State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0325

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Fredi Amilcar Sun Chajon,
Appellant.

Filed January 6, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-22-2827

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Stephen Grego, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of attempted second-degree intentional murder,
in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2022), arguing that the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Alternatively, appellant argues that the
2
district court abused its discretion by not considering his motion for a downward durational
departure. Appellant raises additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. We
affirm.
FACTS
In November 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Fredi Amilcar
Sun Chajon by amended complaint with attempted second-degree intentional murder , in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1); second-degree assault, in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdivision 2 (2022); and first- degree
assault, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.221, subdivision 1 (2022). 1 The
complaint alleged that police responded to an intersection where they found the victim,
M.L., lying in the middle of the road. M.L. told police that Chajon was driving and pointed
a knife at her face and told her he wanted her dead or back in her country of origin and
made threats about killing her family. M.L. also told police that Chajon pushed her out of
the vehicle while it was still moving. Police found a steak knife and M.L.’s belongings in
the intersection where M.L. was found. After a contested omnibus hearing, the district
court dismissed the first-degree assault charge for lack of probable cause. Chajon waived
his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a court trial.

1 The state initially charged Chajon with two counts of second-degree assault, in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdivisions 1 and 2. The first amended complaint
omitted the statutory citation for attempt, Minnesota Statutes section 609.17 (2022), and
included the incorrect penalty. Following the contested omnibus hearing, the district court
concluded that these were technical errors because the charging language and probable
cause statement reflected the state’s intent to charge attempted second-degree intentional
murder. The technical errors were corrected by the district cour t’s order amending the
complaint. Chajon does not raise arguments related to the amended complaint on appeal.
3
At trial, M.L. testified about her relationship with Chajon and what occurred on
November 19 and 20, 2022. M.L. testified that on the night of the incident, Chajon picked
her up from her apartment and they went to the bank to deposit money he had given her to
pay the family’s phone bill. Next, M.L. and Chajon went out for food and dancing, and
then went to Chajon’s house where they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. Around
4:00 a.m. the next morning, Chajon started driving M.L. home but stopped and parked in
an apartment complex and asked her about her relationship with another man. M.L.
explained that the other man was just helping her find an apartment. Chajon said, “I cannot
believe what you did.” He told her that “if [she] wasn’t going to belong to him, [she] was
not going to belong to anyone. That he would rather [she] was dead.” M.L. testified that
she said, “don’t kill me,” and “[t]hink about our daughters.” Then Chajon leaned over and
grabbed a kitchen knife. M.L. testified that she didn’t “remember exactly what the knife
looked like, but it was from [her] kitchen,” and was “one of the ones that you use to eat, to
cut meat.” She stated it was “sky blue,” with “little leaves,” and later described the knife
as “white,” the color of her cup. M.L. testified that Chajon was holding the knife with both
hands and was moving to put the knife in her chest. M.L. tried to fight him off and “was
begging for [her] life.” Then, Chajon stated, “I’m not going to kill you,” and described a
plan to have M.L. deported. Chajon threatened to kill M.L.’s family, and said “[i]f you say
something, they’re going to kill them.”
M.L. testified that Chajon started driving with his left hand and used his right hand
to point the knife at her chest. M.L. removed her seatbelt and was able to open the door.
Chajon noticed, grabbed her blouse, pulled it, and accerlated the car while moving the knife
4
around. M.L. and Chajon engaged in a physical struggle, and M.L. tried to take the knife.
M.L. testified that she received cuts on her fingers, and Chajon punched her in the face and
pushed her out of the vehicle.
The state later called detective N.S, who testified about her investigation and M.L’s
prior consistent account of events. The state also called M.L.’s brother, who described
M.L.’s living situation and M.L. and Chajon’s relationship. He testified that he
remembered M.L. leaving to be with Chajon on the night of the incident. The state also
offered video footage evidence showing M.L. leaving her apartment complex that evening.
A bystander testified to finding M.L. in the intersection and calling 911.
Several law enforcement officers testified about their work on the case. Officer
M.R. testified about first responding to the scene. Officer A.N. testified about taking
photographs of evidence, including a knife and M.L.’s belongings, at the scene. Officer
C.W. testified about his work on the Dakota County Drug Task Force, and his work
locating Chajon following the offense. Officer M.C. testified about his involvement in the
arrest of Chajon. Officer K.S. testified about translating M.L.’s statements made to law
enforcement from Spanish to English. And detective W.B. testified about identifying
Chajon as the suspect, collecting surveillance video, identifying Chajon’s vehicle, and
interviewing Chajon.
Surveillance footage from a business near the intersection where M.L. was found
and Chajon’s interview with law enforcement were admitted as evidence. M.L’s medical
records were admitted through a clinical psychologist who treated M.L. when she was in
5
the hospital following the offense. The defense did not call any witnesses and Chajon
waived his right to testify.
The district court found Chajon guilty of attempted second-degree intentional
murder and not guilty of second-degree assault. The district court found that the state did
not prove any aggravating sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt. In its written
order, the district court found that Chajon and M.L. were previously in a romantic
relationship and had two children. On the evening of November 19, 2022, Chajon picked
up M.L. from her home and they drove to the bank. Then, Chajon and M.L. went to a
restaurant for food and dancing. They returned to Chajon’s home where they had
consensual sex. Chajon began driving M.L. home, but then turned into an apartment
complex and parked. Chajon confronted M.L. about her relationship with another man,
became angry, and brandished a knife used for cutting meat. Chajon told M.L. he was
going to kill her. Chajon pressed the knife towards M.L.’s chest, and M.L. resisted and
begged Chajon not to kill her. Chajon then said he would not kill M.L but described a plan
to get M.L. deported and threatened to kill M.L.’s family. Chajon started to drive back to
his house, while keeping the knife pointed at M.L. M.L. unbuckled her seatbelt, quietly
opened the car door, and planned to jump out of the car. M.L. was ejected from the vehicle,
but “the testimony is unclear as to how.” The district court did not make explicit credibility
determinations generally, but credited M.L’s description of the events in its findings.
At sentencing, Chajon moved for a downward durational departure and argued for
a sentence in the 74- to 103-month range because “the knife attack in the vehicle that
[Chajon] was found responsible for, left relatively minor injuries that were not life-
6
threatening, and he did abandon the attempted murder.” The state argued for a sentence of
183-and-one-half months, which was at the top of the box of the sentencing guidelines.
After listening to the victim-impact statement and arguments from counsel, the district
court imposed a 183-month executed sentence. The district court did not directly explain
its reasons for denying Chajon’s departure motion. Chajon appeals.
DECISION
I. There is sufficient direct evidence to support Chajon’s conviction of attempted
second-degree intentional murder.

Chajon argues that his attempted second-degree intentional murder conviction must
be reversed because there is insufficient evidence that he acted with the specific intent to
kill.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we will “uphold the district court’s
finding[s] if, based on the evidence contained in the record, the [district] court could
reasonably have found [the] defendant guilty of the crime charged.” State v. Vasko, 889
N.W.2d 551, 558 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “The evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved
any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “We use the same standard of review in bench trials and
in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d
727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
Chajon argues that we should evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by applying
the two-step analysis for circumstantial evidence and contends that the circumstantial
7
evidence is inconsistent with the alternative rational hypothesis that Chajon intended to
cause bodily injury, not death. The state argues that direct evidence established Chajon’s
intent to kill the victim. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Chajon’s
statements are direct evidence of his intent, and the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction.
To be found guilty of attempted second-degree intentional murder, the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to “cause[] the death of a
human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without
premeditation.” Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1). To prove attempt, the state must prove
the defendant, “with intent to commit a crime, [did] an act which [was] a substantial step
toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.17,
subd. 1. “The phrase ‘with intent to’ is commonly used by the Legislature to express a
specific-intent requirement.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 –09 (quoting State v.
Mullen, 577 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. 1998)) . The state must prove that the defendant
“either ha[d] a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believe[d] that the
act, if successful, [would] cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2022). The
only disputed element here is whether Chajon had the specific intent to kill M.L.
Because intent is a state of mind, it is generally proved by considering a defendant’s
act in context. State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1996). Intent may be proved
from circumstantial evidence “by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and
actions in light of the totality of the circumstances,” and from the victim’s reaction to a
threat. State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131, 136- 37 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
8
Although intent is frequently proven by circumstantial evidence, intent may also be proved
by direct evidence. State v. Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn. 2024).
Direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895
N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence
from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to
prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Silvernail, 831
N.W.2d 594, 604 (Minn. 2013)).
Here, the state used both direct and circumstantial evidence to prove Chajon’s
intent. The direct evidence included M.L’s description of Chajon’s statements and
conduct. M.L and Detective N.S. testified that Chajon told M.L., “if [she] wasn’t going to
belong to him, [she] was not going to belong to anyone,” and “that he would rather [she]
was dead.” The circumstantial evidence included the circumstances surrounding M.L.’s
and Chajon’s relationship, M.L.’s reaction to Chajon’s statements and conduct, and
Chajon’s statements and conduct following the incident.
In reviewing cases where the state relied on both direct and circumstantial evidence
to prove a disputed element, the supreme court has held that “when a disputed element is
sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone . . . it is the traditional standard, rather than
the circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.” Jones, 4 N.W.3d at 500 (quoting
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence under the traditional standard, we conduct “a painstaking analysis of the record
9
to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction,
was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” Horst, 880 N.W.2d
at 40 (quotation omitted).
In Horst, the supreme court concluded that appellant’s statement, “I want him dead,”
to multiple witnesses was direct evidence of her intent to commit first-degree premeditated
murder. 880 N.W.2d at 40. The supreme court also noted that appellant’s other statements
“such as, ‘we can do this’ and ‘how many rounds did you put in him,’” was direct evidence
that appellant had acknowledged that the shooter would kill the victim. Id. Because there
was direct evidence of each element of the offense, the suprem e court applied the
traditional standard and held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Id.
at 40-41.
In Jones, the supreme court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support
appellant’s conviction for second-degree assault because appellant’s statements were direct
evidence of his intent to use a board as a dangerous weapon in a manner likely to cause
great bodily harm. 4 N.W.3d at 501. The state’s evidence demonstrated that appellant
brandished a wooden board near the victim while simultaneously stating, “I’m going to
beat her bloody.” Jones, 4 N.W.3d at 500. The supreme court concluded that appellant’s
“statements about how he planned to use the board, made during the timeframe when
[appellant] brandished the board while [the victim] was lying on the floor, require no
inference to determine [appellant’s] intended use of the board,” and noted the
contemporaneous timing of the statements aided the court in reaching its conclusion. Id.
at 501.
10
Here, Chajon does not attempt to distinguish his statements from those in Horst and
Jones. Like Horst and Jones, Chajon’s statements that “if [M.L.] wasn’t going to belong
to him, [M.L.] was not going to belong to anyone,” and “that he would rather [M.L.] was
dead,” made while Chajon was brandishing a knife and in control of a vehicle, are direct
evidence of his intent to kill M.L . This evidence required the district court to make no
inference on if or how Chajon intended to kill M.L. Therefore, this direct evidence was
sufficient to convict Chajon of attempted second-degree intentional murder.
Chajon argues that three of the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous and
that the district court made no credibility findings yet seemed to base many of its factual
findings on M.L.’s testimony. First, Chajon argues that the district court’s finding that the
knife had “a sky-blue colored handle with a little leaf design on it,” was clearly erroneous
because it conflicts with a photograph the state introduced into evidence that shows a knife
with a brown, wooden handle.
2 Second, Chajon argues that M.L. testified that she blocked
the knife with her hands and had cuts on her fingers, but this conflicts with the lack of
blood evidence in the vehicle. Third, Chajon argues that M.L’s testimony about Chajon’s
statements is distinctly different from the district court’s finding that “Chajon told M.L. he
was going to kill her.” These arguments are unavailing.
Although, Chajon argues that several of the district court’s findings are contradicted
by other evidence, we must assume that the fact-finder disbelieved any testimony

2 M.L. also testified that the knife was “one of the ones you use to eat, to cut meat,” and
that the knife was white, similar to the color of a cup that she was pointing at in the
courtroom. This testimony was consistent with photograph of the knife admitted at trial,
which depicts a kitchen knife with a wooden handle.
11
conflicting with the verdict. Id. at 500 (stating that, although a witness gave conflicting
testimony about whether appellant said anything during the moment’s surround ing the
assault, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict).
Additionally, “a conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible
witness.” State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). And
even though the district court did not make explicit credibility findings, the district court’s
findings of fact suggest that it found M.L.’s testimony, at least in part, credible. Pechovnik
v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. 2009) (stating that a district court’s factual
findings may “implicitly indicate” that it found testimony credible). In sum, when looking
at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient evidence to
support Chajon's conviction of attempted second-degree intentional murder.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chajon’s motion for
a downward durational departure.

Alternatively, Chajon argues that the district court abused its discretion by not
considering his motion for a downward durational departure. The Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines prescribe a sentence or sentencing range that is “presumed to be appropriate.”
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2022). “A sentencing court ‘must pronounce a sentence
within the applicable range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances’ that distinguish a case and overcome the presumption in favor of the
guidelines sentence.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1). “ Substantial and compelling circumstances are those
circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.” State
12
v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). “A downward
durational departure is justified only if the defendant’s conduct was significantly less
serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Solberg,
882 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3
(2022) (providing a “nonexclusive list of factors” that a district court may use to depart).
We review the district court’s denial of a sentencing departure for an abuse of
discretion. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. And we “will not ordinarily interfere with a
sentence falling within the presumptive sentence range, either dispositionally or
durationally, even if there are grounds that would justify departure.” State v. Bertsch, 707
N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). However, “[w]hen the record contains
evidence of factors supporting departure, which could have been, but were not, considered
by the district court, we may remand for consideration of those factors.” State v. Johnson,
831 N.W.2d 917, 925-26 (Minn. App. 2013) (citing State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262, 264
(Minn. App. 1984)), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
Chajon argues that the record contains legitimate reasons for departure, but the
district court abused its discretion by not “deliberately considering [the] circumstances for
and against departure.” State v. Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. App. 2002), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002). Chajon argues that the district court did not “reach the
merits of the departure motion as it did not address the motion and arguments.” The state
argues that the district court adequately considered the departure motion because “the
district court began the sentencing hearing by reciting the relevant filings,” and the district
13
court “heard a victim impact statement, sentencing arguments from both parties, and
allocution from Chajon.” We agree with the state.
In Curtiss, the district court denied appellant’s motion for a downward durational
departure and imposed the presumptive sentence because it found that “there were no
legitimate reasons for departure.” 353 N.W.2d at 263. This court concluded that legitimate
reasons for departure did exist, and that appellant’s conduct was “barely within the scope
of the serious charge of burglary in the first degree.” Id. Accordingly, the district court
erred by “putting aside arguments for departure rather than considering them alongside
valid reasons for non-departure.” Id. at 264 (quotation omitted).
Unlike Curtiss, the record here demonstrates that the district court properly
considered Chajon’s argument and then exercised its discretion to impose the presumptive
sentence. See State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010) (holding that a
sentence at the top of the range provided in the sentencing grid is not a departure), rev.
denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). The district court started the sentencing hearing by stating,
“[t]here is a victim impact statement in both Spanish and English, a restitution study, which
requested no restitution, a presentence investigation, a sentencing guidelines worksheet, a
durational departure motion[,] [a]nd . . . the dispositional advisor memorandum.”
Although the district court did not expressly acknowledge reviewing each of these
documents, this statement demonstrates that the district court reviewed the record prior to
the sentencing hearing. When defense counsel raised the issue of the presentence
investigation containing facts copied and pasted from the complaint, the district court
stated, “I noticed that as well,” which is further evidence that the district court reviewed
14
the record. The district court also listened to the victim-impact statement, sentencing
arguments from counsel, and allocution from Chajon before imposing the presumptive
sentence, implicitly denying the durational departure motion.
In sum, the record establishes that the district court considered the departure motion
and was aware it had discretion to depart, but chose to impose the presumptive sentence.
Because the district court imposed the presumptive sentence, it was not required to further
explain its reasoning. See State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 -81 (Minn. App. 1985)
(“[A]n explanation is not required when the [district] court considers reasons for departure
but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Chajon’s motion for a downward durational departure.
III. Chajon’s pro se arguments lack merit.
Chajon raises additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. Chajon argues
that his constitutional rights were violated under the Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Chajon arguments center on his claim that the photograph of the
knife introduced by the state at trial is “false” and “tainted” evidence because the
photograph depicts a “tan knife,” but M.L. testified that the knife used to commit the
offense was “sky blue.” Chajon argues that his conviction and sentence is a void judgment
because (1) the district court abused its discretion by allowing the photograph of the knife
into evidence, and effectively commanded a directed verdict by not intervening ; (2) the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the evidence was insufficient, as
he was accused of using a tan knife during the alleged criminal act, which conflicted with
M.L.’s testimony that a sky blue knife was used; (3) his due process rights were violated
15
because he was not given notice of the state’s intent to introduce a photograph of a tan
knife, which conflicted with testimony elicited by the state at trial ; and (4) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel did not object to the
introduction of the photograph of the knife or to the directed verdict.
We conclude that Chajon’s directed-verdict, subject-matter-jurisdiction, and due-
process arguments lack merit because the district court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the photograph of the knife into evidence. See State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d. 895,
902 (Minn. 2019) (stating that the reviewing court need not include detailed discussion of
pro se claims that lack merit). “Evidentiary rulings concerning materiality, foundation,
remoteness, relevancy, or the cumulative nature of the evidence are within the [district]
court’s sound discretion and will only be reversed when that discretion has been clearly
abused.” Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594, 601 (Minn. 1994) (quotation
omitted). The photograph of the knife was relevant to whether Chajon attempted to stab
M.L. because law enforcement found a steak knife in the road near M.L. and the knife
matched M.L.’s description of a kitchen knife used “to cut meat.” See Minn. R. Evid. 401
(stating that relevant evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence”). Chajon’s arguments go to the weight the district court
gave the evidence in light of M.L.’s testimony and not to its admissibility.
Similarly, Chajon’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim also lacks merit. To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “must affirmatively
prove that his counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’
16
and ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561
(Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). Chajon
argues that his counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the photograph of the tan
knife or to the directed verdict constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. However,
“there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable, and this court
does not review matters of trial strategy, or the particular tactics used by counsel.” State
v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 358 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). And Chajon does
not argue how his defense counsel’s failure to object fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
Affirmed.