Frank Joseph Peach, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0315

Frank Joseph Peach, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed September 23, 2024
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge *

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CV-23-516

Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Sebastian Rouanet, Ryan Pesch, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his enrollment in the Minnesota Ignition Interlock
Device (IID) Program, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in concluding

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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that he is ineligible for the program because his driving privileges in Minnesota are
cancelled due to the revocation of his driving privileges in Wisconsin. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Frank Peach has three Minnesota driving- while-impaired (DWI)
convictions, obtained in 2001, 2008, and 2010. He also has a 2021 Wisconsin DWI
conviction, which resulted in a “lifetime revocation” of his Wisconsin driving privileges
because it was his fourth offense. He will have the right to apply for reinstatement of his
Wisconsin driving privileges on October 19, 2031.
Respondent Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety learned of appellant’s
Wisconsin conviction and the loss of his Wisconsin driving privileges and subsequently
revoked and cancelled his Minnesota driver’s license as “inimical to public safety” for
three years , beginning on November 6, 2021. But appellant was not notified of the
revocation and cancellation until March 8, 2023. 1
In 2023, appellant applied for a Minnesota driver’s license and began an application
to enroll in the Minnesota IID program. His applications were denied because his driving
privileges had been revoked in Wisconsin. He petitioned for judicial review, challenging
only the denial of his application for enrollment in the IID program.

1 The statutes and rules use the terms “cancellation,” “denial,” “revocation,” and
“withdrawal” synonymously. See, e.g ., Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 1(d)(1) (2022)
(referring to a license having been “revoked, canceled, or denied”); Minn. R. 7410.5500
(2023) (referring to driving privileges having been “withdrawn”); Minn. R. 7503.1300
(2023) (headed “License Cancellation and Denial”). Similarly, the notice sent to appellant
by the Department of Public Safety was headed “Notice of Revocation,” g ave a “Reason
for Withdrawal ,” and refer red to “other withdrawals on your record”). Except in direct
quotations, this opinion will use the noun “revocation” and the verb “revoke.”
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Following an implied -consent hearing and the submission of post -hearing
memoranda of law, the district court issued an order sustaining the revocation of
appellant’s driving privileges and concluding that he is not eligible for enrollment in the
IID program.2
DECISION
In an appeal from a district court’s decision on license reinstatement under Minn.
Stat. § 171.19 (2022), this court reviews the district court’s application of the law de novo
but defers to the district court’s ability to weigh the evidence. See Constans v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. App. 2013). In reviewing the commissioner’s
application of the law to given facts under Minn. Stat. § 171.19, the district court does not
substitute its own judgment for that of the commissioner. See Mechtel v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 373 N.W.2d 832, 834- 36 (Minn. App. 1985) (reversing a district court’s decision
because it substituted its own judgment for that of the commissioner).
Appellant’s license was revoked under Minn. Stat. § 171.17, subd. 1(a)(9) (2020),
which provides that “The department shall immediately revoke the license of a driver upon
receiving a record of the driver’s conviction of . . . an offense in another state that, if
committed in this state, would be grounds for revoking the driver’s license.” It is

2 In his memorandum to th e district court, appellant for the first time raised due -process
claims. The district court properly did not address these claims . See State v. Brunes, 383
N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating that issues raised for first time in post-hearing
memorandum will not be considered by the court of appeals) , rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 11,
1985). We therefore do not address them on appeal because there is nothing for us to
review. See Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate
courts do not decide issues that have not been considered by the district court).
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undisputed that appellant’s 2021 Wisconsin offense, driving with a blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) at or over .08, would be grounds for revoking his Minnesota driver’s
license under Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2020) (stating that it
is a crime for anyone to drive with a BAC of or over .08) ; see also Minn. Stat. § 169A.54,
subd. 1(5) (2020), (stating that (“ the commissioner shall revoke the driver’s license of a
person convicted of violating section 169A.20 (driving while impaire d) or an ordinance in
conformity with it . . . [for] not less than three years for an offense occurring . . . after three
qualified prior impaired driving incidents and with denial under section 171.04, subdivision
1, clause (10), until rehabilitation is established according to standards established by the
commissioner”).
Because appellant had three prior DWI offenses, under Wisconsin law he received
a “lifetime” revocation of his driving privileges, and because appellant’s driving privileges
have been revoked in Wisconsin, he may not apply for a driver’s license in Minnesota. See
Minn. R. 7410.5500, subp 2 (“If an applicant’s driving privileges are withdrawn in any
other state and the applicant applies for a driver’s license in Minnesota, then the applicant’s
driving privileges must be reinstated in all other states before the applicant is eligible for
driving privileges in Minnesota . . . .” ).
Furthermore, Minnesota law provides that:

(b) A person whose driver’s license has been canceled
or denied as a result of three or more qualified impaired driving
incidents shall not be eligible for reinstatement of driving
privileges without an ignition interlock restriction until the
person:
. . . .
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(2) has submitted verification of abstinence from
alcohol and controlled substances . . . as evidenced by the
person’s use of an [IID] . . . .

(c) The verification of abstine nce must show that the
person has abstained from the use of alcohol and controlled
substances for a period of not less than:

(1) three years, for a person whose driver’s license was
canceled or denied for an offense occurring . . . after three
qualified prior impaired driving incidents . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 169A.55, subd. 4(b) , (c)(1) (2022). But enrollment in the IID program is
restricted to those whose license was revoked for violating the Minnesota statutes specified
in Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 4(c), (d) ( 2022). Appellant violated Minn. Stat. § 171.17,
subd. 1(a)(9), which is not among the specified statutes. Thus, the district court did not err
in concluding that “[u]nder the plain language of the statute [appellant] is not eligible for
enrollment in the [IID] Program.”
Appellant argues that this is an “absurd” result because, if he had committed his
fourth offense in Minnesota instead of in Wisconsin, he could enroll in IID. That may be
true; persons who are convicted of a fourth Minnesota DWI offense are not necessarily
convicted of violating Minn Stat. § 171.17, subd. 1(a)(9), and, if the statute they did violate
is among those specified in Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 4(c), (d) (listing those eligible for
the IID program), they are eligible to enroll.
But it is also true that courts may presume the legislature does not intend an absurd
result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2022). The legislature’s determination that persons with
outstanding license revocations in other states should not be allowed to obtain a Minnesota
license through the IID program is not absurd. “[C]onvictions of another state should
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generally be recognized in the forum state . . . [unless] strong public policy interests of the
forum state provide sufficient reason to override the general rule of recognition.”
State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 537, 539 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that “Minnesota’s
interest in preserving the . . . right [of drivers to obtain legal advice before deciding whether
to submit to chemical testing] is not sufficient to prohibit the use of the South Dakota
convictions to enhance . . . DWI offenses in Minnesota eve n though the South Dakota
convictions were based on uncounseled test decisions”) .
It is equally true that this court “cannot supply that which the legislature purposely
omits or inadvertently overlooks.” Martinco v. Hastings, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (Minn.
1963). Thus, whether appellant would be entitled to enroll in IID if his fourth offense had
been committed in Minnesota is irrelevant; his offense was committed in Wisconsin, is not
included in Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 4(c), (d) , and this court cannot sua sponte include
it.
Affirmed.