court sentenced Hansbrough to 60 months’ imprisonment on the unlawful-
possession offense and to a concurrent prison term of 34 months for the crime of second-
degree assault. This appeal follows.
6
DECISION
Hansbrough challenges his convictions, arguing (1) that the state provided
insufficient evidence to prove that he possessed a firearm, (2) that he is entitled to a new
trial because the district court failed to provide a specific unanimity instruction, and (3) that
several issues raised in his pro se supplemental brief warrant reversal. Below, we address
each of Hansbrough’s arguments in turn.
I. There is sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to prove that
Hansbrough actually and constructively possessed the firearm.

A. Standard of Review
Hansbrough maintains that, because “[t]here was no direct evidence that [he] had a
firearm,” his unlawful-possession conviction “can only be affirmed if the state’s
circumstantial evidence proves his guilt.” The state counters that direct evidence alone is
sufficient to prove that Hansbrough possessed a firearm. Assuming without deciding the
direct evidence adduced at trial was not alone sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict for
unlawful possession of a firearm, we apply the heightened circumstantial-evidence
standard of review.1

1 “The relevant standard of review depends on whether the factfinder . . . reached its
conclusion of law based on direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Petersen, 910
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018). Direct evidence is evidence that is “based on personal
knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.”
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial
evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute
existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When the direct evidence of guilt on a
particular element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict,” appellate courts apply the
heightened circumstantial-evidence standard of review. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638,
643 (Minn. 2017).
7
That heightened standard requires appellate courts “to consider whether the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational
hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted). But appellate courts “will not overturn a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” Id. (quotation omitted). When
applying the circumstantial-evidence standard of review, appellate courts employ “a two-
step process.” State v. Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d 266, 275 (Minn. 2023). “Step one involves
identifying the circumstances proved.” Id. (quotation omitted). At this step, appellate courts
“winnow down the evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts that is consistent with the
jury’s verdict and disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.” Id.
(quotations omitted). “The jury is the sole judge of credibility and is free to accept part and
reject part of the testimony of a particular witness.” Id. (quotations omitted). Step two
requires appellate courts to “analyze whether the circumstances proved are consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other
than guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).
With this standard in mind, we next review the sufficiency of the trial evidence.
B. The circumstances proved are consistent only with hypotheses that
Hansbrough is guilty and are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
other than guilt.

Hansbrough posits that there is a rational hypothesis other than his guilt of
unlawfully possessing a firearm. We disagree.
“To convict [Hansbrough] of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, the
State was required to prove in relevant part that he knowingly possessed the firearm.”
8
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601; see also Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). “Possession may
be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.” Id. “Actual possession,
also referred to as physical possession, involves direct physical control.” State v. Stone,
982 N.W.2d 500, 510 (Minn. App. 2022) (quoting State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353
(Minn. App. 2016)), aff’d, 995 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 2023). Constructive possession may be
proved by showing that the item was found “in a place under [a] defendant’s exclusive
control to which other people did not normally have access.” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d
609, 611 (Minn. 1975). But if the item was found “in a place to which others had access,”
the state must prove that “there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that
[the] defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over [the
firearm].” Id. As explained below, we conclude that there was sufficient direct and
circumstantial evidence to prove actual and constructive possession.
At the first step, we identify the following circumstances proved:
• S.F. ordered food from the owner’s restaurant and was informed by the
owner’s granddaughter that it would take about 20 minutes to prepare the
meal.

• Hansbrough entered the restaurant, cursed about the wait for the food, and
began arguing with the owner about the language he had used to convey his
impatience.

• The owner told Hansbrough that he could leave the restaurant, to which
Hansbrough responded: “I’ll show you what I can do, I’ll show you what I’m
about.”

• Hansbrough exited the restaurant, walked toward his vehicle, opened the
passenger-side door, and grabbed something from that area.

• Hansbrough reentered the restaurant with an object in his front pocket, which
the owner saw was a firearm.
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• Hansbrough said that he “could air this place out if he wanted to,” which the
owner understood as meaning that Hansbrough “would shoot it up.”

• As Hansbrough was yelling and screaming, the owner observed him with his
hand on the firearm.

• Hansbrough remained by the front door while S.F. waited for a refund.

• Once S.F. headed toward the door, Hansbrough removed the object from his
pocket, held it at his side, then put the object back in his pocket and left the
restaurant.

• After closing her business for the day, the owner located Hansbrough at a
liquor store near her restaurant and called 911.

• Police arrived at the liquor store and asked Hansbrough if they could look
inside the vehicle, but Hansbrough was hesitant about allowing law
enforcement to search.

• Police ultimately searched Hansbrough’s vehicle and found a firearm in
S.F.’s bag on the passenger side.

Having identified the circumstances proved, we turn to the second step: determining
“whether the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that [Hansbrough] is
guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Gilleylen, 993
N.W.2d at 275 (quotations omitted). We conclude that there are two rational hypotheses
consistent with Hansbrough’s guilt—one, that he actually possessed the firearm in the
restaurant, and two, that he constructively possessed it in the vehicle outsid e the liquor
store. And we conclude that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt.
The first rational hypothesis consistent with guilt—that Hansbrough actually
possessed a firearm in the restaurant—arises from the circumstances proving that
10
Hansbrough had direct physical control of a firearm when he returned to the business after
his initial confrontation with the owner. More specifically, the circumstances proved
establish that, after an argument with the owner, Hansbrough grabbed S.F.’s firearm from
the passenger side of his vehicle and reentered the restaurant with the firearm in his pocket.
On appeal, Hansbrough does not claim that there is a rational hypothesis other than guilt
as to his actual possession of a firearm in the restaurant.
The second rational hypothesis consistent with guilt—that, while he was at the
liquor store, Hansbrough constructively possessed the firearm in his vehicle—stems from
the circumstances prov ing that Hansbrough continued to consciously exercise dominion
and control over the firearm at the liquor store after he actually possessed it in the
restaurant. This conclusion aligns with a nonprecedential but persuasive opinion in which
we determined that analogous evidence of prior possession of a firearm sufficiently
established a defendant’s constructive possession of the weapon. See State v. Owens,
No. A16-0559, 2017 WL 958474 (Minn. App. Mar. 13, 2017).2
In Owens, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction of unlawfully possessing a Kel–Tec firearm that law enforcement recovered
from the center console of a sport utility vehicle (SUV), which the appellant had been
driving. Id. at *1. Applying the circumstantial -evidence standard of review, we explained
that the circumstances proved included the following: when police stopped appellant, he
was wearing a baseball-style cap with an Oakland Raiders emblem; and “appellant’s

2 Under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 136.01, subdivision 1(c), we cite this
nonprecedential opinion only as persuasive authority.
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property inventory included a cellphone that contained photo[graph]s of a male who
resembled appellant wearing a baseball-style cap with an Oakland Raiders emblem and
holding a handgun that looked like the Kel –Tec handgun.” Id. at *4. Relying on the
photographic evidence depicting the appellant’s prior actual possession of the firearm that
law enforcement found in the SUV’s center console, we concluded that the circumstances
proved were consistent only with a hypothesis that appellant constructively possess ed the
firearm in the center console and were inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than
guilt. Id.
Similar to Owens, the restaurant surveillance footage here shows Hansbrough
grabbing S.F.’s firearm from the passenger side of the vehicle and brandishing the weapon
in the restaurant , thereby evincing Hansbrough’s actual possession of the firearm before
law enforcement found it in the vehicle at the liquor store. And just as the circumstances
proved in Owens established that the appellant had been driving the SUV where the Kel–
Tec firearm was found, it is undisputed here that law enforcement discovered the charged
firearm in Hansbrough’s vehicle. See also State v. Porter, 674 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn.
App. 2004) (concluding that “the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that
[appellant] constructively possessed [a] firearm” based on the facts that appellant lived in
an apartment where the firearm was found and the firearm was discovered near appellant’s
personal belongings).
Hansbrough nonetheless contends that the circumstances proved support a rational
hypothesis other than guilt—that only S.F. exercised dominion and control over the firearm
when it was located in the vehicle at the liquor store. But this hypothesis fails to consider
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all the circumstances proved. These include the owner’s testimony and the surveillance
footage that appellant accessed the same part of the vehicle where the firearm was found
and retrieved an object that appeared to be a firearm, just hours before law enforcement
found the weapon in S.F.’s bag on the passenger side of the vehicle at the liquor store. As
a result, we conclude that the circumstances proved—considered in their totality—are
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.
Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Hansbrough’s unlawful-possession
conviction based on his actual possession of the firearm in the restaurant and his
constructive possession of the firearm in his vehicle.
II. Hansbrough is not entitled to a new trial based on the lack of a specific
unanimity instruction because he has not shown that his substantial rights were
prejudiced.

Hansbrough asserts that he is entitled to a new trial on the unlawful-possession
charge because the district court did not provide a specific unanimity instruction, which he
claims allowed the jurors “to choose between two separate and distinct acts to find that he
possessed a firearm, resulting in a non-unanimous verdict.” We are not persuaded.
Generally, appellate courts “review a district court’s jury instructions for an abuse
of discretion.” State v. Stay, 935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019). But Hansbrough did not
object to the district court’s jury instructions on specific unanimity grounds. Appellate
courts review unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error. See State v. Beganovic, 991
N.W.2d 638, 655 (Minn. 2023). “To establish plain error warranting reversal of a
conviction based on an unobjected-to error, an appellant must show (1) an error (2) that is
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plain (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”3 Id. “The third prong, requiring that
the error affect substantial rights, is satisfied if the error was prejudicial and affected the
outcome of the case.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998). Plain error is
prejudicial “if there is a reasonable likelihood that the giving of the instruction in question
would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. “The defendant has the
burden of proving prejudice, and it is a heavy burden.” State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519,
525 (Minn. 2016).
Assuming without deciding that the lack of a specific unanimity instruction
amounted to plain error,4 we turn to the third prong of the plain-error analysis. Hansbrough
maintains that , because “there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors . . . relied on
different acts, . . . the district court’s error in failing to provide the jury with a specific
unanimity instruction impacted” his substantial rights. He argues that some jurors could
have found that he possessed a BB gun in the restaurant but still found him guilty because
they believed that he constructively possessed the firearm recovered from the vehicle at the
liquor store. He also asserts that other jurors could have rejected his testimony and found
him guilty because they thought he actually possessed the firearm in the restaurant.

3 “But even when these three prongs are established, a plain error does not justify granting
a new trial unless [the appellate court’s] failure to do so will cause the public to seriously
question the fairness and integrity of our judicial system.” State v. Bey, 975 N.W.2d 511,
521 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).

4 “A unanimous verdict shall be required in all cases.” State v. Stempf , 627 N.W.2d 352,
354 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted). “[T]he jury must unanimously agree on which
acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime.” Id. at
355. A “jury cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved
each element.” Id. (quotation omitted).
14
We conclude that any assumed instructional error did not affect Hansbrough’s
substantial rights. Hansbrough has not established that there is a reasonable likelihood that
providing a specific unanimity instruction would have had a significant effect on the jury’s
verdict. Although Hansbrough claims that some jurors could have believed his testimony
that he merely had a BB gun in the restaurant, the jury acquitted Hansbrough of the threats-
of-violence offense based on that incident. That charge —as instructed by the district
court—required the jury to find that Hansbrough “display[ed], exhibit[ed], brandish[ed] or
otherwise employ[ed] a BB gun in a threatening manner.” The jury’s acquittal on that count
was a rejection of such a finding. At the same time, the jury unanimously found
Hansbrough guilty of second-degree assault for the restaurant incident, which —as
instructed by the district court—required the jury to find that Hansbrough assaulted the
victim with a dangerous weapon. And in defining “dangerous weapon” for the jury in its
instructions, the district court explained only that “[a] firearm, whether loaded or unloaded,
or even temporarily inoperable, is a dangerous weapon.” Aside from the general arguments
raised in his pro se supplemental brief,
5 Hansbrough does not challenge his second-degree
assault conviction in this appeal.
In finding Hansbrough guilty of second- degree assault, the jury therefore
necessarily determined that Hansbrough actually possessed a firearm during the incident
at the restaurant. See State v. Thompson, 3 N.W.3d 257, 265 n.7 (Minn. 2024) (explaining
that appellate courts “must assume that the jury follows the [district] court’s instructions”).

5 As explained below, the contentions that Hansbrough asserts in his pro se supplemental
brief are forfeited.
15
Because the jury unanimously found that Hansbrough used a firearm to commit the second-
degree assault, there is no reasonable probability that —had the district court provided a
specific unanimity instruction—the jury would have failed to reach a unanimous verdict
that Hansbrough actually possessed a firearm during the restaurant incident for purposes
of the unlawful-possession charge. And, as discussed above, the evidence—including the
owner’s testimony and the surveillance footage of his earlier actual possession of the
firearm in the restaurant—sufficiently supports Hansbrough’s guilt of unlawfully
possessing the firearm based on his constructive possession of the weapon in the vehicle
outside the liquor store.
Hansbrough has failed to carry his “heavy burden” of proving prejudice. Huber, 877
N.W.2d at 525. Because we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that providing
a specific-unanimity instruction would have significantly affected the unlawful-possession
verdict, Hansbrough is not entitled to reversal. See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741; see also
State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2015) (concluding that “any error did not
affect [the defendant’s] substantial rights” because “i t is not reasonably likely that the
district court’s failure to provide a specific-unanimity jury instruction significantly affected
the verdict”).
III. The alleged errors in Hansbrough’s pro se supplemental brief are forfeited.

Hansbrough submitted a pro se supplemental brief in which he makes several
claims. He asserts: (1) that the district court judge “persuaded” the jury to find him guilty;
(2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct; (3) that the composition of the jury violated
his constitutional rights; (4) that the process —including that state’s ability to argue twice
16
in closing— favored the prosecutor over his attorney; and (5) that his attorney provided him
ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that these contentions are forfeited because
Hansbrough’s pro se brief contains no arguments or citation to legal authority.
“Claims in a pro se supplemental brief that are unsupported by either arguments or
citation to legal authority are forfeited.” State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650–51 (Minn.
2021) (quotations omitted). “Such arguments will not [be] considered unless prejudicial
error is obvious on mere inspection.” Id.
Based on our mere inspection of the record, we discern no obvious prejudicial error.
Thus, Hansbrough’s pro se claims are forfeited and we decline to consider them.
Affirmed.