Mark Lehnertz, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0251

Mark Lehnertz,
Appellant,

vs.

RAM Mutual Insurance Company,
Respondent.

Filed September 23, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-CV-23-404

Justice Ericson Lindell, Mihajlo Babovic, Greenstein Sellers PLLC, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

John J. Neal, Neal PLLC, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this insurance-coverage dispute, appellant- insured argues that the district court
erred in granting respondent-insurer’s motion to dismiss appellant’s complaint for
insufficiency of service of process. Because appellant failed to strictly comply with the
relevant statutory requirements for substitute service, we affirm.
2
FACTS
The facts of this case are undisputed. Appellant Mark Lehnertz purchased an
insurance policy from respondent RAM Mutual Insurance Company (RAM) that provided
property-damage coverage for Lehnertz’s real property. Lehnertz submitted a claim under
the policy after his property suffered hail and wind damage in June 2021. Because RAM
and Lehnertz disagreed about the amount of the loss, Lehnertz attempted to commence a
civil action against RAM by substitute service of process on the Minnesota Commissioner
of Commerce (the commissioner) pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 45.028 (2022).
In his complaint, Lehnertz set forth two claims: a claim for breach of contract and a
claim for declaratory judgment. The breach of contract claim was based on allegations that
RAM “failed to appropriately adjust the loss and to approve and pay the amounts due and
owing to [Lehnertz] pursuant to the policy.” The claim for declaratory judgment sought a
declaration of RAM’s payment obligations under the policy.
RAM moved to dismiss the complaint under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
12.02(d). RAM argued that substitute service of process was defective under section
45.028 because Lehnertz’s complaint (1) failed to allege that RAM engaged in conduct
prohibited or made actionable by the statutes enumerated in section 45.028 and (2) was not
“brought under” any of the enumerated statutes. In response, Lehnertz filed an amended
complaint, adding allegations to his breach-of-contract claim that RAM “refused to timely
respond to [Lehnertz’s] request for a tolling agreement in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 72A.201 [(2022)].” The district court granted RAM’s motion to dismiss,
concluding that the statutory requirements for substitute service of process were not met.
3
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Lehnertz challenges the district court’s grant of RAM’s motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of service of process. Whether service of process is effective presents a
question of law, which we review de novo. Meeker v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 862 N.W.2d
43, 45 (Minn. 2015).
Proper service of process is a fundamental requirement of commencing a lawsuit.
Doerr v. Warner, 76 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Minn. 1956). “[S]ervice of process must accord
strictly with statutory requirements.” Lundgren v. Green, 592 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn.
App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn. July 28, 1999). This is because “[w]ithout sufficient
service of process, a district court has no jurisdiction over a defendant.” Smith v. Flotterud,
716 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2006). Statutory
requirements for substitute service of process are no exception. Jaeger v. Palladium
Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 609 (Minn. 2016).
Section 45.028 sets forth the substantive and procedural requirements for substitute
service on the commissioner for certain “suits, actions, and proceedings.” Specifically,
section 45.028, subdivision 1(a) provides:
When a person, including any nonresident of this state,
engages in conduct prohibited or made actionable by chapters
45 to 83, 155A, 309, and 332, and section 326B.802, or any
rule or order under those chapters, and the person has not filed
a consent to service of process under chapters 45 to 83, 155A,
309, and 332, and section 326B.802, that conduct is equivalent
to an appointment of the commissioner as the person’s attorney
to receive service of process in any noncriminal suit, action, or
proceeding against the person which is based on that conduct
and is brought under chapters 45 to 83, 155A, 309, and 332,
4
and section 326B.802, or any rule or order under those
chapters.

Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). Subdivision 1(a) imposes two
substantive requirements that must be met to perform substitute service on the
commissioner: (1) the plaintiff must allege that the defendant “engage[d] in conduct
prohibited or made actionable by chapters 45 to 83, 155A, 309, and 332, and section
326B.802” and (2) the plaintiff’s suit must be “based on that conduct and . . . brought
under” the enumerated statutes, rules, or orders. Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(a).
1
To determine whether Lehnertz satisfied the substitute-service requirements, we
must interpret section 45.028, subdivision 1(a). Statutory interpretation presents a question
of law, which we review de novo. Johnson v. Concrete Treatments, Inc., 7 N.W.3d 119,
126 (Minn 2024). The goal of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature.” Id. (citation omitted). To do so, we must first determine
whether the statute’s language is ambiguous. Reetz v. City of Saint Paul, 956 N.W.2d 238,
245 (Minn. 2021). A statute is ambiguous only when it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 126. If a statute is susceptible to only one
reasonable interpretation, we apply the statute’s plain meaning. Harkins v. Grant Park

1 Lehnertz did not attempt substitute service in reliance on any statute other than Minnesota
Statutes section 45.028. For example, Lehnertz did not rely on Minnesota Statutes section
60A.19 (2022), which requires that foreign insurers appoint the commissioner as their
attorney, upon whom “all lawful processes in any action or legal proceeding against [the
foreign insurers] may be served.” Minn. Stat. § 60A.19, subd. 3. Section 60A.19 provides
that service on foreign insurers via the commissioner as authorized by that section must be
made in compliance with section 45.028, subdivision 2. We note that our analysis in this
opinion applies narrowly to substitute service allowed pursuant to section 45.028,
subdivision 1(a).
5
Ass’n, 972 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn 2022). When interpreting a statute, we may turn to
dictionary definitions, including legal dictionary definitions, for terms not otherwise
defined in the statute. In re Moratzka, 988 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn. 2023).
The parties’ dispute here revolves around what it means for a “noncriminal suit,
action, or proceeding” to be “brought under” one of the statutes enumerated in section
45.028, subdivision 1(a). Lehnertz argues that “[t]he term ‘brought under’ should be
interpreted to require the plaintiff to contend that conduct that violates [one of the
enumerated] statute[s] occurred, rather than requiring the plaintiff to allege a claim that
was specifically created by [one of the enumerated] statute[s].” RAM contends that
Lehnertz’s interpretation renders the term “brought under” as used in subdivision 1(a)
meaningless because subdivision 1(a) requires that the “suit, action, or proceeding” both
be “based on that conduct and brought under” one of the enumerated statutory provisions.
Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). RAM instead offers that the term
“brought under” as used in subdivision 1(a) requires a prospective plaintiff to “assert a
cause of action specified by statute.” RAM’s argument is more persuasive.
Section 45.028 does not define the term “brought under, ” but “brought under” is a
phrase of common legal parlance. See Minn. Stat. §§ 45.011 (providing definitions for
chapter 45), .028 (2022); Pinares v. United Techs. Corp., 973 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir.
2020).2 As the federal circuit court stated in Pinares, “Simply put, a suit is brought under
the law which supplies its cause of action.” 973 F.3d at 1260. And a “cause of action” is

2 “Though they do not bind us, we consider federal court opinions for their persuasive value
and afford those opinions due deference.” Laliberte v. Dollar Tree, Inc., 987 N.W.2d 590,
594 n.4 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted).
6
the set of facts or the legal theory providing the basis for a lawsuit. Black’s Law Dictionary
275 (12th. Ed. 2024). Relatedly, to “bring an action” means to institute a lawsuit. Id. at
238. Also, our supreme court has recognized that a lawsuit is “brought under” the specific
law that supplies its cause of action. For example, in considering a statute of limitations
question, the supreme court discussed a lawsuit “brought under” Minnesota Statutes
section 176.82 (2022), which “creates a cause of action for retaliatory discharge and for
intentional obstruction of an employee seeking worker’s compensation benefits.”
McDaniel v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 85-86 (Minn. 1991) (emphasis
added); see also White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n ex rel. State v. Minnesota Dep’t of
Nat. Res., 946 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn. 2020) (stating that appellants “brought claims
under Minn. Stat. § 116B.03 (2018), part of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act”).
Consequently, we conclude that it is reasonable to interpret the phrase “brought under” as
used in section 45.028 , subdivision 1(a), to mean a lawsuit is “brought under” a statute
enumerated in section 45.028 when the enumerated statute creates the cause of action for
the lawsuit. Such an interpretation is consistent with common legal parlance.
We next consider Lehnertz’s proffered alternative interpretation of section 45.028,
subdivision 1(a), and conclude that it is unreasonable because it renders the term “brought
under” meaningless. As discussed above, Lehnertz contends that “brought under” should
be interpreted to require the plaintiff to contend that conduct that violates one of the
enumerated statutes occurred, rather than requiring the plaintiff to allege a claim that was
specifically created by one of the enumerated statutes. But the plain language of
subdivision 1(a) mandates that substitute service is authorized only for a suit, action, or
7
proceeding that both is “based on” conduct prohibited or made actionable by an enumerated
statute and “brought under” an enumerated statute. Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(a). 3 In
other words, it is not sufficient that the lawsuit be based on the defendant’s prohibited or
actionable conduct; one of the enumerated statutes must provide the cause of action for the
lawsuit. Lehnertz’s interpretation would render the term “brought under” meaningless,
because section 45.028 already provides that the lawsuit must be “based on” the statutorily
prohibited conduct. We must construe a statute, if possible, “to give effect to all its
provisions.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). Reading subdivision 1(a) of section 45.028 as
a whole, we reject Lehnertz’s interpretation as unreasonable.
In short, the language of section 45.028, subdivision 1(a), limiting substitute service
to a suit, action, or proceeding “brought under” one or more enumerated statutes
unambiguously requires that the plaintiff’s lawsuit include a claim provided for in one of
the enumerated statutes. We now turn to whether Lehnertz’s complaint complied with this
requirement.
Lehnertz’s complaint set forth only two claims—one for breach of contract and one
for declaratory judgment. A claim for breach of contract arises from the common law. See
Moore v. City of New Brighton, 932 N.W.2d 317, 324-25 (Minn. App. 2019) (discussing
breach-of-contract claims and stating that “contract breaches violate the common law”),
rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2019). And Lehnertz’s declaratory-judgment claim was
brought pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 555.02 (2022), but section 555.02 is not

3 Though not relevant here, we note that section 45.028 also provides for substitute service
in actions based on and brought under “any rule or order under” one of the enumerated
statutes. Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(a).
8
among the statutes listed in section 45.028. Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(a) (enumerating
chapters 45 to 83, 155A, 309, and 332, and section 326B.802). Therefore, Lehnertz’s
complaint was not “brought under” any of the enumerated statutes as required by section
45.028. As such, substitute service of process on the commissioner was improper under
section 45.028. The district court therefore did not err by dismissing Lehenrtz’s complaint
for defective service of process.
Still, Lehnertz contends that his amended complaint satisfies the “brought under”
requirement for substitute service under section 45.028. 4 In his amended complaint,
Lehnertz added a paragraph to his breach- of-contract claim, alleging that RAM violated
section 72A.201 by failing to reply to his request for a tolling agreement within ten days.
Lehnertz asserts that his amended breach-of-contract claim was therefore brought under
section 72A.201, which is among the enumerated statutes in section 45.028, subdivision 1.
We are not persuaded.
As the district court noted, section 72A.201 is part of the Unfair Claims Practices
Act (UCPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 72A.01-.52 (2022). See Peterson v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co.,
946 N.W.2d 903, 911 n.5 (Minn. 2020). The supreme court has held that the UCPA does

4 RAM contends that Lehnertz’s initial complaint was never properly before the district
court due to defective service of process, and therefore there was no complaint to amend.
“As a general rule a civil action is commenced, and the court thereby acquires jurisdiction,
when personal service upon the defendant is actually made as prescribed by statute or rule.”
Doerr, 76 N.W.2d at 511. Where service of process on any defendant is deficient, the
district court lacks jurisdiction over that defendant and should dismiss the action.
Landgren v. Pipestone Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 633 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. App. 2001).
Here, the district court did not determine whether the amended complaint was
proper and instead determined that neither complaint could be served pursuant to section
45.028. Similarly, we assume without deciding that Lehnertz properly amended his
complaint.
9
not create a private cause of action for violations of the act. Morris v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins.
Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn. 1986). Because section 72A.201 does not supply a
private cause of action to Lehnertz, his breach-of-contract claim is not “brought under”
section 72A.201. See Pinares, 973 F.3d at 1260. Thus, the new allegation in the amended
complaint that RAM violated section 72A.201 did not transform the complaint into a cause
of action brought under one of the enumerated statutes. Rather, Lehnertz’s amended
breach-of-contract claim remained a claim brought under the common law.
In addition, Lehnertz appears to argue on appeal that his complaint was brought
under Minnesota Statutes section 65A.08, subdivision 2(a) (2022). Lehnertz did not make
this argument before the district court. Generally, we will only consider issues “that were
presented to and considered by the district court.” Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 873
(Minn. App. 2022). Lehnertz forfeited this argument, “and we decline to address it for the
first time on appeal.” Id. Even so, we note that neither the original complaint nor the
amended complaint reference section 65A.08 (2022).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
Lehenrtz’s complaint—amended or not —for insufficiency of service of process.
5
Affirmed.

5 In his brief, Lehnertz also claims that extra-record documents show that RAM consented
to service via the commissioner. During this appeal, Lehnertz filed a motion to supplement
the record with these purported documents, which we denied after Lehnertz filed his
principal brief. On appeal, the scope of our review is constrained to “the complaint and
the documents referenced in the complaint.” Olson v. Lesch , 943 N.W.2d 648, 652 n.3
(Minn. 2020); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“The documents filed in the [district]
court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record
on appeal in all cases.”). Accordingly, we decline to reach Lehnertz’s argument premised
entirely on extra-record materials.