Naomi Campbell, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0292

Naomi Campbell,
Relator,

vs.

Minnesota Adult and Teen Challenge,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed November 12, 2024
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 50035187-2

Naomi Campbell, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Scott D. Blake, Felhaber Larson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Department of Employment and Economic Development,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Relator challenges a decision by an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) to deny her
unemployment benefits. Because the record supports the UJL’s conclusion that relator quit
without a good reason caused by the employer, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent-employer Minnesota Adult and Teen Challenge (Teen Challenge)
provides support to people recovering from drug addiction. Relator Naomi Campbell
worked part-time for Teen Challenge from June to September 2023. Her job involved
providing direct support to clients, such as taking them to classes and appointments.
According to an offer letter that Campbell signed, her base pay was $17 per hour, and she
was entitled to an additional $4 per hour for night shifts and an additional $2 per hour for
weekend shifts.
After Campbell quit her job in September 2023, respondent Minnesota Department
of Employment and Economic Development ( DEED) denied her unemployment benefits,
reasoning that she quit “because [her] pay was too low or the benefits were insufficient”
and Teen Challenge “did not violate any agreement with or obligation to [Campbell]
regarding pay or benefits.”
Campbell appealed, and a ULJ held a hearing. At the hearing, Campbell testified
that during her job interview, Teen Challenge promised her $800 per pay period after taxes
and other deductions, although she could not recall who specifically made that promise.
Nevertheless, consistent with her offer letter, Campbell understood from her interview that
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her base pay would be $17 per hour, and that she would receive an extra $4 per hour for
certain shifts. Once Campbell began employment, some of her paychecks were smaller
than she expected. Campbell discussed her paychecks with a payroll specialist, who “kept
referring [Campbell] back to [her supervisor].” Campbell’s supervisor told her that her
paychecks “added up,” but Campbell “didn’t understand it.” Eventually, Campbell told
Teen Challenge that she was quitting because she was not making enough money, and
based on her interview, she expected to make more money.
A benefits specialist with Teen Challenge also testified. The benefits specialist
confirmed that Campbell raised concerns about her pay with her supervisor and a payroll
specialist. According to the benefits specialist, the payroll specialist concluded that the
hours Campbell worked “seemed to match up with what she was being paid.”
Following the hearing, the ULJ filed an order concluding that “[t]he preponderance
of the evidence shows that Campbell quit for reasons other than a good reason caused by
[Teen Challenge]” because Teen Challenge “offered certain pay rates based on the shifts
that Campbell worked” and because she “received accurate pay based on the pay schedule
contained within her offer letter.” The ULJ relied on the testimony from the benefits
specialist, Campbell’s offer letter, and payroll information. The ULJ found that the
evidence discredited Campbell’s testimony about not being paid correctly.
Campbell requested reconsideration, arguing that Teen Challenge “offered [her] one
salary, and after four pay periods it was not the pay that was expected or offered.” In
February 2024, a ULJ denied the request, reasoning that the prior decision “made
credibility determinations based upon the parties’ testimony and the documents,” and
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Campbell did not provide any information or arguments that would have likely changed
the outcome.
This certiorari appeal followed.
DECISION
Campbell challenges the ULJ’s decision that she is ineligible for unemployment
benefits. In reviewing a ULJ decision, we may remand for further proceedings, or “reverse
or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced
because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision,” among other potential issues,
were “unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the hearing record as submitted.”
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2022). “[A] substantial-evidence analysis requires us to
determine whether the agency has adequately explained how it derived its conclusion and
whether that conclusion is reasonable on the basis of the record.” In re NorthMet Project
Permit to Mine Application, 959 N.W.2d 731, 749 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
The ULJ decided that Campbell was ineligible for unemployment benefits because
she quit her employment without a good reason caused by her employer. Generally, when
an employee quits employment, she is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1 (2022). However, exceptions exist. Id. Among those exceptions is an
employee quitting “because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Id., subd. 1(1). A
good reason caused by the employer is one “(1) that is directly related to the employment
and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that
would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than
remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a) (2022).
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Whether “an employee quit without good reason attributable to the employer is a
legal conclusion” reviewed de novo. Thao v. Command Ctr., Inc., 824 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
App. 2012). However, we review the “ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable
to the decision and will not disturb them when they are supported by substantial evidence.”
Id. In doing so, we defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. Haugen v. Superior Dev.,
Inc., 819 N.W.2d 715, 722-23 (Minn. App. 2012). “When the credibility of a witness . . .
has a significant effect on the outcome of a decision, the [ULJ] must set out the reason for
crediting or discrediting that testimony.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2022).
Campbell argues that she had good reason to quit because her pay was not as
promised in the interview. However, the ULJ did not find that Teen Challenge reneged on
any promises to grant Campbell certain pay. See Ryks v. Nieuwsma Livestock Equip., 410
N.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding that an employee did not quit for good
reason where the evidence did not support his argument that the employer breached an
agreement for a specific commission rate). Instead, the ULJ reviewed the pay rates in
Campbell’s offer letter and found, based on evidence about her work schedule and
compensation, that her paychecks “were correct” and that her testimony to the contrary
lacked credibility. Based on its findings, the ULJ concluded that “Campbell quit for
reasons other than a good reason caused by [Teen Challenge].” Because the ULJ explained
how it reached its conclusion, and that conclusion is reasonable based on the record, we
disagree with Campbell that the ULJ’s conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.