In the Matter of the Child of: B. A. N. and W. J. K., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0375

In the Matter of the Child of:
B. A. N. and W. J. K., Parents.

Filed August 12, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-JV-23-5081

Kimberly Stommes, Jeddeloh Snyder Stommes, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant
mother)

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Rachel E. Pence, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Natalie Jacques, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the termination, that respondent county
did not make reasonable reunification efforts, and that termination is not in her child’s best
interests. We affirm.

2

FACTS
In October 2023, Wright County Health and Human Services (the county) petitioned
to terminate the parental rights of appellant BAN (mother) to her child, MK, born in
October 2022, based on mother’s ongoing methamphetamine addiction and its previous
impact on her children .1 In February 2024, following a two-day trial, the district court
terminated mother’s parental rights based on the following circumstances, which were
either proved at trial or are undisputed.
In October 2021, mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to two other
children: KK, born in 2017, and EK, born in 2020. She had exposed both children to her
methamphetamine use. EK’s meconium2 tested positive for methamphetamine, and a hair-
follicle test performed on KK when she was approximately three years old showed the
presence of methamphetamine.
In July 2022, the county received a report that mother was pregnant with MK.
Mother admitted that she did not receive prenatal care. MK’s meconium tested positive
for methamphetamine. The county informed mother that MK could remain in her care if
she submitted to drug testing and complied with a safety plan. Mother agreed to do so.
The county asked mother to submit to a drug test on October 15, 2022. She did not test
until October 18, but the test was negative. Mother signed a safety plan and agreed to
submit to future testing requests. The county told mother that if she provided a negative

1 MK’s father is not a party to this appeal.
2 Meconium is a newborn’s first stool.
3
hair-follicle test, the county would “close the case.” Mother failed to submit to a hair-
follicle test and repeatedly failed to submit to random testing.
On November 23, 2022, the county filed a petition alleging that MK was a child in
need of protection or services (CHIPS). On December 5, following an emergency-
protective-care hearing, MK was placed outside of the home with his paternal grandmother,
who had adopted KK and EK. On January 4, 2023, the county began discussing an out-of-
home placement plan with mother. The county signed the plan on January 9, and filed it
with the district court on January 13, but mother repeatedly refused to meet with the county
and never signed the plan. Nonetheless, at a May 8, 2023 hearing, the district court adopted
the plan because mother indicated that she had received it more than once and had no
specific objections.
The out-of -home placement plan addressed mother’s chemical-dependency and
mental-health issues and offered chemical-dependency and mental-health assessments, as
well as any recommended treatment or therapy. The plan prohibited mother from using
mood-altering substances and required her to submit to random drug testing.
On April 28, 2023, the district court adjudicated MK a child in need of protection
or services. The court ordered mother to provide a hair-follicle test within seven days and
to cooperate with random testing. Mother failed to complete the hair-follicle test and failed
to cooperate with random testing. On May 8, 2023, the district court ordered mother to
immediately submit to a hair-follicle test, and the test was positive for methamphetamine.
In July 2023, the district court was informed that mother ag ain tested positive for
methamphetamine and had missed numerous tests.
4
On July 12, 2023, seven months after MK was removed from her care, mother
completed a chemical -dependency evaluation, reported using methamphetamine, and
indicated that she had no treatment obstacles. The assessment provided a diagnosis of
methamphetamine dependence and recommended, in part, that mother abstain from using
mood-altering substances, submit to random testing, and complete residential treatment
“consisting of 24-hour care for multidimensional co-occurring services and group
treatment.”
Mother failed to follow the assessment’s recommendations. She submitted to
urinalysis tests that were positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on October 23,
October 26, and December 4, 2023. Two of her tests were also positive for Ecstasy. She
missed approximately 90 tests, some of which were to occur on or around the time of her
supervised visits with MK. Additionally, she failed to complete chemical-dependency
treatment. She missed numerous intake appointments for inpatient treatment, and although
the county arranged for her admission to two different inpatient-treatment facilities, she
left both within days of admission.
On July 19, 2023, mother completed a mental-health assessment, which provided
diagnoses of methamphetamine dependence, persistent adjustment disorder with anxiety,
and post-traumatic stress disorder. The assessment recommended that mother participate
in individual therapy and undergo chemical-dependency inpatient treatment. It also stated
that mother might potentially benefit from “trauma specific therapy.”
The record indicates that mother attended some therapy sessions. But the extent of
mother’s participation was unclear because she did not sign a valid release of information,
5
and the county was therefore unable to confirm mother’s participation or review her
therapy records.
On September 11, 2023, the district court denied requests to extend the permanency
deadlines and ordered that the county file a permanency petition within 30 days. On
October 9, 2023, the county filed a termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) petition.
At the time of the TPR trial in January 2024, MK had been placed outside the home
for approximately 403 days. But to her credit, mother had consistently engaged in
supervised visits with MK twice per week. At the termination trial, the district court heard
testimony from mother, MK’s father, a social worker, a public- health nurse, a visit
supervisor, and the guardian ad litem (GAL).
On February 29, 2024, the district court filed an order terminating mother’s parental
rights to MK on three statutory grounds: (1) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2022)
(parental neglect); (2) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2022) (palpable unfitness);
and (3) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2022) (failure of reasonable efforts).
The district court found that mother “has chronic, severe, and unaddressed chemical
dependency issues, which did not improve over the pendency of this case” and that mother
“wavered between categorically denying any use of methamphetamine to admitting use
and requesting chemical dependency treatment, while not following through on treatment
or testing.” The court further found that the county made reasonable efforts t o reunify
mother with MK and that it was in MK’s best interests for mother’s parental righ ts to be
terminated.
Mother appeals.
6
DECISION
I.
Mother contends that the district court improperly terminated her parental rights
because the county failed to prove a statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence.
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court’s decision in a termination
proceeding must be based on conditions existing at the time of the termination. In re
Welfare of Child of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. July
17, 2007). There must be evidence that “the present conditions of neglect will continue for
a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn.
1980).
The petitioner must produce “clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the
statutory termination grounds exists.” In re Welfare of C.K., 426 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn.
1988); see Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2022) (listing multiple grounds). This court
will affirm a termination order if at least one statutory ground for termination is supported
by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the best interests of the child, so
long as the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family or reasonable efforts were
not required. In re Welfare of Child. of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708-09 (Minn. 2005).
The district court’s determination that a statutory ground for termination exists and
its decision to terminate parental rights are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re
Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
7
6, 2021). A district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that lack
evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary matters in a manner
contrary to logic and the facts on record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn.
2022). The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. J.H., 968 N.W.2d
at 600. Under a clear-error standard of review, “we view the evidence in a light favorable
to the findings.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021).
We do not reweigh the evidence, engage in fact-finding, or reconcile conflicting evidence.
Id. at 221-22.
Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), a ground on which the district court
relied, a district court may terminate parental rights if the child has been placed outside the
home and “reasonable efforts, under the direc tion of the court, have failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child’s placement.” There is a presumption that reasonable efforts
have failed if: (1) the child was under age eight when the CHIPS petition was filed and
“the child has resided out of the parental home under court order for six months unless the
parent has maintained regular contact with the child and the parent is complying with the
out-of-home placement plan,” (2) “the court has approved the out -of-home placement
plan,” (3) the “conditions leading to the out-of-home placement have not been corrected,”
and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the
parent and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
Here, the district court determined that there was a presumption that reasonable
efforts had failed because (1) MK “was approximately two months old when the [child-
protection] petition was filed” and, at the time of trial, MK had resided out of the parental
8
home for over six months; (2) the district court adopted the county’s signed out-of-home
placement plan on May 8, 2023; (3) mother failed to resolve her mental-health and
chemical-dependency issues and failed to comply with her case plan; and (4) the county
made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunite the family. 3 The court also
determined that despite the “many resources” provided by the county, mother failed to
make progress on her severe chemical-health problems.
In challenging the district court’s termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5), mother argues that the county did not make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
her and to reunite her with MK. In any termination proceeding, the district court must find
that “reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent
were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent
of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the
family,” unless reasonable efforts for reunification are not otherwise required under statute.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2022). Mother challenges the district court’s reasonable-
efforts finding both in the context of the general reasonable-efforts requirement of section
260C.301, subdivision 8, and in the context of the statutory basis for termination under
section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(5).
Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to
include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150

3 The district court ordered MK’s out-of-home placement in December 2022, and the TPR
trial was in January 2024. Thus, by the time of trial, MK had been in out-of-home
placement for nearly 12 months.
9
(Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). In determining
whether the county’s efforts were reasonable, a court should consider whether the services
provided were: (1) “selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if appropriate,
the child”; (2) “tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s family”;
(3) “relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being of the child”; (4) “adequate to meet
the individualized needs of the child and family”; (5) “culturally appropriate”;
(6) “available and accessible”; (7) “consistent and timely”; and (8) “realistic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022).
Whether the county made reasonable efforts is a factual finding that we review for
clear error. See In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Minn. 2008). The
district court found that the county made reasonable efforts, including:
the out of home placement plan, contact via in-person, phone,
and email; attempted safety planning, rapid response meeting,
chemical dependency evaluation, referrals for chemical
dependency treatment, drug testing, referrals for diagnostic
assessment, assistance with scheduling mental and chemical
health appointments, referral to Four County Crisis Response
Team, parenting education, housing resources, transportation
assistance, including fuel cards, and assistance with
maintaining county financial benefits.

In addition, the county “scheduled parenting time visits, organized transportation for [MK],
arranged a supervisor for visits, and provided foster care placement, medical care, kinship
placement, sibling connections, foster care therapeutic support services, and a kinship
search.”
Mother argues that the chemical-dependency programming that she was offered was
not appropriate because the programming did not contain a mental-health component and
10
her mental-health assessment stated that she might benefit from trauma-specific therapy.
But the county social worker testified that she recommended a co-occurring program to
mother and had discussed that option with mother since the time of mother’s chemical-
dependency evaluation. And the GAL testified that there was an attempt to get mother into
“Recovering Hope, which is a joint mental health and chemical dependency treatment”
program.
Although t he county made efforts to get mother into inpatient treatment, as
recommended by her mental-health assessment, she simply failed to make any progress or
complete treatment. Likewise, the county offered mother mental-health services, and she
failed to util ize those services. The record indicates that mother discontinued her
individual therapy services in June or July of 2023, and prior to that, had only been
attending monthly. The record also indicates that mother declined to pursue therapeutic
services as recommended when she was experiencing anxiety over entering inpatient
treatment programs.
Mother also argues that despite her consistent participation in supervised visitation
with MK, the county “never offered an increase in the duration or amount of supervised
visits, unsupervised visits, or a trial home visit during the pendency of this termination of
parental rights case.” That argument is unpersuasive because it ignores the fact that mother
never meaningfully addressed the chemical -dependency and mental-health issues that
necessitated supervised visitation.
At trial, mother testified that she felt supported by the county and that her social
worker had “done the best that she can” and had done “all the right things” to try to help
11
her. But mother stated that she is her own “biggest barrier.” On this record, mother has
not shown that the district court’s reasonable-efforts finding is clearly erroneous.
In addition to challenging the district court’s reasonable-efforts finding, mother
argues that the district court failed to address the conditions existing at the time of the
termination trial, noting that at the time of trial she “was striving to meet both her mental
health and chemical dependency needs by having reached out to Mayo Clinic’s co-
occurring inpatient program” and that her last positive drug test was on December 4, 2023,
“which was over a month prior to the start of trial.” She claims that she “was meeting her
mental health needs, was not using drugs, . . . had corrected the conditions that led to the
out-of-home placement of her child,” and that there was no evidence her drug use would
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.
The record refutes mother’s argument. As the district court found, her “history of
addiction is extensive,” mother’s chemical-use assessment in the case involving her other
children “rated the severity of her substance use disorder as ‘severe,’” and during the prior
case, mother “did not take a single drug test.” The district court also found that in this case,
“[o]n at least seven occasions, [mother] stated that she was admitting [herself] to a
treatment program and failed to do so.” For example, the district court found that the
county secured inpatient treatment for mother at Recovering Hope in July 2023. On August
15 and 17, mother informed the county social worker that she would enter treatment at
Recovering Hope the following day; she failed to do so. On October 5, 2023, mother asked
for assistance getting into Recovering Hope and as of October 10, mother had entered
treatment there. But on October 11, mother left Recovering Hope against staff advice.
12
Mother repeated that pattern in November 2023. On November 30, the county
social worker contacted New Beginnings on mother’s behalf, and New Beginnings agreed
to accept mother into its treatment program. Mother once again told the social worker that
she would enter treatment the next day; she failed to do so. On December 4, mother told
the social worker that she would enter treatment at New Beginnings the following day.
Mother was admitted to the program on December 5, but she had left the program as of
December 7. Mother later claimed that she left because she had completed another
assessment and that her level of dependency did not require inpatient treatment so long as
“she participates in a high intensity outpatient program that is five days a week.” But
mother never sought further treatment.
In sum, as of the trial date in the underlying TPR proceeding, mother had not
completed treatment and had missed approximately 90 urinalysis tests from October 2022
through January 2024. Mother’s two other children tested positive for methamphetamine
in the prior case, MK tested positive for methamphetamine in this case, and mother failed
to complete treatment to address her chemical dependency in either case. Contrary to
mother’s argument, there was evidence—as reflected in the district court’s findings—that
her drug use would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating mother’s
parental rights to MK on the ground that reasonable efforts under the direction of the court
had failed to correct the conditions leading to MK’s out-of- home placement. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). Because we ultimately affirm the termination on this
13
ground, we do not address the other statutory grounds on which the district court relied.
See T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 708.
II.
Mother contends that the district court abused its discretion in determining that
termination of her parental rights was in MK’s best interests.
If at least one statutory basis to terminate parental rights exists, the paramount
consideration in determining whether parental rights should be terminated is the child’s
best interests. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2022). Thus, if a district court determines
that a statutory ground for termination exists, it must also determine that termination is in
the child’s best interests before terminating parental rights. See In re Welfare of Child. of
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “The
‘best interests of the child’ means all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2022).
The district court must explain its rationale for concluding that termination is in the
child’s best interests after balancing three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (enumerating
the best-interests factors outlined in R.T.B.). “ Competing interests include such things as
a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” R.T.B., 492
N.W.2d at 4. “Where the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are
14
paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. A district court’s best-interest determination
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
The district court found that MK’s “needs for a sober home with a mentally healthy
parent, stability, and safety outweigh[ed] the interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship.” It noted that MK had “been in foster care for most of his life and needs
permanency,” that MK “is doing well in his current placement,” and that MK’s “medical
needs are being met and he is meeting his developmental milestones.”
In considering mother’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship, the
court noted mother’s testimony that she is a “good mom” and evidence that supervised
visits were “going well.” However, the court noted mother’s acknowledgment of her own
mental-health struggles, her acknowledgment that it is important for MK to have a sober
caregiver, and her acknowledgment that it was in MK’s best interests to “remain where he
is right now.”
Lastly, the district court thoroughly considered the competing interest of the child.
Largely relying on the GAL’s testimony, the district court explained:
Though [the GAL’s] preferred disposition is a transfer
of custody, the foster parent would not agree. [The GAL]
testified that she has concerns regarding the negative impact of
terminating [mother’s] parental rights; however, to effectuate
a transfer of legal custody, [MK] would have to be removed
from his siblings, which would be detrimental to [MK]. [The
GAL] indicates that the most important negative impact of
termination is that it will affect the bond between [mother] and
[MK]; however, the foster parent has indicated [that] she
would support future contact. While there is some harm to
[MK], it is outweighed by the harm [MK] would face if
separated from his siblings. [The GAL] testified that [the
county] provided reasonable efforts to [mother] and [MK], but
15
that [mother] failed to successfully complete the case plan.
[Mother] has had numerous attempts to address her ongoing
mental health issues and methamphetamine use. Even if
[mother] enrolled in an in-person treatment setting
immediately, [MK] has been in out of home placement for so
long [that] the GAL would not support more time. [The GAL]
testified that she thought carefully about the best interest
factors and how they relate to [MK]. Due to [MK’s] age, he is
not able to express a preference. He needs an attentive, sober,
responsive caregiver who can ensure his safety. [The GAL]
does not believe [mother] is in a position now or in the
foreseeable future to meet [MK’s] needs. She demonstrates
parenting capabilities in a controlled environment, but [the
GAL] has lasting safety concerns.

(Footnote omitted.)

Mother focuses on the fact that she engaged in visitation with MK and maintained
a loving relationship. But the district court considered mother’s relationship with the child
and ultimately determined that MK’s need for a safe and sober caregiver outweighed any
interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7
(“Where the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are
paramount.”).
In sum, the district court thoroughly and thoughtfully applied the best-interests
factors and did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of mother’s parental
rights was in MK’s best interests.
We have no doubt that mother loves MK, as the district court recognized. And we
appreciate that MK is placed with family, including the child’s siblings. But the district
court did not err in reasoning that mother’s love does not outweigh the need for MK to
have a stable, secure, and safe home, in which the child is not exposed to neglect resulting
16
from mother’s clearly demonstrated inability to recover from her methamphetamine
addiction in the indeterminate future.
Affirmed.