State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0334

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nurbayan Obssa Hassan,
Appellant.

Filed March 31, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-23387

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristyn M. Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Cody Goodchild, Assistant City
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for driving while impaired (test refusal),
arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because he did not validly waive his right to
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counsel. In his pro se brief, he also challenges both evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency
of the evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 2, 2023, appellant Nurbayan Hassan was charged with gross
misdemeanor driving while impaired ( test refusal). The next day, the district court
appointed the public defender’s office to represent appellant. On November 27, after
extensive discussion with a first district court judge (the first judge), appellant’s request to
discharge the public defender was granted.
In December 2023, appellant appeared pro se at a pretrial hearing before a second
district court judge (the second judge). Appellant asked to represent himself and, after the
hearing, both he and the second judge signed and dated a waiver of counsel. The waiver
stated:
I understand I have an absolute right to have an attorney
represent me in this case.

. . . .

I understand if the [c]ourt allows me to represent myself:
I will be responsible for preparing my case for trial and
trying my case;
I will be bound by the same rules as an attorney;
If I fail to do something in a timely manner, or make a
mistake because of my unfamiliarity with the law, I will be
bound by those decisions and must deal with them myself.
I will not have an attorney to review the evidence,
investigate the charges, obtain statements from witnesses, do
legal research, draft motions, make written or oral arguments
to the [c]ourt, question witnesses, make objections, argue to a
jury, or take any other action to prepare or assist my case.

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The next hearing was before a third district court judge (the third judge) on January
22, 2024. Appellant waived a jury trial and told the third judge he wanted to proceed
without an attorney. The third judge determined that an evidentiary hearing would be more
appropriate than a motion hearing and offered appellant information about the Legal Rights
Center so he could obtain an attorney before the evidentiary hearing.
At a later bench trial on February 7, 2024, appellant again appeared pro se before
the third judge who asked him about his waiver of counsel. Appellant told the third judge
he was representing himself and had no further questions. The third judge denied
appellant’s motions to dismiss the case, reinstate his driver’s license, return his license
plates, and recover a towing fee; found him guilty; and sentenced him, stating: “You are
sentenced to the Hennepin County Adult Corrections Facility for 364 days. Execution of
this sentence is stayed for four years. Y ou are ordered to serve 90 days.” The sentence
was stayed pending appeal.
On appeal, appellant challenges the validity of his waiver of his right to counsel; he
also submits various issues in a pro se brief.
DECISION
I. Validity of waiver of counsel
The clearly erroneous standard controls our review of a district
court’s finding that a defendant has knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. A finding is clearly
erroneous when there is no reasonable evidence to support the
finding or when an appellate court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake occurred. When the facts are
undisputed, however, the question of whether a waiver -of-
counsel was knowing and intelligent is a constitutional one that
is reviewed de novo.
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State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012) (citations omitted). For a waiver to
be valid, “the record must demonstrate among other things that the waiver is made with
eyes open,” which includes “knowing the po ssible punishments for the offense.” Id. at
888. A defendant who has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel “must
be allowed to represent himself despite his lack of the legal ability to conduct a good
defense.” State v. Bonkowske, 957 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. App. 2021). An invalid waiver
requires reversal of a conviction as a remedy. Bonga v. State, 765 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn.
2009).
The requirements for waiving counsel for defendants charged with felonies differ
from the requirements for waiving counsel for defendants charged with misdemeanors or
gross misdemeanors. For defendants charged with felonies:
[t]he court must ensure that defendants . . . who appear
without counsel, do not request counsel, and wish to represent
themselves, enter on the record a voluntary and intelligent
written waiver of the right to counsel. If the defendant refuses
to sign the written waiver form, the waiver must be made on
the record. Before accepting the waiver, the court must advise
the defendant of the following:
(a) nature of the charges;
(b) all offenses included within the charges;
(c) range of allowable punishments;
(c) there may be defenses;
(d) mitigating circumstances may exist; and
(e) all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the
consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel, including
the advantages and disadvantages of the decision to waive
counsel.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). In contrast, defendants
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charged with a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor punishable
by incarceration who appear without counsel, do not request
counsel, and wish to represent themselves, must waive counsel
in writing or on the record. The court must not accept the
waiver unless the court is sat isfied that it is voluntary and has
been made with full knowledge and understanding of the
defendant’s rights.

Id., subd. 1(3). In both situations, “[t]he court may appoint the district public defender for
the limited purpose of advising and consulting with the defendant as to the waiver.” Id.
However, “circumstances [can] demonstrate a valid waiver even if the district court
does not obtain a written waiver” and “a district court’s failure to conduct an on-the-record
inquiry regarding waiver . . . does not require reversal when the particular facts and
circumstances of the case demonstrate a valid waiver.” State v. Gant, 996 N.W.2d 1, 7-8,
(Minn. App. 2023) (quotation and citations omitted). Because the district court erred “by
conducting a felony sentencing hearing with a pro se defendant wh o did not expressly or
impliedly waive the right to counsel,” the court of appeals in Gant “reverse[d] and
remand[ed] for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 12.
Gant sets out four factors to consider in determining the validity of a waiver: (1) the
defendant’s “previous representation by counsel,” (2) whether “standby counsel” was
available, (3) the “district court engagement” with the defendant, and (4) the defendant’s
“prior experience” with the crim inal justice system. Id. at 8 -10. Appellant relies
extensively on these factors to argue that his waiver was invalid. But Gant is
distinguishable for two reasons.
First, Gant concerned a waiver of counsel for the sentencing hearing of a “defendant
charged with a felony.” Id. at 4-5. Consequently, the validity of that waiver was governed
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by Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4), which requires both a written waiver of the right to
counsel and an advisory from the district court. Because neither of these had occurred
before the sentencing hearing, the waiver was not procedurally valid. Id. at 7. This court
therefore used the four Gant factors to determine whether it was otherwise valid. Id. at 8.
Appellant, in contrast, was charged with a gross misdemeanor, which is governed by Minn.
R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(3), and requires only that the waiver be either in writing or on the
record and that the district court be satisfied that the waiver is voluntary and made with the
defendant’s full knowledge of his rights. Appellant’s waiver met these conditions and
therefore was procedurally valid, so no consideration of the Gant factors was appropriate,
much less necessary.
Second, the factors themselves do not support appellant’s claim that his waiver was
not valid. As to previous representation by counsel, the transcript of the November 27,
2023, hearing indicates that appellant’s counsel told the first judge that she and appellant
had a discussion, she explained “various things and options,” and appellant was “quite sure
that he want[ed] to discharge the public defender’s office .” The first judge then asked
appellant if counsel’s statement was accurate and if he understoo d that : (a) he had the
ability to represent himself, (b) he could hire an attorney to represent him, and (c) he
qualified for representation by the public defender’s office and a public defender had been
appointed to represent him. Appellant answered, “yes,” to each question. The first judge
then asked appellant if he understood that, if he discharged the public defender’s office, he
could not come back and say he made a mistake and he did want the office to represent
him, and appellant answered, “Yep.” When the first judge asked appellant if he had been
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to law school or taken the bar exam, appellant answered “No.” The first judge then told
appellant that he had to follow the rules that applied to him and no judge would help him
and that the “Office of Legal Rights ” would be a possible option if he did want help. 1
Finally, appellant answered “Yes” when asked if he was certain discharging the public
defender’s office was what he wanted to do.
As to advisory counsel, appellant cites cases in which defendants accused of felonies
and subject to subdivision 1(4) of the rule had advisory counsel, but no cases in which
defendants like appellant, charged with a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, had
advisory counsel, and appellant offers no other support for his view that a district court is
obliged to provide advisory counsel to those accused of gross misdemeanors. Moreover,
the rule states that a district court may, not that it must, appoint advisory counsel because
of concerns about “fairness of the process” or about “delays in completing the trial.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 2(1)-(2). The court may also “appoint the district public defender
for the limited purpose of advising and consulting with the defendant as to the waiver.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). Here, the first judge did appoint a public defender,
who talked to appellant before being fired.
As to the district court’s statements about waiver, in addition to appellant’s
discussion with the first judge on November 27, 2023, the second judge and the third judge
discussed the matter with him. The second judge asked appellant if he wished to represent
himself and, when appellant answered that he did, told him:

1 We assume the district court meant the Legal Rights Center.
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[Y]ou know, the advantage of hiring private counsel is if you
hire an attorney, they know the statutes of Minnesota, the rules
of criminal procedure, how to evaluate evidence, how to
request it, how to evaluate a negotiation and compare what the
offer is in this case to other cases. You understand that?

Appellant answered, “Yep.” The second judge then explained the waiver form to appellant,
saying, “If you would review it, sir, sign it, and date it, then we have an accurate record.
We do that in cases where people are representing themselves just to make sure they’re
clear about everything. Do you have any questions about anything?” Appellant said, “I’ll
just look at the waiver. I’m not sure,” and the second judge explained further, “The waiver
says to the [c]ourt we’ve explained to you that you have a right to have private counsel,
and you’re making an informed choice that you don’t want that. . . . [T]hat’s what you, I
believe, [are] telling me.” Appellant replied, “Okay.” The second judge went on, “That’s
why you’re representing yourself today?” and appellant said, “Yeah.” The second judge
continued,
[S]o the waiver that I’m talking about is it’s a written
waiver. . . . It’s kind of a protocol that we give to people when
they are making the choice to represent themselves and
waiving or giving up their right to have an attorney stand next
to them and r epresent them. So I’m just going to ask you to
review that and sign that and make it part of the record if that’s
what you want to do, which I think it is.

. . . .

. . . I’m trying not to confuse you. So we’re going to print out
that form and we’ll give that to you. If you want to just have a
seat, review it. If you understand everything in it I’ll ask you
just to sign it, put today’s date on it, and then bring i t back to
the court operations staff, who is to my left. They’ll make a
copy of it for you and give you a copy, and then you’re free to
take off.
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The waiver form was signed and dated by both appellant and the second judge.2

On January 22, 2024, the third judge asked appellant if he had applied for
representation by the public defender’s office. After counsel for the state explained that
appellant had “actually f ired his public defender ,” the third judge asked appellant if he
wanted to proceed without an attorney, and appellant said that he did. The third judge told
appellant:
You are representing yourself, having fired your public
defender. You should know that you can, of course, hire an
attorney to represent you. We do have information about the
Legal Rights Center, and they represent people on a sliding
scale. So that mig ht be an option for you and we’re happy to
give you that information.
If you represent yourself, you’re held to the same
standards as an attorney. . . .[Y]ou’ll be expected to follow all
the same rules and protocols as an attorney would; do you
understand?

Appellant again answered, “Yes.” After explaining to appellant that he would be having
an evidentiary hearing and what that would entail, the third judge said,
[W]hat I’d suggest is that you go to the Self Help Center. It’s
available online, but there are also people downstairs, and try
to get some assistance. Because, as I said, because you’re
representing yourself, you’ll be expected to follow the same
rules and protocol as an attorney. The judge can’t help you
figure out what to say or what evidence to provide. You need
to figure that out for yourself, sir.

2 Although the waiver form was not filed until later, there is no indication that this affected
its validity.
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Thus, the first judge, the second judge, and the third judge all took pains to see that the
waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and appellant at no point indicated that he
did not understand what he was doing in waiving his right to counsel.
Finally, appellant’s only prior experience of the judicial system reflected in the
record is appellant’s 2016 DWI conviction. Having had a prior conviction and experienced
its consequences, appellant was not ignorant of the judicial process. Even if it were
appropriate to consider the four Gant factors when there is a procedurally valid waiver,
none of them would provide a basis for concluding that appellant’s waiver of his right to
counsel was not valid.
II. Pro se brief
Appellant’s pro se brief asks this court to “vacate” his conviction on the ground s
that he was not allowed to present some evidence and that other evidence was
misconstrued. Other than referring to and quoting the Fourteenth and the Fourth
Amendments to the United States Constitution , appellant offers no legal support or
argument for either assertion . Pro se supplemental-brief claims that are not supported by
legal arguments or citations to legal authority are forfeited. State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148,
165-66 (Minn. 2020). As to the issues that are raised in appellant’s pro se brief, we have
reviewed them and determined that they all fail.
Affirmed.