In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: B. M. H. and J. J. B., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0342

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: B. M. H. and J. J. B., Parents.

Filed October 28, 2024
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-JV-23-2468

William Murray, Schatz Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant B.M.H.)

Brian M. Mortenson, Rice County Attorney, Sean R. McCarthy, Assistant County
Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent Rice County Human Services)

Ashley K. Morelli, Blahnik, Prchal & Stoll, PLLC, Prior Lake, Minnesota (for respondent
J.J.B.)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices, Bird Island, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem
Stacy Heusinkveld)

Stephen R. Ecker, Faribault, Minnesota (for child 1)

Matthew Androsky, Owatonna, Minnesota (for child 2)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
This appeal arose from an order adjudicating five children to be in need of protection
or services (CHIPS). Appellant mother argues that the district court abused its discretion
2
in determining that respondent county proved by clear and convincing evidence that
mother’s two children were CHIPS. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that at least one statutory ground supported the CHIPS adjudication for each
child, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant B.M.H. (mother) has two children, child 1 and child 2. 1 Mother’s
romantic partner is A.C., who is the father of child 3, child 4, and child 5. During the events
involved in this appeal, mother, child 1, and child 2 lived with A.C., as did child 3, child 4,
and child 5. Only the CHIPS adjudications of child 1 and child 2 are at issue in this appeal.
In October 2023, respondent Rice County Human Services (the county) filed CHIPS
petitions for all five children, alleging that A.C. sexually abused child 1 over three years.
The petition here sought protection or services on three statutory grounds, Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.007, subd. 6(2) (child is a victim of physical or sexual abuse or resides with a victim
of child abuse), (8) (child is without proper parental care), and (9) (child’s environment
endangers the child) (2022).
The county took immediate custody of all five children . Following an emergency
protective-care hearing, the district court found that the petitions stated a prima facie case
and that the children were CHIPS and would be endangered if returned to the home. The
district court placed all five children out of the home. At the admit/deny hearing, mother
entered a denial.

1 Respondent J.J.B. is the father of child 1 and child 2; J.J.B. did not live with mother ,
child 1, and child 2 during the period relevant to the issues in this appeal.
3
The county and child 1 moved to consolidate the cases of all five children for trial,
which the district court granted after determining that a joint trial was in the best interests
of the children. 2 In January 2024, the district court held an eight-day trial that included
testimony from the five children; mother; H.S., who is the mother of child 3, child 4, and
child 5; case investigators; medical staff; and two guardians ad litem.
After trial, the district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law , and an order
adjudicating the five children as CHIPS. Following a direct appeal by child 3, child 4, and
child 5, we affirmed the district court’s adjudication of them as CHIPS. See In re Welfare
of Child. of H.M.S., No. A24-0277, 2024 WL 4025017, at *1 (Minn. App. Sept. 3, 2024).
Below, we summarize the facts relevant to the issues in this appeal with reference
to our opinion in H.M.S. and, when helpful to understand the issues, also include other
evidence and the district court’s findings.
In spring 2020, mother , child 1, and child 2 moved in with A.C., child 3, child 4,
and child 5. Together, the seven family members lived in a home on Hunt Lake outside
Faribault (lake house). All the children lived at the lake house full- time, except child 5,
who stayed there only on weekends. A.C. also operated a farm near French Lake at which
some of the abuse took place. Child 1 was 17 years old at the time of trial.
Our opinion in H.M.S. stated the salient facts based on the trial evidence:
Child 1 lived in the [lake house] until September 2023,
when A.C. and [mother] kicked her out of the house following
an argument. According to child 1, A.C. ordered her to get out
of his home, picked her up, and threw her out the door. Child 1

2 The district court consolidated two court files for trial: 66-JV-23-2468, involving child 1
and child 2, and 66-JV-23-2467, involving child 3, child 4, and child 5.
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went to a friend’s home and later spoke with the police. The
following day, child 1 moved in with her aunt. Child 1
explained that she wanted to live with her aunt because she did
not want to “stay[] in the same household as [A.C.].” She
eventually told her aunt that A.C. had sexually abused her.
Child 1’s aunt reported these allegations to the police.

At the [trial], child 1 stated that the sexual abuse
happened “[a]lmost daily” for about three years. The abuse
began with “inappropriate touching” and progressed to sexual
penetration. On occasion, A.C. gave child 1 money or bought
her things to keep her quiet. Child 1 stated that A.C. also
physically disciplined her by dragging her “by the ear” or
picking her up and throwing her “like a sack of potatoes to the
floor.” Child 1 tried to speak to her mother about the abuse, but
her mother did not believe her. She was also afraid that A.C.
would begin sexually abusing her younger sister, child 2.
Child 1 noted that she would not feel safe returning to the home
and did not believe that her mother was “fighting for [her]
safety and protection.”

Child 2, child 3, child 4, and child 5 also testified at the
[trial]. These four children denied any knowledge of physical
or sexual abuse against child 1. Child 2 stated that she often
saw A.C. and child 1 arguing and once saw him break a chair
after he picked it up and threw it on the ground. However,
child 2 denied seeing A.C. physically discipline anyone.
Child 3 likewise denied that A.C. was physically abusive. As
for child 4, he agreed that people screamed, argued, and had
disagreements in his home, but he stated that he never saw the
arguments turn physical. Similarly, child 5 stated that she saw
arguments at A.C.’s home but did not hear people screaming
at each other and did not see anyone receive physical
discipline. Child 2, child 3, child 4, and child 5 indicated that
they were comfortable in the home and around A.C.

The district court also heard testimony from . . .
[mother] and H.S.

[Mother] testified that she never saw A.C. physically
discipline child 1, pick her up and throw her, engage in
inappropriate behavior, or have any type of sexual contact with
her. She also never saw him physically discipline any of the
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other children. When asked about the incident in September
2023 when child 1 was thrown out of the house, [mother] stated
that A.C. “never touched” child 1 but “scooped her underneath
the armpits and drug her out onto the deck” and then “laid her
down” on the ground before locking her out of the house.

H.S. is the mother of child 3, child 4, and child 5. She
lived with A.C. for about 10 years and did not see him
physically discipline the children during that time. She did not
see A.C. treat the children in a way that “trouble[d]” her and
she did not have any concerns about the safety of the children
in his care.

The guardians ad litem also testified. The guardian ad
litem assigned to work with child 1 and child 2 urged the
district court to consider child 1 and child 2 as children in need
of protection or services. The guardian ad litem for child 3,
child 4, and child 5 also made a statement to the district court
asserting that the children should be adjudicated in need of
protection or services.

Id. at *2.
Child 1’s testimony offered other details that are relevant to the issues on appeal.
She described the lake house as having two rooms in the lower level—the “living room
area” for child 1, including her bed, and the adjoining bedroom shared by child 3 and child
4. Other family members—A.C., mother, child 2, and child 5—slept on the upper level of
the house.
Child 1 testified that A.C.’s sexual abuse of her began at the end of her eighth-grade
year with inappropriate touching and that child 1 discussed this with her mother, who
responded that this behavior was just how A.C. “shows his love.” A.C. sometimes touched
child 1’s leg, upper thigh, and genitals in the family car while child 3 and child 4 were in
the backseat.
6
When child 1 was a freshman in high school, the abuse progressed, and A.C. had
sexual intercourse with her “multiple times a week” until August 2023. Child 1 stated that
one incident occurred inside the cabin of a tractor on the farm after A.C. offered child 1 a
$100 bill in exchange for sexual intercourse. Child 1 added that, when she would resist or
try to avoid sexual contact, A.C. would bribe her with cash or purchases of clothes that she
wanted. Child 1 also described how A.C. physically punished her and testified that he did
so “a couple times a month.”
After child 1 moved in with her aunt, she went to a doctor for what she believed was
a urinary-tract infection. The doctor told child 1 that she ha d a urinary-tract infection and
genital herpes. Child 1 believed that she contracted herpes from A.C. because she has not
had sexual intercourse with anyone else. Two clinic employees provided testimony and
medical records confirming child 1’s diagnosis. Child 1 shared the diagnosis with mother,
who, according to child 1, did not believe her.
Child 2’s testimony similarly offered other details that are relevant to the issues on
appeal. Child 2 was 11 years old at the trial and, as mentioned above, denied observing any
physical or sexual abuse by A.C. against child 1. Child 2 testified that she did not get along
with child 1 but got along with the other children. Child 2 stated that A.C. did not physically
discipline her, although he yelled at her for crying when he had a “long day.” She denied
ever seeing A.C. push or shake anyone in the househo ld. Child 2 stated that she was not
scared of A.C., mother, or the other children in the home. Child 2 testified, however, that
mother would discipline the children for being “naughty” by bringing them outside and
saying that “the coyotes were going to get us.”
7
The county also called investigators who had interviewed child 1 and the other
children. After child 1’s aunt reported the abuse, county social workers and a police officer
spoke with child 1 and later scheduled Cornerhouse interviews with child 1 and the other
children.3
A county social worker testified that, during the interview, child 1 gave a “detailed”
description of the sexual abuse and its progression over time. Child 1 told the social worker
that, during one sexual assault by A.C., child 1 watched the hands of a clock on the wall
and described that “it took forever for them to move.” The social worker testified that it is
common for victims of sexual abuse to disassociate from the abuse and focus on something
in the room. Child 1 also disclosed details about A.C.’s bribes when she would not do what
A.C. wanted. For example, she described receiving $500 from A.C.; child 1 showed the
social worker a transfer on her bank’s web application.
The district court also heard from mother, who testified that child 1 suffered from
mental illness, including post-traumatic stress disorder, after seeing her biological father,
J.J.B., physically abuse mother. Mother testified that child 1 has been in therapy for several
years. Child 1 also has von Willebrand’s disease, a blood-clotting disorder characterized
by bruising and easy bleeding.
Mother testified that child 1 went from being a high-performing student to failing
her sophomore year, but mother had no explanation for the change. As for the genital sores

3 A Cornerhouse interview is a forensic-style, person-led interview that allows a victim of
abuse the opportunity to share information specific to their allegations. Jennifer Anderson
et al., The Cornerhouse Forensic Interview Protocol: RATAC, 12 T.M. Cooley J. Prac. &
Clinical L. 193, 194-95 (2010).
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on child 1, mother stated that she believed they were ingrown hair s. Mother testified that
child 1 had a joint account with mother and, when shown a bank statement, agreed that it
showed a transfer of $500 on September 11, 2023. She also testified that child 1 had made
a Converse shoe purchase.
Mother acknowledged that when she wants to get her children’s attention, she grabs
their earlobes. She admitted that, when her children were younger, she threatened to lock
them out of the house at night and told them that “the coyotes were going to get them.” She
also admitted that, during the September 2023 incident when A.C. dragged child 1 outside,
mother locked child 1 out of the house when child 1 tried to reenter. Mother “wanted child 1
to cool down,” according to the district court’s findings. After child 1 reported she had
been abused, mother told child 1 that she and A.C. did not want her back in their household.
After the trial concluded, the district court issued a 36-page order on February 1,
2024. The district court provided 133 detailed factual findings, including credibility
findings, and concluded that the county had proved by clear and convincing evidence that
child 1 and child 2 needed protection or services based on the statutory grounds the county
alleged. The district court therefore adjudicated child 1 and child 2, along with the other
children, as CHIPS.
Mother appeals the CHIPS adjudications of child 1 and child 2.
DECISION
Mother argues that the district court erred by finding that the evidence was sufficient
to support the CHIPS adjudications of child 1 and child 2. The county responds that this
court “should not disturb the district court’s findings and credibility determinations.”
9
A district court has broad discretion in deciding juvenile- protection matters. In re
Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. App. 2009). A district court
abuses its discretion “ by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey , 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Appellate
courts accord considerable deference to the district court’s decision because a district court
is in a superior position to assess witness credibility. In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d
393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
This court reviews a district court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Welfare of
Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321-22 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20,
2015). The clear-error standard of review “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence
exists to support the decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222
(Minn. 2021). “When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). When applying the clear-error standard of
review, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings; (2) do
not reweigh the evidence; (3) do not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile
conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus,
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all
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the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.

Id. at 222 (quotations omitted); see In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601
n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney on appeal in a juvenile-protection case), rev.
denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d. 346, 355 (Minn.
App. 2024) (same).
For the district court to adjudicate a child as CHIPS , the county needs to (1) prove
at least one ground under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2022), and (2) show that the
child needs protection or services as a result. S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 728. To sustain a
CHIPS adjudication, t he statutory ground must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 1(a) (2022); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.03. To
determine whether the evidence was clear and convincing , an appellate court inquires
closely into the sufficiency of the evidence. S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 733.
The district court adjudicated child 1 as CHIPS on five statutory grounds and child 2
as CHIPS on three grounds. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6. To affirm, we must
conclude that sufficient evidence supports at least one ground for each child. See S.S.W.,
767 N.W.2d at 728.
A. Residing with a Victim or a Perpetrator of Child Abuse

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.007, subdivision 6(2), allows a CHIPS
adjudication if, among other things, the child “has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse
as defined in section 260E.03, subdivision 18 or 20,” or “resides with or would reside with
a perpetrator of domestic child abuse as defined in subdivision 13 or child abuse as defined
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in subdivision 5 or 13.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2)(i), (iii). “Child abuse” means
an act that involves a minor victim and constitutes one of several specific criminal offenses,
including assault offenses and criminal-sexual -conduct offenses. Id., subd. 5 (2022).
“Domestic child abuse” includes “any physical injury to a minor family or household
member inflicted by an adult family or household member other than by accidental means,”
criminal-sexual-conduct offenses by an adult against a minor family or household member,
and physical or sexual abuse. Id., subd. 13 (2022).
The district court concluded that child 1 and child 2 needed protection or services
because (1) child 1 had been physically and sexually abused by A.C. under
subdivision 6(2)(i) and (2) both children resided with A.C., a perpetrator of domestic child
abuse under subdivision 6(2)(iii).
1. Physical and Sexual Abuse Against Child 1
The district court found that child 1 was the victim of sexual abuse because she was
“repeatedly sexually abused by [A.C.] in their shared home at the end of her 8th grade
year/beginning of her freshman year of high school up until August 2023.” The district
court made detailed factual findings about the progression of the sexual abuse and about
the effects of this abuse on child 1. The district court also found that child 1 was the victim
of physical abuse based on her testimony about other abusive physical encounters with
A.C., including the September 2023 incident in which A.C. threw her out of the house.
The district court expressly found child 1 to be credible, noting that she at times
“had to stop to compose herself,” that many times “her eyes were closed as she was
testifying as to the abuse,” and that her testimony was “in line” with her earlier statements
12
to the county and to law enforcement. The district court also found that child 1’s testimony
explained why she did not disclose the abuse to mother—she was afraid mother “would
not believe her” or “keep her safe.”
On appeal, mother contends that the district court’s findings “hinge on the
allegations put forth by child 1.” Mother argues that the district court erred in relying on
child 1’s testimony because it was “contradicted and uncorroborated.”
Mother’s arguments essentially contend that the district court’s factual findings are
defective because certain aspects of the record could be read to support findings that mother
wanted the district court to make, but which the district court did not make. As discussed
above, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence, find their own facts, or reconcile
conflicting evidence. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222. This court will affirm if reasonable
evidence in the record supports the district court’s factual findings. D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at
321-22. Because mother cannot show that no record evidence supports the district court’s
factual findings, her arguments, as a matter of law, are insufficient to get relief on appeal.
Even so, we discuss mother’s challenges to seven aspects of child 1’s testimony.
First, mother argues that child 1’s testimony that other household members
interrupted A.C.’s assaults is implausible because no one in the household testified to
observing or suspecting inappropriate behavior between A.C. and c hild 1. But the district
court found that, “[t]hough other witnesses testified that they did not see anything happen”
between A.C. and child 1, “that does not equate to no abuse.” The district court noted that
“[s]exual abuse and physical abuse are often not observed by others” and that this
household adhered to a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.
13
The district court explained that the other household members had “favorable bias
towards one another, and their testimony was reflective of that bias.” Specifically, mother
was “clearly biased” towards A.C., child 2 was biased towards mother, child 3 was biased
towards A.C., and c hild 4 and child 5 had limited involvement in the household. In
particular, the district court explained its credibility finding about child 2:
During the testimony of Child 2, it was clear she was
protecting someone, although it was unclear who that was or if
it was herself. It was clear during her testimony that Child 2’s
perspective is that Child 1 is the bad person in the household
and that any problems in the household were the fault of
Child 1. Child 2’s testimony is biased towards . . . her mother.

Thus, the district court weighed all the evidence, including child 1’s testimony, and found
child 1 credible and the other children not credible.
Second, mother argues that other testimony contradicted child 1’s testimony that
she orally resisted A.C.’s abuse in a “loud tone” and cried out in pain when his assaults
progressed to penetration. Mother contends that no one testified they heard anything
suspicious from the downstairs living area where the assaults occurred. Mother overlooks
key parts of child 1’s testimony—for example, that child 1 would tell A.C. to stop in both
quiet and loud tones. Also, child 1 testified that she did not believe that child 3 or child 4
saw or heard the assaults, even though they slept in the adjoining bedroom.
Third, mother argues that child 1’s diagnosis of v on Wille brand’s disease
contradicts her testimony about the assaults. Mother argues that, “if [child 1] was sexually
assaulted by [A.C.] as she claims, there would have not only have been extensive bruises
on her body but also a substantial amount of blood loss.” Mother points to her own
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testimony that she noticed nothing of concern while doing child 1’s laundry. Mother
ignores her own testimony that child 1 did laundry. During a Cornerhouse interview,
child 1 stated that she threw away her bedsheets after one sexual assault left them bloody.
Fourth, mother argues that the testimony of child 3 and child 4 contradicts child 1’s
testimony that A.C. touched her upper thigh while she was in the front seat of the family
car. Child 3 and child 4 were in the backseat, and mother contends that they denied
witnessing anything suspicious. The district court clarified that child 1 “believed the boys
may have seen something from the backseat of the car, but there was no reaction from them
when they were in the car.” (Emphasis added.) The district court also found that the
testimony of child 3 and child 4 reflected the household’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.
Fifth, mother argues that child 1 had “multiple streams [of] income” from her jobs
and implies that child 1’s money came from those jobs, not A.C. Mother contends that
child 1 would not be susceptible to bribery. It is accurate that child 1 testified she worked
at a lodge and babysat while living at the lake house. Child 1 provided investigators and
the district court with bank records showing a $500 transfer from her savings account into
her checking account and a subsequent shoe purchase she made with those funds. And
child 1 testified that A.C. gave her a $500 bribe to keep her silent. We will not reweigh this
testimony, which the district court found credible. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (stating
that “the clear-error standard does not contemplate a reweighing of the evidence” by an
appellate court).
Sixth, mother argues that child 1’s testimony that A.C. assaulted her while they were
inside the cabin of a tractor was implausible because other family members worked nearby
15
on the farm. Mother contends that her testimony and the testimony of child 3 contradict
child 1’s claims. We defer to the district court’s finding that this specific instance of sexual
assault occurred based on child 1’s credible testimony and the district court’s finding that
mother and child 3 were biased in favor of A.C. and not credible. See L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d
at 396 (stating that appellate courts defer to a district court’s credibility findings).
Seventh, mother argues that child 1’s statement that she had received inappropriate
text messages from A.C. was unfounded because child 1 did not submit the actual messages
to the district court. Despite child 1’s inability to produce the actual text messages, we will
not second-guess the district court’s finding that child 1’s testimony generally was credible
and consistent with statements made during earlier interviews. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221 (stating that, when applying the clear-error standard, appellate courts “view the
evidence in a light favorable” to the district court’s findings).
In sum, the district court’s findings are supported by record evidence, including
child 1’s testimony about the sexual and physical abuse. The district court found child 1
credible. The district court also found that each of the other testifying family members was
not credible and was either biased or had limited involvement in the household. This court
will defer to the district court’s superior position to assess witness credibility, including its
finding that child 1 is more credible than mother and the other children. See L.A.F.,
554 N.W.2d at 396 (giving the district court’s credibility determinations deference in
juvenile-protection matters).
Child 1’s testimony was corroborated by the exhibits admitted into the record, which
included child-abuse summary reports, maltreatment determinations, law-enforcement
16
investigation reports, medical records, photos, and text messages. Other witnesses also
corroborated child 1’s testimony, including a social worker and a physician’s assistant.
Mother herself testified that child 1 “went from an A and B student to almost failing the
entire sophomore year” and had no explanation.
Thus, the evidence reasonably supports the district court’s finding that A.C.
physically and sexually abused child 1. We therefore determine that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by adjudicating child 1 as CHIPS under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6(2)(i).
2. Living with a Perpetrator of Child Abuse
The district court found that a CHIPS adjudication was also warranted as to both
child 1 and child 2 because the children resided with or would be residing with a perpetrator
of domestic child abuse under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2)(iii). The district court
determined that the children were “residing in the home with [A.C.] . . . at the time that the
sexual abuse occurred.” Mother does not dispute that child 2 resided with child 1 and A.C.
when the abuse allegedly occurred. As discussed above, the district court made thorough
factual findings about this physical and sexual abuse and found that child 1’s testimony
was credible.
The district court further found that mother “has continued to reside with [A.C.] and
defended [A.C.] throughout this process.” During the abuse investigation, mother told law
enforcement that A.C. is the “most kind and gentle person [she has] ever met.” The district
court found that “[b]oth child 1 and child 2 resided with or would reside with a perpetrator
of domestic child abuse, as [mother] remains residing with [A.C.] and has provided no
17
evidence that she intends to move from that residence.” Mother does not believe any of
child 1’s allegations against A.C. and told child 1 that she does not want her to return to
the lake house. The district court determined that mother “has no ability to protect the
children, nor has she taken any steps to protect the children from [A.C.] given the evidence
presented.” Based on these facts, the district court determined that child 1 and c hild 2
needed protection or services.
The district court also adjudicated child 1 as CHIPS under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6(2)(ii) (residing with a victim of child abuse), (8) (deprivation of proper parental
care), and (9) (injurious or dangerous environment). Based on our determination that at
least one other statutory ground supports child 1 and child 2’s CHIPS adjudications, we
need not address these alternative bases.
Because record evidence reasonably supports the district court’s finding that child 1
and child 2 resided with or would reside with A.C., a perpetrator of domestic child abuse,
and consequently needed protection or services, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in adjudicating child 1 and child 2 as CHIPS under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.007, subd. 6(2)(iii).
Affirmed.