County of Cottonwood, Petitioner,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0409

County of Cottonwood,
Petitioner,

Debbie Denise Koch, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Joseph Zachary Zoellner,
Respondent.

Filed December 9, 2024
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Cottonwood County District Court
File No. 17-FA-17-219

Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s order denying her motion to modify
her court-ordered parenting time with her two children . Mother argues that the district
court abused its discretion because its findings support modification of the parenting-time
schedule and modification is in the best interests of the children. Because we discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to maintain the existing parenting-time
schedule, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Debbie Denise Koch and respondent-father Joseph Zachary
Zoellner have two joint children. Prior to 2019, the parties shared joint legal and joint
physical custody of the children, and f ather had 43% of parenting time and mother had
57% of parenting time.
On January 8, 2019, child-protection services removed the children from mother’s
care and placed them in father’s care because mother failed a drug test. Father subsequently
requested that the district court modify physical custody and the parenting-time schedule.
He sought temporary sole physical custody of the children and requested that mother
receive supervised parenting time subject to certain conditions, including maintaining her
sobriety. Mother opposed the motion. In December 2019, pursuant to the parties’
stipulation, the district court modified custody and parenting time by awarding father sole
physical custody of the children and reducing mother’s parenting time to 31%. The district
court granted mother unsupervised parenting time conditioned on her continued sobriety.
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The district court did not alter the parties’ joint legal custody of the children. Shortly
thereafter, mother achieved, and has since maintained, her sobriety.
Since the 2019 custody and parenting-time modification, both parties have
re-married. In 2021, father married T.Z., who regularly assists with parenting time and
supervision of the children. And in August 2023, mother married K.L., who also regularly
assists with parenting time and supervision. K.L. had multiple domestic-assault -related
convictions between 2011 and 2019.
In October 2023, mother moved the district court to modify the parenting-time
schedule to allow for equal parenting time between the parties. Mother argued that
modification was in the children’s best interests because, among other reasons, she has
achieved and maintained sobriety, she has successfully completed treatment for alcohol
and controlled-substance abuse, she has been consistent with her existing parenting-time
obligations, she has an “excellent” relationship with the children, modification would
benefit her relationship with the children , she had been the primary caregiver for most of
the children’s lives, and she has cooperated with father in co-parenting the children.
Following a hearing, the district court denied mother’s motion, concluding in
pertinent part that modification of the schedule was not in the best interests of the children;
the children are “thriving under the current schedule”; the children are “happy, healthy,
and feel safe”; the parties have been effectively co-parenting under the existing schedule;
and the current schedule provides consistency and “generous parenting time to both
parents.”
Mother appeals.
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DECISION
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request to
modify the parenting- time schedule because she asserts that modification is in the
children’s best interests. She argues that the district court did not properly consider her
evidence in support of her request to modify the existing schedule, that the district court’s
findings support modification, and that the district court otherwise abused its discretion in
analyzing whether modification was in the children’s best interests.
We limit our review of a district court’s decision regarding parenting time to
whether the district court abused its discretion. Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596
(Minn. 2018 ). “Appellate courts recognize that a district court has broad discretion to
decide parenting-time questions and will not reverse a parenting-time decision unless the
district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact
that are not supported by the record.” Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App.
2014) (citations omitted); see also Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)
(“A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by
the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the
facts on record.” (quotation omitted)). We review a district court’s findings of fact “for
clear error . . . reversing only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Thorton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019)
(quotations omitted). And if “the record reasonably supports the findings, . . . it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
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to the contrary.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted).
So long as a modification of parenting time does not change a child’s primary
residence, a district court “shall” modify parenting time “[i]f modification would serve the
best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2022). In determining
whether modification would serve a child’s best interests, a district court considers 12
factors:
(1) a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and
other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
child’s needs and development;
(2) any special medical, mental health, developmental
disability, or educational needs that the child may have that
may require special parenting arrangements or access to
recommended services;
(3) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to
express an independent, reliable preference;
(4) whether domestic abuse . . . has occurred in the
parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship; the nature
and context of the domestic abuse; and the implications of the
domestic abuse for parenting and for the child’s safety,
well-being, and developmental needs;
(5) any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a
parent that affects the child’s safety or developmental needs;
(6) the history and nature of each parent’s participation
in providing care for the child;
(7) the willingness and ability of each parent to provide
ongoing care for the child; to meet the child’s ongoing
developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to
maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time;
(8) the effect on the child’s well-being and development
of changes to home, school, and community;
(9) the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
ongoing relationships between the child and each parent,
siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life;
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(10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting
time with both parents and the detriment to the child in limiting
parenting time with either parent;
(11) except in cases in which domestic abuse . . . has
occurred, the disposition of each parent to support the child’s
relationship with the other parent and to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact between the child and the other
parent; and
(12) the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate
in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information
and minimize exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to
utilize methods for resolving disputes regarding any major
decision concerning the life of the child.
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2022). A district court “must make detailed findings on
each of the factors . . . based on the evidence presented and explain how each factor led to
its conclusions and to the determination of . . . parenting time.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(1) (2022). A “[district] court may not use one factor to the exclusion of all
others, and the [district] court shall consider that the factors may be interrelated.” Id. In
evaluating these factors, “the district court’s foremost consideration is the best interests of
the child.” Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at 792.
We address each of mother’s challenges in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the existing
parenting-time schedule met the children’s needs.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
children’s physical, spiritual, cultural, emotional, and other needs did not support
modifying the parenting-time schedule. She asserts that the district court erred in
considering the children’s educational needs, did not “directly address” the relevant needs
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of the children with “specificity,” and the district court’s findings were otherwise “woefully
inadequate.” We disagree.
In its best-interests determination, a district court must consider and evaluate a
“child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other needs, and the effect of the
proposed arrangements on the child’s needs and development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a)(1) (emphasis added). The district court found that the children’s physical,
emotional, spiritual, and other needs were met by the existing schedule. In making this
finding, the district court referenced evidence showing the environment in father’s home
affords the children a more productive atmosphere to complete schoolwork, that mother’s
home is not as conducive to the completion of schoolwork because the children are at times
tired or distracted in that environment, and that the children have an established routine in
father’s home. These findings are supported by the record. Although mother presented
contrary evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion in how the district court weighed
conflicting evidence where the record reasonably supports its findings. See Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 223 (explaining that we will not set aside a district court’s findings of fact
unless they are “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence”).
Mother argues that the statute does not expressly provide that the district court may
consider the children’s educational needs in determining the best interests of the children .
But the statute sets forth a nonexclusive list of considerations and expressly affords a
district court discretion to consider “other needs” of the children in determining their best
interests. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1). And mother cites no authority that requires
a district court to make specific and separate findings as to each of the emotional, spiritual,
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cultural, and physical needs of the children. Because the district court properly applied the
law and its factual findings are supported by the record, we discern no abuse of discretion.
II. The district court properly considered mother’s husband’s history of domestic
abuse in its determination not to modify parenting time.

Mother argues that the district court misapplied the law because it considered her
husband’s history of domestic violence in its determination that modification of the
parenting-time schedule was not in the best interests of the children. In determining the
best interests of the children, the district court evaluated “whether domestic abuse . . . ha[d]
occurred in the parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship; the nature and context
of the domestic abuse; and the implications of the domestic abuse for parenting and for the
child’s safety, well-being, and developmental needs.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(4).
Here, the district court found that there had been no domestic violence between
mother and father or in either household but that mother’s husband, K.L., has a history of
domestic abuse including a recent felony domestic-assault conviction for which he was on
probation at the time of the modification proceeding. Assuming without deciding that
mother’s husband’s recent history of domestic abuse does not fall squarely within the
subdivision 1(a)(4) best-interests consideration, these facts are nevertheless relevant to the
best interests of the children. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(9) (considering the
proposed arrangements between the child and other significant persons in the child’s life).
Indeed, the district court considered these facts because K.L. often cared for the children
while mother was working. We note that mother does not contest the accuracy of these
findings. And mother cites no Minnesota authority prohibiting a district court in its overall
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evaluation of the best interests of the children from considering the history of domestic
abuse by a resident of mother’s household who cares for the children. Cf. Simonson v.
Simonson, 292 N.W.2d 12, 13 (Minn. 1980) (determining that the district court could not
disregard mother’s husband’s history of sexually molesting children in custody
determination). That the district court may have considered mother’s husband’s history of
domestic abuse in the context of subdivision 1(a)(4) as opposed to another statutory
best-interests factor was therefore harmless. See Grein v. Grein, 364 N.W.2d 383, 387
(Minn. 1985) (declining to remand a custody-modification determination for further
findings when “on remand the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that
comport with the statutory language” and reach the same result); Minn. R. Civ. P. 61
(requiring courts to ignore harmless error). Because the supreme court has allowed the
district court to consider this type of history in determining that it was not in the best
interests of the children to modify custody, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s determination that K.L.’s history of domestic abuse weighed against modification
of the parenting-time order. See Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at 790 (discussing Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1 (2018), and noting that “a district court needs great leeway in making a
custody decision that serves a child’s best interests, in light of each child’s unique family
circumstance”); cf. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(f) (2022) (noting that a “custody
determination” includes a ruling regarding parenting time).
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the history
and nature of each parent’s participation in caring for the children did not
weigh in favor of modifying the parenting-time schedule.

Mother asks us to conclude that the district court did not give due consideration to
her evidence that shows her consistent and positive involvement with the children. A
district court must evaluate and consider “ the history and nature of each parent’ s
participation in providing care for the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(6). The
district court determined that modification of the parenting- time order was unwarranted
because father has “excelled” at “providing a stable home and predictable daily routine”
for the children during the five years that he served as the children’s primary caregiver.
We decline to disturb the district court’s determination because the district court’s factual
determination is supported by the record, and mother does not identify an abuse of
discretion associated with the district court’s determination.
Mother does not argue that the district court’s findings are unsupported by the record
or that the district court misapplied the law. See Suleski, 855 N.W.2d at 334 (“Appellate
courts . . . will not reverse a parenting- time decision unless the district court abused its
discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported
by the record.” (citation omitted)). She instead asks us to substitute our judgment for that
of the district court and afford her evidence greater weight—an action we do not undertake
on appeal. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223 (“[T]he role of an appellate court is not to
weigh, reweigh, or inherently reweigh the evidence when applying a clear-error review.”).
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IV. The district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in declining to modify
the parenting-time schedule.

Mother summarily argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to
modify the parenting-time schedule to the extent it based its determination of the children’s
best interests on improper considerations. Mother specifically faults the district court for
speculating about mother’s living arrangements, declining to recognize that maximizing
parenting time means equal parenting time, and determining that the parties’ co-parenting
and willingness and ability to care for the children are neutral factors in the best-interests
analysis. In making these arguments, mother does not identify any error of law or factual
finding unsupported by the record.1 And in balancing these and the relevant best-interests
factors, the district court found that the children were “thriving” under the current
parenting-time schedule, that maintaining consistency in the schedule was in the best
interests of the children, that the current schedule afforded significant and continued
opportunity for mother to foster positive relationships with the children, and that the current
schedule was otherwise effective.
We are convinced from our review of the entire record that the district court
thoroughly considered evidence related to the children’s best interests and properly
exercised its discretion in determining that no modification of the existing parenting-time

1 To the extent that mother argues that the district court made unfair factual inferences
about mother’s living arrangements from averments in K.L.’s affidavit and the effect of
those arrangements on the children, any such inferences are ultimately harmless because
the district court concluded that this factor was neutral in its best-interests determination.
Therefore, if any such error occurred, we consider it to be harmless. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61.

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schedule was warranted. 2 We cannot reweigh the evidence presented to the district court
when determining whether the district court abused its discretion. Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427
N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). Our responsibility is to correct errors, not to retry the case.
Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 68 n.2 (Minn. 1979). And the law
“leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the court’s balancing of the
best-interests considerations.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App.
2000).
Finally, we agree with the district court that mother’s achievement and maintenance
of sobriety is commendable and has positively impacted her relationship with the children
and her co-parenting. And we too recognize, as the district court did, that mother desires
to spend more time with the children. But we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion where, as here, it weighed the evidence presented and determined that the current
schedule provides “generous parenting time” to both parents, consistency for the children,
and the opportunity for both parents to “develop and sustain nurturing relationships” with
the children, all of which are in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.

2 We note that mother challenges the district court’s findings regarding “any physical,
mental, or chemical health issue of a parent that affects the child’s safety or developmental
needs.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(5). But the district court concluded that this factor
supported modification of the parenting-time schedule because mother had undertaken
positive steps to achieve and maintain sobriety and we again decline to reweigh the
best-interests factors.