A24-0991

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0353
A24-0991

In re the Marriage of:

Petroula Nicole Hansen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Espen Allen Hansen,
Respondent.

Filed December 23, 2024
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-15-7518, 27-DA-FA-17-372

Petroula Hansen, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Nathalie S. Rabuse, DeSmidt Rabuse PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this parenting dispute, pro se appellant-mother argues that the district court made
clearly erroneous findings of fact, erroneously construed her motion for amended findings
as a motion to reconsider, abused its discretion in denying her request to appoint a parenting
2
time expediter (PTE) , and abused its discretion in awarding respondent -father conduct -
based attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTS
The marriage between appellant Petroula Nicole Hansen (mother) and respondent
Espen Allen Hansen (father) was dissolved in January 2016. Pursuant to the parties’
stipulation, which was adopted by the district court, the parties were granted joint legal and
joint physical custody of their two minor children, each born in December 2014, as well as
equal, regular parenting time on a rotating schedule.
In September 2017, by stipulation and order, a parenting consultant (PC) was
appointed. Under the stipulation, the PC was appointed for two years unless extended by
mutual agreement of the parties. Although the parties initially agreed to renew the PC’s
services in January 2023, father rescinded his agreement later that month. As of January
2023, the parties no longer have a court-appointed PC.
In June 2023, mother filed a motion requesting, among other things: (1) appointment
of a PTE; (2) relief related to the children’s extracurricular activities; (3) that the children
be allowed to wear smart watches; (4) inclusion of a non-disparagement clause; (5) that the
time required to respond to Our Family Wizard (OFW) 1 communication be reduced from
72 hours to 24 hours; and (6) relief related to childcare issues. Mother later filed an
“addendum” to her motion, requesting that a vacation parenting -time schedule be

1 OFW is a cell phone application that helps parents manage child -custody schedules and
co-parenting issues.
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established. Father generally opposed mother’s requested relief and, the day after he filed
his response, mother filed a supplemental affidavit and exhibits, which were untimely.
A hearing was held on July 17, 2023, at which the district court agreed to consider
mother’s untimely filings conditioned on father having the opportunity to respond. After
father responded, mother filed an “Affidavit of Health Care Expenses and Demand fo r
Payment” and “Notice of Intent to Collect Unreimbursed or Uninsured Health Care
Expenses and Request for Payment,” seeking to collect $15 of a $30 uninsured medical
expense. And on September 29, 2023, mother moved to find father in contempt for several
alleged violations of the judgment and decree and other orders.
On October 23, 2023, the district court (1) declined to appoint a PTE; (2) denied
mother’s requested relief related to the children’s extra -curricular activities; (3) declined
to require that the children wear smartwatches; (4) in “routine language,” order ed that the
parties not disparage each other; (5) denied mother’s request to reduce the parties’ OFW -
communication time; (6) denied mother’s requested relief regarding childcare issues; and
(7) granted relief related to the parties’ proposals regarding vac ation parenting time. The
district court also addressed mother’s contempt motion, finding that her motion “will not
be heard unless [she] properly obtains a hearing date from the Court for that motion.”
On November 14, 2023, the district court filed an amended order clarifying an issue
related to mother’s contempt motion. The next day, mother moved for amended findings.
Father opposed mother’s motion, but requested correction of a clerical error, as wel l as an
award of conduct-based attorney fees.
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On January 23, 2024, the district court filed a second amended order related to the
issues raised in mother’s June 2023 motion; the second amended order did not materially
change the amended order. In a separate order filed the same day, the district court treated
mother’s motion for amended findings as a motion to reconsider and denied the motion.
The district court also found that mother’s motion “had the effect of extending litigation of
this matter increasing the expense of these proceedings.” Therefore, the district court found
“it appropriate to grant [f]ather attorney fees of $3,000.” Mother appeals.2
DECISION
I.
Mother challenges several of the district court’s findings of fact. We review a
district court’s factual findings for clear error. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see Sefkow v.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). In conducting this review, appellate courts
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, do not find their own facts,
do not reweigh the evidence, do not reconcile conflicting evidence, and “need not go into
an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the corr ectness of the
findings of the [district] court.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-
22 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); see also Bayer v. Bayer, 979 N.W.2d 507, 513 (Minn.
App. 2022) (citing Kenney in family-law appeal). Our duty is fully performed after we

2 After this appeal was filed, the part of mother’s appeal seeking review of the portion of
the January 23, 2024 order awarding father attorney fees was dismissed as premature. But
after judgment was entered on the attorney-fee award in May 2024, mother filed an appeal
of that award. This court subsequently filed an order consolidating mother’s appeals.
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have fairly considered all the evidence and determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.
First, mother challenges the district court’s findings that (A) it was concerned about
the “triviality” and the number of times that mother has raised parenting issues in court;
(B) the time and energy spent on mother’s motions could be better focused on the children;
(C) it was “unconscionable” that the children are being robbed of a childhood free from
parental conflict; and (D) mother should consider alternatives before bringing additional
motions. But these findings reflect the district court’s perceptions based upon the parties’
actions throughout the proceedings, the evidence presented at the hearing, and the court’s
opportunity to judge the credibility of the testimony. Mother’s disagreement with these
findings does not demonstrate that they are clearly erroneous.
Second, mother challenges the district court’s finding that: “Based on the
information provided to this Court the children are not endangered in either party’s care.”
Mother contends that “[t]his finding is inappropriate because endangerment elements were
not analyzed in this proceeding.” But the district court made the finding in addressing its
concern about mother’s litigious nature, and the record supports the finding that, based on
the information in the record, the children are not endangered in either parent’s care.
Third, mother argues that the “district court clearly erred in making findings
regarding [her] risk of being frivolous . . . without analyzing the criteria for a frivolous
litigant” set forth in Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02. We disagree. The district court never found
mother to be a frivolous litigant. Instead, the district court found that it was “very
concerned about the number of times [m]other has brought this matter before the Court
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since the parties’ marriage was dissolved and about the triviality of some of [m]other’s
requests for relief.” The district court then cautioned mother “to strongly consider
alternatives to litigation before bringing additional motions,” and found that “[i]f she does
not do so she risks facing a motion to be found a frivolous litigant.” Because the district
court never found mother to be a frivolous litigant, an analysis of the related rules was
unnecessary.
Fourth, mother argues that she was deprived of a fair hearing because the district
court judge was not impartial. But the district court’s disagreement with mother’s position,
and its related findings, does not demonstrate that the district court judge was biased. And
mother points to nothing in the record supporting her claim that the district court judge was
not impartial. Accordingly, mother has failed to show that any of the challenged findings
are clearly erroneous.
II.
Mother challenges the denial of her motion for amended findings, arguing that the
district court erred in construing her November 15, 2023 motion for amended findings as
a motion for reconsideration. This court reviews the denial of a motion for amended
findings under an abuse -of-discretion standard. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 364
(Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2006) . But “[t]he interpretation of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law that we review de novo.” Gams
v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Minn. 2016).
“A motion to amend findings must be based on the files, exhibits, and minutes of
the court, not on evidence that is not a part of the record.” Zander, 720 N.W.2d at 364; see
7
also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02 (permitting amendment of findings when based on “the files,
exhibits, and minutes of the court”). On a motion for amended findings, the district court
must base its decision on “the evidence as submitted during the trial of the case and may
neither go outside the record, nor consider new evidence.” Zander, 720 N.W.2d at
364 (quotation omitted). “The purpose of a motion for amended findings is to permit the
[district] court a review of its own exercise of discretion.” Johnson v Johnson, 563 N.W.2d
77, 78 (Minn. App. 1997) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 1997).
“Motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express permission of the court,
which will be granted only upon a showing of compelling circumstances.” Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 115.11. “Motions for reconsideration play a very limited role in civil practice, and
should be approached cautiously and used sparingly.” Id., adv. comm. cmt. And “a motion
for reconsideration cannot introduce new evidence.” State v. Allwine , 963 N.W.2d 178,
191 (Minn. 2021).
The district court found that mother’s “motion for amended findings both raises new
arguments and offers new evidence not made in her original motion and reargues her prior
motion alleging the Court failed to consider th ose arguments.” The district court also
determined that mother’s “motion for amended findings is not supported by existing law
and the Court finds it to be a motion to reconsider.” The district court then denied mother’s
motion, determining that mother “did not follow the requirements of Rule 115.11 regarding
a motion to reconsider.”
Mother appears to argue that the district court erroneously construed her motion to
amend as one for reconsideration because the court addressed her challenges to the court’s
8
findings, rendering its determination “confusing and inconsistent” with the order as whole.
But a review of mother’s motion and supporting affidavit indicates that mother primarily
reargued her prior motion and claimed that the district court failed to consider her previous
arguments. And, as the district court found, mother’s motion made new arguments and
relied on new evidence that was outside the record. As such, we cannot conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in construing mother’s motion for amended findings as
a motion to reconsider.
Moreover, even if the district court erroneously construed mother’s motion as one
for reconsideration, her argument on appeal demonstrates that she is not entitled to relief
because she is unable to show prejudice. See Bloom v. Hydrotherm, Inc., 499 N.W.2d 842,
845 (Minn. App. 1993) (stating that, on appeal, the appellant has the burden to show error
and prejudice), rev. denied (Minn. June 28, 1993). As mother points out in her brief, the
district court considered and addressed the arguments made in her motion. In other words,
despite construing mother’s motion as an improper motion for reconsideration, the district
court still addressed her arguments. Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s
decision to deny mother’s motion for amended findings was not an abuse of discretion
because mother’s motion was based on evidence that is not part of the record, and the court
appropriately reviewed its own exercise of discretion.
III.
Mother challenges the denial of her request to appoint a PTE, arguing first that the
“district court misapplied the law when it did not apply the proper statu tes,” such a Minn.
Stat. § 518.17, to resolve a parenting-time question. A district court’s decision to appoint
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a PTE is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Nolte v. Mehrens , 648 N.W.2d 727, 731
(Minn. App. 2002). But a district court’s compliance with the statutory requirements
governing appointment of a PTE is reviewed de novo. Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716,
724 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001); see also Ramirez v. Ramirez,
630 N.W.2d 463, 465 (Minn. App. 2001) (“The applicability of a statute is an issue of
statutory interpretation, which appellate courts review de novo.”).
Minnesota Statutes section 518.17 governs a determination of child custody and
requires the district court to evaluate the best interest of the child. Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1 (2022). In doing so, a district court “must consider and evaluate all relevant
factors,” including 12 statutory factors. Id., subd. 1(a)(1-12) (2022). But the supreme court
has recognized that Minn. Stat. § 518.17 “applies to the creation and initial approval of
parenting plans.” Hansen v. Todnem , 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018) (emphasis
added).
Here, mother’s request that a PTE be appointed did not involve the creation or initial
approval of a parenting plan. As such, the best -interest factors set forth in section 518.17
are not applicable. See id. Moreover, the appointment of a PTE is governed by Minn. Stat.
§ 518.1751 (2022). There is nothing in this statute requiring a district court to consider the
best-interest factors set forth in section 518.17, when the appointment of a PTE is
requested. See Minn. Stat. § 518.1751. The district cour t did not err by not considering
the best-interest factors in addressing mother’s request for the appointment of a PTE.
Mother also appears to challenge the district court’s findings related to denial of her
request to appoint a PTE . Specifically, she contends that “the district court’s finding that
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a PTE is inappropriate based on [ mother] abusing the PC process is unfounded” because
the evidence shows that both parties sought the PC’s services equally. But the district court
found that father “alleges that [m]other has abused the PC process and by seeking the PC’s
involvement anytime [ f]ather disagreed with her.” (Emphasis added.) And the district
court found that father “provided numerous examples of [m]other doing so.” Although the
district court did not list each example provided by father, the district court’s findings are
supported by the record because father alleged that wife abused the PC process and then
provided examples. The district court then weighed father’s allegations and the examples
he provided in deciding not t o appoint a PTE. In doing so, the district court made
credibility determinations, to which this court defers. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23
(stating that, when reviewing factual findings for clear error, appellate courts defer to the
district court’s credibility determinations). As such, the district court’s findings related to
father’s allegations that mother abused the PC process are not clearly erroneous.
Mother further argues that, in light of the parties’ September 2017 agreement to
appoint a PC, the district court erroneously determined that “‘the scope of authority of a
PTE is vastly different from and much more limited than that of a PC.’” She argues that,
“[a]lthough PCs and PTEs are distinct, they are not vastly different in the type of resolution
services they offer when examining the PC’s authority in the parties’ PC decisions, [and]
the parties’ stipulated PC order.” And mother argues that, beca use “mediation services
have limitations compared to PCs and PTEs,” the district court abused its discretion in
declining to appoint a PTE.
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We disagree. This court has recognized that PTEs are distinct from PCs. Szarzynski
v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn. App. 2007). PCs are “a creature of contract or
of an agreement of the parties which is generally incorporated into (or at least referred to
in) a district court’s custody ruling.” Id. Consequently, PCs require a stipulation or
agreement between the parties and cannot be appointed by a district court on its own
motion. See id. Conversely, PTEs are appointed pursuant to the proc edure set forth in
Minn. Stat. § 518.1751. “The purpose of a [PTE] is to resolve parenting time disputes by
enforcing, interpreting, clarifying, and addressing circumstances not specifically addressed
by an existing parenting time order and, if appropriat e to make a determination as to
whether the existing parenting time order has been violated.” Minn. Stat. § 518.1751, subd.
1b(a). Therefore, the district court properly determined that PCs are “vastly different” from
PTEs.
Moreover, as the district court found in its order denying mother’s motion for
amended findings, “[t]he appointment of a PC was not at issue at the hearing resulting in
the October 23, 2023 Order.” Rather, mother sought the appointment of a PTE. The district
court considered mother’s position, but determined that “the appointment of a PTE is not
[an] appropriate method of alternative dispute resolution for the parties.” Instead, the
district court determined that mediation is appropriate to resolve the parties’ differences,
and that “[i]f they cannot be resolved through mediation either party may then file a motion
with the Court.” The district court’s decision appears to be grounded in the contentious
nature of the parties’ relationship. Although mother may be unhappy that the parties must
resolve their differences through mediation, the district court’s decision was based, in large
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part, on mother’s own actions. Accordingly, mother is unable to show that the district court
abused its discretion in declining to appoint a PTE.
IV.
Mother challenges the district court’s decision to award father conduct-based
attorney fees. A district court may, in its discretion, award conduct -based attorney fees
and costs against a party “who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the
proceedings.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022). Whether to award conduct -based
attorney fees generally depends on “the impact a party’s behavior has had on the costs of
the litigation.” Dabrowski v. Dabrowski , 477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App. 1991) . We
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s award of conduct-based
attorney fees. Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999).
The district court found that father requested “an award of $6,927 in conduct-based
attorney fees incurred in having to respond to [m]other’s motion for amended findings.”
The district court then found that mother’s “motion for amended findings both rais es new
arguments and offers new evidence not made in her original motion and reargues her prior
motion alleging the Court failed to consider those arguments.” The district court also found
that mother’s “motion for amended findings is not supported by existing law and the Court
finds it to be a motion to reconsider.” The district court further determined that mother
failed to “follow the requirements of rule 115.11 regarding a motion to reconsider.” Thus,
the district court determined that mother’s “motion has had the effect of extending litigation
of this matter increasing the expenses of these proceedings.” And after finding that father
13
provided the requisite affidavit required under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 119.02, the district court
found “it appropriate to grant [f]ather attorney fees of $3,000.”
Mother argues that the district court’s “findings are not supported by the record and
the district court misapplied the law when it considered [her] motion to reconsider.”
Mother also contends that her “arguments are neither frivolous nor asserted in bad faith,”
and her “conduct did not violate a court order nor did it prevent or disrupt a future
adjudication of the parties.” And mother blames father for much of the litigation, claiming
that her “motion and subsequent court involvement would have likely b een wholly
unnecessary if [father] had not rescinded the parties’ agreement to renew PC services” in
January 2023. Thus, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding
father conduct-based attorney fees.
We disagree. As noted above, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
construing mother’s motion for amended findings as one for reconsideration. And the
district court’s findings that mother failed to adhere to rule 115.11 regarding a motion to
reconsider are supported by the record. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11 (stating that
“[m]otions to reconsider are prohibited except by express permission of the court,” and
“shall be made only by letter to the court of no more than two pages in length, a copy of
which must be served on all opposing counsel and self-represented litigants”).
Moreover, the record reflects that mother has habitually filed trivial and meritless
motions. For example, the record reflects that mother filed a request for an order for
protection that was eventually denied. The record also reflects that mother sought to collect
$15 of a $30 uninsured medical expense. And , in addition to her motions related to this
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case, mother filed a motion to hold father in contempt which, at the time of the January 23,
2024 order, “no hearing date and no affidavit of service ha[d] been filed with the Court.”
The triviality of mother’s court filings, including her improper motion for reconsideration,
supports the district court’s finding that mother’s motions have “had the effect of extending
the litigation in this matter increasing the expenses of these proceedings.”
Finally, the record reflects that father requested almost $7,000 in attorney fees and
supported his request with the requisite affidavit under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 119.02. But
despite father’s request for almost $7,000 in attorney fees, the district court ordered that
mother only pay $3,000 of those fees. And although this court has stated that it is “normally
reluctant to grant an award of attorneys’ fees against a pro se litigant” absent “extreme”
conduct, Liedtke v. Fillenworth, 372 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 13, 1985), this court has also stated that pro se litigants are generally held to the same
standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules, Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald , 629
N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s award of conduct-based attorney fees.
Affirmed.