State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0324

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dywon Jackson,
Appellant.

Filed April 14, 2025
Reversed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-11447

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, N. Nate Summers, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Nathan D. Converse, Special Assistant Public Defender, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
On direct appeal from his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm, appellant
argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress all evidence of a gun
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found by law enforcement during a traffic stop of his vehicle. Because law enforcement
lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was engaged in criminal activity
before conducting the traffic stop, we reverse the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress and vacate the conviction.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Dywon Jackson with unlawful
possession of a firearm in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2)
(2020), after finding a gun in his car during a traffic stop. Before trial, Jackson moved to
suppress evidence of the gun and dismiss the complaint. The district court held a contested
omnibus hearing on Jackson’s motion, at which the district court heard testimony from two
police officers (Officer S and Officer B) and received video recordings of the traffic stop
from Officer B’s body-worn camera and squad car. The evidence presented at the omnibus
hearing established the following facts.
On June 12, 2022, Officer S and his partner were investigating multiple burglaries
in the city of Richfield. The officers identified two suspects and set up surveillance on the
suspects’ house. When the suspects left the house and drove away in their car, the officers
followed them, stopped them on Lyndale Avenue, and arrested them. Once the suspects
were in custody, Officer S asked to have an additional officer (Sergeant D) surveil the
suspects’ house because Officer S was busy drafting a search warrant for the house and his
partner was with the suspects. Officer S expected to find various stolen items in the
suspects’ house, including computers, iPads, shoes, keys, and furniture.
3
While drafting the search warrant, Officer S received a report from Sergeant D via
police radio that he saw some activity in the vicinity of the suspects’ home. Officer S
testified that “[i]t was dark out” at the time. According to Officer S, Sergeant D was located
down the street “a little bit” from the suspects’ house. Sergeant D, who did not testify at
the hearing, reported to Officer S that he saw a car “pull up” and “people get out.” The
people were then “moving from the car to the house out of sight of [Sergeant D’s] point of
view, and back and forth.” According to Officer S, Sergeant D was not able to see “what
was happening at the house” because his view was blocked by trees and bushes. After
maybe “a couple minutes,” Sergeant D saw the people leave in their car. Sergeant D did
not report seeing the people bring anything from the house back to the car.
While Sergeant D was observing the unknown individuals at the suspects’ house,
Officer S learned from one of the suspects that they were not expecting anyone at their
house during that time. Nor was anybody in the home at the time, according to the suspect.
Officer S testified that he was concerned about the unknown individuals’ presence
at the house for multiple reasons. Officer S was concerned that the unknown individuals
were “burglarizing the house themselves, or . . . removing potential evidence from the
house.” He was also concerned about officer safety because officers were eventually going
to enter the house to execute the search warrant. Based on his concerns, Officer S requested
that Officer B, who was in the vicinity of the house in another squad car, conduct a traffic
stop on the unknown individuals’ car “in order to see what they were doing [at the house].”
Officer B followed the car and then conducted a traffic stop. Officer B testified that
he stopped the car because “it was very suspicious that a vehicle was parked outside the
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residence that no one was supposed to be at.” When the prosecutor asked Officer B
whether he observed the driver of the car commit a traffic violation, Officer B testified that
he could not “recall observing any traffic violations.”
After he stopped the car, Officer B identified the driver as Jackson. While speaking
with Jackson, Officer B smelled the odor of cannabis and learned that Jackson’s passenger
had a felony warrant for her arrest unrelated to the burglary under investigation. Officer B
arrested both Jackson and his passenger. Officer B then searched Jackson’s vehicle and
discovered a gun between a seat and the center console. Jackson, who had a prior
conviction that prohibited him from possessing firearms, was charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm.
Following the omnibus hearing, Jackson filed a memorandum in support of his
motion to suppress evidence of the gun and dismiss the complaint. Jackson argued that the
state failed to demonstrate that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Jackson was engaged in criminal activity prior to the traffic stop. The state filed a
responsive memorandum, arguing that police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity based on Jackson’s conduct at the house and based on his driving conduct
after leaving the house. The district court denied the motion. The district court agreed
with the state that Officer S’s testimony demonstrated that police had “a reasonable and
articulable suspicion” that Jackson was engaged in criminal activity at the house. The
district court did not address the state’s alternative theory based on Jackson’s driving
conduct.
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The parties then agreed to a court trial on stipulated evidence under Minnesota Rule
of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. 1 The district court found Jackson guilty of
unlawful possession of a firearm and imposed a stayed 71-month sentence.
Jackson appeals.
DECISION
Jackson challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, contending
that law enforcement lacked the necessary reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to conduct the investigatory traffic stop. On review of a pretrial ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its “legal
determination that an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion de novo.”
State v. Garding, 12 N.W.3d 697, 703 (Minn. 2024).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable.” State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566, 572 (Minn. 2024)
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). But, under the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “an officer may, consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake ,

1 Rule 26.01, subdivision 4, provides the process by which a defendant may preserve
appellate review of a pretrial issue that the parties agree is dispositive. Here, the state
agreed that “a trial will be unnecessary if the defendant prevails on appeal.”
6
744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The Terry framework applies in
the context of traffic stops. Id.
The parties do not dispute the facts, nor does the state dispute that the traffic stop at
issue was a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The sole question before us is
whether officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity by Jackson to
support the traffic stop and subsequent warrantless search.
The standard for reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory traffic stop is not
high, but it does require “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the
stop.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). The
standard is met when officers “articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393
(quotation omitted). “A hunch, without additional objectively articulable facts, cannot
provide the basis for an investigatory stop.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 (quotation omitted).
The state has the burden to establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion. State v. Flowers,
734 N.W.2d 239, 256 (Minn. 2007).
Jackson contends that the state failed to meet the reasonable-suspicion standard, and
therefore the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He argues that neither
his conduct at the suspects’ house nor his driving conduct gave rise to reasonable suspicion
that he engaged in criminal activity. The state counters that Jackson’s conduct at the house
and his driving conduct each independently support the traffic stop of Jackson’s vehicle.
We address each basis separately.
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Jackson’s Conduct at the House

Jackson first contends that his conduct in the vicinity of the house does not support
a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Jackson argues that the officers’
suspicion was “based on nothing more than an unparticularized hunch.” He also contends
that the officers’ suspicion of his criminal activity was impermissibly focused on his mere
proximity to the house. The state responds that law enforcement articulated objective facts
to suspect Jackson of burglary or removing evidence from the house based on his conduct
of going “back and forth” from his car to the house at night while the homeowners, who
were burglary suspects, were not home and were not expecting any guests.
Based on our de novo review, we conclude that the state failed to meet its burden to
establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Jackson was engaged in criminal activity
while in the vicinity of the home. At the contested omnibus hearing, police did not
articulate facts that established an objectively reasonable basis for suspecting that Jackson
engaged in burglary or was tampering with evidence. According to Officer S, Sergeant D
reported that Jackson was in the vicinity of the house only for “a couple minutes.” Sergeant
D saw Jackson pull up in a car, get out, and go “back and forth” from the car to the house.
But Sergeant D could not see whether Jackson entered the home because Sergeant D’s view
was obstructed by trees and bushes. And Sergeant D did not report observing Jackson
carrying any items from the house back to his car. Because police could not articulate any
facts suggesting that Jackson actually entered the house, Officer S’s suspicion that Jackson
engaged in burglary by removing items from the house or tampered with evidence in the
8
house amounts to nothing more than a hunch.2 This mere hunch cannot justify the
subsequent warrantless traffic stop of Jackson after he left the vicinity of the house. See
Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843.
We also agree with Jackson that law enforcement’s rationale for stopping him was
based largely on his mere proximity to the suspects’ house. As discussed above, Officer S
articulated that Jackson walked “back and forth” between the house and his car over the
course of “a couple minutes.” Objectively, these vague facts merely place Jackson at the
scene of an active burglary investigation. But “[m]ere proximity to, or association with, a
person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity is not enough to support
reasonable suspicion of [criminal activity].”3 Id. at 844. Although the state demonstrated
that Jackson was indeed walking near the house during an active burglary investigation,

2 Similarly, Officer S’s safety concern over eventually entering the home to execute the
warrant does not establish reasonable suspicion of Jackson’s criminal activity when
Officer S did not articulate any objective facts supporting a suspicion that Jackson, or
anyone else, entered the home.

3 The United States Supreme Court has held that law enforcement may conduct a
warrantless seizure of an occupant of a building that is being searched pursuant to a valid
warrant. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701-05 (1981). That holding is inapplicable
here for two reasons. First, the existence of a valid warrant to search a building at the time
of the warrantless seizure of the building’s occupant is “[o]f prime importance.” Id. at 701.
Here, the record shows that officers had not yet applied for a warrant to search the house
when they stopped Jackson. Second, the holding in Summers only extends to “occupants”
of the building to be searched. Id. at 705. The record indicates that Jackson was not an
occupant of the suspects’ house. Even assuming that officers had a reasonable basis to
conclude that Jackson was an occupant of the suspects’ house, “the decision to detain must
be acted upon at the scene of the search and not at a later time in a more remote place.”
Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 201-02 (2013) (narrowing the holding of Summers).
Because Jackson was stopped only after driving away from the suspects’ house, the stop
had to be “justified by some other rationale.” Id. at 202. Accordingly, Summers does not
implicate the lawfulness of the stop at issue.
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Officer S articulated no objective facts tying Jackson to the burglary investigation or any
other criminal activity. Jackson’s mere proximity to the suspects’ house was therefore
insufficient to give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion warranting the traffic stop.
In sum, the state has not satisfied its burden of articulating sufficient objective facts
to demonstrate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Jackson in or near the
suspects’ house. The district court’s determination to the contrary was erroneous.
Jackson’s Driving

At the omnibus hearing, the state also argued that Jackson’s driving conduct was
unlawful, thereby providing law enforcement with another, independent basis for stopping
Jackson’s vehicle. To support this argument, the state relied only on Officer B’s
squad-camera video. After determining that Jackson’s conduct at the house justified the
stop, the district court declined to consider whether a potential traffic violation provided a
separate basis for stopping Jackson. On appeal, the state contends that the squad-car video
shows that Jackson violated a traffic law and thereby establishes reasonable suspicion of
Jackson’s criminal activity. We disagree.
To support its argument, the state asserts that the squad-camera video introduced at
the contested omnibus hearing shows that Jackson changed lanes without signaling in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169.19, subdivision 4 (2020 ). “Ordinarily, if an
officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an
objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578
(Minn. 1997). But Officer B explicitly testified at the omnibus hearing that he di d not
recall any traffic violations by Jackson. And to establish reasonable suspicion, “[t ]he
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officer must be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Cripps ,
533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995) (emphasis added). The only fact articulated by
Officer B at the hearing as to Jackson’s driving was that he did not recall observing Jackson
commit a traffic violation. Because Cripps requires that the officer articulate a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity, the state cannot rely on
the squad-car video alone to establish reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation when
Officer B articulated no particularized facts of a potential traffic violation.
Still, the state argues that this court can examine the squad-camera video to
determine whether the video establishes objective, reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. The state relies on State v. Grunig, in which the supreme court held that “[a]
respondent can raise alternative arguments on appeal in defense of the underlying decision
when there are sufficient facts in the record for the appellate court to consider the
alternative theories, there is legal support for the arguments, and the alternative grounds
would not expand the relief previously granted.” 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003)
(emphasis added). But there was no factual record developed regarding whether Jackson
committed a traffic violation because Officer B denied observing a traffic violation. And,
while the squad-camera video was admitted into the record, the district court made no
factual findings on Jackson’s purported traffic violations based on the squad-car video.
Consequently, Grunig does not support the state’s contention that this court should
conclude that the squad-car video provides independent support for the traffic stop without
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any officer testimony. We therefore decline to address the merits of the state’s alternative
argument based on the squad-car video.
Conclusion
Based on our de novo review of the record and undisputed facts, we conclude that
the state did not meet its burden at the omnibus hearing to demonstrate officers had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Jackson engaged in criminal activity to support the
traffic stop. Accordingly, the traffic stop was an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. “Evidence obtained
as a result of a seizure without reasonable suspicion must be suppressed.” Diede,
795 N.W.2d at 842. Jackson is therefore entitled to the suppression of all evidence
obtained as a result of the unlawful traffic stop.
Because the parties agreed that the district court’s pretrial ruling was dispositive and
that a trial would be unnecessary if Jackson prevailed on appeal, remand for a contested
trial is unnecessary. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(a), (c); see also State v. Yang,
814 N.W.2d 716, 718, 722-23 (Minn. App. 2012) (reversing conviction without remand
after concluding that the district court erred in pretrial ruling in case tried by rule 26.01,
subdivision 4). Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of Jackson’s motion to
suppress and vacate his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm.
Reversed.