A24-1949

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0322
A24-1949

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Timothy Dustin Johannes,
Appellant.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CR-23-2102; 73-CR-13-7376

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Greg Scanlan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
These consolidated appeals relate to two motions to correct a sentence that appellant
Timothy Dustin Johannes filed related to 2014 and 2023 convictions for felony, first-degree
2
driving while impaired (DWI). Johannes challenges the district court’s decision to construe
both motions as petitions for postconviction relief, and its decision to apply the two-year
time bar to preclude relief for the 2014 conviction. Because we conclude the district court
correctly construed both motions as petitions for postconviction relief and that the two-
year time bar precludes relief for the 2014 petition, we affirm in part. But because the
district court relied on the 2014 conviction as the basis for denying postconviction relief
for the 2023 conviction, and the state did not rely on the 2014 conviction as the basis for
the 2023 conviction, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
These cases arise out of Johannes’s history of impaired driving offenses. On
May 17, 2012, a district court adjudicated Johannes—who was a juvenile at the time—
delinquent of felony criminal vehicular operation (CVO), under Minn. Stat. § 609.21,
subds. 1(3), 1a(b) (2010).1
On June 9, 2013, law enforcement arrested Johannes—who was an adult at the
time—for multiple DWI offenses in Stearns County. Based on the prior juvenile
adjudication for felony CVO, respondent State of Minnesota charged Johannes with two
felony counts of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, Minn. Stat.
§§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5), .24, subd. 2 (2012), and one count of misdemeanor driving
after revocation, Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (2012). With the assistance of counsel,

1 The district court also found Johannes guilty of misdemeanor fourth-degree DWI, under
Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5), .27 (2010), which is not relevant to this appeal.
3
Johannes entered a straight plea 2 to one felony DWI count under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24,
subd. 2. The district court convicted Johannes of felony DWI on August 21, 2014, and
subsequently sentenced him to the presumptive 42-months in prison, with five years of
conditional release (“2014 conviction”). The remaining charges were dismissed.
On February 13, 2018, law enforcement arrested Johannes for additional DWI
offenses in Aitkin County. Based on the 2014 conviction, the state charged Johannes with
two felony DWI counts for refusing to submit to a chemical test, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20,
subd. 2(2) (Supp. 2017), .24, subd. 2 (2016), and operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of a controlled substance, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(2), .24, subd. 2 (2016).
On July 18, 2018, with the assistance of counsel, Johannes pleaded guilty to felony DWI
test refusal. The same day, the district court convicted and sentenced him to 58-months in
prison for the felony DWI offense, with five years of conditional release (“2018
conviction”).3 The remaining DWI charge was dismissed.
On March 11, 2023, law enforcement arrested Johannes again for DWI offenses in
Stearns County. Based on the 2018 conviction, the state charged Johannes with two felony
DWI counts—refusing to submit to a chemical test, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(1),
.24, subd. 2 (2022), and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, Minn.
Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), .24, subd. 2 (2022). Before trial, Johannes, with the assistance

2 A defendant enters a “straight plea” when they “plead[] guilty to the offense but [do] not
enter into any agreement regarding sentencing.” State v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 879 N.W.2d
324, 327 (Minn. 2016).
3 The state also charged Johannes with three counts related to controlled-substance
possession. Johannes pleaded guilty to second-degree possession, which is not relevant to
this appeal. The remaining controlled-substance charges were dismissed.
4
of counsel, agreed to stipulate to the existence of a prior felony DWI conviction. At a
pretrial motion hearing, the district court placed Johannes under oath, and he testified that
he had a prior felony DWI conviction from July 18, 2018. After a two-day trial, the jury
found Johannes guilty of both counts. The district court convicted Johannes of felony DWI
for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and sentenced him to 72-
months in prison, with five years of conditional release (“2023 conviction”).4
Johannes filed a direct appeal from his 2023 conviction in February 2024 (No. A24-
0322). Our court then granted Johannes’s motion to stay the appeal so that he could pursue
postconviction relief. Thereafter, on June 21, 2024, Johannes filed motions to correct his
sentences under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, in both Stearns and Aitkin counties.
Johannes sought to reclassify his 2014, 2018, and 2023 sentences from felonies to gross
misdemeanors. Johannes argued that the juvenile adjudication for felony CVO did not
lawfully enhance the 2014 conviction to a felony because Johannes was not “convicted”
when he was adjudicated delinquent. Accordingly, Johannes asserted that the
2014 conviction could not be used to enhance his 2018 conviction to a felony, and the
2018 conviction could not be used to enhance his 2023 conviction to a felony. The state
filed an answer, asserting that the motions to correct the sentences should be construed as
petitions for postconviction relief and, consequently, the challenge to the 2014 conviction
was time barred. The state also disputed Johannes’s argument on the merits.

4 Under Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2022), the district court did not adjudicate the other offense.
5
On November 19, 2024, Johannes sent a letter to update the Stearns County district
court, attaching an Aitkin County district court order that granted Johannes’s motion to
correct his sentence as it related to the 2018 conviction, and downgraded the sentence from
a felony to a gross misdemeanor. That same day, the Stearns County district court
construed Johannes’s motions to correct his sentences as petitions for postconviction relief.
The district court then determined that relief for the 2014 conviction was time barred.
Alternatively, the Stearns County district court concluded that the juvenile adjudication for
felony CVO could lawfully enhance the 2014 conviction. On that basis, the district court
denied the petition for postconviction relief on the 2023 conviction.
Johannes then moved for our court to dissolve the previous stay on his direct appeal
of the 2023 conviction , and we granted the motion. Johannes also appealed the Stearns
County district court’s decision related to the 2014 conviction (No. A24-1949). We
consolidated the appeals.
DECISION
The threshold issue we must decide is whether the district court correctly construed
Johannes’s motions to correct his sentences as petitions for postconviction relief. A
defendant may collaterally attack a sentence in two ways: (1) a motion to correct a sentence
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, or (2) a petition for postconviction relief under
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2024). Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn.
App. 2014). A petition for postconviction relief allows a defendant to challenge their
conviction or sentence, but—absent an exception—is subject to a two- year time bar. Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subds. 1, 4 (2024). By contrast, a motion to correct a sentence grants the
6
district court limited authority to modify only a sentence, State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477,
480 (Minn. 2015), but is not subject to a time bar, Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 (“The
court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.”).
Because there is no time bar to correct a sentence, defendants often move to correct
a sentence after more than two years have passed. Accordingly, district courts often need
to evaluate whether to construe a motion to correct a sentence as a petition for
postconviction relief. The supreme court has determined that “if the motion implicates
more than simply the sentence, ” the district court should treat the motion as a
postconviction petition. Munt v. State, 920 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Minn. 2018) (quotation
omitted). This rule is intended to ensure that defendants cannot use a motion to correct a
sentence “to circumvent the procedural requirements of the postconviction statute.” Wayne
v. State, 870 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 2015). To determine whether a motion to correct a
sentence must be construed as a postconviction petition, the district court must “look to the
pleadings and the relief sought in order to determine the nature of [the] claim.” Coles, 862
N.W.2d at 480.
The supreme court has not resolved the appropriate standard of review we need to
apply when reviewing a district court’s decision to treat a motion to correct a sentence as
a petition for postconviction relief. Bolstad v. State, 966 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Minn. 2021).
But it has applied a de novo standard of review where, as here, the arguments require the
appellate court to interpret the text of a statute. See id.
We therefore review de novo whether the district court appropriately construed
Johannes’s motions as petitions for postconviction relief. Johannes filed motions to correct
7
his sentences for the 2014 and 2023 convictions on the basis that he had never “previously
been convicted of a felony” under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2) -(3) (2022).
Section 169A.24 (2022) provides:
A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while
impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the
person:
(1) commits the violation within ten years of the first of
three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents;
(2) has previously been convicted of a felony under this
section; or
(3) has previously been convicted of a felony under [as
relevant here, Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(2)-(6)] . . . .

. . . A person who commits first-degree driving while
impaired is guilty of a felony . . . .5

Johannes asserts that whether he has “previously been convicted of a felony” relates only
to his sentences, not his convictions, because the only relief he seeks is downgrading each
conviction from a felony to a gross misdemeanor. The state disagrees, arguing that whether
he had “previously been convicted of a felony” relates to his convictions, not his sentences.
We conclude the supreme court’s decision in State v. Smith is dispositive of this
issue. See 899 N.W.2d 120, 122- 23 (Minn. 2017). There, the supreme court addressed
whether the state presented sufficient evidence to sustain a first-degree DWI conviction
under section 169A.24, subdivision 1(1). Id. On appeal, Smith argued that, because the
state relied on a prior conviction that did not satisfy the definition of “qualified prior

5 Although Johannes was convicted under earlier versions of this statute, intervening
amendments to the statute were not substantive and do not affect our analysis. See 2014
Minn. Laws ch. 180, § 3, at 282-83; 2019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 5, art. 6, § 3, at
1015-16; 2020 Minn. Laws ch. 83, art. 1, § 57, at 232. Therefore, we apply the version
applicable to the 2023 conviction.
8
impaired driving incident[],” the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain the guilty
verdict. Id. at 122. The supreme court agreed, evaluating whether Smith had “three or
more prior impaired-driving incidents” under section 169A.24, subdivision 1(1), as an
element of the offense. See id. at 122-23, 126. After concluding one of the three predicate
offenses did not qualify under the statutory language, the supreme court reversed Smith’s
conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of guilt. Id.
Applying Smith, we conclude that the question of whether Johannes has “previously
been convicted of a felony” under section 169A.24, subdivision 1(2)- (3), is an element of
the offense. As such, his challenge to his 2014 and 2023 convictions on the basis that he
has “not previously been convicted of a felony” goes to his convictions, not his sentences.
Therefore, the district court appropriately construed Johannes’s motions as petitions for
postconviction relief. See Bolstad, 966 N.W.2d at 243.
With that threshold question resolved, we must decide whether Johannes’s
challenge to his 2014 conviction is time barred. “We review the denial of a petition for
postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. A postconviction court abuses its
discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based
its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings .”
Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (quotation and citation omitted). “We
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo
to determine whether it abused its discretion. ” Caldwell v. State, 976 N.W.2d 131, 137
(Minn. 2022).
9
“The postconviction statute authorizes a person convicted of a crime who claims
that the conviction or sentence violates their rights under the constitution or laws of the
United States or Minnesota to file a petition for postconviction relief.” Brouillette v. State,
994 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Minn. App. 2023), aff’d, 10 N.W.3d 24 (Minn. 2024). “No petition
for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry
of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s
disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a). But
section 590.01, subdivision 4(b), lists five exceptions to the two-year time bar, including—
as relevant here—when “the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” 6
Here, Johannes argues that he meets the requirements for the interests-of-justice
exception.7 Johannes asserts “the gravamen of the injustice [he] suffered” is that “no one
in the Stearns County criminal courts . . . recognized that the [2014 conviction] was only a
gross misdemeanor,” as “[n]one of them understood what everyone in criminal justice

6 “Any petition invoking an exception . . . must be filed within two years of the date the
claim arises.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). A claim arises when the claimant “ knew
or should have known ” that the claim existed. Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 560
(Minn. 2012).
7 The district court did not address the interests-of-justice exception for the
2014 conviction, despite Johannes raising the issue. Instead, the district court concluded
that “even if [it] were to find that the interests of justice applied,” the 2014 conviction
“would fail upon the merits.” Because Johannes presented the argument to the district
court, and we review the application of the interests-of-justice exception de novo, we elect
to reach this issue. See Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 239-42 (Minn. 2011) (analyzing
whether interests-of-justice exception was properly before its court for consideration and
analyzing merits of the claim); Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) ( “A
reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation
omitted)); State v. Roby, 463 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn. 1990) (citing Thiele in a criminal
case).
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should start out assuming: a juvenile adjudication is not a conviction.” Johannes explains
that he “did not appeal the 2014 [conviction ] or file a postconviction petition” because
“[h]e had no reason to believe there would be grounds for doing so.” Rather, “[h]e trusted
the signed complaint, the prosecutor, his counsel, and the [district] court when he was told
the charge was a felony,” and “[ h]e remained completely oblivious to the [substantive]
issue” now raised on appeal.
We begin by emphasizing our view that Johannes’s petition presents a nonfrivolous
argument regarding the use of his juvenile adjudication to enhance his 2014 conviction.
And a favorable decision on this straightforward legal question would implicate not only
his 2014 conviction, but also his 2018 conviction and his 2023 conviction before us on
direct appeal.
With that said, the supreme court has been clear that the interests-of-justice
exception “is triggered by an injustice that caused the petitioner to miss the primary
deadline [to file a petition] and not the substantive claims in the petition.” Paul v. State,
20 N.W.3d 48, 56 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted); Caldwell, 976 N.W.2d at 141;
Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 557. And under this precedent, we see no basis to conclude that
Johannes could not have known of this potential legal error within the two-year time period.
Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed
Johannes’s petition for postconviction relief for the 2014 conviction on the basis that it is
time barred.
But in reaching this decision, we acknowledge Johannes’s concerns that applying
existing precedent to preclude a collateral attack on the 2014 conviction will have lifelong
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consequences. We further note our frustration that, in the context of the 2023 conviction,
we cannot reach a straightforward legal question about whether the 2014 conviction is
properly treated as a felony for enhancement purposes. But cf. State v. Schmidt, 712
N.W.2d 530, 539 (Minn. 2006) (noting “a conviction based on an uncounseled plea can be
. . . disregarded for enhancement purposes . . . because it is ‘inherently prejudicial’ and
unreliable” (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967))). This is especially true
given that no one in the justice system —the defense attorneys, prosecutors, or judges —
appears to have realized the lifelong import of using a juvenile adjudication as the basis for
enhancing Johannes’s 2014 conviction to a felony. Nonetheless, we must conclude that
Johannes’s postconviction petition for the 2014 conviction is time barred. See State v.
Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 846 (Minn. 2012) (acknowledging that the supreme court’ s
“power to reverse prophylactically or in the interests of justice comes from [its] power to
supervise [district] courts” (quotation omitted)); State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 n.6
(Minn. 2006) ( “The court of appeals does not exercise supervisory powers that are reserved
to [the supreme] court.”).
Finally, we address the district court’s decision to deny Johannes’s petition for
postconviction relief for the 2023 conviction. Here, we part ways with the district court.
The district court relied on the 2014 conviction as the basis to sustain the 2023 conviction
as a felony. But under Smith, we must look at the prior conviction that the district court
actually relied upon to enhance Johannes’s sentence, which in this case was the
2018 conviction, not the 2014 conviction. See 899 N.W.2d at 122. And although Johannes
stipulated to the 2018 conviction, the record before us is unclear regarding the
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2018 conviction’s status as a felony or gross misdemeanor.8 Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for the district court to reevaluate Johannes’s petition for postconviction relief for
the 2023 conviction by considering the stipulated-to 2018 conviction.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

8 The only evidence in the record indicates that the Aitkin County district court downgraded
the 2018 conviction from a felony to a gross misdemeanor. The Stearns County district
court had this information at the time it made its decision.