In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: K. C. M. and C. C. M., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0368

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
K. C. M. and C. C. M., Parents.

Filed August 26, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-JV-23-5

Matthew J. Miller, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant mother K.C.M.)

Kimberly Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Rachel Caplan, Assistant County Attorney,
Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services)

Lara C. Whiteside, Public Defender’s Office, Hibbing, Minnesota (for children J.R.M. and
L.L.M.)

Sara Henkel, Virginia, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from the termination of appellant mother’s parental rights, mother argues
that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant K.C.M. (mother) is the mother of four minor children: J.R.M. (age 14 at
the time of trial), L.L.M. (age 13 at the time of trial), E.-I.L.M. (age 5 at the time of trial),
and C.E.M. (age 4 at the time of trial). The children’s father initially lived with mother and
the children, but by early 2020 he had relocated to Florida.
Between October 2015 and October 2021, the St. Louis County Public Health and
Human Services Department (the county) received numerous reports about the family
regarding various child-protection concerns, including environmental hazards,
unreasonable confinement, and failure to provide for the children’s basic needs. The reports
detailed the children being locked in rooms without access to food or toileting facilities,
physical abuse, neglect of J.R.M.’s dental health to the extent that she was unable to eat
food due to mouth pain, unsanitary living conditions, failure to provide J.R.M. and L.L.M.
with access to mental-health support after trips to the hospital for suicidal ideation, blaming
of J.R.M. and L.L.M. for social services involvement, and failure to provide J.R.M. with
necessary medications. During this time, the county offered services to the family related
to these concerns.
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On October 31, 2021, J.R.M. was arrested and placed on a police hold after crashing
mother’s car into a tree. The three other children were removed from the home on
November 1, 2021, after police visited the home to inform mother of J.R.M.’s police hold
and the officers discovered the home in an unsafe condition, with the two youngest children
confined in a bedroom by a bungee cord.
After the children were removed from the home, the county filed an emergency
petition alleging that the children were in need of protection or services (CHIPS). Mother
admitted the factual allegations in the petition alleging the children to be CHIPS, and the
district court adjudicated the children CHIPS.
The county submitted out-of-home placement plans for each child. The case plans
were updated approximately every six months—with the exception of E.-I.L.M.’s plan,
which was updated only two times, once four months after the initial plan and then again
ten months later —and received court approval. The plans included the following
requirements: (1) that mother “engage with homemaker services and demonstrate the
successful application of those principles over a period of time with the children”; (2) that
mother and father “engage with parenting education, i.e. , IFBS [Intensive Family Based
Services], COS [Circles of Security], and Family Wise and demonstrate the successful
application of those principles over a period of time with the children”; and (3) that mother
and father “address mental health concerns via diagnostic assessment, and follow all
recommendations and demonstrate the successful application of those principles over a
period of time with the children.”
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In January 2023, the county filed a petition to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of
both parents. Mother entered a denial to the petition.
The matter proceeded to trial, which was held December 8 and 12, 2023. At trial,
several witnesses testified, including L.L.M., mother, the consulting psychologist for the
county, the assigned social worker, two other employees of the county, the supervised-
visits supervisor, the g uardian ad litem, and mother’s coworker. The district court also
admitted and received numerous exhibits, including child-protection reports from between
October 2015 and August 2023, Social Services Information System (SSIS) notes, and the
notes from supervised visits facilitated by Lutheran Social Services (LSS).
During trial, the parties agreed to a permanency resolution for J.R.M.—temporary
custody to the county. Following the trial, father consented to the adoption of L.L.M.,
E.-I.L.M., and C.E.M. Subsequently, the district court filed an order terminating mother’s
parental rights as to L.L.M., E.-I.L.M., and C.E.M.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). Whether to terminate parental rights is
within the district court’s discretion. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127,
136 (Minn. 2014). This court will affirm the district court’s decision to terminate parental
rights when the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification or those efforts were
not required, at least one statutory condition supports termination, and termination is in the
child’s best interests. See In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
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2008); Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022) (addressing when reasonable efforts are not
necessary).
Mother challenges only the district court’s determination that the county made
reasonable efforts toward reunification. Appellate courts review the district court’s factual
findings on the county’s efforts provided to the family for clear error. In re Welfare of
Child. of J.C.L. , 958 N.W.2d 653, 658 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 12,
2021); see also In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012)
(stating that we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error). The district
court’s determination whether the efforts were reasonable is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015),
rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). A district court abuses its discretion if its findings of
fact are unsupported by the record, if it improperly applies the law, or if it resolves the
question in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record. Woolsey v. Woolsey,
975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022).
Reasonable efforts must “go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real,
genuine assistance” and consider “the length of the time the county was involved and the
quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990),
rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). In determining whether the county’s efforts were
reasonable, the district court must consider whether the services provided were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and,
if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family;
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(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well -being of
the child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022).
The district court found that the county provided reasonable efforts, including
“safety planning, foster care; coordination with medical providers, referrals for therapy for
the children and parents, supervised visitation; referrals for [IFBS], multiple family
assessments, offers for respite care, case management services, homemaker services, . . .
ongoing case management,” and “numerous offers to help [mother] establish ongoing case
management services, ARMHS [Adult Rehabilitative Mental Health Services],
homemaker services, and [IFBS].” The district court found that these services “were
relevant to the safety and protection of the children, adequate to meet the needs of the
children and family, culturally appropriate, available and accessible, consistent and timely,
and realistic under the circumstances.”
On appeal, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding
that the county provided reasonable efforts because (1) the factors in Minnesota Statutes
section 260.012(h) do not support the district court’s conclusion that the county’s efforts
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were reasonable and (2) the county’s efforts did not go beyond mere form or provide
genuine assistance. We are not persuaded by either argument.1
I. The factors in Minnesota Statutes section 260.012(h) support the district
court’s conclusion.

Mother’s first argument exclusively focuses on the three components of the case
plans: (1) that mother “engage with homemaker services and demonstrate the successful
application of those principles over a period of time with the children”; (2) that she “engage
with parenting education, i.e., IFBS, COS, and Family Wise and demonstrate the successful
application of those principles over a period of time with the children”; and (3) that she
“address mental health concerns via diagnostic assessment, and follow all
recommendations and demonstrate the successful application of those principles over a
period of time with the children.” Mother argues that the county’s efforts were not
reasonable because these case-plan requirements were not selected in collaboration with
her, tailored to the specific needs of the family, adequate, available and accessible, or
consistent and timely. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (providing the factors the district court
must consider in determining whether the county’s efforts are reas onable). We address
each of mother’s arguments under the corresponding section 260.012(h) factor.

1 The county argues that reasonable efforts were not required because the district court
concluded that mother was palpably unfit. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4)
(2022). We are not persuaded. Reasonable efforts are required in every case unless an
enumerated exception exists, and a finding of palpable unfitness is not one of the
exceptions listed. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022).
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A. Section 260.012(h)(1): Selected in Collaboration with the Family
The district court did not find or conclude that the efforts provided by the county
were selected in collaboration with the family. Mother contends that the fact that the case-
plan requirements were not selected in collaboration with her cuts against concluding that
the county’s efforts were reasonable. We acknowledge mother’s argument, but, within the
context of nearly eight years of the parents not cooperating with the county’s attempted
provision of services, the fact that the district court did not consider whether the case-plan
requirements were selected in collaboration with mother does not make them
unreasonable.2
B. Section 260.012(h)(2): Tailored to the Family’s Needs
Mother also argues that the case plans were not tailored to her family’s needs. The
district court found that the homemaker-services requirement was “to help [mother]
increase her functional abilities with regard to running a household, which would
secondarily be anticipated to support her ability to provide a physically safe and predictable
home environment for her children.” Regarding the parenting-education requirement, the
district court found that this service was offered “to bolster [mother’s] ability to understand
and meet the daily needs of her children, particularly the needs that are more complex than

2 We also note that mother asserts that the case plans were not updated every six months
and that she was not made aware of the requirements. Contrary to mother’s assertion,
nearly all of the case plans were updated approximately every six months and they were
addressed with her on several occasions. We acknowledge that not all of the case plans
were updated exactly every six months as required by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 1a(b) (2022). But mother cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that dictates
that the county’s efforts were therefore unreasonable.
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simple food, clothing, and shelter.” And regarding the mental- health requirement, the
district court found that it was included “to increase [mother’s] resiliency and ability to
manage stress, understand and cope with both her and the children’s trauma histories and
current and future mental health needs, and provide a safe and supportive environment to
discuss issues arising within the home and family system.” These findings and the context
in which the children were removed from the home support the distr ict court’s conclusion
that the services were tailored to the needs of the family.
Mother’s specific arguments regarding this factor are not persuasive. Mother begins
by arguing that the homemaker-services requirement was not tailored to her family’s needs
because she engaged with homemaker services, the social worker testified that in January
2023 mother’s home showed improvement, and the social worker had not returned to
mother’s home to see her progress after that. But the district court found that mother had
only one meeting with homemaker services over the entire history of the county’s
involvement with the family. And, while the social worker testified that the main living
area of mother’s home showed improvement, she testified that the upstairs area with the
bedrooms was still “treacherous” and “cluttered” and that animal feces were still present.
Mother’s argument that this requirement was not tailored to her needs because she
improved the cleanliness of her home is not persuasive. And, while the county could have
conducted more visits to monitor the condition of mother’s home, it is not clear that it was
unreasonable for the county not to do so when it was known that mother failed to engage
with homemaker services.
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Next, mother argues that the parenting-education requirement was not tailored to
the family’s needs because it included participation in IFBS and, according to mother, the
social worker did not put in a referral for that program because the social worker felt it
would be a “waste of time.” But, as the county points out, this statement by the social
worker is taken grossly out of context. At trial, the social worker testified that she discussed
IFBS with mother, who expressed disinterest in the service. The social worker also testified
that, despite mother’s disinterest, she nevertheless discussed a referral with the IFBS
providers but “IFBS was kind of, like, don’t do another referral because there’s no
engagement and it’s just a waste of our time.” Mother’s argument is thus mistaken and
unavailing.
Mother also argues that the mental-health-assessment requirement was not tailored
to her needs because the diagnostic assessment was not obtainable and, when the
recommendations were made available, they were “out of date.” Contrary to mother’s
contention, although the diagnostic assessment was delayed and not received until January
2023, it was obtained and discussed with her at that time. The assessment was also
discussed with mother in March 2023 and in the summer of 2023. The district court found
that it was unreasonable to conclude that mother was unaware of the recommendations in
the assessment. Mother had approximately 11 months prior to trial to implement the
recommendations. And, while the social worker agreed with defense counsel that “by the
time [the] results were received, they were more or less out of date,” she also testified that
she believed that following the recommendations from the assessment would have
11
benefited mother. It is not clear that the delay in access makes the requirements to complete
an assessment and follow the recommendations not tailored to mother’s needs.
Ultimately, the district court’s findings and the record support its conclusion that
the county’s efforts were tailored to the family’s needs.
C. Section 260.012(h)(4): Adequate
Mother argues that the case plan must have been inadequate to meet the family’s
individualized needs because she was in compliance with the case plan but the social
worker nevertheless testified that she (the social worker) did not believe mother had made
enough progress on parenting, mental health, or the home’s cleanliness. We are not
persuaded that mother’s compliance with a case plan, while not having fully completed the
goals of the case plan by the time of trial, makes the case plan inadequate.
D. Section 260.012(h)(6): Available and Accessible
Mother argues that the diagnostic assessment, IFBS, and supervised visits between
her and the two younger children were not available and accessible to her. But, as discussed
above, although the diagnostic assessment was delayed, it was accessible to mother
approximately 11 months before trial. And IFBS was inaccessible because of mother’s
disinterest, which informed IFBS’s directive to the social worker not to place a referral.
And mother was provided with ample opportunity for supervised visits with all the children
and, at one point, one- on-one visits with each of the two older children. The fact that a
particular arrangement of supervised visits was not provided does not make the supervised
visits unavailable and inaccessible.
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E. Section 260.012(h)(7): Consistent and Timely
Mother argues that the homemaker-services requirement was not consistent or
timely because the social worker did not return to her home between January 2023 and trial
in December 2023 to inspect mother’s improvements to the home. While home inspections
by the county may have been inconsistent, this does not make the county’s efforts as a
whole regarding homemaker services inconsistent and untimely.
Regarding services related to the mental-health requirement, mother argues that they
were not consistent or timely because the diagnostic assessment was done in March 2022
and the county did not obtain a copy until January 2023. Again, although there was a delay
in obtaining mother’s diagnostic assessment, it is not clear that the delay—which left
mother with 11 months before trial in which to comply with the recommendations—makes
the county’s efforts inconsistent or untimely.
F. Section 260.012(h)(8): Realistic Under the Circumstances
Mother argues the plan was not realistic because it required compliance with the
recommendations of the diagnostic assessment, which, she contends, were out of date by
the time they were obtained. As discussed above, while the social worker agreed with
defense counsel that “by the time [the] results were received, they were more or less out of
date,” she also testified that she believed the recommendations from the assessment would
have benefited mother. Based on this record, it is not clear that the case plan was unrealistic
because it is not clear that the recommendations were inapplicable to mother or the goals
of the case plan.
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Mother argues that “failing to monitor or assess” her progress in improving her
home for approximately 11 months prior to trial makes the case plan unrealistic. But
mother’s progress engaging with the homemaker services was monitored—she attended
only one meeting. And it is not clear that the county’s refraining from visiting mother’s
home after January 2023 makes the plan unrealistic under the circumstances of mother’s
failure to engage with homemaker services.
In sum, mother has not demonstrated that the district court’s determination that the
county provided reasonable efforts is unsupported by the section 260.012(h) factors. We
therefore discern no abuse of discretion.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
provided reasonable efforts because the county’s efforts went beyond mere
form.

Mother also makes a series of arguments as to why the county’s efforts did not go
beyond mere form or provide genuine assistance and therefore the district court’s
reasonable-efforts determination was an abuse of discretion. We are not persuaded.
Mother first argues that the supervised visits should have been changed to visits
between mother and the younger children without the older children because the visits were
negatively impacted by the children’s age differences, jealousy between the two older
children, and desires on the part of the older children to “vent” to mother during visits. The
district court considered the social worker’s testimony that the county “explored multiple
different combinations of children and settings in an attempt to find a combination that
[mother] could manage so they could be expanded.” And the district court found that
“[w]hen [the social worker] attempted to set up one on one visits with [mother] and [one
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of the older children, L.L.M.,] to allow [L.L.M.] an opportunity to have contact with her
mom outside the presence of [the younger children], [mother] wasn’t available for any of
the proposed visits in the first two months.” Mother was given an opportunity for visits
with a reduced number of children, and she did not take advantage of it. The fact that the
county did not provide mother with supervised visits with only the two younger children,
when she did not take advantage of one-on-one supervised visits with L.L.M., does not
make the efforts unreasonable.
Mother also contends that the county did not do enough to have a CHIPS specialized
psychological evaluation with parenting- capacity assessment (parenting-capacity
assessment) performed. She states that “two referrals, and two years elapsed, only to finally
have the referral come available, yet it was learned that the [county] had provided an old
number to [mother], and [mother] still was never able to get this critical assessment
performed.” But the county consulted with a psychologist about a parenting- capacity
assessment on at least two occasions and followed up about the availability of a provider
for the assessment once. And, though the provider was initially given the wrong phone
number at which to contact mother, the social worker gave the provider the correct number
once she realized the mistake. The provider left messages for mother at the correct number
but was unable to reach her to schedule her evaluation. Under these circumstances, the fact
that a parenting-capacity assessment was not performed does not make the county’s efforts
unreasonable.
Mother next asserts that the county failed to provide reasonable efforts because it
did not address the issue of the youngest child referring to the foster parents as his “mom
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and dad.” Although the social worker testified that the youngest child referred to the foster
parents as his mother and father, mother does not point to any evidence in the record
supporting her contention that the county failed to address this issue. And, even if mother’s
assertion is true, this is a minimal oversight given the greater context of the issues facing
the family. The county’s failure to address this issue does not make its efforts unreasonable.
Mother also contends that the county’s efforts to improve her parenting skills were
not reasonable because the county did not provide appropriate coaching opportunities
during supervised visits and did not provide an opportunity for family or reunification
therapy. Outside of supervised visits, the county referred mother to the FamilyWise
coaching program in February 2022, but FamilyWise discontinued working with the family
in April 2022 after concluding that mother was unable to benefit from the coaching. The
social worker discussed this with mother. And the supervisor of the supervised visits,
whom the district court found credible, testified that during visits she would offer
suggestions to mother about what to say and how to switch to appropriate topics of
conversation with the children. The supervisor also testified that she told the children to
listen to their mother as mother tried to apply the parenting skills. Regarding family
therapy, this service was not recommended because it would not be beneficial to one of the
older children, L.L.M., because of where that child was in her own healing. The county’s
efforts to improve mother’s parenting skills were not unreasonable.
Mother argues that the county’s efforts were unreasonable because the county did
not allow her to participate in the children’s appointments with their providers and rarely
shared information about the children’s health needs. The district court considered
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mother’s testimony that she was never told about the children’s diagnoses, medications, or
appointments. But it also noted that mother “was also unable to describe medical diagnoses
or needs, which predated the children’s removal in November of 2021.” Specifically, the
district court found that mother “was unable to show any understanding of [J.R.M.’s] long-
standing diagnosis . . . and could neither explain what it was nor how to meet the needs of
a child with [such a diagnosis].” And the district court found that the social worker
communicated E.-I.L.M.’s diagnosis to mother, which is supported by the record. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the county’s efforts were
reasonable despite the county’s failure to include mother in the children’s appointments.
Mother also argues that her testimony established that communication with the
social worker “was extremely difficult and slow” and that she asked for a written case plan
from the social worker but was never provided one. The district court did not include this
testimony in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, and mother does not provide any
analysis or argument as to why it should be considered a fact on appeal.
Finally, mother argues that between late August 2023 and trial in December 2023,
the social worker did not set up supervised visits for mother “until shortly prior to the trial,
when [the social worker] testified that she set up ‘one last visit.’” This is factually
inaccurate. The district court found that, during the relevant time, the social worker
continued to “coordinate visit logistics, and observe visits” and that sometime in October
2023 the social worker “consulted about LSS terminating [mother’s] visits due to too many
cancellations.” The record supports the district court’s findings regarding multiple visits
being scheduled after August 2023 and being cancelled by mother on many occasions. The
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social worker’s testimony regarding “one last visit” appears to be in reference to one last
visit before trial after the LSS visits were reinstated.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county’s
efforts were reasonable given the circumstances of this case. See In re Welfare of A.M.C.,
920 N.W.2d 648, 655 -57 (Minn. App. 2018) (reviewing “reasonable efforts” as fact-
dependent).
Affirmed.