Provision Media, Inc., Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0376

Provision Media, Inc.,
Appellant,

vs.

Century College, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed December 30, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Ede, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-22-5247

Kevin S. Sandstrom, Keith A. Marnholtz, Eckberg Lammers, P.C., Stillwater, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Alec Sloan, Joseph D. Weiner, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Appellant contractor challenges the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of
appellant’s claims arising from respondent college’s rejection of appellant’s bid in a public-
bidding process. Because we conclude that the district court erred by granting summary
2
judgment to respondents and there is no alternative basis to affirm, we reverse the district
court’s order and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
FACTS
This appeal stems from a public-bidding process to furnish technology for
respondent Century College. Appellant Provision Media, Inc. (PMI) submitted a bid for
audiovisual work that Century rejected in favor of a lower bid from PMI’s competitor,
Tierney Brothers. PMI filed a civil action seeking monetary damages and equitable relief
against respondents Century, Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (Minnesota State),
and Century’s Vice President of Information Technology, John M. Rohleder (collectively,
respondents). In the lawsuit, PMI asserted that Rohleder gave PMI insight into Century’s
audiovisual needs and that PMI relied on this information in formulating its unsuccessful
bid. The district court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment based on its
determinations that PMI’s claims fail as a matter of law for lack of reasonable reliance and
that PMI’s own misconduct bars suit. PMI appeals the resulting judgment. The following
factual recitation is presented in the light most favorable to PMI.
1
Century is a public community college and part of the Minnesota State system. In
2021, Century received federal relief funds to update its campus and to mitigate the effects
of COVID- 19 by incorporating remote learning equipment into its classrooms.
Procurement for such services is governed by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 136F.581 (2022).

1 See Commerce Bank v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015)
(indicating that , on appeal from summary judgment, an appellate court “view[s] the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted”).
3
State colleges in Minnesota—including Century—may engage one of four contractors
operating under contract with the State of Minnesota for work on their campuses. Two of
these contractors are Tierney Brothers and PMI. PMI is a contractor “specializing in the
installation of audiovisual equipment in educational institutions and government facilities.”
In March 2021, Rohleder invited PMI’s president, John Rudie, to a meeting. Rudie
believed that the meeting related to an ongoing project. Instead, Rohleder told Rudie about
the federally funded classroom-modernization project and asked Rudie if PMI would be
interested in submitting a bid. Rohleder explained that Century had received funds from a
federal COVID-relief program, that money was “no object,” and that Century wanted “the
best equipment available in all rooms.” Rudie testified in his deposition as follows: “I
clarified that. I said, Seriously, money is no object? This will drive up our cost. If we bid
that, you’ll award that, you’ll award it to us? He said, Yes. We don’t want to look back and
wish we had done better.”
Given this exchange, Rudie thought that Century intended to award the bid to PMI,
as long as PMI complied with Rohleder’s directives of providing Century with the best
equipment, without regard to the price. At the same time, Rudie would have accepted an
outcome wherein Century awarded the bid to another company, if that company had
offered a bid with superior equipment at a higher price, consistent with Rohleder’s
directives. Rudie asked Rohleder if PMI could start working on a bid response
immediately, and Rohleder permitted Rudie to do so. As a result, Rudie emailed PMI’s
vendors the same day to begin the bid-pricing process.
4
About two weeks later, Century issued a request for proposal (RFP) “for a campus-
wide [audiovisual] technology refresh and update project” for 160 classrooms on its
campus (the project). PMI and Tierney Brothers both submitted bids in response to the
RFP. Based on Rudie’s conversation with Rohleder, PMI crafted a higher bid price to
reflect its understanding that Century wanted expensive, top -of-the-line equipment. If
Rudie had not spoken to Rohleder, he would have used different components and provided
a lower bid. As a result, PMI submitted a bid with a price of $5.1 million using “state- of-
the-art equipment.” Tierney Brothers, however, submitted a lower bid with an overall price
of $4.4 million using average equipment. About a month later, PMI filed an addendum to
the original proposal, lowering its bid price by using more modest equipment. Century
ultimately declined to consider this alternative bid.
Century convened a bid-selection review committee, led by Rohleder, to help
formulate bids, review them, and make decisions on the project. In May 2021, Century
awarded the contract to Tierney Brothers. The Minnesota State Board of Trustees approved
the award. Century and Tierney Brothers executed the contract in June 2021.
PMI brought a civil action against respondents, asserting the following claims:
(1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) promissory estoppel;
and (4) equitable estoppel. Each of these claims includes an allegation that PMI relied on
Rohleder’s representation that Century wanted state-of -the-art audiovisual equipment for
the project. PMI sought to recover lost profits and other expenses.
Respondents filed an answer denying the allegations in the complaint. Following
discovery, respondents moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there were no
5
material facts in dispute and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Following a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment for respondents and
dismissed PMI’s complaint with prejudice.
PMI appeals.
DECISION
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
Appellate courts “review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. In doing
so, [appellate courts] determine whether the district court properly applied the law and
whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.”
Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010)
(citation omitted). As noted above, an appellate court reviewing a grant of summary
judgment construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment was granted—here, PMI. Windcliff Ass’n, Inc. v. Breyfogle, 988
N.W.2d 911, 916 (Minn. 2023). “A defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law when the record reflects a complete lack of proof on an essential element of the
plaintiff’s claim.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995). Summary
judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any grounds. Doe v. Archdiocese of St.
Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012).
PMI argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment because
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether PMI reasonably relied on Rohleder’s
statements when preparing its bid. It also maintains that the district court improperly
6
applied the doctrines of in pari delicto and unclean hands. In addition to defending the
district court’s reasoning against the foregoing challenges by PMI, respondents contend
that we can affirm the district court’s decision on alternative grounds. We address each of
the parties’ arguments in turn.
I. The district court erred in determining that PMI’s claims fail as a matter of
law for lack of reasonable reliance because it weighed the evidence and assessed
credibility.

PMI asserts that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for
respondents based on its determination that PMI’s reliance on Rohleder’s statements at the
pre-bid meeting was unreasonable as a matter of law. We agree.
To prove its claims of intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel, PMI must show detrimental reliance. See
Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Minn. 2012) (outlining elements for a negligent
misrepresentation claim, including reliance); Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616
N.W.2d 732, 746 (Minn. 2000) (“[T]he first element of promissory estoppel . . . [requires]
that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the promisee.”); Ag Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Schroeder, 693 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Minn. App.
2005) (requiring the complaining party in an intentional- misrepresentation claim to show
that it “acted in reliance on the respondent’s false or misleading representation to [its]
detriment”); Pollard v. Southdale Gardens of Edina Condo. Ass’n, 698 N.W.2d 449, 454
(Minn. App. 2005) (setting forth elements of equitable estoppel). PMI must also establish
that its reliance was reasonable. See Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533
7
N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 1995) (noting that “establishing the reasonableness of the reliance
is essential to any cause of action in which detrimental reliance is an element”).
Whether a party reasonably relied on a statement is generally a factual question for
the fact-finder. Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 736 N.W.2d 313, 321 (Minn.
2007). But in some cases, the district court may determine that reliance is not reasonable
as a matter of law . Id. For instance, reliance is not reasonable if “the record reflects a
complete failure of proof.” Id. Moreover, a party cannot reasonably rely on a representation
if its falsity is obvious to the listener. Spiess v. Brandt, 41 N.W.2d 561, 566 (Minn. 1950).
Summary judgment may also be appropriate when the promise was made by someone
lacking authority to bind the promisor. Nicollet Restoration, Inc., 533 N.W.2d at 848.
The district court decided that summary judgment was warranted because it
determined that Rudie’s reliance on Rohleder’s statements in the pre-bid meeting was not
reasonable as a matter of law. More specifically, the district court ruled that “[a]ny reliance
by PMI on Rohleder’s alleged comments was unreasonable in view of the inconsistency
between those comments, on the one hand, and the [RFP], on the other.” And the district
court determined that PMI made a “calculated choice” not to resolve that inconsistency by
asking Rohleder for clarification because any question PMI posed about Rohleder’s alleged
comments would have been shared with all prospective bidders, thereby eliminating PMI’s
“unfair advantage” over the others. We conclude that the district court misapplied the law
in awarding summary judgment in respondents’ favor because it weighed evidence relevant
to disputed material facts and made credibility assessments. See Kenneh v. Homeward
8
Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020) (cautioning courts not to weigh evidence
or assess credibility on a motion for summary judgment).
To begin, the record contains genuinely conflicting material facts— which bear on
the reasonableness of PMI’s reliance—about the nature of the conversation between
Rohleder and Rudie at the pre-bid meeting.
Rohleder estimated that the meeting lasted 15 to 20 minutes. He could not recall
telling Rudie that Century wanted the best equipment. In his affidavit, Rohleder insisted
that he “never told John Rudie that the project had an unlimited budget or that [PMI] should
prepare a bid in any particular way.” He professed that he “did not intend for [Rudie or
PMI] to rely on anything [he] said in preparing its bid.” Rohleder denied that he encouraged
Rudie to reach out to his vendors following the meeting. He assert ed that incorporating
Zoom-related technology was a “major component” of how these funds were intended to
be used. Rohleder also stated that the committee “unanimously selected” Tierney Brothers
for the project due to its “superior understanding of Zoom Room technology relative to
[PMI]” and its “superior capacity to complete such a large project and the lower price
Tierney [Brothers] bid.”
By contrast, Rudie testified in his deposition that he spoke with Rohleder for about
one hour, during which Rohleder described the project “in some detail.” According to
Rudie, Rohleder stated that Century wanted “to upgrade to the best,” that “money [was] no
object,” and that Century “want[ed] the best equipment possible.” Rudie specifically
repudiated Rohleder’s claims: “Contrary to Rohleder’s declaration . . . , whereby he states
he did not say anything meaningful or specific nor intend for me or PMI to rely on anything
9
he said during the [pre-bid] meeting in preparing a bid, I vehemently disagree with
Rohleder’s statement.” Moreover, Rudie attested that he received permission from
Rohleder to start working with his vendors immediately after the pre -bid meeting. Rudie
understood that if PMI formulated a bid in line with Rohleder’s expectations, Century
would award the bid to PMI. He explained:
Why else would [Rohleder] have given me the background of
the financial situation? Normally, in a bid, we have no idea
how much money there is to spend . . . . In this case I was told
in advance there was an abundance of money . . . . I expected
[PMI] to be selected as long as we complied with [the]
directive of giving them the best equipment and not worry
about the price.
PMI asserts that its ultimate bid—which was higher in price and included more expensive
equipment—reflects Rudie’s understanding of Rohleder’s expectations.
The factual dispute about what was said at the pre-bid meeting is material to
determining whether PMI’s reliance was reasonable. That being the case, the district court
erroneously determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the
reasonableness of PMI’s reliance. It is for the fact-finder— and neither the district court at
summary judgment nor this court on review—to evaluate this conflicting evidence, as well
as other contradictory witness testimony.
This includes Rohleder’s characterization of his ability to affect the outcome of the
bid process by noting that the review committee “simply rated the responses” to the bids it
received. Rohleder also stated that he relied on Century’s procurement department to gather
and assess bids to ensure the bids adhered to the state’s requirements. But PMI submitted
a countervailing affidavit from its expert, Eric Johnson , a city administrator familiar with
10
Minnesota public bidding rules, procedures, and processes. Johnson asserted that “PMI’s
reliance on [Rohleder’s] representations [was] justified and reasonable considering all of
the factual circumstances[.]” He noted that “Rohleder made a statement to Rudie about the
[high-end] equipment Century wanted.” Furthermore, Johnson stated that “ Rudie was
reasonable and justified in relying on this information because the insight was derived from
a highly ranked individual within Century . . . and, more so, from an individual who was
one of the decision-makers of this RFP process.” This aligns with other summary-judgment
evidence. Rohleder was Century’s Vice President of Information Technology. He led the
committee responsible for reviewing the bids and making recommendations about the
project to the Minnesota State Board of Trustees. As Johnson noted, “[d]ue to Rohleder’s
ability to persuade and recommend a particular bid as providing the ‘best value’ to the
Board of Trustees, it was reasonable for a bidder such as PMI to rely upon his
representations as to the desired quality of equipment to be utilized.”
Whether Rudie was reasonable in assuming that Rohleder had the ability to
influence the outcome of the bid process is therefore a question of fact not suitable for
resolution at the summary-judgment stage. Cf. Nicollet Restoration, Inc., 533 N.W.2d at
848 (concluding that the record did not support a finding of reasonable reliance on
summary judgment where promises were made by one lacking authority to bind the
promisor); see also Spiess, 41 N.W.2d at 567 (stating that, where one party is presumed to
know the truth, reliance is assumed).
The district court also erred in determining that Rudie submitted PMI’s bid “with
the understanding that he was the only one who had received” the information from
11
Rohleder. In particular, the district court erroneously weighed the evidence to determine
that PMI prepared its bid “with the belief that [the] information [that Rohleder provided
Rudie] gave them an unfair advantage over other prospective bidders.” The district court
based this determination on the following deposition testimony, which Rudie provided
when asked whether he was “the only bidder who had this purported private meeting” with
Rohleder: “To my knowledge, yes.” But Rudie did not testify that he affirmatively knew
that no other contractors were meeting with Rohleder. And at this stage, we must draw all
inferences in PMI’s favor. See Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d 613, 620
(Minn. 2021) (noting that, on appeal from summary judgment, we “view[] the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolv[e] all doubts and factual
inferences against the moving party”). By resolving any doubt and drawing an inference
against PMI based on the above deposition testimony, the district court erred.
Along with adjudicating disputed issues of material fact, the district court
erroneously made credibility determinations. In particular, the district court construed
Rudie’s deposition testimony as “candidly acknowledg[ing] . . . that the information
allegedly divulged by Rohleder was inappropriate” and determined that Rudie “expected
the subsequent bidding process to be meaningless and a sham.” But Rudie stated that he
had “no concept of Rohleder’s statement being inappropriate or outside the bounds of what
bidders should know.” He also explained that:
Rohleder conveyed the information to me about the project in
an upfront, matter-of- fact way and without any qualms or
hesitations, leading me to believe that the representations were
genuine and appropriate. Rohleder seemed to want to be
informative, not sneaky or underhanded. Further, from PMI’s
12
years of history and past dealings with Rohleder, I had found
Rohleder to be a forthright and trustworthy individual, and had
no reason to believe those character traits had changed.

Relatedly, the district court erroneously assessed credibility in determining that
Rudie believed he had “an unfair advantage over other prospective bidders” and that
Rohleder had “promised to award the contract to PMI.” Rudie, however, did not claim to
believe that PMI would be awarded the contract regardless of the other bids. He instead
stated that he expected PMI “to be selected as long as [PMI] complied with [Rohleder’s]
directive of giving them the best equipment and not worry[ing] about the price.” When
respondents’ attorney asked what outcome Rudie expected “if somebody else also gave the
best equipment and didn’t worry about the price,” Rudie responded: “I’m not sure.” And
when counsel inquired if Rudie “would . . . expect it to be automatically given to [PMI] if
another company also complied with those [directives,]” Rudie answered: “[I]t would be
fair to say if another company had come in with superior equipment at a higher price,
thereby living up to [Rohleder’s] directives, I would have been more accepting of it.”
Construing these exchanges in the light most favorable to PMI should have compelled
summary-judgment determinations that Rudie assumed: (1) that Century would have
awarded PMI the contract only if PMI complied with Rohleder’s directives of providing
Century with the best equipment, without regard to the price; and (2) that another contractor
could have received the bid if such a bidder had offered superior equipment.
In short, PMI and respondents provided conflicting evidence about the nature of the
pre-bid meeting between Rohleder and Rudie. Viewing the record before us in the light
most favorable to PMI, we conclude that a fact-finder could find that PMI relied on
13
Rohleder’s statements and that this reliance was reasonable. On review from a summary-
judgment decision, issues of credibility are for the jury to resolve, Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at
233, and “[w]eighing the evidence and assessing credibility on summary judgment is
error,” Hoyt, 736 N.W.2d at 320. Mindful of this standard of review, we conclude that
summary judgment is inappropriate. We therefore reverse the district court ’s grant of
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
II. The district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment against
PMI based on the doctrines of in pari delicto and unclean hands.

PMI next argues that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that its claims
were barred by the doctrines of in pari delicto and unclean hands. This argument is
persuasive.
The decision to grant equitable relief under these theories is within the discretion of
the district court and will be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion. See
Brown v. Lee, 859 N.W.2d 836, 844 (Minn. App. 2015) (applying the abuse-of-discretion
standard to an unclean -hands defense), rev. denied (Minn. May 19, 2015); Christians v.
Grant Thornton, LLP, 733 N.W.2d 803, 814 (Minn. App. 2007) (“Because in pari delicto
is an equitable doctrine, we review its application for an abuse of discretion.”), rev. denied
(Minn. Sep. 18, 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court exercises its
discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or bases its ruling on an erroneous view of
the law. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. County of Hennepin , 450 N.W.2d 299, 306 (Minn.
1990).
14
Below, we review the district court’s application of ea ch doctrine at summary
judgment for an abuse of discretion.
A. In Pari Delicto
The doctrine of in pari delicto “is based upon judicial reluctance to intervene in
disputes between parties who are both wrongdoers in equal fault.” State by Head v.
AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 199 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Minn. 1972). It is
appropriate to apply this doctrine for: “(1) preventing enforcement of a contract the
performance of which is illegal; (2) preventing enforcement of an equitable remedy when
the parties have been involved in mutually unlawful activity; or (3) use as a defense in a
tort claim of one party against another.” Brubaker v. Hi-Banks Resort Corp., 415 N.W.2d
680, 684 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1988).
The district court applied this doctrine because it determined that Rudie must have
believed that the bidding process would be “meaningless and a sham.” In finding that PMI
was attempting to “circumvent or defeat competitive bidding requirements by exploiting
information that it believed had been inappropriately divulged by Rohleder,” the district
court abused its discretion through its imputation of a motive behind PMI’s actions.
Although the district court acknowledged Rudie’s assertion that he did not elicit this
information from Rohleder and only listened as Rohleder described the parameters of the
project, the court did not credit countervailing evidence presented by PMI and instead
found that PMI “knew that what it was doing was wrong.”
The district court abused its discretion by applying the doctrine of in pari delicto
based on these findings. This is because the district court did not construe the summary-
15
judgment record in the light most favorable to PMI. And viewing the record before us in
that light, we conclude that there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
parties’ discussion about the importance of a bid using higher-end equipment amounted to
an “illegal contract.” A fact-finder crediting Rudie’s statements about the pre-bid meeting
could reasonably conclude that Rohleder’s assertion that Century wanted to acquire the
“best equipment” is not illegal. Indeed, the best-value approach in selecting a bid is a
recognized procedure “by which the award of a government contract depends on which
proposal represents the best value based on an analysis of the tradeoff of qualitative
technical factors and price or cost factors.” Rochester City Lines, Co. v. City of Rochester,
868 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. 2015) (quotations omitted). And Minnesota courts have
declined to apply in pari delicto to defeat an agreement that is not in itself illegal and does
not call for the district court to be part of the unlawful conduct. See Brubaker, 415 N.W.2d
at 684 (advising that Minnesota caselaw recognizes that “judicial refusal to be involved
arises only in those cases where the court is asked to do something that is itself part of the
unlawful act”).
Additionally, the district court abused its discretion by weighing the evidence in
assessing fault. Rudie testified that he was invited to the meeting, did not know what would
be discussed, was “surprised” by Rohleder’s candor about the budget, and received
permission to start contacting PMI’s vendors immediately. When counsel asked Rudie if
he understood “it to be a noncompetitive process,” Rudie responded: “I wasn’t sure. There
was no RFP out at that point. I had no idea what the process was.” Had the district court
properly credited this testimony —as it must at the summary-judgment stage—it would
16
have been compelled to determine that PMI did not engage in wrongdoing. Instead, the
district court rejected Rudie’s testimony and found that, “[w]hile it is possible that
Rohleder may have some amount of fault, on this record it does not appear that he engaged
in deliberate wrongdoing or acted out of self-interested motives, as PMI did.”
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to PMI, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment against PMI based on
the determination that the in pari delicto doctrine applies at this procedural juncture. The
district court’s rulings incorporate credibility determinations that are inappropriate in
adjudicating a motion for summary judgment. See Hoyt, 736 N.W.2d at 320 (explaining
that determining credibility on summary judgment is improper). This is particularly so in
light of the genuine issues of material fact evinced by the summary-judgment record before
us and given that comparative fault is generally a factual inquiry for the jury that is not
readily suited for disposition at summary judgment. See, e.g., Van Gordon v. Herzog, 410
N.W.2d 405, 409 (Minn. App. 1987) (noting that questions of comparative fault are for the
jury).
2 Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment
against PMI based on its determination that the in pari delicto doctrine barred PMI from
bringing suit against respondents as a matter of law.

2 Cf. Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank AG, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1066 (D. Minn. 2003)
(applying Minnesota law and persuasively stating that, “[b]ecause in pari delicto requires
the trial court to make a determination of fact regarding the mutual fault of the parties, a
resolution of the defense on a motion to dismiss would be inappropriate” (quotation
omitted)). Because “decisions of a federal district court on a matter of Minnesota law are
not binding on a Minnesota state court,” we cite Stephenson only as persuasive authority.
Central Specialties, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep’t of Transp., 5 N.W.3d 409, 417 (Minn. App.
2024), rev. denied (Minn. July 9, 2024).
17
B. Unclean Hands
The unclean hands doctrine precludes a plaintiff’s ability to recover in equity. Hepfl
v. Meadowcroft, 9 N.W.3d 567, 573 (Minn. 2024). The doctrine will be invoked “against
a party whose conduct has been unconscionable by reason of a bad motive, or where the
result induced by his conduct will be unconscionable.” Creative Commc’ns Consultants v.
Gaylord, 403 N.W.2d 654, 657–58 (Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted).
Based on reasoning similar to that underlying its decision to apply the doctrine of
in pari delicto, the district court also barred PMI’s claims under the doctrine of unclean
hands. It determined that “PMI knew that what it was doing was wrong,” that it attempted
to “circumvent or defeat competitive bidding requirements by exploiting information” that
was inappropriately divulged, and that it did so to gain an unfair advantage over its
competitors.
PMI argues that the district court improperly resolved disputed questions of fact for
respondents by applying this doctrine. Again, we agree. Whether PMI sought an unfair
advantage over its competitors or violated the state’s competitive bidding requirements
rests on the resolution of disputed material facts and credibility determinations, as
discussed above. We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
granting summary judgment against PMI based on its determination that the doctrine of
unclean hands barred PMI from seeking equitable relief as a matter of law.

18
III. There are no i ndependent bases upon which we may a ffirm summary
judgment.

Respondents argue that there are alternative bases to affirm the district court’s
decision to grant summary judgment. We disagree.
First, respondents assert that the district court’s decision should be upheld because
PMI’s claims require a showing of causation and PMI has not presented evidence
supporting this element. They contend that PMI cannot obtain relief unless it demonstrates
that PMI would have received the bid even if the pre- bid meeting between Rudie and
Rohleder had not occurred. But causation is an issue of fact, which is generally unsuitable
for summary judgment. See, e.g., Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 373
(Minn. 2008) (“Whether proximate cause exists in a particular case is a question of fact for
the jury to decide.”); Ingram v. Syverson, 674 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn. App. 2004)
(“Where reasonable minds can differ on the issue of causation, the jury should resolve the
issue, and it would be error to grant summary judgment.”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20,
2004). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to PMI , a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to causation. Thus, we decline to affirm the district court’s summary-
judgment decision on that basis.
Second, respondents contend that PMI cannot show that it suffered damages.
Resolution of this issue hinges on the fact -finder’s determination of PMI’s tort and
equitable claims. Because the amount of damages is generally a question of fact to be
submitted to the jury and not to be determined at summary judgment, the issue of PMI’s
damages—if any—is not suitable for disposition at this stage. See Alsides v. Brown Inst.,
19
Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 475 (Minn. App. 1999) (noting that “damages are generally a
question of fact for the jury” precluding summary judgment).
Thus, we decline to uphold summary judgment on bases that fall within the purview
of the fact-finder.3
Reversed and remanded.

3 PMI raises additional arguments about respondents’ post-bid behavior and their decision
to award the project to Tierney Brothers. Because we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion,
we decline to address these issues.