State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0323

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kenneth James Holcomb, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed January 21, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-20142

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson , Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the district court violated his right to a public trial by partially closing the
courtroom during voir dire. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2022, appellant Kenneth James Holcomb, Jr. was charged with third-
degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2022). The
complaint alleged that Holcomb had sexually assaulted his cousin while she was asleep on
a couch.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, and voir dire commenced on September 5, 2023.
The jury pool first received a written questionnaire, which included questions about
whether they had personally experienced a sexual assault. Several prospective jurors
responded in the affirmative; counsel asked to question them individually about their
experiences outside of the presence of the other jurors. The next day, the district court
conducted a sequestered voir dire but did not close the courtroom.
While counsel questioned individual prospective jurors about their experience with
sexual assault, three courtroom observers, later identified as members of Holcomb’s family
(family members), began to engage in disruptive and disrespectful behavior. The behavior
included making comments and exaggerated facial expressions in response to the
prospective jurors’ answers, loudly discussing the case with each other in and near the
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courtroom, using cellphones inside the courtroom, and failing to stand when instructed to
“[a]ll rise for the jury.”
Following the first disruptive outburst, the district court warned both an individual
family member and the gallery at large that they may not com ment or speak in the
courtroom and that failing to abide by this rule would result in their removal. The court
also told the gallery that they must stand when members of the jury enter the courtroom
and reiterated that cellphone use is prohibited.
Despite these warnings, one of the family members caused yet another disruption
by loudly exclaiming, “[o]h, no,” and “[r]acist as hell” as the district court discussed a
motion to dismiss a prospective juror. The district court subsequently noted this outburst
on the record and stated that the two other family members had recently left the courtroom
and could be heard loudly discussing the case in the hallway where individual prospective
jurors could hear them. After expressing concern that these disruptive individuals may
taint the jury pool, the district court excluded them from the courtroom for the rest of the
afternoon. The court advised them that they could return as observers the following
morning. A nondisruptive member of the public was also present in the gallery and was
allowed to remain for the rest of the day. Because the district court determined that its
action was a “partial [courtroom] closure,” it issued written findings of fact in support of
its decision later that afternoon.
Defense counsel did not object to the district court’s warnings or to the exclusion of
the family members. Rather, defense counsel appeared to acknowledge the inappropriate
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nature of the family members’ conduct by reporting to the court that he “had a good chat
with the family,” and believed it would be “smoother sailing from here on out.”
The rest of the trial proceeded without disruption. On September 12, the jury found
Holcomb guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court convicted him
of the offense and sentenced him to 42 months in prison.
Holcomb appeals.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide criminal defendants with
the right to a public trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. But this right is
not absolute and may give way to other rights or interests in certain cases. State v.
Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Minn. 1995). Our supreme court has adopted the factors
articulated in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), for determining when a courtroom
closure is justified. Id. Waller requires that (1) the party seeking closure “advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced,” (2) the closure is “no broader than
necessary to protect that interest,” (3) the district court “consider reasonable alternatives to
closing the proceeding,” and (4) the district court make “findings adequate to support the
closure.” Id. (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48).
When, as here, a defendant fails to object to a courtroom closure in the district court,
we review for plain error. Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 357-59 (Minn. 2022). To
meet this standard, a defendant must show that (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain,
and (3) it affected their substantial rights. Id. at 356. Even if the defendant satisfies all
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three of these prongs, we will only correct the error if it “seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
Holcomb suggests that the district court plainly erred because the exclusion of his
three disruptive family members was an unjustified violation of his public-trial right. 1
Accordingly, he contends that he is entitled to a new trial or, at a minimum, a remand for
additional findings in line with Waller. We disagree for two reasons.
First, we are not persuaded that the district court’s exclusion of some, but not all,
members of the public for part of a day constitutes a true closure of the courtroom. N ot
every restriction on courtroom access amounts to a violation of a defendant’s right to a
public trial. State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 660 (Minn. 2001). Some restrictions are
“too trivial” to deprive a defendant of the protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. (quoting Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1996)). Therefore, we must first
determine “whether a closure even occurred.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn.
2015).
When determining whether a restriction on courtroom access constitutes a “true
closure” in violation of a defendant’s right to a public trial, we consider several factors first
articulated in Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 660-61. These factors include that
(1) the courtroom was never cleared of all spectators; (2) the
trial remained open to the general public and the press;
(3) there was no period of the trial in which members of the
general public were absent; and (4) neither the defendant, the

1 Neither party articulated the correct plain-error standard of review under Pulczinski in
their briefing to this court. Nevertheless, we construe their arguments under the plain-error
standard.
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defendant’s family or friends, nor any witnesses were
improperly excluded from the trial.

State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 601 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted) (summarizing
the Lindsey factors). In Lindsey, the district court excluded two children who had no known
relationship to the defendant from the courtroom. 632 N.W.2d at 657. The supreme court
reasoned that such an exclusion was too trivial to amount to a true closure because the
record did not indicate that the defendant’s friends or family were improperly excluded and
because the courtroom was never cleared of all spectators and was open to the general
public and press at all times. Id. at 660-61.
Relying on Lindsey, Holcomb argues that the district court’s exclusion of the three
disruptive individuals cannot be considered too trivial to violate his public-trial right
because they were his family members. See id. at 661. This argument is unavailing
because it ignores the focus of the fourth Lindsey factor—whether a person within one of
the enumerated categories was “improperly excluded from the trial.” Silvernail, 831
N.W.2d at 601 (emphasis added).
State v. Caldwell guides our analysis. 803 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 2011). In that case,
the district court removed Caldwell’s mother from the courtroom after she made several
disruptive remarks during pretrial courtroom proceedings. Id. at 390. The supreme court
concluded that this exclusion did not violate Caldwell’s right to a public trial, reasoning
that, because Caldwell’s mother repeatedly disrupted the proceedings and because the
district court did not bar all trial observers, it appropriately exercised its discretion to
“exclude spectators to preserve order in the courtroom.” Id. (quoting State v. Ware, 498
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N.W.2d 454, 458 (Minn. 1993)). Caldwell clearly distinguishes the exclusion of disruptive
family members from the exclusion of family members generally. Id.
As in Caldwell, the district court excluded the three family members only after they
repeatedly engaged in disruptive and disrespectful behavior. The courtroom was never
closed to the general public or the press, and at no point were all spectators excluded.
Moreover, the three family members were only excluded for a very limited time—a single
afternoon out of a six- day jury trial. See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn.
2012) (concluding no public-trial-right violation in part because the closure occurred only
during the jury instructions, which “did not comprise a proportionately large portion of the
trial proceedings”).
On this record, we conclude that the district’s court’s limited exclusion of
Holcomb’s three family members from the courtroom due to their repeated, disruptive
behavior does not amount to a true closure that implicated Holcomb’s right to a public trial.
Second, even if we viewed the district court’s exclusion of the family members as a
true closure, Holcomb bears the burden of demonstrating that the closure was not justified
under Waller. Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 356 (stating that “a defendant must establish”
that an error existed). For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that he has not met
that burden.
Overriding Interest
The first Waller factor asks whether the closure advanced an overriding interest that
was likely to be prejudiced. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d at 201. Holcomb contends that the
district court’s articulated concern that “the jury panel [would be] tainted by disruptive
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outbursts and comments” coming from the gallery is an insufficient interest under Waller.
But he provides no legal authority to support this assertion. Instead, Holcomb suggests
that the record renders it impossible “to credit the theory that avoiding jury ‘taint’
represented an overriding interest” because the district court failed to specifically describe
the disruptive courtroom conduct.2
Contrary to Holcomb’s suggestion , the district court did make specific findings
(both orally and in writing) that, in addition to “verbal interruptions”—many of which are
captured in the trial transcript—the family members were “rolling their eyes, shaking their
head, and making faces during the individual voir dire process.” The district court further
stated that this “behavior had a clear impact on the jurors being questioned about deeply
personal information, ” and that the family members’ verbal and nonverbal signals
“distracted the jurors that were being questioned and had the potential to make them
nervous or fearful.” We conclude that these circumstance s—as clearly articulated by the
district court—establish that avoiding the risk of tainting the jury was an overriding interest
that justified excluding the family members.
Breadth of Closure
The second Waller factor asks whether the closure was broader than necessary to
protect the stated overriding interest. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d at 201. Holcomb does not
challenge the breadth of the closure, and with good reason. The partial closure was

2 In his principal brief to this court, Holcomb asserts that the district court “failed to make
findings supporting the closure.” But he recants this assertion in his reply brief and
withdraws that portion of his argument.
9
narrowly tailored; three specific, disruptive individuals were excluded for a single
afternoon of a six-day trial while other members of the public were permitted to remain in
the courtroom. All three disruptive family members were permitted to return the following
morning to observe the rest of the trial. On this record, we easily conclude that the partial
closure was not overbroad.
Reasonable Alternatives
The third Waller factor asks whether the district court considered reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding. Id. “This is not an inquiry the district court can take
lightly”; it must make findings showing that it considered reasonable alternatives even
when none are offered by the parties. State v. Bell, 993 N.W.2d 418, 426 (Minn. 2023).
Holcomb asserts that the district court failed to “list or discuss” alternatives. The
record defeats this assertion. Review of both the district court’s oral order and written
findings reveals that the court twice admonished all observers in the gallery, warning them
that disruptive behavior would result in their removal from the courtroom. On one
occurrence, the district court went so far as to interrupt the questioning of a prospective
juror to admonish a family member. The district court’s multiple warnings to the gallery
demonstrate that it not only considered reasonable alternatives to a closure but pursued
those alternatives until the repeated disruption s—occurring both inside and outside of the
courtroom—required greater intervention. And, even then, the district court only excluded
three specific individuals. See State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 141 (Minn. 2009)
(describing a district court’s consideration of excluding specific individuals likely to
intimidate a witness as a reasonable alternative).
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Because the district court provided multiple verbal warnings to the gallery—
arguably the only reasonable alternative under the circumstances— we conclude that the
third Waller factor is satisfied.
Adequate Findings
The final Waller factor requires the district court to make adequate findings to
support the courtroom closure. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d at 201. Here, the district court has
provided multiple pages of detailed findings in support of its actions. It is undisputed—
and we agree—that these findings are adequate under Waller. Because all four Waller
factors are met, we conclude that the courtroom closure was justified. See id.
In sum, the district court’s exclusion of three disruptive family members for a single
afternoon during Holcomb’s six-day jury trial did not amount to a courtroom closure in
violation of his public -trial right. Moreover, even assuming the district court’s actions
constituted a “true closure,” that closure was justified under Waller. Accordingly,
Holcomb is not entitled to a new trial or other relief.
Affirmed.