State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0289

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Michael Dahlin,
Appellant.

Filed January 21, 2025
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Red Lake County District Court
File No. 63-CR-23-43

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Tanner C. Holten, Red Lake County Attorney, Red Lake Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this appeal from final judgments of conviction for second- degree controlled
substance crime, possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle, and fourth-degree driving
while impaired (DWI), appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
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suppress evidence and to dismiss the charges. Appellant contends: (1) that (a) he preserved
his right to appeal the stop of his vehicle and that (b) law enforcement was not justified in
pulling him over; and (2) that neither (a) probable cause nor (b) a reasonable belief that he
was dangerous and could gain immediate control of a weapon justified the expansion of
the stop into a warrantless vehicle search. Because we conclude that the district court did
not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress and to dismiss the charges, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant James Michael Dahlin with:
second-degree controlled substance crime, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
152.022, subdivision 2(a)(1) (2022); possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle, in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.027, subdivision 3 (2022); and fourth -degree
DWI, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(2) (2022). These
charges arose from a traffic stop and subsequent search of Dahlin’s vehicle.
Dahlin moved the district court to suppress “[a]ny and all evidence obtained as a
result of a stop, search, or seizure, on the ground that such evidence was obtained in
violation of [Dahlin’s] constitutional and statutory protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” Specifically, Dahlin argued that law enforcement had no legal basis
“to conduct a warrantless search” of his vehicle because the circumstances did not “satisfy
any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement,” including the exception for officer
safety. The following recitation of facts stems from the district court’s findings, which are
based on the stipulated evidence that the court received per the parties’ agreement at an
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omnibus hearing on Dahlin’s motion. The undisputed evidence includes the criminal
complaint and the arresting deputy’s report.
In April 2023, Deputy B.G. was on patrol in Red Lake County when he observed a
vehicle traveling northbound with its driver-side taillight “barely illuminated and not fully
operational.” The deputy “went to get behind the vehicle to initiate a traffic stop and the
vehicle made a U- turn” into a parking lot. The deputy also made a U-turn “to get behind
the vehicle again” and then activated his emergency lights. The vehicle turned into a
laundromat without “utilizing its turn signal within 100 feet of it turn ing.” “Upon getting
behind the vehicle, the driver immediately got out of the vehicle and put his hands in the
air.” Deputy B.G. recognized the driver as Dahlin and instructed him to get back into his
vehicle. Dahlin did so. Deputy B.G. knew Dahlin “to be a violent offender and was aware
that [Dahlin] had served time in prison for an assault involving a weapon.” As he was
speaking to dispatch, the deputy observed Dahlin move around in his vehicle “as if he was
grabbing something or moving something underneath his driver’s seat.” At that time,
another deputy arrived on scene.
Deputy B.G. approached the vehicle and instructed Dahlin to step out so that the
deputy could search for weapons. Dahlin exited his vehicle and Deputy B.G. performed a
pat-down search. The deputy did not locate any weapons on Dahlin at that time. Deputy
B.G. noticed that Dahlin was speaking quickly, that his pupils were constricted, that he was
“fidgety,” and that his mood was inconsistent. The deputy knew that these were “signs of
being under the influence of a controlled substance.”
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Deputy B.G. then opened the door to Dahlin’s vehicle to “conduct an officer safety
search of [Dahlin’s] immediate area of control for weapons.” After finishing the protective
search, the deputy intended to complete his investigation of the traffic violation and to have
Dahlin re-enter the vehicle. But when he opened the door, Deputy B.G. smelled a “strong
odor of marijuana” coming from the vehicle. As a result, the deputy decided to search the
vehicle for marijuana as well as weapons. During the search, Deputy B.G. opened the
center console of Dahlin’s vehicle and found a pillowcase that smelled like marijuana.
Upon opening the pillowcase, the deputy found drugs and related contraband. Deputy B.G.
arrested Dahlin for possession of controlled substances, searched him again, and found a
knife in his pocket. The deputy later applied for and obtained a search warrant to take a
sample of Dahlin’s urine.
In a memorandum accompanying his motion to suppress, Dahlin maintained that
Deputy B.G. “lacked any basis for performing a warrantless search” on his vehicle. Dahlin
further contended that, given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy B.G.’s search
exceeded any applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement. In support of this
argument, Dahlin pointed to the facts that the deputy had stopped Dahlin for a minor traffic
violation, Dahlin had complied with Deputy B.G.’s orders, the deputy did not specifically
observe any weapons, and Dahlin was “under the direct supervision of at least one deputy
at all times.”
After the omnibus hearing, the district court filed an order denying Dahlin’s motion.
The district court determined that Deputy B.G. “made a lawful investigative stop of”
Dahlin’s vehicle because the deputy had observed at least two traffic violations:
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(1) “driver-side taillight/taillamp partially illuminated and not functioning properly [per]
Minnesota Statutes, sections 169.48, 169.50, 169.55, and 169.57”; and (2) failure to signal
a turn. Furthermore, the district court ruled that the partially illuminated light and failure
to signal were “reasonable and articulable suspicions of traffic violations or equipment
violations sufficient to stop the motor vehicle.”
As to the expansion of the stop into the warrantless search of Dahlin’s vehicle, the
district court decided that law enforcement had lawful justification based on probable cause
and the “protective weapons search exception to the warrant requirement.” The district
court reasoned that, because the deputy observed several indicia of drug use and detected
the smell of marijuana, Deputy B.G. “had probable cause to believe that a further search of
the vehicle may reveal additional evidence of a crime or contraband.” And the district court
determined that Dahlin’s violent criminal history, the indicia of drug use, and Dahlin’s
actions after the stop —including his immediate exit from the vehicle and furtive
movements—supported the reasonableness of the deputy’s actions in conducting a
protective sweep of the vehicle. The district court explained that “it was likely that the
defendant would have been cited and released at the conclusion of the stop and interaction
with Deputy [B.G.] but for the discovery of the drugs and drug-related contraband.” Thus,
the district court ruled that Deputy B.G. “had every right to ensure his own safety during
this encounter, including [by completing] the protective weapons search of the subject
motor vehicle.”
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Dahlin waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the state’s case under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. The district court later filed
an order finding Dahlin guilty of all three charges, followed by judgments of conviction.
Dahlin appeals.
DECISION
Dahlin challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and to dismiss
the charges. He argues: (1) that (a) he preserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of
the stop and that (b) Deputy B.G. did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to pull him
over; and (2) that neither (a) probable cause nor (b) a reasonable belief that he was
dangerous and could gain immediate control of a weapon justified the expansion of the
stop into a search of his vehicle without a warrant.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
[appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Ortega, 770
N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous
if, on the entire evidence, [appellate courts] are left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake occurred.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846–47 (Mi nn. 2011).
“Deference must be given to the district court’s credibility determinations.” State v.
Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012) (citing State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101,
108 (Minn. 1989)).
Below, we address each of Dahlin’s arguments in turn.
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I. The district court did not err in determining that the traffic stop of Dahlin’s
vehicle was lawful.

A. Dahlin preserved his right to appeal the traffic stop’s constitutionality.

Before turning to the merits of Dahlin’s contentions about the lawfulness of the
traffic stop, we must first address the state’s assertion that Dahlin waived his right to appeal
this issue by failing to raise it before the district court. The state maintains that, because
Dahlin did not argue against the legality of the stop in the district court, the state was not
“afforded an opportunity to call witnesses or establish a record of this issue at the omnibus
stage.” Dahlin disputes these claims. We agree with Dahlin that his challenge to the stop is
properly before us.
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.01, subdivision 2, provides that
“[d]efenses, objections, issues, or requests that can be determined without trial on the
merits must be made before trial by a motion to dismiss or to grant appropriate relief. The
motion must include all defenses, objections, issues, and requests then available.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 10.01, subd. 2. “[A] pretrial motion to suppress should specify, with as much
particularity as is reasonable under the circumstances, the grounds advanced for
suppression in order to give the state as much advance notice as possible as to the
contentions it must be prepared to meet at the hearing.” State v. Needham, 488 N.W.2d
294, 296 (Minn. 1992). A failure to include an issue in the motion “constitutes waiver.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 10.01, subd. 2. Generally, appellate courts “do not consider issues raised
for the first time on appeal.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Minn. 2011).
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We are not convinced that Dahlin waived his right to challenge the traffic stop.
Dahlin’s motion to suppress framed the issue in a comprehensive manner. He requested
that “[a]ny and all evidence obtained as a result of a stop, search, or seizure” be suppressed
“on the ground that such evidence was obtained in violation of [his] constitutional and
statutory protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Although Dahlin’s
memorandum accompanying his motion to suppress did not contain a specific contention
that the stop was unlawful, Dahlin broadly framed the issue in his motion as including a
challenge to the stop. Moreover, the district court explicitly determined that the deputy
made a “lawful investigative stop” of Dahlin’s vehicle. And the state submitted Deputy
B.G.’s incident report as part of the stipulated evidence that the parties agreed to provide
the district court at the omnibus hearing. That report details the reasons why the deputy
stopped Dahlin’s vehicle.
Because the district court analyzed the issue in its order, the state established a
record about the issue, and both parties have fully briefed the issue on appeal, we discern
no unfair surprise to the state. Thus, we next turn to a substantive review of the legality of
the stop.
B. Law enforcement was justified in stopping Dahlin’s vehicle based on
reasonable, articulable suspicion of a traffic violation.

Dahlin maintains that Deputy B.G. did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to
justify the initial stop of his vehicle. We are not persuaded.
“The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (citing U.S. Const. amend.
9
IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10). “Warrantless searches and seizures are generally
unreasonable.” Id. A law enforcement officer may, however, “conduct a brief investigatory
stop if they have reasonable, articulable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’”
Birkland v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 940 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Minn. App. 2020) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
“Reasonable suspicion must be particularized and based on specific and articulable
facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752 (quotation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion
requires more than a mere hunch but is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “An officer must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop.” State v.
Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 1997). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a
traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the
vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
We conclude that Dahlin’s barely illuminated and nonfunctioning taillight
sufficiently supports the district court’s determination that reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal activity justified the traffic stop.
1 Minnesota Statutes section 169.48,

1 Dahlin also argues that the district court erred by determining “that Deputy [B.G.’s] stop
was justified by Dahlin’s failure to signal” because the turn-signal violation occurred after
the deputy “activated his squad lights to stop Dahlin.” At oral argument, the state conceded
that, because Dahlin’s failure to signal occurred after he was seized by law enforcement,
we cannot rely on it as a justification for the traffic stop that had already been initiated. We
agree. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968) (“It is axiomatic that an incident
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subdivision 1 (2022), provides that every vehicle “upon a highway . . . at any time from
sunset to sunrise . . . shall display lighted headlamps [and] lighted tail lamps.” Deputy B.G.
had an objective basis for suspecting Dahlin of violating that statute—which required
Dahlin’s vehicle to display lighted tail lamps—because the deputy observed a taillight that
was “barely illuminated and not fully operational.”
Dahlin nevertheless asserts that, although the district court’s finding that his taillight
was partially illuminated and not functioning is supported by the record, “the district
court’s legal determination that the traffic law was violated was incorrect.” He maintains
that the district court “did not find, nor does the record reflect, that the taillight was not
visible from 500 feet to the rear or that it was not activated upon the application of the
brakes and visible from 100 feet.” Dahlin therefore asserts that “the district court
incorrectly found that [he] violated the cited traffic laws.”
It is true that Minnesota Statutes section 169.50, subdivision 1 (2022), provides that
every vehicle “must be equipped with at least one tail lamp, exhibiting a red light plainly
visible from a distance of 500 feet to the rear.” Similarly, Minnesota Statutes section
169.57, subdivision 1 (2022), requires a vehicle to be equipped with at least two rear stop
lamps, which shall be visible from a distance of 100 feet. And Dahlin is correct that the
record does not reflect that the taillight was not visible from 500 feet to the rear or visible
from 100 feet after activation.

search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification. ”). And we therefore
do not consider Dahlin’s failure to signal in analyzing whether the stop was lawful.
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But the district court’s task was to determine only whether reasonable, articulable
suspicion justified the stop, not that Dahlin had, in fact, violated a traffic law. As the
Minnesota Supreme Court explained in Taylor, “[r]easonable suspicion requires more than
a mere hunch but is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” 965 N.W.2d at 752
(quotation omitted). Indeed, the supreme court “has held that, to make a lawful traffic stop,
a law enforcement officer must have a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular persons stopped of criminal activity.’” George, 557 N.W.2d at 578 (quoting
Berge v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985)) (explaining that the
supreme court’s “cases . . . do not require much of a showing in order to justify a traffic
stop”). Here, Deputy B.G.’s observation of a taillight on Dahlin’s vehicle that was “barely
illuminated and not fully operational” sufficiently satisfies the low bar required to establish
reasonable suspicion that Dahlin had violated sections 169.48 and 169.57. 2

2 Dahlin further asserts that, although Minnesota Statutes section 169.55, subdivision 1
(2022), “requires only one red light to be visible from 500 feet to the rear,” the district court
found only that “the driver-side light was partially illuminated and not functioning
properly, which is not a violation of” the statute. Subdivision 1 of section 169.55 provides
that, “[a]t the times when lighted lamps on vehicles are required[,] each vehicle . . . must
be equipped with . . . a lamp or lantern exhibiting a red light visible from a distance of 500
feet to the rear.” As mentioned in the preceding text, Minnesota Statutes section 169.50,
subdivision 1, similarly provides that every vehicle “must be equipped with at least one tail
lamp, exhibiting a red light plainly visible from a distance of 500 feet to the rear.” But even
assuming without deciding that sections 169.50 and 169.55 did not require Dahlin’s vehicle
to have more than one taillight, Minnesota Statutes section 169.48, subdivision 1,
nonetheless does mandate “lighted tail lamps.” As discussed above, section 169.57,
subdivision 1, likewise requires a vehicle to be equipped with at least two rear stop lamps.
Because Deputy B.G. had reason to believe Dahlin was driving a vehicle in violation of
sections 169.48 and 169.57, we reject Dahlin’s contention that only one lighted tail lamp
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Based on the facts in the record establishing a particularized basis for reasonable,
articulable suspicion of a traffic violation—“however insignificant” —we conclude that the
district court did not err in determining that the stop of Dahlin’s vehicle was lawful. Id.
II. The district court did not err in determining that the expansion of the traffic
stop into a warrantless search of Dahlin’s vehicle was lawful.

“An initially valid stop of a vehicle may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in
its intensity or scope.” State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. 2021) (quotation
omitted). “The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is
determined by the seizure’s mission— to address the traffic violation that warranted the
stop and attend to related safety concerns.” Id. (quotation omitted). “An officer seeking to
expand the duration or scope of the traffic stop beyond its original justification may only
do so if he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person
of criminal activity.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Each incremental intrusion during a stop
must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of
the stop permissible.” Id. (quotation omitted). In other words, “each step of an officer’s
investigation must be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original
legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness.” Id.
(quotation omitted).

was required and instead conclude that the deputy had sufficient reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop Dahlin’s vehicle. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578.
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Below, we analyze whether the expansion of the traffic stop was justified by
(a) probable cause or (b) a reasonable belief that Dahlin was dangerous and could gain
immediate control of a weapon.
A. Law enforcement had probable cause to search Dahlin’s vehicle.
Dahlin contends that Deputy B.G. lacked probable cause to search his vehicle based
on observing indicia of drug use.3 This claim does not warrant reversal.
Law enforcement may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle “if there is probable
cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” State v.
Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “Probable cause exists
when there are facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonable prudent person
to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Probable cause
is an objective inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances in each case.” Id.
“[T]he totality of the circumstances includes reasonable inferences that police officers draw
from facts, based on their training and experience, because police officers may interpret
circumstances differently than untrained persons.” Id.
Contrary to Dahlin’s contention that “the sole factor observed by Deputy [B.G.],
prior to the search of the vehicle, was Dahlin’s indicia of drug use,” the probable cause to

3 Dahlin also argues that the odor of marijuana could not support probable cause because
Deputy B.G. did not detect it until after the vehicle search began. At oral argument, the
state conceded that, based on the timing of Deputy B.G.’s detection of the marijuana odor,
we cannot consider the smell as part of our probable cause analysis. As with the failure-to-
signal issue discussed above, we again agree. Cf. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63. And we therefore
do not consider the odor of marijuana in deciding whether there was probable cause to
justify the vehicle search.
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search Dahlin’s vehicle was not based only on facts about Dahlin’s apparent impairment.
It is true that Deputy B.G. observed that Dahlin was speaking quickly, that his pupils were
constricted, that he was “fidgety,” and that his mood was inconsistent. And the deputy did
understand these indicia as “signs of [Dahlin] being under the influence of a controlled
substance.” But Deputy B.G. also observed Dahlin make several furtive movements after
the traffic stop. Dahlin exited his vehicle immediately after the deputy stopped him. Then,
following compliance with Deputy B.G.’s instruction that he reenter the vehicle, Dahlin
moved around inside “as if he was grabbing something or moving something underneath
his driver’s seat.” Furthermore, the deputy recognized the driver as Dahlin, whom Deputy
B.G. knew as “a violent offender” who “had served time in prison for an assault involving
a weapon.” All of this occurred before the deputy began the search.
As Dahlin acknowledges in his brief, “Minnesota courts have routinely held
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle exists when indicia of drug use
is accompanied by other factors.” We agree. See, e.g., State v. Gallagher, 275 N.W.2d 803,
808 (Minn. 1979) (holding that probable cause supported a lawful search based on “the
totality of the circumstances,” which included an “officer observ[ing] defendant’s exit from
his car and the passenger’s furtive gestures attempting to shield [the officer’s] view[,] . . .
coupled with his observations of defendant’s and his passenger’ s ‘widely-staring’ eyes,”
which “indicated the possible use of a controlled substance”). The same is true of furtive
movements. See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 385 N.W.2d 373, 375–77 (Minn. App. 1986)
(holding that probable cause supported a lawful search based on, among other things, an
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officer’s “personal knowledge of appellant,” including “appellant’s previous felony
convictions,” as well as “appellant’s furtive movements”).
We therefore conclude that, taken together, these specific circumstances would
warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe that Dahlin’s vehicle contained contraband.
As a result, the district court did not err in determining that the expansion of the traffic stop
into a warrantless search of Dahlin’s vehicle was lawfully based on probable cause.
B. Law enforcement was justified in conducting a protective search of
Dahlin’s vehicle.

Finally, Dahlin argues that the district court erred in determining that Deputy B.G.
“possessed a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that Dahlin was
dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons.” We disagree.4
“A protective search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, limited to those
areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the officer possesses a
reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that the suspect is dangerous and
may gain immediate control of a weapon.” State v. Waddell, 655 N.W.2d 803, 810 (Minn.
2003). Generally, whether a suspect is under police control during a protective search is
immaterial to the legality of the search because , “if the suspect is not placed under arrest,
he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons
inside.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051–52 (1983).

4 Although we need not address Dahlin’s protective-search argument because we have
already concluded that the search was justified by probable cause, we do so because, even
if probable cause did not support the intrusion, it was nonetheless a lawful protective
search.
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The district court did not err in determining that Deputy B.G. possessed a reasonable
belief based on specific facts that Dahlin was dangerous and could have gained immediate
control of a weapon. As just discussed, Deputy B.G. knew Dahlin “to be a violent offender”
and “was aware that [Dahlin] had served time in prison for an assault involving a weapon.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld a protective search when the defendant “was
known to carry firearms, and he had been connected with a homicide in which a firearm
was apparently used.” State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Minn. 1980). Together with
his knowledge about Dahlin’s background, the deputy also observed several furtive
movements by Dahlin, including Dahlin’s immediate exit from the vehicle after being
pulled over and his subsequent conduct inside the vehicle, which suggested that he was
grabbing or relocating something. And Deputy B.G. observed that Dahlin was fidgety and
that his mood was inconsistent. These specific and articulable facts bolstered the
reasonableness of the deputy’s belief that Dahlin was dangerous and might gain immediate
control of a weapon. Cf. State v. Alesso, 328 N.W.2d 685, 688 –89 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that an officer was justified in conducting a protective search of a defendant in a vehicle
because the officer “noticed that [the] defendant was either trying to conceal or remove an
object of some sort from his right pocket,” which was “a furtive movement” that the
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded “justified” the search).
Although he acknowledges that he made furtive movements, Dahlin nonetheless
asserts that a protective search was not justified because he “had been removed from the
vehicle, the vehicle door[s] had been closed, he had been Terry searched for weapons, and
he was under the control of both” deputies at the time of the search. Dahlin claims that the
17
only way he would have returned to his vehicle is if the deputies allowed him to do so, an
outcome that Dahlin maintains “is simply not believable” because he had exhibited signs
of controlled substance use. Thus, Dahlin challenges as clearly erroneous the district
court’s finding that “it was likely that the defendant would have been cited and released at
the conclusion of the stop and interaction with Deputy [B.G.] but for the discovery of the
drugs and drug-related contraband.”
We conclude that the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous because we
are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Diede, 795
N.W.2d at 846–47. In his report, Deputy B.G. wrote that he intended “to have . . . Dahlin
take a seat back in [Dahlin’s] vehicle and continue with [the deputy’s] routine traffic stop.”
The district court implicitly credited this statement by the deputy. See State v. Jones, 755
N.W.2d 341, 348–49 (Minn. App. 2008) (recognizing that “the di strict court made an
implicit credibility finding”), aff’d, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009). More specifically, in
determining that Deputy B.G. acted reasonably by conducting a protective search of
Dahlin’s vehicle, the district court adopted “all of the facts recited by” the state in its brief
opposing Dahlin’s motion, including that the deputy planned to return Dahlin to the
vehicle. As mentioned previously, we must defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. See Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 691. We also note that Deputy B.G.’s
statement mirrors the deputy’s decision to instruct Dahlin to return to his own vehicle when
Dahlin first exited at the outset of their roadside encounter.
Moreover, the district court did not affirmatively rule that Dahlin would have been
cited and released. Instead, the district court determined that citation and release was a
18
likely outcome had the deputy not discovered drugs and related contraband. And this
finding is not clearly erroneous because it is reasonably supported by Deputy B.G.’s
assertion to that effect in his report. Thus, we are not left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake occurred. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846–47.
In sum, Deputy B.G. had reasonable, articulable suspicion of a traffic violation to
support the vehicle stop. And the expansion of the stop into a search of the vehicle was
supported both by probable cause and by a reasonable belief that Dahlin was dangerous
and could gain immediate control of a weapon. Thus, the district court did not err in
denying Dahlin’s motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges.
Affirmed.