State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0404

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stefan Scott Tucker,
Appellant.

Filed January 13, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File Nos. 18-CR-22-1804, 18-CR-22-1806

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Lindsey S. Lindstrom, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant Stefan Scott Tucker argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for downward dispositional sentencing departures. Because the district
court acted within its discretion by imposing guideline sentences, we affirm.
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FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Tucker with a third-degree controlled
substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(6) (2022), and petty
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.092(a)
(2022).1 Based on a separate incident, the state charged Tucker with felony driving while
impaired (DWI)—test refusal in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2022), and
driving after revocation in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (2022).
Tucker pleaded guilty to the third-degree controlled substance crime and felony
DWI and the state dismissed the other charges. The district court accepted Tucker’s pleas
and ordered that he complete a presentence investigation (PSI).
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel moved for downward dispositional
departures, arguing that drug court would provide the support and programming Tucker
needs to be successful with his sobriety. Two witnesses testified about Tucker’s
commitment to his sobriety, the need for a structured treatment setting, and Tucker’s
acceptance of responsibility for his actions. Tucker addressed the court, acknowledging
that he previously failed to take responsibility for his addiction but stating that he was ready
for the intensity of drug court and asked the court for a “chance to change.”
The state opposed the motion, noting Tucker’s noncompliance while on supervision;
his sporadic, short-term efforts at sobriety; the PSI author’s inability to find any
mitigating—only aggravating—departure factors; and that acceptance into drug court

1 The state later amended the complaint to add one count of felony fifth-degree controlled
substance possession in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2022).
3
could not be the basis for a departure. The state requested executed guideline prison
sentences.
The district court considered the arguments and determined that without a formal
acceptance into drug court it could not make an informed decision about whether Tucker
was eligible for a dispositional departure. The district court continued the sentencing
hearing to determine whether Tucker would be accepted into the treatment court.
The following day, the parties returned for the continued sentencing hearing. The
district court informed the parties that Tucker would be eligible for drug court if he was no
longer facing a presumptive commit to prison. The state reiterated its position that
Tucker’s potential acceptance into drug court could not justify a departure and that no
substantial and compelling circumstances existed to support a departure. Defense counsel
argued that Tucker’s eligibility for the drug -court program constituted substantial and
compelling circumstances that supported a departure.
In denying the motion for a departure, the district court noted that Tucker may be
amenable to an intensive supervision program, but questioned whether intensive
supervision would increase Tucker’s likelihood of success enough to surpass the “high bar”
of a substantial and compelling circumstance. The court then stated,
[A]nd that’s the hard part about this process when the standard
is substantial and compelling. It is a really high bar. And I
have no doubt in my mind that a treatment court would increase
your chances substantially and I frankly wish that there was an
agreement that gave you the chance, but that isn’t where we’re
at. That’s not our reality. I can’t change that. Because if there
was an agreement I would have supported it, but we’re here
under a contested situation. I have to follow the law even
though I may not like the result.
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I can’t reach the point that as much as I think that a treatment
court which isn’t one hundred percent automatic here, but I
think if I departed that they would take you, but I can’t
guarantee that. It would increase your odds of success. I know
that on regular probation I don’t think you would be successful,
and we would end up executing your sentence. I also think that
if you got into the treatment court they would work with you,
help you, but you would be on a relatively short leash, but I
think you expect that.

And I keep coming back to this high bar that’s set of substantial
and compelling. I wish I had enough facts to be able to get you
over that hurdle, Mr. Tucker, quite honestly. I just don’t have
them.

Finding that there were no substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the
sentencing guidelines , t he court sentenced Tucker to executed guideline sentences of
39 months for the third-degree controlled substance conviction and 57 months for the
felony DWI, with five years of conditional release.
Before concluding the hearing, the district court told Tucker:
I know it’s with a heavy heart that I do this, but I’m obligated
to follow the law. It isn’t what I think is in your best interest,
but best interest isn’t the standard here. And I hope, I pray,
that what you’ve learned and the change in your attitude and
the change in your approach, and that you’re tired of being in
that rut that you take advantage of every single program you
can.

And I think some of your clarity has been from the time you’ve
spent in custody because you’ve been clean and it’s not a
factor. I don’t get to consider it, but I will tell you that I have
developed a fondness for a clean and sober Mr. Tucker, and I
hope you find a way to stay that way. I just don’t get to take it
into consideration what I do here, but I’ve watched the
transformation. And I frankly just wish that it was enough to
get over that big hurdle. So, I wish you luck.

Tucker appeals.
5
DECISION
Tucker argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for
downward dispositional departures. A district court’s denial of a motion for a downward
dispositional departure is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto,
855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). A district court need not provide an explanation
for denying the departure if it “elects to impose the presumptive sentence.” State v. Van
Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985). Appellate courts “may not interfere with
the sentencing court[’]s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing
court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
determination.” Id. at 80-81. Only in a “rare” case will this court reverse a district court’s
imposition of the presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences “to maintain
uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat.
§ 244.09, subd. 5 (2022). A district court must impose a sentence within the presumptive
range unless it finds that “substantial and compelling circumstances are present in the
record.” State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 270 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
“Substantial and compelling circumstances are those that make a case atypical.”
State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018).
Tucker relies on State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 2002), to argue that
the district court improperly based its sentencing decision on an erroneous view of the law
when the court considered the parties’ lack of agreement as a reason for finding no
substantial or compelling circumstances to depart. In Misquadace, the question presented
6
was “whether a plea agreement, standing alone, provides substantial and compelling
justification for departure.” 644 N.W.2d at 69. The district court had imposed upward
departure sentences “pursuant to the plea agreement” without stating any other reason for
the departure. Id. at 66. In affirming this court’s reversal of the sentence, the supreme
court held that all departures from the sentencing guidelines “must be supported by
substantial and compelling circumstances, and that a plea agreement —standing alone —is
not a sufficient basis to depart from the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 72.
But unlike in Misquadace, the district court here did not grant a departure ; it
imposed presumptive guideline sentences. The record reveals that the district court
wrestled with the substantial-and-compelling standard, but it noted that it did not have
“enough facts” to make the findings that the standard was satisfied.
Tucker also argues that the district court abused its discretion because the court did
have “substantial and compelling circumstances to support a departure beyond just the
agreement of the state. ” He argues that his amenability to community-based treatment ,
age, remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and community support were all substantial and
compelling circumstances that supported departure. But “the presence of mitigating factors
does not obligate the court” to grant a departure from the presumptive sentence.
Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). Instead, the district court retains the discretion whether to grant a
departure. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308.
The district court here carefully and deliberately considered circumstances for and
against departure and properly exercised its discretion by imposing sentences within the
7
presumptive ranges. The record reveals that the district court struggled with its sentencing
decision, even continuing the hearing to a second day to further deliberate. But after careful
evaluation of all the testimony, arguments, and information presented, the court concluded
that the circumstances did not rise to the level of substantial and compelling. We cannot
“interfere with the sentencing court[’]s exercise of discretion, [when] . . . the record shows
the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before
making a determination.” Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at 80-81.
We acknowledge and commend the progress that Tucker has made. Maintaining
sobriety through difficult life circumstances is not easy. While we are sympathetic to the
positive impact the drug court might have had on Tucker’s ability to remain law abiding
and sober, this is not a case so rare that warrants reversal. Just as the district court properly
noted that it was bound to apply the substantial-and-compelling-reasons standard, binding
precedent likewise compels our conclusion that the district court acted within its discretion
by denying Tucker’s departure motion and imposing the presumptive guideline sentences.
Affirmed.