State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0240

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kendall Dvontae Pruitt,
Appellant.

Filed February 10, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-1317

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Elizabeth Lamin, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson , Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
∗
SYLLABUS
Under Minnesota Sentencing Guideline 2.B.5.b (Supp. 2021), a district court may
assign prior-felony criminal-history points for a prior non-Minnesota conviction only if

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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(1) the equivalent Minnesota offense is a felony and (2) the defendant received a sentence
for the prior non-Minnesota conviction that would be a felony-level sentence in Minnesota.
OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Kendall Dvontae Pruitt pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree murder.
In determining Pruitt’s criminal-history score for sentencing purposes, the district court
assigned him two prior-felony points and one custody-status point, for a total of three
criminal-history points. We conclude that the district court erred by assigning Pruitt one
and one-half prior-felony points based on a prior federal conviction that is equivalent to a
Minnesota gross misdemeanor. We also conclude that, because the prior federal conviction
is equivalent to a Minnesota gross misdemeanor, the district court erred by assigning Pruitt
one custody-status point. Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
In March 2022, the state charged Pruitt with aiding and abetting second-degree
intentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 1(1), 609.05, subd. 1,
609.11, subd. 5(a) (2020). The state alleged in the complaint that, during the evening of
February 1, 2022, a 27-year-old man was playing video games in a bedroom of a residence
in St. Paul when he was fatally shot multiple times through a window. The state alleged
that Pruitt was one of four persons who fired shots at the victim.
Three months later, the state filed a superseding indictment alleging five charges:
(1) aiding and abetting first-degree murder for the benefit of a gang, in violation of Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1), 609.229, subd. 2 (2020); (2) aiding and abetting first-degree
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premeditated murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) ; (3) aiding and abetting
second-degree intentional murder for the benefit of a gang , in violation of Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.19, subd. 1(1) , 609.229, subd. 2 (2020); (4) aiding and abetting second-degree
intentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19 , subd. 1(1); and (5) possession of
firearm by ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020). The
state later filed a notice of its intent to seek an aggravated sentence.
In July 2023, the district court ordered a pre-plea sentencing memorandum because
the parties were considering a plea agreement. Probation officers prepared a pre-plea
memorandum that identified three prior convictions. First, in 2015, Pruitt was convicted
in Minnesota of third- degree riot for the benefit of a gang. Second, in 2017, Pruitt was
convicted in federal court of engaging in a conspiracy to possess a firearm as a felon. Third,
in 2020, Pruitt was convicted in federal court of escaping from federal custody. The
probation officers recommended that one-half of a prior-felony point be assigned for
Pruitt’s first prior conviction but that no prior-felony points be assigned for the second and
third prior convictions because there are no equivalent Minnesota offenses. Accordingly,
the probation officers recommended that Pruitt’s one-half prior-felony point be rounded
down to zero prior-felony points. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.i (Supp. 2021)
(requiring that partial prior-felony point values be rounded down to nearest whole number).
The state filed a memorandum of law to challenge the recommendation of the pre-
plea memorandum. The state argued that, in addition to the one-half prior-felony point for
the first prior conviction, the district court should assign Pruitt one and one-half prior-
felony points for the second prior conviction (the 2017 federal conviction of engaging in a
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conspiracy to possess a firearm as a felon) on the ground that the offense is equivalent to a
Minnesota felony offense. The state also argued that the district court should assign Pruitt
one custody-status point on the ground that he committed the present offense while on
supervised released for his second prior conviction. Accordingly, the state argued that the
district court should assign Pruitt a total of three criminal-history points. Pruitt responded
by filing a memorandum in which he argued for zero prior-felony points. The district court
resolved the issue by indicating its intent to assign three criminal-history points for the
reasons urged by the state.
In September 2023, the state and Pruitt entered into a plea agreement. Pruitt agreed
to plead guilty to the fourth count of the superseding indictment (aiding and abetting
second-degree intentional murder), and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts.
The parties agreed on an executed sentence of 406 months of imprisonment. At a
sentencing hearing in November 2023, the district court imposed the agreed-upon sentence,
which is within the presumptive sentencing range given a severity level of 11 and a
criminal-history score of three. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (Supp. 2021). Pruitt
appeals.
ISSUE
Is Pruitt’s prior federal conviction of engaging in a conspiracy to possess a firearm
as a felon, for which the district court assigned him one and one-half prior-felony points,
equivalent to a Minnesota felony offense?

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ANALYSIS
Pruitt argues that the district court erred by assigning him one and one-half prior-
felony points for his 2017 federal conviction of engaging in a conspiracy to possess a
firearm as a felon, which Pruitt contends is not equivalent to a Minnesota felony offense.
A.
The legislature has authorized the promulgation of sentencing guidelines “ to
maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn.
Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2024 ). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe
presumptive sentences for felony offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (Supp. 2021). A
defendant’s presumptive sentence depends on two variables: the severity level of the
present offense and the defendant’s criminal -history score. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2,
2.C.1 (Supp. 2021).
This appeal is concerned solely with Pruitt’s criminal-history score. A defendant’s
criminal-history score is the “sum of points” derived from the defendant’s prior felony
convictions, the defendant’s “custody status at the time of the [present] offense,” the
defendant’s “prior misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors,” and the defendant’s “prior
juvenile adjudications.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B (Supp. 2021). “The State bears the
burden of proof at sentencing to show that a prior conviction qualifies for inclusion within
the criminal-history score.” Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 2018).
Appellate courts generally apply an abuse-of -discretion standard of review to a district
court’s determination of a defendant’s criminal-history score. State v. Strobel, 921 N.W.2d
563, 573 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’ d, 932 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2019). But if the district
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court’s determination depends on an interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, a de novo
standard of review applies. State v. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2019).
The sentencing guidelines provide that prior non-Minnesota convictions may be
included in a defendant’s criminal-history score. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.a (Supp.
2021). In any particular case, the district court “must make the final determination as to
whether and how a prior non-Minnesota conviction should be counted in the criminal
history score.” Id. The guidelines direct district courts to analyze the issue in the following
way:
Find the equivalent Minnesota offense based on the
elements of the prior non-Minnesota offense. The section in
which to count the non -Minnesota offense in criminal history
depends on:

• whether the offense is defined as a felony, gross
misdemeanor, or targeted misdemeanor in Minnesota;
and
• the sentence imposed.

An offense may be counted as a felony only if it would
both be defined as a felony in Minnesota, and the offender
received a sentence that in Minnesota would be a felony-level
sentence, which includes the equivalent of a stay of imposition.
The offense definitions in effect when the current Minnesota
offense was committed govern the designation of non-
Minnesota convictions as felonies, gross misdemeanors, or
misdemeanors.

Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b (Supp. 2021) (emphasis added).
Guideline 2.B.5.b accounts for the fact that there is “[n]o uniform nationwide
characterization of the terms ‘felony,’ ‘gross misdemeanor,’ and ‘misdemeanor.’” Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.B.502 (Supp. 2021). The guideline makes clear that there are two
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independent requirements for the assignment of prior-felony points based on a prior non-
Minnesota conviction. First, the prior non-Minnesota offense must be defined as a felony;
second, the defendant must have received a sentence that would be a felony-level sentence
in Minnesota. Id. Given the clear language of guideline 2.B.5.b, a district court does not
have discretion to assign prior-felony points for a prior non-Minnesota offense unless both
requirements are satisfied. Rather, a district court may assign prior-felony criminal-history
points for a prior non-Minnesota conviction only if (1) the equivalent Minnesota offense is
a felony and (2) the defendant received a sentence for the prior non- Minnesota conviction
that would be a felony-level sentence in Minnesota.
B.
In this case, Pruitt contends that the first requirement of guideline 2.B.5.b is not
satisfied because his 2017 federal conviction would not be defined as a felony under
Minnesota law.
To carry its burden of proof with respect to Pruitt’s criminal-history points, the state
submitted a copy of the indictment that led to Pruitt’ s 2017 federal conviction. The
indictment shows that Pruitt and four other persons were charged with a conspiracy to
violate a federal statute that provides, “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm or ammunition . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (providing for offense of conspiracy “to commit any
offense against the United States”). To establish Pruitt’s guilt on that charge, the federal
government was required to prove both the existence of a conspiracy and Pruitt’s “act to
8
effect the object of the conspiracy.” See 18 U.S.C. § 371. The state introduced copies of
Pruitt’s federal plea agreement and the federal court’s judgment, which shows that Pruitt
was convicted of one charge and received a 53-month prison sentence.
In this case, the district court reasoned that the federal offense of which Pruitt was
convicted in 2017 is equivalent to the Minnesota offense of violating Minnesota Statutes
section 624.713, which generally provides that certain categories of persons are ineligible
“to possess ammunition or a pistol or semiautomatic military-style assault weapon or [with
one exception] any other firearm.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1 (2020).
Pruitt contends that the district court erred by not correctly identifying the
equivalent Minnesota offense. Specifically, Pruitt contends that the equivalent Minnesota
offense is the offense of engaging in a conspiracy to commit the offense described in
subdivision 1(10)(i) of section 624.713. That provision makes it unlawful for a person to
possess a firearm if the person “has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. ” Id., subd. 1(10)(i). A violation of section
624.713, subdivision 1(10)(i), is a gross misdemeanor. Id., subd. 2(c).
In response, the state contends that the equivalent Minnesota offense is a violation
of a different provision of section 624.713 —subdivision 1(2). That provision makes it
unlawful for a person to possess a firearm if the person has been convicted of “a crime of
violence.” Id., subd. 1(2). A conviction of a violation of section 624.713, subdivision 1(2),
is a felony. Id., subd. 2(b).
To establish a defendant’s guilt on a conspiracy charge in Minnesota, the state must
prove both a conspiracy and “some overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy.” Minn.
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Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2 (2020); see also State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 257 (Minn. 2008).
The Minnesota conspiracy statute is equivalent to the federal conspiracy statute.
Consequently, to resolve this appeal, we may focus on the offense underlying Pruitt’s 2017
federal conviction. We seek to determine whether a violation of subdivision 1(10)(i) or
subdivision 1(2) of section 624.713 is equivalent to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
the offense underlying Pruitt’s 2017 federal conspiracy conviction.
The applicable guideline requires that the analysis focus on “offense definitions in
effect when the current Minnesota offense was committed,” not the defendant’s conduct or
status at the time of the prior non-Minnesota conviction. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.B.5.b (Supp. 2021). The language of subdivision 1(10)(i) is identical to the language of
the statute setting forth the offense underlying Pruitt’s federal conspiracy conviction, which
applies to a person “ who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year .” See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). According ly,
the Minnesota offense of violating section 624.713, subdivision 1(10)(i), is equivalent to
the federal offense of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) . Consequently, the Minnesota
offense of engaging in a conspiracy to violate section 624.713, subdivision 1(10)(i), is
equivalent to Pruitt’s 2017 federal conviction of engaging in a conspiracy to violate 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
As stated above, the offense of violating section 624.713, subdivision 1(10)(i), is a
gross misdemeanor, not a felony. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2(c). Likewise, the offense
of engaging in a conspiracy to violate section 624.713, subdivision 1(10)(i), is not a felony
because the penalty for a conspiracy offense may be no more than one-half of the penalty
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for the intended crime. See Minn. Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2(3); see also Minn Stat. § 609.02,
subds. 2-4 (2020). Thus, the first requirement of the assignment of prior-felony points
based on a prior non- Minnesota conviction —that the offense is defined as a felony in
Minnesota—is not satisfied. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b (Supp. 2021).
C.
The state contends that the district court did not err by assigning prior-felony points
for Pruitt’s 2017 federal conviction because the district court’s analysis is consistent with
Hill v. State, 483 N.W.2d 57 (Minn. 1992).
In Hill, the supreme court applied the 1987 version of the sentencing guidelines to
determine whether the defendant’s prior out-of-state convictions should be deemed
felonies for purposes of calculating the defendant’s criminal-history score. Id. at 60. The
defendant argued that the inquiry should be limited to the question of whether Minnesota
has an offense with the same definition as the prior out-of-state conviction. Id. at 61. The
supreme court disagreed with the defendant ’s argument, reasoning that the inquiry is
broader because the comments to the sentencing guidelines “suggest that the main focus
should be on the offense definition” but that a sentencing court “should also consider ‘the
nature’ of the offense and ‘the sentence received by the offender.’” Id. at 61 (quoting Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines cmt. II.B.505 (1987)).
In this case, the district court cited and relied on Hill when assigning criminal-
history points to Pruitt. The district court reasoned that the “nature” of Pruitt’s 2017 federal
conviction and the sentence he received are “consistent with” section 624.713 generally.
The state contends that the district court did not err because “the combination of” the
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offense definition, the nature of the offense, and the sentence Pruitt received “supported
the district court’s determination that the federal conspiracy felon-in- possession statute is
akin to possession of a firearm by an ineligible person based on a prior crime-of -violence
conviction.”
We question whether the district court properly applied Hill, in which the supreme
court stated that “the main focus should be on the offense definition.” Id. at 61. But, more
importantly, we question whether Hill applies. The Hill opinion must be understood in the
context of the 1987 version of the sentencing guidelines, which is significantly different
from the 2021 version with respect to the assignment of prior-felony points for non-
Minnesota prior convictions. In 1987, the entirety of guideline II.B.5 provided, “The
designation of out-of-state convictions as felonies, gross misdemeanors, or misdemeanors
shall be governed by the offense definitions and sentences provided in Minnesota law.”
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.B.5. (1987). In contrast, the 2021 version of guideline 2.B.5
consists of five paragraphs, including the long, detailed paragraph we have quoted above.
See supra 6. In addition, the Hill court relied primarily on comment II.B.505, which
provided that “sentencing courts should consider the nature and definition of the foreign
offense, as well as the sentence received by the offender.” See Hill, 483 N.W.2d at 61
(citing Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. II.B.505 (1987)). But that comment no longer exists.
The 2021 guideline contains two distinct requirements and expressly states that both
requirements must be satisfied before a district court may assign prior-felony points to a
prior non-Minnesota conviction. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b (Supp. 2021). The Hill
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opinion does not provide useful guidance concerning how to apply the 2021 version of
guideline 2.B.5.b.
The state also argues, in the alternative, that Pruitt should be assigned at least one
prior-felony point for his 2017 federal conviction. The state relies on guideline 2.B.5 .d,
which states, “Federal felony offenses that received a sentence that in Minnesota would be
a felony-level sentence, but for which no comparable Minnesota offense exists, must
receive a weight of one in computing the criminal history score.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.B.5.d. (Supp. 2021) (emphasis added). This provision applies only if there is no
comparable Minnesota offense. I d. But we have concluded that a Minnesota offense is
equivalent to the federal offense of which Pruitt was convicted in 2017. Because that
Minnesota offense is “equivalent” to that federal offense for purposes of guideline 2.B.5.b,
the Minnesota offense is “comparable” to the federal offense for purposes of guideline
2.B.5.d. Thus, the state’s alternative argument is without merit.
For these reasons, the district court erred by assigning Pruitt one and one-half prior-
felony points for his 2017 federal conviction.
D.
In arguing for an appropriate appellate remedy, Pruitt asserts that, if the erroneously
assigned one and one-half prior-felony points are removed from the calculation, only one-
half prior-felony point remains. He contends that the one-half prior-felony point should be
rounded down to zero prior-felony points. Pruitt’s contention is consistent with a guideline
that provides, “If the sum of the [prior-felony ] weights results in a partial point, the point
value must be rounded down to the nearest whole number.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
13
2.B.1.i. (Supp. 2021). Thus, Pruitt’s one-half prior-felony point must be rounded down to
zero prior-felony points.
Pruitt further argues that, if his 2017 federal conviction is equivalent to a Minnesota
gross-misdemeanor offense, he should have been assigned only one-half of a custody-
status point, not one custody-status point. Pruitt’s contention is consistent with a guideline
providing that only one-half of a custody-status point should be assigned to a Minnesota
non-traffic gross misdemeanor. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.2.a., 2.B.2.a.(iv) (Supp.
2021). Furthermore, one-half of a custody- status point must be rounded down to zero
custody-status points. State v. Beganovic, 974 N.W.2d 278, 288 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d,
991 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2023). Thus, Pruitt’s one-half custody- status point must be
rounded down to zero custody-status points.
Because both the one-half prior-felony point and the one-half custody-status point
must be rounded down to zero, Pruitt’s total criminal-history score is zero.
DECISION
The district court erred by sentencing Pruitt based on a criminal -history score of
three. Pruitt ’s criminal-history score is zero. Therefore, we reverse and remand for
resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.