State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0405

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Johnathan Casper Hassig,
Appellant.

Filed September 9, 2024
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-CR-20-786

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matthew Stinson, Wabasha County Attorney, Wabasha, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant challenges the revocation of his probation, arguing that he received
insufficient notice of a violation and that the district court did not properly consider
whether the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. Because
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appellant received sufficient notice of his violations, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion by revoking probation, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Johnathan Casper Hassig pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court stayed
imposition of sentence and placed Hassig on probation for 15 years, the terms of which
included a 365-day period of electronic home monitoring (EHM) in lieu of jail time ,
refraining from having contact with minor females, remaining law-abiding, refraining from
the use of alcohol and controlled substances, completion of a chemical-use assessment, and
completion of a psychological sexual evaluation and sex-offender treatment.
Respondent State of Minnesota filed a probation-violation report, alleging that
Hassig violated the condition of his probation that he be on EHM in lieu of jail time because
he was terminated from his EHM program for nonpayment. Hassig admitted to the
violation. The district court imposed an intermediate sanction of seven days in the county
jail.
The state filed a second probation-violation report, alleging that Hassig violated the
condition of his probation that he refrain from having contact with minor females.
Specifically, the state alleged that a 17-year -old female spent the night at Hassig’s home
and that Hassig had been arrested and charged with contributing to the delinquency of a
minor. The state later filed an addendum to the second probation-violation report, adding
allegations that Hassig violated probation by using a controlled substance and did not
complete a chemical-use assessment and intensive outpatient treatment for chemical use.
3
Hassig admitted to all three violations, but later explained that his failure to
complete chemical-use treatment was because the programming occurred at the same time
as sex-offender treatment. The district court determined that his probation-condition
violations of contact with minor females and chemical use were intentional and
inexcusable, but that his failure to complete chemical-use treatment was excusable. And
the district court determined that treatment would not be most effectively provided in
confinement. The district court revoked the stay of imposition of sentence and imposed
the sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment. It stayed execution of that sentence and ordered
that Hassig serve five days in the county jail, complete a chemical assessment, follow the
recommendations from an evaluation, and re-enroll in a specific sex-offender treatment
program.
The state and Hassig later agreed through a sanctions conference that Hassig would
be subject to 12 months of monitoring software on his electronic devices because Hassig
violated probation by having third-party contact with a minor. The district court ordered
12 months of monitoring software on Hassig’s electronic devices.
The state later filed a third probation-violation report, alleging that Hassig violated
probation because he was terminated from the sex-offender treatment program due to “poor
attendance and lack of progress.” The district court held a contested probation-violation
hearing. The hearing first focused on whether Hassig violated the terms of probation. A
probation officer, who was not Hassig’s supervising officer, testified that there were two
violations: (1) “[t]he new charges and conviction in Olmsted County for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor” and (2) “[Hassig] leaving sex offender treatment without
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successful completion.” The probation officer testified that “[t]he conviction date was
October 1, and he was convicted for gross misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of
a minor and sentenced under a stay of imposition.” The probation officer further testified
that the new conviction was not included in a probation-violation report, that Hassig was
ordered to remain law -abiding as part of his probation, and that the second probation-
violation report contained allegations of a violation based on the same incident that resulted
in the new conviction but that the criminal nature of the incident was not part of the second
probation violation. The probation officer testified that the treatment provider stated that
Hassig admitted that he did not show up for treatment because “he had gotten a new job,
and wouldn’t be able to make the schedule work.” The probation officer also testified that
Hassig was looking up sex-offender treatment programs on his monitored electronic
device.
Hassig testified that he was terminated from his sex-offender treatment program.
He testified that he got a job working from 7:00 a.m. until about 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday, and that his sex-offender treatment program was from 10:00 a.m. until
about 11:30 a.m. Hassig testified that he requested treatment at a different time, but the
program did not accommodate that request. Hassig also testified about his criticisms of
the sex-offender treatment program and his efforts to enroll in a different program. Hassig
admitted that he was terminated in part because he was not participating in treatment, and
that he was not doing so because of the program’s attempt to modify his thinking and
behavior and because they were not covering the materials that the program had outlined.
Hassig testified that he prioritized his job over treatment because it offered him financial
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stability and job security. The district court determined that Hassig violated the terms of
his probation that he be law-abiding and that he complete sex-offender treatment, and that
these violations were intentional and inexcusable.
The focus of the hearing then turned to whether the need for confinement
outweighed the policies favoring probation. The probation officer testified that the
circumstances leading to the criminal complaint involved Hassig’s “contact with two
females who were under the age of eighteen,” that he “encouraged them to come to his
apartment, and he would provide vape and cigarettes to them ,” and that the females spent
the night. The probation officer testified that it would take approximately one month before
Hassig could begin the sex-offender treatment program available through the department
of corrections. The probation officer testified that Hassig was having attendance issues
with treatment and that his participation and performance was below average.
The district court concluded that the need to confine Hassig outweighed the policies
favoring probation. It revoked probation and executed the stayed sentence of 15 months’
imprisonment with a 10-year conditional-release term and credit for 53 days of time served.
Hassig appeals.
DECISION
A district court may revoke probation when a probationer violates a condition of
their probation. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1 (2022);
1 see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.14 (2022) was amended to add a subdivision stating that “[c]orrectional
treatment is better provided through a community resource than through confinement and
would not unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation was not revoked”

6
(setting forth the procedure for probation revocation). Hassig argues that the district court
abused its discretion by revoking his probation because the district court (1) relied on a
probation-violation allegation that the state did not properly notice before the
probation-revocation hearing in deciding to revoke probation and (2) did not sufficiently
analyze whether the need to confine Hassig outweighed the policies favoring probation.
The state did not file a responsive brief. We address Hassig’s arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not violate due- process requirements by revoking
probation based on Hassig’s new criminal conviction.

Hassig argues that the district court improperly revoked probation by relying on a
new gross-misdemeanor conviction that was not alleged or noticed as a probation
violation.2 A probationer is entitled to procedural due process as part of a revocation
proceeding. State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 2015). Such due process
requires that a probationer be given written notice of the alleged violations. State v. Austin,
295 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 1980); Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 2 (2022) (providing that a
probationer must be notified in writing of the alleged probation violation); Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.04, subd. 1(2)(b) (same). The written notice must include “a factual statement

and listing circumstances in which “[p]olicies favoring probation outweigh the need for
confinement if a person has not previously violated a condition of probation” and for which
imposition or execution of a sentence is not warranted. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1a
(Supp. 2023). The amendment became effective on August 1, 2023, for violations that
occur on or after that date. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 17, § 33, at 1114-15. Because
this was not Hassig’s first probation violation, we cite the 2022 version of the statute.

2 Hassig also noted that “the conduct involved in the new gross-misdemeanor conviction
had already been admitted to and punished” at the hearing for Hassig’s second probation
violation. But Hassig does not assert that this is a basis for reversal.
7
supporting probable cause to believe the probationer violated the terms of probation.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 1(1)(2)(d). “Whether a defendant has been denied due
process of law is a question of law that we review de novo.” Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d at 280.
The third probation-violation report, which was filed on August 2, 2023, did not list
Hassig’s conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor as an alleged violation
of probation. But the state included information about the charge under the
recommendations portion of the report and under Hassig’s criminal history, in which the
state included the charge as “pending” as of the date of the report. The conviction was
later entered on October 1, 2023. Although the report was not updated to include the
conviction as a distinct violation of the terms of Hassig’s probation, we conclude that the
report was sufficient to satisfy Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04(2). Hassig had adequate warning
in the report that the conviction resulting from the identified charge could come up during
the contested hearing for his third probation violation because the underlying facts of that
conviction were included in the report.
II. The district court sufficiently analyzed whether the need for confinement
outweighed the policies favoring probation.

Hassig next challenges the district court’s analysis of one factor that a court
considers when deciding whether to revoke probation —that the “need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Hassig argues
that the district court erred in concluding that confinement outweighed the policies favoring
probation because (1) the only alleged violation properly before the district court was
Hassig’s failure to complete treatment; (2) that failure was based on Hassig prioritizing a
8
job over his treatment, and his financial needs were not a proper basis to revoke probation;
and (3) there were community-based options for sex-offender treatment that the district
court did not consider. In other words, Hassig argues that the “district court’s findings here
are more indicative of a reflexive revocation following a third violation, rather than one
that fully weighed the value of Hassig’s full -time employment and the possibility of a
treatment program that would be compatible with his work schedule.”
A district court’s decision to revoke probation “cannot be a reflexive reaction to an
accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing that the offender’s behavior
demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin, 295
N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted). Before a district court revokes probation, it must
(1) “designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated,” (2) “find that the
violation was intentional or inexcusable,” and (3) “find that [the] need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.”
3 Id. at 250; see also State v. Modtland, 695
N.W.2d 602, 606 (Minn. 2005) (referring to these findings as the “ Austin factors”). “[I]n
making the three Austin findings, courts are not charged with merely conforming to
procedural requirements; rather, courts must seek to convey their substantive reasons for
revocation and the evidence relied upon.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608. The district
court “must balance the probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring
his rehabilitation and the public safety.” Id. at 606-07 (quotation omitted). And the district

3 Because the district court conducted a contested revocation hearing, the district court was
required to make written findings of fact. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(3). Hassig
notes that such findings must be written but does not challenge the lack of written findings
on appeal.
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court must bear in mind that “the purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation
should be used only as a last resort when treatment has failed.” Id. at 606 (quotation
omitted).
In determining whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation, a district court consider s (1) whether “confinement is necessary to protect the
public from further criminal activity by the offender,” (2) whether “the offender is in need
of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined,” or
(3) whether “it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were
not revoked.” Id. at 607 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320
(Minn. App. 2023) (referring to these considerations as the “Modtland subfactors”), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023). The district court needs to identify only one of these
subfactors to establish the need for confinement. Smith, 994 N.W.2d at 320 (“Only one
Modtland subfactor is necessary to support revocation.”). A district court has “broad
discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be
reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50.
But “whether a lower court has made the findings required under Austin presents a question
of law which is subject to de novo review.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d. at 605.
The district court ruled on the third Austin factor as follows:
[T]he first issue when I determine whether or not
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation, I need
to determine whether confinement is necessary to protect the
public from further criminal activity. Then there’s two other
factors that I’ll get into. I do find that confinement is necessary
to protect the public from further criminal activity. In
summary, we had an instance where it may not have been
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criminal sexual conduct, but there certainly was a conviction
that involved others. My concern is that to simply determine
otherwise is really contrary to what the facts are. There’s
actually been a demonstration that when Mr. Hassig is not
confined, the public is not protected from further criminal
activity.

As far as the next factor which is whether the need for
correctional treatment can most effectively be provided during
confinement, to be very frank I think that’s a close call. I’m
not sure. What we may get into in just a moment is what would
the time frame be. Exactly how long would Mr. Hassig have
to serve. So I am determining that the factor related to the need
of correctional treatment whether that could most effectively
be provided during confinement, I’m not convinced that’s true,
so I’m not making that determination.

The last factor is whether it would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation if probation is not revoked. I think
it would unduly depreciate it. There’s been prior violations.
The reasons given for not completing [sex-offender treatment]
as I indicated earlier I find them intentional and inexcusable.
It seems to me that, Mr. Hassig, you decided you’re going to
put work ahead of your conditions. It was very clear you had
to complete treatment. So you basically had that opportunity.
You didn’t do it because you chose to work and because you
felt that they were trying to change your thinking. I don’t think
you understand really what this programming is about. It is to
assist you in changing your thinking as I indicated earlier.

Hassig first asserts that the only “noticed” violation related to Hassig’s decision to
take a full-time job. As discussed above, we conclude that Hassig had adequate notice that
his new conviction could be discussed at the contested hearing, and we therefore decline
to limit the violations for which the district court could base its reasoning on the third
Austin factor.
Hassig next asserts that it was improper for the district court to revoke probation
based on Hassig’s decision to prioritize his job because it did not fully consider the
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financial importance of that job before revoking probation. In support of this argument,
Hassig cites State v. Morrow for the proposition that a court must inquire into the reasons
for the failure to pay before revoking probation. 492 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. App. 1992).
In Morrow, we concluded that the district court did not violate a defendant’s due-process
or equal-protection rights when it revoked probation after determining that there were no
funding options available, from a third-party or the defendant, to pay for the treatment that
the court ordered as a condition of probation. Id. at 542-49. Hassig did not assert that he
was terminated from sex-offender treatment because he was unable to pay. And while we
understand the importance of Hassig’s financial stability and housing security, which this
job offered, the district court’s conclusion that Hassig needed to prioritize satisfying the
conditions of his probation was not an abuse of discretion.
Hassig finally asserts that the district court did not adequately explain why other
community-based treatment options were not available to Hassig. The district court’s
findings and explanation of its decision could have been more thorough. Modtland, 695
N.W.2d at 606-08 (explaining the need to carefully balance the probationer’s and the state’s
competing interests and that the analysis framework is designed to “create throughout,
fact-specific records setting forth [the district court’s] reasons for revoking probation” and
that “courts must seek to convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence
relied upon”). But this is not a case where the district court offered no reasoning or
evidence on which it based its decision to revoke probation. Rather, the district court
considered and made findings for each Modtland subfactor. Notably, the district court
pointed to Hassig’s testimony that he did not like that sex-offender treatment aimed to
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change his thinking. The district court explained that it did not believe that Hassig
understood that the purpose of treatment was to change his thinking. On this record, we
conclude that the district court sufficiently analyzed and explained its determination that
the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
Affirmed.