In re the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0316

In re the Matter of:

Deandre D’Shaun Adams, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Antoinette York,
Appellant.

Filed April 28, 2025
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-22-722

Daniel B. McGuire, RAM Law PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Calandra Revering, Revering Law & Consulting, Minnetonka, Minnesota; and

Victoria Taylor, Shawn Reinke, Reinke Taylor, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Parents having equal parenting time with their five-year -old daughter live in
different states and disagree about where she should enter school. The district court held
that the girl should attend a Minnesota school near her father rather than a Wisconsin school
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near her mother, a holding that consequently changes the parenting -time arrangement.
Mother appeals, arguing that the district court decision improperly restricted her parenting
time, modified custody, and changed the child’s primary residence without an evidentiary
hearing or requisite findings. Because mother assented to the district court’s procedure to
resolve the parties’ school-choice dispute and because the decision was well supported by
the district court’s reasoning and the undisputed circumstances, we affirm.
FACTS
Deandre Adams and Antoinette York, unmarried, had a daughter in 2018. We will
call the girl April, a name we have randomly chosen in the interest of protecting her
privacy. At the time, both parents lived in Mankato but later moved to different cities—
Adams to Plymouth and York to Madison, Wisconsin. They stipulated to an order affording
them joint legal custody, joint physical custody, and equal parenting time on a weekly
alternating schedule. They effectuated the schedule by meeting for exchanges halfway
between their homes, which are separated by a roughly four-hour drive.
As April approached age five and neared time to enroll in primary school, Adams
and York disagreed about where she should attend kindergarten, each parent favoring
enrollment near his or her home. York moved the district court to grant her sole legal and
physical custody so April could attend school in Madison. Adams opposed York’s motion,
arguing that York had not alleged endangerment to support her custody-change request.
York countered, insisting that “[a]n endangerment standard would not be appropriate to
use solely in determining the appropriate parent for the child during the school year,
especially if both parents have no endangerment issues.” The district court denied York’s
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motion, observing that she had not made a prima facie case of endangerment and reasoning
that the dispute should be determined instead based on the statutory standard for permitting
removal of a child from the state, Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 3 (2024).
The district court observed that the fundamental issue was whether to move April’s primary
residence to another state.
Neither party objected to the district court’s reframing of the issue, and they then
presented information relevant to the school-choice decision. E ach party implicitly
acknowledged that the school determination would necessarily affect the parenting-time
schedule. Each advocated for school enrollment near his or her home and for near ly
exclusive parenting time during the school year while conceding that the other parent
should have extensive parenting time during the summer and during school-year breaks.
York gave her reasons that April should attend school in Madison. She asserted that
she has more time than Adams to care for April’s needs because she is a stay-at-home
mother and has support from her husband. She emphasized too that April would have two
siblings in York’s home and that April is close with them. And she pointed out that April
has many friends and engages in activities in Madison. She asserted that, by contrast,
Adams works three jobs and relies on his mother to care for April while he works. She said
also that she, rather than Adams, has taken April to medical appointments. And she
emphasized that April is black, claiming that she would benefit from attending a more
racially diverse school, like the one she would attend in Madison and unlike the schools
Adams suggested near his home in Plymouth.
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Adams gave his reasons that April should attend school in Plymouth. Disputing
York’s representation about his employment and reliance on other caregivers, he said he
has only one job and that it is in the Eden Prairie School District. He maintained that his
role as an educator allowed him to help April remain current in her education while they
withheld her from starting kindergarten during their school-choice dispute. Adams
observed that Gleason Lake Elementary, one of three schools he offered for April to attend,
is the ninth-ranked public elementary school in Minnesota. He contrasted Gleason Lake’s
academic success (having 74% of its students proficient in reading and 80% proficient in
math and being in the top-ranked school district in the state) with th e lack of academic
success of the school that York proposed (having only 27% of its students proficient in
reading and 17% proficient in math). Adams had earlier acknowledged that April’s primary
care providers are in Madison, but he asserted that he too takes her to doctor visits. He
added that much of April’s extended family lives in Minnesota, including her grandparents
with whom she has a strong bond.
The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the parties’ competing
school-choice and parenting-time affidavits but received arguments from counsel at a
motion hearing. It then filed an order in which it analyzed the dispute under its previously
announced standard— the removal best-interests factors. The district court’s order
discussed the parties’ evidence outlined in their affidavits, indicating the court’s
disappointment that it had to choose between two exceptional parents who have both been
significantly and properly involved in April’s life. It determined that, on balance, April’s
interests are best served attending Gleason Lake Elementary. It based this on various
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circumstances, especially the school’s academic success given that April would begin
kindergarten at a delayed age. It considered but was unconvinced by York’s school-
diversity argument. Recognizing that continuing with equal parenting time would no longer
be feasible, it granted Adams parenting time during the school year and afforded York “the
entire summer [except for one week to Adams], every holiday, and every school break
more than two days, and [one additional two-day weekend each month].” It also designated
thrice-weekly electronic contact between York and April during the school year.
York appeals.
DECISION
York makes two arguments on appeal. She first argues, for the first time on appeal,
that the district court erred by restricting her parenting time, effectively modifying the
custodial arrangement, and changing April’s primary residence without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing or making endangerment or parenting-time noncompliance findings.
She argues second that the district court failed to apply the best-interests factors listed in
Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1 (2024). Both arguments fail.
York’s first category of argument overlooks the manner in which she and Adams
presented the issues for the district court’s determination. Generally speaking, “litigants
are bound [on appeal] by the theory or theories, however erroneous or improvident, upon
which the action was actually tried below.” Annis v. Annis, 84 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn.
1957); Roth v. Weir, 690 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Minn. App. 2005) (holding that an appellant
who has not raised an issue in district court may forfeit the issue even if it was raised by an
adverse party). And also generally, where a child attends school is decided by the child’s
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legal custodian. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(a) (2024) (defining “legal custody” as
the “right” to make decisions about, among other things, a child’s education). Where, as
here, parents share joint legal custody, they have “equal rights and responsibilities,
including the right to participate in major decisions determining the child’s upbringing,
including education.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (2024). So when joint legal
custodians do not agree about where their child will attend school, the district court resolves
the dispute based on the child’s best interests. See Novak v. Novak, 446 N.W.2d 422, 424
(Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). In this case, however, the district
court did not decide the issue as a matter of legal custody. When it denied York’s initial
motion, it announced that, under the circumstances of the school-choice dispute and in the
absence of any allegation of endangerment, it would instead resolve the parties’
disagreement by relying on the statutory best-interests factors that apply when the court
considers ordering a move in a child’s primary residence to another state. This seemed
reasonable to the district court since under the existing equal-time arrangement, each
party’s home was designated as the primary residence. Neither party objected to that order.
And both tacitly acquiesced by submitting affidavits using the removal best- interests
factors. Neither party asserted that resolving the school-choice issue would constitute a de
facto change in custody or asserted that an endangerment finding would be necessary, even
though both proposed a schedule that recognized that the parent who wins the school-
choice contest would consequently have nearly exclusive school-year parenting time.
We observe too that, when the district court’s final order announced that it “does
not interpret the law regarding the issues in this matter to require an evidentiary hearing,”
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it was not denying York’s request for an evidentiary hearing but Adams’s request for one.
Contrary to York’s position on appeal, she plainly (and successfully) argued to the district
court that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary:
I know that counsel wants to have an evidentiary
hearing, but . . . substantial modifications of visitation rights
would require an evidentiary hearing if the moving party
makes a prima facie showing that visitation is likely to
endanger the child’s physical or emotional wellbeing, but
insubstantial modifications would not require an evidentiary
hearing and would be appropriate if they are in the child’s best
interest.

Our position today is that the child would not be
subjected to any abuse or any endangerment. This is a best
interest standard and we’ve shown through our affidavits that
it would be in [ April]’s best interest to go to school with her
mother. I know that [Adams] wants the Court to hold an
evidentiary hearing. Our position is that an evidentiary
hearing . . . is not necessary, Your Honor. In that the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals allows Your Honor to make a
determination about modifying the parenting time and
allowing [April] to be with [York] during the school year
without a hearing.

I know that the parties were sharing equal parenting
time, and that [Adams] believes that his parenting time would
be significantly reduced or diminished. Our position is that Ms.
York is willing to allow [Adams] to have a significant amount
of modified parenting time. What that means, Your Honor, is
she’s willing to offer [Adams] summers, holidays, expanded
weekends, but the child is five years old, and it is very
important that she be with her mother during the school year;
during her first year of school.

Having convinced the district court that no evidentiary hearing was needed and that the
school-choice issue could be determined without an endangerment finding, and having
tacitly accepted that the removal best-interests factors should influence the district court’s
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analysis, York’s contentions on appeal are not well received. She has failed to preserve
most of her arguments contesting the district court’s procedure.
We decline to address York’s unpreserved arguments on their merits. We recognize
that we may address them despite York’s waiver in the interests of justice. Putz v. Putz,
645 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. 2002); see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. But the interests of
justice do not weigh in York’s favor given her urging of the district court to employ the
process it ultimately employed. And although it may be true that the removal standard is
not a perfect fit, neither are the potentially applicable child-custody and parenting-time
statutes that York offers on appeal. York did not believe that the process or an unequal
division of parenting time was unjust when she argued for it, and under these
circumstances, neither do we.
York also argues that the district court should have made findings under all the
statutory best-interests factors from Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1(a).
We review the district court’s choice of a legal standard de novo. Anderson v. Archer, 510
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1993). But the supreme court has held that the best-interests
factors under Minnesota Statutes section 518.17 govern the creation and initial approval of
parenting plans, that section 518.175 governs parenting-time modifications, and that a
district court must consider only relevant best-interests factors. See Hansen v. Todnem, 908
N.W.2d 592, 596–99 (Minn. 2018). The district court was not bound to analyze the
inevitable modification here under the section 518.17 best-interests factors. It therefore did
not err by instead making detailed findings under the other, clearly relevant, best-interests
factors in section 518.175, subdivision 3, and coming to a well-reasoned decision.
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York finally forwards a policy argument, which is that granting custody to the parent
in the better school system is financially discriminatory. We need not address this issue
because York did not present the argument or highlight any supporting evidence in the
district court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). We add that the
policy concern York espouses is not immediately compelling on its face and that, in any
event, as we repeated in LaChapelle v. Mitten , 607 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn. App. 2000),
rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000), our role is to correct legal errors, not establish public
policy. And to the extent that York positions her policy argument in a constitutional, equal-
protection frame, we have also explained that the state’s interest in a child’s best interests
can outweigh a parent’s assertion of even constitutional rights. See Geske v. Marcolina ,
642 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. App. 2002). York’s policy argument fails.
Affirmed.