In the Matter of the Welfare of: L. L. I., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0252

In the Matter of the Welfare of: L. L. I., Child.

Filed December 2, 2024
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-JV-23-151

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-23-3316

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant L.L.I.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Hannah M. Hanlon, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges her stayed delinquency adjudication for third-degree assault,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the victim suffered substantial
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bodily harm and that the state failed to prove that appellant was not acting in self-defense.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant L.L.I. and M.C. have had a hostile relationship involving harassment and
bullying since middle school. Their negative interactions culminated in an altercation on
May 16, 2023, at a retail store in Chanhassen. At the time, L.L.I. was 17 years old and
M.C. was nearly 17 years old. Each was accompanied by a friend.
The store’s video surveillance footage shows M.C. and L.L.I. exchanging words
near the women’s clothing section and then separating. Subsequent surveillance footage
from the store shows M.C. approach and reengage with L.L.I. and L.L.I.’s friend, J.S., at
the self-checkout stations. L.L.I. and J.S. testified that M.C. verbally harassed them both
with insults and expletives. At trial, M.C. admitted that the language she used was rude.
Surveillance footage shows L.L.I. exiting the store. L.L.I. testified at trial that this was to
remove herself from M.C., who continued to harass J.S. until he lef t the self-checkout
station. M.C. followed J.S. as he exited the store.
M.C. called 911. In the audio recording of her call, M.C. claims that L.L.I. and J.S.
were harassing her. L.L.I. was standing outside of the exit doors when J.S. walked out,
followed by M.C., who remained on the phone with the 911 operator. As she walked near
L.L.I., M.C. conspicuously told the 911 operator that “[L.L.I.’s] mom, I think, is a drug
addict.” L.L.I. then punched M.C., wrestled her to the ground, and slammed her head into
the concrete sidewalk twice. J.S. pulled L.L.I. off of M.C., ending the altercation. M.C.
remained on the phone with the 911 operator the whole time, and when the fight ended,
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M.C. told the operator, “Hi, she just beat me up.” M.C. went to urgent care and received a
CT scan, which did not show signs of brain injury. A few days later, M.C. visited her
family doctor for follow-up. M.C.’s family doctor diagnosed her with a concussion, and
at trial, M.C. testified that she experienced light sensitivity, headaches, nausea, and balance
issues after the altercation.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged L.L.I. by juvenile-delinquency petition with
third-degree assault inflicting substantial bodily harm, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.223,
subd. 1 (2022), and fourth-degree criminal damage to property pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 609.595, subd. 3 (2022), for damage to M.C.’s cell phone allegedly sustained during the
altercation. At the court trial, the state presented testimony from M.C., M.C.’s family
doctor, a store employee who witnessed the altercation, and a responding police officer.
L.L.I. argued that she acted out of self-defense. To support her defense, she presented her
own testimony, testimony from J.S., and testimony from a customer who witnessed the
exchange at the self-checkout. The parties stipulated to admission of evidence including
the store’s surveillance footage and the audio recording of M.C.’s 911 call.
After trial, the district court found L.L.I. guilty of third-degree assault inflicting
substantial bodily harm because it found that M.C. suffered a concussion and it rejected
L.L.I.’s theory of self -defense. The district court found that L.L.I. was not guilty of
criminal damage to property. At the beginning of the memorandum accompanying its
order, the district court stated that “it is important for the Court to describe the context of
this offense . . . [M.C.] purposefully baited [L.L.I.] into a fight, with the express intention
of getting her in trouble.” The district court provided detailed factual findings about the
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history between the two young women, including M.C.’s race-based insults toward L.L.I.,
and stated that it “did not find much of [M.C.]’s testimony to be credible.” The district
court also found that, although L.L.I. was the target of M.C.’s bullying, L.L.I. “participated
in back-and-forth childish insults” and “wanted to fight [M.C.].” Describing the encounter
in the store, the district court stated, “ The best evidence suggests that [M.C.] called 911,
knowing that she was going to bait [L.L.I.] into a fight, so that she could get [L.L.I.] in
trouble by falsely claiming that [L.L.I.] was harassing her and threatening to fight her.”
The district court’s order concluded its analysis finding L.L.I. guilty of third-degree assault
by saying,
Although [M.C.] baited [L.L.I.] into fighting by calling her
mom a drug user, [L.L.I.] was clearly the aggressor under the
law. . . . The circumstances present an explanation for why
[L.L.I.] reacted the way she did, but that explanation does not
amount to a legal defense for her actions.

L.L.I. appeals.
DECISION
L.L.I. raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that this court should reverse
her stayed adjudication because there was not sufficient evidence in the trial record to
support the district court’s determination that M.C. suffered substantial bodily harm, an
element of third-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1. Second, she argues
that the state failed to prove she was not acting in self-defense. We address each argument
in turn.
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I. The state provided sufficient evidence to support the district court’s
determination that M.C. suffered substantial bodily harm.
L.L.I. argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that M.C. suffered
substantial bodily harm because the district court discredited M.C.’s testimony about losing
consciousness, M.C.’s CT scan did not show signs of brain injury, and M.C.’s concussion
diagnosis was based on self-reported symptoms. The state argues that the evidence
supports the district court’s finding that M.C. suffered a concussion, caselaw demonstrates
a concussion can be substantial bodily harm, and this court cannot dismiss the district
court’s finding that certain parts of M.C.’s testimony about her symptoms were credible.
Appellate courts apply the same standard of review to evaluate the s ufficiency of
the evidence in court and jury trials. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
This standard applies in juvenile and non-juvenile matters. See In re Welfare of S.A.M.,
570 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. App. 1997) (applying this standard of review to a
juvenile-delinquency proceeding). Appellate courts review the sufficiency of the evidence
by “carefully examin[ing] the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate
inferences drawn from them would permit the [district court] to reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257,
263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the decision and assume “the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that
conflicted with the [decision].” Id.
Direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris,
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895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Witness testimony “is direct
evidence when it reflects a witness’s personal observations and allows the [district court]
to find the defendant guilty without having to draw any inferences.” State v. Horst,
880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). Video can be direct evidence. See State v. McCormick,
835 N.W.2d 498, 507 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). When direct
evidence supports a disputed element of an offense, appellate review is limited to a
“painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the [disposition], was sufficient to permit the [district court] to reach
the [decision] which [it] did.” Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 39-40 (quotation omitted).
A person commits assault in the third degree when they (1) assault another person
and (2) inflict substantial bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1. “Substantial bodily
harm” is “bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which
causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily member.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a
(2022). Whether an injury constitutes substantial bodily har m is a question for the
fact-finder. See State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. 2005) (stating, in the context
of first-degree assault, that whether an injury constitutes great bodily harm is a question
for the fact-finder).
In determining that the state proved the substantial-bodily-harm element of L.L.I.’s
assault offense, the district court relied on direct evidence, including testimony,
surveillance footage, the 911-call recording, and photographs of injuries. The surveillance
footage shows L.L.I. grabbing M.C.’s head and slamming it into the concrete two times.
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M.C. testified about her symptoms following the altercation, including light sensitivity,
headaches, nausea, and balance issues, and the district court credited that portion of her
testimony. The district court also credited the family doctor’s testimony that she diagnosed
M.C. with a concussion and found that M.C. “suffered a temporary but substantial
impairment to her brain’s functioning.” We defer to the credibility determinations of the
district court. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366
(1993).
Although L.L.I. correctly notes that the district court found that M.C. did not lose
consciousness, that fact does not prohibit it from determining that substantial bodily harm
occurred. Persuasive caselaw 1 demonstrates that substantial bodily harm can occur when
a victim suffers a concussion without losing consciousness. See , e.g., State v. Bowles,
No. A15-1144, 2016 WL 3042985, at *1-2 (Minn. App. May 31, 2016) (concluding that
bruises and a concussion can constitute substantial bodily harm, even when a victim’s
testimony is not credible and a CT scan shows no injuries) , rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 23,
2016); State v. Ayala , No. A13-2322, 2014 WL 7236931, at *3- 5 (Minn. App. Dec. 22,
2014) (concluding that blood loss, a hematoma, and doctor testimony that the victim
exhibited concussion symptoms were sufficient to support a determination of substantial
bodily harm), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2015).
The record shows, without inference or presumption, that M.C. (1) was diagnosed
with a concussion, (2) suffered headaches, (3) sustained bleeding where her head hit the

1 “Nonprecedential opinions . . . may be cited as persuasive authority.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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ground, (4) experienced nausea, (5) experienced light sensitivity, and (6) experienced
issues with her balance. Thus, the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
decision, supports the district court’s finding that M.C. suffered a concussion and ongoing
symptoms. Persuasive caselaw supports the district court’s determination that those
injuries constitute substantial bodily harm as defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a.
Because the evidence in the record supports the district court’s determination that
L.L.I. inflicted substantial bodily harm on M.C., we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support L.L.I.’s stayed adjudication for third-degree assault.
II. The state provided sufficient evidence to support the district court’s
determination that L.L.I. did not act in self-defense during the altercation.
L.L.I. next argues that the state provided insufficient evidence to show that she did
not act in self-defense. L.L.I. maintains that her past relations with M.C., combined with
M.C.’s offensive conduct, gave cause for her conduct. The state argues that L.L.I. cannot
claim self-defense because she was the initial aggressor and that, even if she could claim
it, the state disproved each element.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.06, subdivision 1(3), provides that “reasonable
force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other’s consent” when
someone is “resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2022). To raise self-defense, the proponent must make a threshold
showing of the following elements: (1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the
part of the proponent; (2) the proponent’s actual and honest belief that they were in
imminent danger of bodily harm; (3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief;
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and (4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger. State v. Radke,
821 N.W.2d 316, 324 (Minn. 2012). Once the defense is raised, the state must disprove at
least one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. An initial aggressor cannot
raise this defense unless they withdraw from the confrontation. Bellcourt v. State ,
390 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Minn. 1986). An “initial aggressor” begins or induces an incident
by engaging in activity that is a “good deal greater than mere conversation.” State v.
Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 145 (Minn. 2012) (quoting State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d
405, 412 (Minn. 2006)).
We again r eview the sufficiency of the evidence by “carefully examin[ing] the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the [district court] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,” viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the decision, and
assuming that “the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the [decision].”
Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 263. We also apply the principles set forth above regarding direct
evidence.
Video surveillance captured the altercation between L.L.I. and M.C. from start to
finish. The footage shows that L.L.I. did not withdraw from the altercation with M.C. but
returned to it and was the first to physically engage in more than “mere conversation” by
punching M.C. in the face, wrestling her to the ground, and slamming her head into the
concrete twice. Testimony supports L.L.I.’s assertion that, on the evening of May 16,
2023, M.C. was disrespectful and crude . However, M.C. presented no need for L.L.I. to
resist an offense against herself or J.S. The direct evidence in the record shows that L.L.I.
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was the initial aggressor. See Carridine, 812 N.W.2d at 145; Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at
272. Because the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the decision,
demonstrates that L.L.I. was the initial aggressor in the altercation, we do not reach her
remaining arguments relating to her assertion of self-defense. Although M.C.’s conduct
was designed to provoke L.L.I. into responding, L.L.I. cannot raise a self-defense claim as
the initial aggressor, and therefore, the district court did not err in determining that L.L.I.
did not act in self-defense.
Affirmed.