Paul Hansmeier, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0392

Paul Hansmeier,
Appellant,

vs.

Tobies Enterprises, Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed September 16, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Pine County District Court
File No. 58-CV-23-535

Paul Hansmeier, Sandstone, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Erik T. Salveson, Brandie Morgenroth, Kelly P. Magnus, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and John Smith,
Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Self-represented appellant Paul Hansmeier challenges the district court’s decisions
to dismiss his lawsuit against respondent Tobies Enterprises, Inc. (Tobies) and to grant

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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sanctions against Hansmeier. Because we conclude the district court correctly determined
that Hansmeier failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and did not abuse
its discretion when it imposed sanctions, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2022, Hansmeier initiated a civil action alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 121 01-12213 (2018 & Supp.
IV 2022), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.50 (2022 &
Supp. 2023) against Tobies and U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland (the ADA action).
Tobies removed the ADA action to the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota. Less than a week later, the federal district court issued an order dismissing the
case as frivolous. The order described the ADA action as “typical” of Hansmeier’s
“vexatious” pattern of litigation. In addition to dismissing the ADA action, the federal
district court “certified that any appeal from the dismissal of this action would not be taken
in good faith,” and imposed filing restrictions on Hansmeier.
Fourteen months later, Hansmeier moved to vacate the federal district court’s order
dismissing the ADA action as frivolous. In response, Tobies filed a letter with the chief
judge for the federal district court. The letter asked the chief judge to summarily deny
Hansmeier’s motion because it was untimely and raised the same arguments the federal
district court rejected when it dismissed the ADA action. In the letter, Tobies stated that
“Hansmeier is seeking to perpetrate the same illegal conduct that caused him to be
convicted and sentenced to serve time in federal prison.” The federal district court
summarily denied Hansmeier’s motion to vacate.
3
In September 2023, Hansmeier initiated this lawsuit when he served Tobies with a
complaint. In the complaint, Hansmeier alleged that Tobies defamed him in its letter to
the chief judge. Hansmeier also sought a declaration that his assertion of the claims in the
ADA action did “not come within the scope of the offenses defined by the Minnesota
Criminal Code” or, alternatively, “that the Minnesota Criminal Code,” as applied to
Hansmeier, violates article I, section 8, of the Minnesota Constitution. Finally, Hansmeier
sought “an injunction prohibiting Tobies from enforcing the Minnesota Criminal Code’s
civil or criminal remedies against Hansmeier.”
In October 2023, Tobies filed this case in the Washington County District Court and
moved to dismiss the complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). Tobies argued the district
court should dismiss the defamation claim because, as relevant here, Tobies was entitled
to absolute privilege for the allegedly defamatory statement made by its attorney during a
judicial proceeding. With respect to the declaratory-judgment claim, Tobies argued
Hansmeier failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Hansmeier
failed to allege a bona fide legal interest, failed to allege a genuine conflict of tangible
interests, and requested relief that was not capable of specific resolution through
declaratory judgment.
On October 25, 2023, Tobies served Hansmeier with a letter, informing Hansmeier
that it intended to file motions for sanctions against Hansmeier under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9
and Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 if he did not withdraw his complaint within 21 days. The letter
stated that Hansmeier’s claims were “without basis in law,” and enclosed copies of
Tobies’s draft motions.
4
In November 2023, the Washington County District Court transferred venue to Pine
County District Court. Hansmeier served Tobies with an amended complaint . On
November 20, 2023, Tobies moved to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting that
Hansmeier was not free to amend the complaint without leave of the court or Tobies’s
written consent . In addition, Tobies asserted that its briefing for its original motion to
dismiss continued to justify dismissal. The same day, Tobies filed two motions to sanction
Hansmeier under rule 9 and rule 11.
The district court held a hearing on the motions. Hansmeier did not order a
transcript of the motion hearing. At the conclusion of argument, the district court orally
granted Tobies’s motion to dismiss and took the motions for sanctions under advisement.
The district court filed its written order granting Tobies’s motion to dismiss and dismissing
Hansmeier’s amended complaint with prejudice the same day. The district court
subsequently issued its order granting Tobies’s motions for sanctions.
Hansmeier appeals from the resulting judgments.
DECISION
Hansmeier challenges both the order dismissing his amended complaint with
prejudice and the order granting Tobies’s motions for sanctions. We first address the
district court’s decision to dismiss Hansmeier’s amended complaint and then address the
district court’s decision to grant Tobies’s motions for sanctions.
I.
Hansmeier challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss his amended
complaint, arguing that he stated claims upon which relief could be granted for defamation
5
and declaratory judgment. When reviewing a district court’s decision to dismiss a
complaint under rule 12.02(e), “we review the legal sufficiency of the claim de novo to
determine whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Graphic
Commc’ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund “A” v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682,
692 (Minn. 2014). “We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851
N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014).
A. Defamation
Hansmeier challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss his defamation claim,
arguing that the amended complaint did not establish that Tobies was entitled to absolute
privilege for the alleged conduct. Because Hansmeier’s amended complaint hinges its
defamation claim on statements Tobies’s attorney made that are subject to absolute
privilege, we are not persuaded.
“[A] statement[], even if defamatory, may be protected by absolute privilege in a
defamation lawsuit if the statement is (1) made by . . . [an] attorney . . . ; (2) made at a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; and (3) the statement at issue is relevant to the subject
matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn.
2007). “When absolute privilege applies, the speaker is completely shielded from liability
. . . .” Id.
Here, the allegedly defamatory statements described in the complaint are subject to
absolute privilege. First, the amended complaint alleged that Tobies defamed Hansmeier
when Tobies’s attorney “communicated a defamatory statement.” Second, the amended
6
complaint asserted that the statement was communicated “to the Chief District Court Judge
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota” and the statement was made “[i]n
relation to Hansmeier’s petitioning activity against Tobies.” Last, the amended complaint
contended that the alleged defamatory statement—that Hansmeier was “seeking to
perpetrate the same illegal conduct that caused him to be convicted and sentenced to serve
time in federal prison”—was made in response to his motion to vacate the judgment in the
ADA action. Thus, taking the allegations in the amended complaint as true, Tobies is
entitled to absolute privilege because the amended complaint asserted that the allegedly
defamatory statement was (1) made by Tobies’s attorney; (2) in connection with
Hansmeier’s motion to vacate in the ADA action; and (3) related to the subject matter of
the motion to vacate.
Hansmeier disagrees, arguing the amended complaint affirmatively alleged that
Tobies’s statement was irrelevant to the subject matter of the litigation. Under the third
element of absolute privilege, a statement is relevant if it has “reference and relation to the
subject matter of the action and [it is] connected therewith[.]” Newgard, 729 N.W.2d at
306 (second alteration in original) (quoting Matthis v. Kennedy, 67 N.W.2d 413, 418
(Minn. 1954)). “The relevance of a statement to litigation is a question of law, and any
doubts as to relevance of a statement ‘must be resolved in favor of finding the statements
pertinent.’” Id. at 306-07 (quoting Jensen v. Olson, 141 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. 1966)).
We acknowledge that Hansmeier’s complaint stated the legal conclusion that
Tobies’s attorney’s statement had “nothing to do with the facts of his petitioning activity.”
But we do not defer to legal conclusions stated in a complaint. See Halva v. Minn. State
7
Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 501-02 (Minn. 2021). And, as described above, the facts
alleged in the complaint lead to only one conclusion: Tobies’s attorney made this statement
in connection with Hansmeier’s motion to vacate the judgment in the ADA action.
Hansmeier also argues that Tobies’s attorney did not make the statement in a judicial
proceeding because he made the statement to the chief judge rather than the judge assigned
to the ADA action. First, we observe that absolute privilege extends not only to judicial
proceedings, but also “quasi-judicial proceeding[s],” and, in some cases, even “statements
published prior to the judicial proceeding.” Newgard, 729 N.W.2d at 306. Second,
Hansmeier has not developed his argument beyond mere assertion or cited any authority to
support his argument that a letter to the chief judge in this context would not satisfy the
second element of absolute immunity. 1 See State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915
(Minn. 2015) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any
argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal
unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quoting State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d
539, 552 (Minn. 2009))).

1 To the extent Hansmeier argues for a change to the law, he has failed to preserve that
issue for appeal because he never ordered the transcript of the motion hearing. See State
v. Carlson, 161 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. 1968) (“It is elementary that a party seeking review
has a duty to see that the appellate court is presented with a record which is sufficient to
show the alleged errors and all matters necessary to consider the questions presented.”);
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.02, subd. 1(a) (requiring appellants to order transcripts “of those
parts of the proceedings not already part of the record which are deemed necessary for
inclusion in the record”). Because we cannot review the transcript to determine whether
this argument was addressed and resolved by the district court, we decline to address this
argument. See Rochon Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 831 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Minn. App. 2013)
(“Generally, an appellate court will not address matters not presented to, and considered
by, the district court.”), rev. denied (Minn. June 18, 2013).
8
For these reasons, we conclude the district court correctly dismissed Hansmeier’s
defamation claim on the ground that the alleged defamatory statement is subject to absolute
immunity.
B. Declaratory Judgment
Hansmeier also argues the district court erred when it dismissed his declaratory-
judgment claim.2 A claim for declaratory judgment will only present a justiciable
controversy if the claim: “(1) involves definite and concrete assertions of right that
emanate from a legal source, (2) involves a genuine conflict in tangible interests between
parties with adverse interests, and (3) is capable of specific resolution by judgment rather
than presenting hypothetical facts that would form an advisory opinion.” Onvoy, Inc. v.
ALLETE, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617-18 (Minn. 2007).
In his amended complaint, Hansmeier alleged:
53. Hansmeier would like to reassert the claims in the [ADA
action] against Tobies in Minnesota state court, but he is
chilled from doing so by Tobies’[s] accusations of criminal
activity. As someone who is imprisoned for his litigation
conduct, Hansmeier is, for the reasons stated in the complaint
[in the ADA action], uniquely vulnerable to accusations that he
is violating the law via his petitioning activity. Hansmeier
must either refrain from asserting his claims against Tobies or
assert his claims against Tobies under the threat of civil and
criminal penalties under the Minnesota Criminal Code.

54. Hansmeier seeks a declaration from the Court that his
assertion of the claims [in the ADA action] do[] not come

2 Tobies correctly observes that Hansmeier’s claim for injunctive relief stemmed entirely
from his claim for declaratory judgment. Thus, we disagree with Hansmeier’s argument
that we should reverse the district court on the ground that he stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted when he requested an injunction as the remedy for his declaratory-
judgment claim.
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within the scope of the offenses defined by the Minnesota
Criminal Code or, in the alternative, that the Minnesota
Criminal Code violates [article I, section 8] of the Minnesota
Constitution as applied to Hansmeier. Hansmeier further seeks
an injunction prohibiting Tobies from enforcing the Minnesota
Criminal Code’s civil or criminal remedies against Hansmeier.

Hansmeier claims his complaint met all three requirements to allege a declaratory-
judgment claim. We are not persuaded.
First, Hansmeier’s claim is not based on a definite and concrete assertion of right.
Instead, the claim is based on a hypothetical future occurrence. Hansmeier does not allege
that he would face criminal consequences if he filed the ADA action in state court. Yet,
he seeks a declaration that filing the ADA action would not violate “the Minnesota
Criminal Code” in general, or if it would, that the “Minnesota Criminal Code” is
unconstitutional as applied to him. It is well established that “[i]ssues which have no
existence other than in the realm of future possibility are purely hypothetical and are not
justiciable.” Lee v. Delmont, 36 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Minn. 1949).
Second, Hansmeier’s declaratory-judgment claim does not involve a genuine
conflict between the parties because Tobies, a private entity, has no authority to bring a
criminal proceeding against Hansmeier. And, in the hypothetical situation where a
government entity did bring a criminal proceeding against Hansmeier, Tobies would not
be a party to that proceeding. Thus, Hansmeier has failed to state a claim that “involves a
genuine conflict in tangible interests between parties with adverse interests.” Onvoy, 736
N.W.2d at 617-18.
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For these reasons, we conclude the district court correctly dismissed Hansmeier’s
declaratory-judgment claim on the ground that he failed “to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e).
II.
Hansmeier also argues the district court abused its discretion when it granted
Tobies’s motions for sanctions. We review a district court’s decision to grant a sanctions
motion for an abuse of discretion. See Collins v. Waconia Dodge, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 142,
145 (Minn. App. 2011) (rule 11), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011); Szarzynski v.
Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 290, 294 (Minn. App. 2007) (rule 9).
Hansmeier argues that the district court abused its discretion when it granted
Tobies’s motions for sanctions because the district court failed to follow procedural
safeguards set forth in rule 9 and rule 11. Specifically, Hansmeier claims that Tobies did
not provide him with the 21-day safe harbor required by both rules. See Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 9.01; Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a).
We note that our review is hampered by Hansmeier’s failure to order a transcript of
the motion hearing. “An appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record.”
Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. App. 1995). This burden applies
to pro se appellant s. Noltimier v. Noltimier , 157 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 1968) (per
curiam). When the appellant fails to provide a transcript, our review is limited to whether
the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Mesenbourg, 528 N.W.2d at 494.
Here, in the absence of a transcript, we are unable to determine whether
(1) Hansmeier challenged Tobies’s motions on the ground that he was deprived of the 21-
11
day safe harbor; and, if so (2) whether the district court made the required determination s
or reviewed the relevant factors before imposing sanctions. Hansmeier bore the burden of
providing this court with a sufficient record to enable appellate review, id., and, in the
absence of that record, we are unable to determine whether the district court was presented
with or decided the issue Hansmeier now raises, see Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n,
566 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1997) (stating “the general rule . . . that appellate courts will
not consider questions which were not presented to or decided by the district court”).
Therefore, based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions. See Collins, 793 N.W.2d at 146 (affirming
district court’s imposition of sanctions in part because appellant did not provide transcripts
and therefore did not provide this court with a sufficient record to conclude the district
court abused its discretion); see also Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn.
1944) (“[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively
before there can be reversal. . . . [T]he burden of showing error rests upon the one who
relies upon it.”).
Affirmed.