Chad Alan Hoflock, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0185

Chad Alan Hoflock, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 9, 2024
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File Nos. 42-CR-20-734, 42-CR-21-282, 42-CR-21-633

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Abby Wikelius, Lyon County Attorney, Julianna F. Passe, Assistant County Attorney,
Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
In this appeal from the postconviction court’s order denying postconviction relief,
appellant Chad Alan Hoflock argues (1) his guilty pleas were unintelligent because he was
advised that he would be eligible for the Minnesota Department of Correction’s (the
2
department) Challenge Incarceration Program1 when, in fact, he was not eligible, and (2) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel related to advice he received about eligibility for
the program. Because eligibility for the program is a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea, and because counsel’s performance was not deficient, we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2021, a prosecutor and Hoflock’s counsel negotiated a possible global
plea agreement to resolve eight separate cases. Prior to Hoflock entering his guilty pleas,
Hoflock’s attorney contacted the Challenge Incarceration Program’s director to discuss
eligibility requirements. Hoflock completed a plea petition memorializing the global
agreement, which did not mention his participation in the Challenge Incarceration Program.
The global agreement contemplated that Hoflock would plead guilty: to threats of
violence in 42 -CR-20-734 and receive a stayed 21- month sentence; to second degree-
controlled substance crime in 42-CR-21- 282 and receive an executed 81-month sentence;
and to third-degree controlled substance crime in 42-CR-21- 633 and receive an executed
68-month sentence. The parties agreed the sentences would be served concurrently.
At the plea hearing, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: [O]ther than this agreement, have there
been threats made to you or promises made to you that cause
you to feel pressure to take, um, a plea offer?

HOFLOCK: Uh, no ma’am.

1 The Challenge Incarceration Program is an initiative of the department that enables some
incarcerated individuals to be released early from prison upon successful completion of the
program. See Minn. Stat. §§ 244.17, .171-.172 (2022).
3
THE COURT: Have you had enough time to visit with
attorneys that have been representing you in this matter[?]

HOFLOCK: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Then I find you are making a knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver of your rights[.]

The district court then accepted Hoflock’s guilty pleas under the global agreement.
The district court later pronounced the sentence as the parties had agreed. Hoflock
demanded that his stayed 21-month sentence be executed, and the court granted his request.
After sentencing, Hoflock learned that he was ineligible for the Challenge
Incarceration Program because he was required to register as a predatory offender due to
his conviction of threats of violence. Because he was determined to be ineligible for the
program, Hoflock is required to serve his sentence in prison without the potential for early
release available to those individuals who complete the program.
In October 2023, Hoflock filed a postconviction petition requesting to withdraw his
pleas, claiming the pleas were not intelligently entered because he pleaded guilty under the
belief that he would be eligible for early release through the Challenge Incarceration
Program. Hoflock also argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his
attorney’s advice about his eligibility to participate in the program . Finally, Hoflock
argued that he was sentenced with an inaccurate criminal-history score.
The postconviction court denied Hoflock’s request for an evidentiary hearing on his
postconviction petition. The court did hold a new sentencing hearing, but resentenced
Hoflock to the same negotiated sentence with a corrected criminal-history score.
Hoflock appeals.
4
DECISION
Appellate courts review the “denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as
a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d
162, 167 (Minn. 2012). A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of
the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 786
(Minn. 2015). We review a postconviction court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. Williams v. State, 869 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn. 2015).
I. A program-eligibility determination is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea
that does not affect the intelligence of a plea.

Hoflock argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his
petition seeking to withdraw his pleas. A postconviction court must allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof that withdrawal is necessary to
correct a “manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
A manifest injustice occurs when a plea is constitutionally invalid. State v. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. We review the validity of a plea de novo. Id.
A plea is intelligent if the defendant understands the charges, the rights being
waived, and the consequences of the plea. Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Minn.
App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). “Counsel, however, is not required to
advise the defendant of every consequence for the defendant’s plea to be intelligent.”
Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (emphasis in original).
5
The postconviction court determined that neither Hoflock’s plea petition, nor his
statements at the plea hearing, suggested that the pleas were conditioned upon his
acceptance to the Challenge Incarceration Program. The court also determined that
Hoflock understood the direct consequences of his pleas and that his eligibility and possible
acceptance into the program constituted a collateral consequence of the pleas.
In assessing the validity of a guilty plea, only “direct consequences” are relevant to
the determination of whether the plea was intelligent. State v. Bell, 971 N.W.2d 92, 101
(Minn. App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2022). Direct consequences “flow
definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea ” and usually include “the
maximum sentence to be imposed and the amount of any fine.” State v. Crump,
826 N.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. May 21, 2013). Lack of
awareness or incorrect advice regarding a direct consequence may render a guilty plea
inaccurate, involuntary, and unintelligent. Id.
In contrast, collateral consequences are those that “serve a substantially different
purpose” other than to punish and are “civil and regulatory in nature.” Kaiser v. State,
641 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Minn. 2002). “[A] defendant’s lack of awareness of
a collateral consequence of a guilty plea does not render the guilty plea unintelligent and
entitle a defendant to withdraw it.” Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823 (emphasis in original).
This court has held that the department’s discretionary release determinations are
collateral consequence s that do not affect the intelligence of a guilty plea. See Bell,
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971 N.W.2d at 100.2 Bell had argued that his plea was invalid because his counsel
provided an incomplete description of the department’s parole decision-making process.
Id. Although neither the district court nor counsel fully set forth the factors that the
department would use to determine Bell’s parole eligibility, we concluded that no manifest
injustice occurred because the parole-eligibility determination constituted a collateral
consequence that does not affect the intelligence of a plea.3 Id.
The same holds true for Hoflock. No manifest injustice occurred in this case
because the parole-eligibility determination—here, Hoflock’s acceptance into the
Challenge Incarceration Program—constituted a collateral consequence that did not affect
the intelligence of Hoflock’s plea.
Hoflock contends that the supreme court’s decision in Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d
573 (Minn. 1998), requires us to allow him to withdraw his pleas. However, in Alanis, the
supreme court held that the defendant’s plea was not intelligent because eligibility “to enter

2 See also State v. Washington, No. A05-699, 2006 WL 279042, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 7,
2006) (rejecting argument that defendant’s guilty plea was not intelligent because he was
misinformed about his eligibility for the Challenge Incarceration Program), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 26, 2006); Perales v. State, No. A03-1074, 2004 WL 292073, at *2-3 (Minn.
App. Feb. 17, 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 2004). These nonprecedential cases are
persuasive to our resolution of this issue. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

3 Because Hoflock had been charged with kidnapping and subsequently pleaded guilty to,
and was convicted of, threats of violence arising from the same circumstances as the
kidnapping charge, the statute required him to register as a predatory offender. See Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(1)(ii) (2022). Like eligibility for the Challenge Incarceration
Program, the predatory-offender registration requirement constitutes a collateral
consequence of a plea. See Kaiser, 641 N.W.2d at 907. To the extent Hoflock’s arguments
for plea withdrawal are premised upon the requirement that he register as a predatory
offender, we similarly conclude that the registration constituted a collateral consequence
that did not render his pleas unintelligent.
7
the boot camp program was a key factor in Alanis’s decision to plead guilty, and repeatedly
throughout the plea hearing, Alanis asked whether he would qualify for the program.” 583
N.W.2d at 576. That is not true in this case. Hoflock’s desire to participate in the program
was not memorialized in either the plea agreement or at his plea hearing.
Because the department’s determination of eligibility for the Challenge
Incarceration Program similarly constitutes a collateral consequence of his pleas,
Hoflock’s guilty pleas are not rendered unintelligent.
II. Hoflock did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney’s
performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Alternatively, Hoflock argues that he is entitled to withdraw his pleas because he
received ineffective assistance of counsel based on advice he received regarding his
eligibility for the Challenge Incarceration Program. We review a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo. Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the
right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I , § 6.
The right to effective counsel applies during the plea-bargaining process. See
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). Because ineffective assistance of counsel can
render a plea invalid, “a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel creates a
manifest injustice as a matter of law.” State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 53 1, 541 (Minn.
App. 2017). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty
plea, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong test. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718
(Minn. 1994) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
8
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. Second, the defendant must show prejudice by
demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that, “but for counsel’s errors, [the
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ellis-
Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 536 (quotation omitted). “We need not address both . . . prongs if
one is determinative.” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003).
“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an
attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney
would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266− 67
(Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). “[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance was reasonable.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that “misleading advice by counsel
to his client is not [a] ground for relief, unless it clearly rises to the level of unprofessional
conduct.” State v. Bailey, 132 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn. 1965) (quotation omitted). In
general, “an attorney’s representation does not fall below the objective standard of
reasonableness . . . if the attorney fails to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences
of a guilty plea.” Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 536.
Hoflock argues that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness because his attorney failed to inform him of his ineligibility for the
Challenge Incarceration Program. The postconviction court determined that Hoflock failed
to allege facts to show that “his pleas were invalid on the basis he was denied the
constitutional right to effective counsel.”
9
Hoflock presented no evidence to the postconviction court that his attorney
affirmatively misadvised him, such that Hoflock was unable to make an intelligent decision
in electing to plead guilty. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has affirmatively
held that an attorney’s failure to advise a defendant of a registration requirement before a
defendant enters a guilty plea does not violate the right to effective counsel. See Taylor,
887 N.W.2d at 826. Because Hoflock has not demonstrated that the first prong of the
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis is met, we affirm on that ground without reaching
the second prong. See Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842.
Affirmed.