In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0258

In re the Marriage of:

Linda Beth Krelitz, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael James Krelitz,
Appellant.

Filed September 9, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-1111

Linda Beth Krelitz, Minneapolis, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Michael J. Krelitz, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this dissolution dispute, self -represented appellant- husband argues that the
district court abused its discretion by (1) imposing a retroactive spousal-maintenance
obligation and (2) miscalculating the property-equalization payment. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
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FACTS
Appellant Michael James Krelitz (husband) and respondent Linda Beth Krelitz
(wife) married in 1995 and have two adult children. After 24 years of marriage, wife filed
a dissolution action in February 2019. Beginning in July 2019, the district court ordered
husband to pay wife $1,779 per month in temporary spousal maintenance until the parties’
trial. Wife filed a motion to modify the temporary-maintenance award in July 2020, which
the district court denied.
The parties proceeded to a two-day court trial in August and September 2020,
primarily litigating the issues of marital-property division and spousal maintenance.
Following trial, the district court entered a judgment and decree in February 2021 which
dissolved the parties’ marriage, allocated their assets and debts, and awarded wife
permanent spousal maintenance. Although wife had not renewed her motion to modify the
temporary maintenance award, the district court made husband’s permanent-maintenance
obligation retroactive to the date of trial. Husband appealed the judgment and decree to
this court.
In December 2022, this court remanded the district court’s judgment for further
findings on the issues of, among other things, (1) whether money husband received from
his mother during the parties’ marriage constituted a gift or marital property; (2) the
allocation of a marital debt the parties incurred on a credit card ; and (3) the valuation of
wife’s Individual Retirement Account (IRA). See Krelitz v. Krelitz, No. A21 -1203, 2022
WL 17747302, at *2-4 (Minn. App. Dec. 12, 2022).
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The district court filed orders in June and October 2023 addressing the remanded
issues. In its orders, the district court determined that (1) the money husband received from
his mother constituted a gift and was therefore not marital property; (2) the marital credit-
card debt should be allocated evenly between the parties; and (3) its initial valuation of
wife’s IRA would not be altered from the initial decree. In December 2023, the district
court filed an amended judgment and decree that included an equalizer-payment
calculation that reflected its determinations on the remanded issues.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
I. The district court abused its discretion by retroactively modifying wife’s
maintenance award to the parties’ trial date.2

Husband argues that, because wife did not have a pending motion to modify the
temporary-maintenance award on the date of trial, the district court abused its discretion
by awarding wife permanent spousal maintenance retroactive to the trial date rather than
the date on which it entered its final judgment and decree. We agree.
A temporary order for spousal maintenance “shall continue in full force and effect
until the earlier of its amendment or vacation, dismissal of the main action or entry of a
final decree of dissolution or legal separation.” Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 5 (2022)
(emphasis added). District courts may retroactively modify spousal maintenance “only

1 Wife did not file a brief, and we therefore decide this appeal on the merits. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 142.03.
2 Although appellant raised this issue in his prior appeal, our prior opinion did not address
the retroactive maintenance award. See Krelitz, 2022 WL 17747302, at *6.
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with respect to any period during which the petitioning party has pending a motion for
modification.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(f) (Supp. 2023) (emphasis added). We
review the district court’s decision to modify spousal maintenance retroactively for an
abuse of discretion. Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 181 (Minn. App. 2020). “A district
court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court denied wife’s motion to modify the temporary-maintenance
order a month before trial. Wife did not renew the motion before trial, did not raise the
issue of retroactive maintenance in either her dissolution petition or the proposed order she
submitted before trial, and the parties did not litigate retroactive maintenance at trial.
Instead, wife first noticed her intent to seek retroactive maintenance in the proposed order
she filed two months after trial in November 2020. The district court adopted wife’s
proposal to require husband to pay $8,396 in monthly spousal maintenance beginning on
September 1, 2020, the date of the parties’ trial.
Because wife did not have a pending motion to modify on the date of trial, we
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law when it used
the parties’ trial date as the effective date for the modified maintenance award. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(f); Christenson v. Christenson, 490 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Minn. App.
1992) (noting that, because appellant did not renew his motion for modification after
district court denied his initial motion, his support obligation could not be modified
retroactive to date of his original motion), rev. granted (Minn. Jan 15, 1993), and appeal
5
dismissed (Minn. Feb. 16, 1993). Although wife requested retroactive modification in the
proposed order she filed after trial, raising the issue in a posttrial filing was insufficient to
revive her prior motion . We therefore reverse the district court on this point and remand
with instructions to change the effective date of wife’s maintenance award to February 16,
2021, the date on which the district court entered the judgment and decree. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.131, subd. 5.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion with its calculation of the parties’
property-equalization payment.

Husband contends that the district court abused its discretion with its calculation of
the equalizer payment because it made clearly erroneous factual findings regarding (1) the
purported loan the parties’ received from husband’s mother during the parties’ marriage;
(2) the allocation of the parties’ credit-card debt; and (3) the valuation of wife’s IRA. We
address each issue in turn.
District courts have “broad discretion” to evaluate marital assets and debts, and
appellate courts will not overturn a district court’s distribution absent an abuse of that
discretion. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 358 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. App. 1984). “A district court
abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence . . . .”
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (quotation omitted). District courts should be “guided by
equitable considerations in distributing rights and liabilities.” Kreidler v. Kreidler, 348
N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. App. 1984).

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A. The record supports the district court’s finding that husband’s mother
gifted him $100,000 during the parties’ marriage.

Husband asserts that the district court clearly erred by finding that the $100,000
mother transferred to him during the parties’ marriage constituted a gift and was therefore
nonmarital property omitted from the equalization payment. Husband’s argument is
unavailing.
Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law, but reviewing courts
defer to the district court’s underlying factual findings. Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644,
649 (Minn. 2008). “[P]roperty acquired by either spouse during the marriage is
presumptively marital, but a spouse may defeat the presumption” by showing that the
property is nonmarital by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 649-50 (citing Minn.
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2006)). Nonmarital property includes property “acquired by
either spouse . . . as a gift . . . made by a third party to one but not to the other spouse.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(a) (2022).
A valid gift requires that (1) the donor intend to make a gift; (2) the property be
delivered; and (3) the donor absolutely dispose of the property. Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d
797, 800 (Minn. 1997). The party asserting a valid gift must prove the elements of a gift
by clear and convincing evidence. Muschik v. Conner -Muschik, 920 N.W.2d 215, 223
(Minn. App. 2018). Whether donative intent exists is a question of fact that is evaluated
under the circumstances of the transfer. Id. We review a district court’s factual findings
for clear error. Manor v. Gales, 649 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. App. 2002). It appears that
husband disputes only the first element of the gift analysis.
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Here, the district court provided a detailed explanation supporting its finding that
the circumstances showed that husband’s mother intended to transfer the $100,000 as a
gift, not as a loan. These circumstances included that (1) neither husband nor his mother
could provide documentation of the purported loan or describe its basic terms; (2) there
were no penalties for nonpayment ; (3) neither husband nor his mother were tracking loan
payments; (4) wife had no input on the purported loan; and (5) husband testified that the
parties still owed the entire principal of the purported loan despite husband supposedly
making payments for several years.
The record supports the district court’s finding. Husband appears to argue that the
district court should have determined that his mother loaned the money based on his and
his mother’s testimony as well as his bank records that he claimed reflected loan payments.3
However, as noted by the district court, they provided equivocal testimony regarding the
terms of the purported loan. Additionally, we “defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations and do not reconcile conflicting evidence” with respect to factual
determinations. Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation
omitted).4 Furthermore, the amorphous nature of the alleged intra-family “loan” supports

3 Although there appears to be some evidence of “transfers” to husband’s mother, this
evidence alone is insufficient to conclude that the district court’s finding on donative intent
for the $100,000 transfer is clearly erroneous.
4 Husband also cites the nonprecedential decision in Dunham v. Dunham, No. A06-2195,
2007 WL 4563949, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 31, 2007) for the proposition that “testimony
may be enough to establish that transfers of money between family members were loans.”
However, unlike Dunham, the district court did not credit husband’s or his mother’s
testimony about the loan. Varner v. Varner, 400 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Minn. App. 1987) (“The
finder of fact is not required to accept even uncontradicted testimony if the surrounding
facts and circumstances afford reasonable grounds for doubting its credibility.”).
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the district court’s finding on donative intent. See Novick v. Novick, 366 N.W.2d 330, 332
(Minn. App. 1985) (affirming district court’s conclusion that “undocumented, unsecured”
intra-family “loans” were gifts); In re Estate of Lobe, 348 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. App.
1984) (concluding that, when evidence regarding transfer consists almost entirely of oral
testimony, we can disturb district court’s determinations in only “the most unusual
circumstances”). We therefore discern no error by the district court.
B. The record supports the district court’s findings regarding the parties’
credit-card debt.

Husband next contends that, because he testified that he paid the parties’ credit-card
debt using nonmarital funds, the district court clearly erred by crediting both parties for
paying half of the debt in its equalization-payment calculation. We disagree.
Here, the district court reasoned that it would be “fair and equitable” to value the
credit-card debt at $15,611.16 to prevent father from receiving a windfall because the
parties’ creditor forgave $9,921.10 of the debt. The district court then allocated half of the
remaining debt to each party after finding that there was no evidence in the record that
husband paid the debt with nonmarital assets.
Husband appears to argue that, because he had to pay individual income taxes on
the forgiven debt, he would not receive a windfall if the district court valued the debt at its
full, unpaid balance. However, husband would still have received a windfall if the district
court credited him with paying the original balance because, although he had to report the
forgiven debt on his income taxes, he did not have to pay the entire balance of the forgiven
debt. Considering the potential for husband to receive a significant windfall, along with
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the district court’s finding that husband’s net monthly income was over four times greater
than wife’s, the district court did not abuse its “broad discretion” by valuing the debt at the
reduced total after accounting for equitable considerations. Dahlberg, 358 N.W.2d at 80;
Kreidler, 348 N.W.2d at 784.
Husband also argues that the district court disregarded the documentary evidence
showing that he paid the credit-card debt with nonmarital funds. The record does appear
to show that husband made three payments 5 totaling $8,954.30 on the debt from his
personal bank account following the valuation date. However, there is no evidence
accounting for how the remaining $6,656.86 of the reduced debt balance was paid. To the
extent husband did not carry his burden to show that he paid the marital debt with his
nonmarital funds, caselaw supports the idea that the district court should treat the remaining
$6,656.86 as paid with marital funds. Baker, 753 N.W.2d at 649-50. District courts are
permitted to factor equitable considerations when allocating debts and are not required to
divide marital debts evenly, and the district court therefore acted within its “broad
discretion” by crediting each party with $7,805.58 towards the debt. Kreidler, 348 N.W.2d
at 784; see Dahlberg, 358 N.W.2d at 80 (noting that district courts are not required to credit
party for debts voluntarily paid before trial); Justis v. Justis, 384 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Minn.
App. 1986) (reasoning that district courts are not required to apportion marital debts to both
parties and that “[a] party to a dissolution may be held liable for marital debts even though

5 Husband claims that the record also shows a fourth payment towards this debt. Our
review of the record shows evidence of only three payments. Notably, husband declined
the district court’s offer to request an evidentiary hearing to supplement the record on the
alleged payments.
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the other party receives the benefit of payment” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn.
May 29, 1986); Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979) (stating that, for
district court valuations, “it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a
reasonable range of figures”).
C. The record supports the district court’s valuation of wife’s IRA.

Husband argues that the district court impermissibly allowed wife to liquidate her
IRA to pay a portion of her attorney fees and that it clearly erred by valuing the account at
its May 2020 balance of $858, when the balance on the valuation date was $42,762.95. We
are not persuaded.
A district court’s valuation of an item of property is a finding of fact that appellate
courts will not set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604,
606 (Minn. 2001). Additionally, the district court has discretion to adjust the value of an
asset after its valuation date “[i]f there is a substantial change in value of an asset between
the date of valuation and the final distribution” and adjusting the valuation is necessary “to
effect an equitable distribution.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2022); see Gill v. Gill, 919
N.W.2d 297, 311 (Minn. 2018) (Anderson, J. dissenting). However, a party generally may
not use marital assets to pay their attorney fees. See Baker, 753 N.W.2d at 653-54.
Husband raised an identical argument in his first appeal to this court. See Krelitz ,
2022 WL 17747302 at *4. This court noted that, in its original order, the district court
supported its valuation of wife’s IRA by finding that (1) “[i]t is equitable to have the
account reflect the [then-current] balance in the account-[w]ife’s attorney[] fees needed to
come from some source, and this was the account [w] ife chose”; (2) husband “has the
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potential to earn significantly more income” than wife; and (3) the valuation “recognize[d]
this basic reality of the parties’ financial situations.” Id.
We previously concluded that the district court made insufficient findings regarding
wife’s IRA to allow for meaningful appellate review. Id. We noted that the district court’s
first reason constituted an impermissible justification to adjust a valuation under Minnesota
Statute section 518.58 (2020). Id. However, our prior opinion indicated that, while the
district court’s rationale concerning the parties’ relative income and financial situations
may have been sufficient, the district court needed to make further findings addressing
“whether [it] would have adjusted the valuation of the IRA for those reasons alone.” Id.
On remand, the district court stated that, regardless of the reason for the diminished
funds, it was “fair and equitable” to value the IRA at its current balance because (1) wife
“will likely never earn more in her career than her spousal maintenance award,” while
husband “is capable of earning significantly more income,” (2) it “recognize[d] this basic
reality of the parties’ financial situations in agreeing to reduce [w]ife’s account balance,”
and (3) “the temporary spousal maintenance [w]ife was awarded pending the outcome of
the trial was significantly less than what [w]ife was awarded in permanent spousal
maintenance after trial, leaving her with a significant deficiency for many months.”
Considering that the district court followed our remand instructions regarding the
IRA valuation, and that the record supports its findings on the parties’ finances, the district
court did not abuse its “broad discretion” to distribute the parties’ marital property
equitably. See Kreidler, 348 N.W.2d at 784; Dahlberg, 358 N.W.2d at 80; Gill, 919 N.W.2d
at 311. Because the district court articulated a permissible basis to adjust the valuation of
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wife’s IRA under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1, it did not clearly err by valuing her IRA at
$858 even though that resulted in an unequal distribution. Ruzic v. Ruzic, 281 N.W.2d 502,
505 (Minn. 1979) (noting that district court may consider parties’ “earning ability” and
capacity to generate income when making distributions under section 518.58); Sirek v.
Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn. App. 2005) (“[A]n equitable division of marital
property is not necessarily an equal division.” (Quotation omitted.)).
Because each of husband’s challenges to the district court’s findings regarding the
equalizer payment are unpersuasive, his argument that the district court abused its
discretion by miscalculating the equalizer payment fails.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.