State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0189

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Charles Edward Love,
Appellant.

Filed January 13, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-5976

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Ramsey County jury found Charles Edward Love guilty of burglary and
aggravated robbery based on evidence that he stole money from the office of a liquor store
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and injured a store owner when she attempted to re cover the money from him. We
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support both convictions. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
During the afternoon of September 29, 2022, Y.H. was working alone at a liquor
store she co-owns in Maplewood. The store consists of a large rectangular room with a
check-out counter and a small office at the front of the store near the door. The interior
door leading to the office, which is solid and unmarked, is usually closed but unlocked.
At approximately 3:00 p.m., a man entered the store and asked for wine. Y.H.
pointed him toward the back of the store. The man said that he needed help, so Y.H.
followed him to the back of the store while the man asked her questions about wine. Y.H.
became suspicious when the man repeatedly walked past the place s to which she was
directing him and continuously talked on his cell phone.
A surveillance video-recording shows that, unbeknownst to Y.H., a second man
entered the liquor store while the first man and Y.H. were in the back of the store. The
video-recording shows that the second man walked toward the office door, opened it, and
entered the office. A short time later, Y.H. returned to the check-out counter.
The first man eventually walked to the check-out counter to purchase a small single-
serving bottle of liquor, which cost $1.31. He did not have enough money, but Y.H.
allowed him to complete the purchase because she wanted him to leave.
As the first man was checking out and leaving the store, Y.H. noticed that he kept
looking at the office door. After the first man had left, Y.H. attempted to enter the office,
but she was unable to open the door because someone was pushing back on the door from
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the inside. Y.H. eventually pushed the door open wide enough to see a man, later identified
as Love, in the office. Y.H. asked Love what he was doing there, and he said that he was
there to use the restroom. Y.H. noticed that a safety box where cash normally is kept was
open and that the cash was gone. Y.H. told Love that she was going to call the police and
attempted to close the door and leave. A struggle ensued when Love attempted to keep the
door open. Y.H. saw that both of Love’s pockets “were stuffed full with cash,” and she
told him that she needed her money back. When Y.H. reached for the money in Love’s
pockets, he hit her hand away. Love pushed Y.H., and she fell against the inside of the
office door. Love then pushed Y.H. to the side, opened the office door, and left the store.
Y.H. followed Love outside and again asked him to give the money back to her.
Love responded aggressively, as if he was going to hit Y.H. An eyewitness saw the
altercation, called 911, and took photographs of Love and his accomplice. The eyewitness
saw both men drive away in a silver sedan.
When police officers arrived, Y.H. told the m that her hand was injured in the
incident, and the officers took a photograph of it. Y.H. testified at trial that her hand later
swelled, became discolored, and caused her pain but that she did not see a doctor “because
there was no one to watch [her] store.” Y.H.’s husband, a co-owner of the store, told a
police officer that Love had taken $901 in cash and two cartons of cigarettes.
Several police officers identified Love in the eyewitness’s photographs.
Investigators learned that Love had met with his parole officer just a couple hours before
the incident. At that meeting, which occurred in a parking lot, Love’s parole officer took
several photographs of Love, a man accompanying him, and their silver car. The parole
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officer’s photographs and the eyewitness’s photographs depict the same distinctive
patterned shirt worn by Love’s accomplice.
In October 2022, the state charged Love with first-degree burglary, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2022), and first-degree aggravated robbery, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2022). The case was tried to a jury on four days in
September 2023. After the state rested its case-in-chief, Love moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the two first-degree charges. The district court denied the motion. At the
request of the parties, the district court instructed the jury on the lesser-included offenses
of theft and simple robbery. The jury found Love guilty of all four charges. The district
court imposed concurrent sentences of 140 months of imprisonment on the convictions of
first-degree burglary and first-degree aggravated robbery. Love appeals.
DECISION
Love argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of first-
degree burglary and first-degree aggravated robbery.
In analyzing an argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction,
this court undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.” State
v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that “the
jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v.
Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We will not overturn a
verdict if the jury, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
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requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
I. Burglary
Love first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of first-
degree burglary on the ground that the state did not prove that consent to enter the liquor
store’s office was expressly withdrawn before he entered the office.
A person commits first-degree burglary if he or she “enters a building without
consent and with intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and
commits a crime while in the building,” and, in addition, the building is an occupied
dwelling, the burglar possesses a dangerous weapon, or the burglar assaults a person within
the building. Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1 (emphasis added). In this case, the state
charged Love with the third type of first-degree burglary, which requires proof that he
“assault[ed] a person within the building.” See id., subd. 1(c).
Love’s argument focuses on the phrase, “enters a building without consent.”
Specifically, Love’s argument is based on the statutory definition of that phrase, which
states, in part, “Whoever enters a building while open to the general public does so with
consent except when consent was expressly withdrawn before entry.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.581, subd. 4 (2022) (emphasis added). Love contends that there is no evidence that
consent to enter the office was withdrawn before he entered the office. In response, the
state contends that Love had consent to enter the part of the store in which merchandise
was displayed but did not have consent to enter the liquor store’s office. The state contends
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that, by entering the office, Love exceeded the scope of the consent given to him, which
makes it unnecessary to consider whether any consent was withdrawn.
There is no dispute that Love had consent to enter the liquor store, which was open
to the general public. To resolve Love’s argument, we must determine whether Love had
consent to enter the liquor store’s office. If he did, we would consider whether such consent
was withdrawn before Love entered the office. But if Love never had consent to enter the
office, we need not consider whether any consent was withdrawn.
Both parties cite State v. McDonald, 346 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 1984), a case with
analogous facts. The defendant in McDonald “entered a drugstore during business hours
but at a time when the pharmacy was closed and, without consent, entered a closed storage
room that was off limits to the general public and from there tried to gain access to the
locked pharmacy for the purpose of stealing controlled substances.” Id. at 352. The
supreme court affirmed the defendant’s burglary conviction by stating, “We uphold the
conviction on the ground that . . . defendant exceeded the scope of the consent given him
and other members of the public and entered the storage room with intent to gain access to
the locked pharmacy from there.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.58,
subd. 1(1) (1982)).
The supreme court revisited McDonald in State v. Lopez, 908 N.W.2d 334 (Minn.
2018). In that case, the defendant, a hotel guest, walked through the halls of the hotel,
checking for unlocked room doors. Id. at 335. After finding an unlocked room door, he
entered the room and stole a wallet and a cell phone. Id. On appeal from his conviction of
burglary, the defendant argued that the state failed to prove that he entered the hotel
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building without consent. Id. at 336. The supreme court rejected th e argument based on
McDonald. Id. at 337. The Lopez court explained that, in McDonald, “[w]e recognized
that consent to enter a building may be limited to specific areas” such that “a person enters
a building without consent under the burglary statute when he or she enters a portion of a
building where they do not have permission to be.” Id. The Lopez court explained further
that the burglary conviction in McDonald was affirmed because the defendant “exceeded
the scope of his license to be present in the drugstore by entering a nonpublic area of the
store—the storage room.” Id. The Lopez court applied McDonald by reasoning that
“[w]hen Lopez entered [another guest’s] hotel room, he exceeded the scope of his consent
to be present in the hotel building” and “therefore entered a building without consent.” Id.
at 338.
In this case, the evidence shows that the office is located near the front of the liquor
store, to the side of the check-out counter. The door to the office is a solid, unmarked door.
The door usually is kept closed. In addition, the evidence shows that Love and another
man engaged in a coordinated effort to cause Y.H. to go to the back of the store so that she
could not see Love enter the office. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the
area behind the closed door was not open to the general public. Consequently, the evidence
is sufficient to support a finding that Love exceeded the scope of consent given to him.
Love does not argue that the verdict depends on circumstantial evidence, which would
implicate a heightened standard of review. See S tate v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600
(Minn. 2017); State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). Consequently, we may
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conclude that the evidence is sufficient if the jury “could reasonably conclude that” Love
exceeded the scope of consent when he entered the office. See Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
Under the applicable caselaw—which recognizes that “a building open to the public
may still have portions of it that are not open to the public and that a person enters a building
without consent if he or she enters a portion of a building that is not open to the public”—
Love entered the building without consent when he exceeded the scope of consent to enter
the liquor store by entering the office. See Lopez, 908 N.W.2d at 338 (citing McDonald,
346 N.W.2d at 352) . Because Love exceeded the scope of consent, it is unnecessary to
consider whether consent to enter the office was expressly withdrawn.
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support Love’s conviction of first-degree
burglary.
II. Aggravated Robbery
Love also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of first-
degree aggravated robbery on the ground that the state did not prove that he inflicted bodily
harm on Y.H.
A person commits first-degree aggravated robbery if he or she, “while committing
a robbery, . . . inflicts bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1. Love
does not dispute that Y.H. sustained an injury to her hand or that her injury constitutes
bodily harm. He contends only that the state did not prove that he “inflicted” Y.H.’s bodily
harm on her “while committing” a robbery. He argues that the state did not carry its burden
of proof because Y.H. “did not testify at any point that he inflicted harm upon her” and did
not testify to “feeling any pain during any of the physical contact made by” him.
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In State v. Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 2016), an assault case, the supreme court
stated that the word “inflict” means “to lay (a blow) on” or “cause (something damaging
or painful) to be endured.” Id. at 832 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
1160 (2002)). The supreme court concluded that Dorn “inflicted” bodily harm on another
person by shoving him in the chest, which caused him to fall backward into a bonfire. Id.
at 829, 833. The supreme court reasoned that Dorn’s conduct constituted infliction of
bodily harm “because she intentionally applied nonconsensual force against” the other
person. Id. at 832. In addition, the supreme court assumed without deciding that “an
‘infliction’ requires direct causation” and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
prove direct cause because “Dorn pushed [the victim] hard enough to cause him to lose his
balance within a few feet of hot embers, and [the victim] fell into the fire within moments
of Dorn’s push.” Id. at 833.
In this case, Y.H. testified that her hand was injured during the incident involving
Love, but she did not testify with specificity about exactly when her hand was injured or
which act of Love caused the injury. Nonetheless, the evidence is sufficient to allow the
jury to find that Love inflicted bodily harm on Y.H. Y.H. testified that she struggled to
close the office door while Love pushed to open it and that Love prevailed by pushing with
more force, which caus ed her hand to slip off the door. Y.H. also testified that Love hit
her hand with his own hand when she attempted to remove money from his pockets. Even
though Y.H. did not pinpoint the precise moment in time when her hand was injured, the
evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury occurred between
the time that Love entered the office and the time that Love drove away in a silver car and
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that Love’s conduct was the direct cause of the injury. Again, Love does not argue that the
verdict depends on circumstantial evidence, which would implicate a heightened standard
of review. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600; Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 . Consequently, we
may conclude that the evidence is sufficient if the jury “could reasonably conclude that ”
Love engaged in an act that directly caused Y.H.’s hand injury. See Ortega, 813 N.W.2d
at 100. Given the evidence, the jury reasonably could have found that Love inflicted bodily
harm on Y.H. either when he forcefully pushed the office door open or when he hit her
hand to prevent her from removing money from his pockets.
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support Love’s conviction of first-degree robbery.
Affirmed.