In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. K. B., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0411

In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. K. B., Child.

Filed September 9, 2024
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-23-614

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura G. Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant D.K.B.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-juvenile argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the
state’s motion for nonpresumptive adult certification. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2023, respondent State of Minnesota filed a delinquency petition, alleging
that 15-year-old appellant D.K.B. (DOB: 03/05/2008) committed two counts of attempted
second-degree murder. The probable-cause statement in the petition provides:
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On July 8, 2023, three teenagers in a car approached D.K.B. as he walked along the
street. One of the teenagers asked D.K.B. a few times: “Did you jump [my friend] ?”
D.K.B. pulled out a gun, fired at least two shots into the car, and ran.
Around 2:30 p.m., officers were dispatched to a parking lot and found the three
teenagers in a parked car. The driver, D.B., had a grazing gunshot wound on his arm and
a gunshot wound on his leg. The front passenger, Z.A., had a gunshot wound that entered
his right chest area and exited the upper left abdominal area. Z.A. had a cloth on his chest
to stop the bleeding. He said that he did not want to die. D.B. and Z.A. were transported
to the hospital where they were stabilized.
The rear passenger, L.R., appeared uninjured. L.R. explained that, about a month
or two earlier, he and his friend had been “jumped” by D.K.B. and some of his friends.
L.R. recorded the July 8 shooting on his phone. The video showed that nobody in the car
did or said anything threatening to D.K.B. Officers went to D.K.B.’s residence, detained
D.K.B., and found firearms, ammunition, and a magazine in the residence.
The state filed a motion for nonpresumptive adult certification, and the district court
ordered a certification study. The examiner evaluated the six public-safety factors, see
Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4 (2022), and recommended that D.K.B. be designated
extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ).
In August 2023, after interviewing D.K.B. and D.K.B.’s mother and reviewing
several documents, a probation agent filed a certification study. The agent recommended
adult certification mainly because of the seriousness of the offense and D.K.B.’s
culpability. In November 2023, a psychologist evaluated D.K.B. and recommended EJJ.
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The district court held a certification hearing. The probation agent testified that
when she interviewed D.K.B., he talked about his pets and how much he loves his family
and follows his mother’s rules, which was in “very stark” contrast to the offense he
committed. Regarding the six public-safety factors, the agent stated that the first and
second factors—seriousness of the offense and D.K.B.’s culpability — favored certification
because D.K.B. shot two individuals and acted alone. Because D.K.B. has no delinquency
record and was not offered programming, the agent concluded that the third and fourth
factors favored juvenile jurisdiction.
Regarding the fifth factor—the adequacy of punishment available in the juvenile
system—the agent determined that the only option was placement in a long-term
correctional program. The agent concluded that this factor favored EJJ. Finally, regarding
the sixth factor—dispositional options— the agent stated that the presumptive adult
sentence was 153 months in prison, which would best serve public safety.
The psychologist testified that the first two factors favored certification and the third
and fourth factors favored retention in the juvenile system. Regarding the adequacy of
punishment available in the juvenile system, the psychologist determined that long -term
programs could meet D.K.B.’s needs and this factor favored retention in the juvenile
system. Regarding dispositional options, the psychologist recommended EJJ because of
the benefits from D.K.B.’s extended time on probation.
Following the certification hearing, on February 20, 2024, the district court granted
the state’s motion for adult certification. The district court found that D.K.B. “concedes”
that the first factor weighed in favor of certification. The district court also found that
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D.K.B.’s culpability weighed in favor of certification. The district court found that D.K.B.
has no delinquency history, which favored EJJ. The district court also found that, although
D.K.B. had “escalating behavioral incidents at school and while in custody,” he has not
received programming to assist with these behaviors. This factor favored EJJ.
Regarding the adequacy of punishment or programming in the juvenile system, the
district court found that D.K.B. would need a long-term correctional program. The district
court noted that the probation agent and the psychologist opined that this factor favored
juvenile retention or EJJ but determined that the evidence did not support this conclusion.
The district court stated that if designated EJJ, D.K.B. could complete the program in a
short period of time and that it was “speculative” that the structure of the program would
be successful. The district court expressed concern that D.K.B.’s failure at rehabilitation
would be a risk to public safety. The district court concluded that EJJ “is not an adequate
punishment for the seriousness of these charges” and found that this factor favored
certification.
Finally, in considering the dispositional options, the district court determined that it
would retain jurisdiction with a juvenile disposition for approximately 36 months. If
designated EJJ, the district court would have jurisdiction for approximately 60 months .
The district court found that the psychologist opined that D.K.B. would benefit from
supervision until he is 21 years old because D.K.B. “would have the opportunity for some
stability before turning 21 . . . [because a juvenile’s] . . . development and maturation that
occurs between 16-21 is significant.” The psychologist stated that if D.K.B. went to prison,
however, he would be “easily susceptible to developing a greater delinquent orientation
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[and that] [w]hile he has engaged in some serious delinquent behavior, [D.K.B.] does not
currently have a delinquent attitude, but prison puts him at a much greater risk of
developing one.” The district court concluded:
The [c]ourt is troubled by the severity of the charges in this
matter . . . . The [s]tate has demonstrated that jurisdiction over
[D.K.B.] until his 21st birthday for treatment and supervision
is not sufficient time to ensure public safety is protected
. . . [and] that retaining the proceeding in juvenile court and
providing interventions does not serve public safety and will
not address the significant risk of [D.K.B.] engaging in further
criminal behavior, especially when compared to the assured
benefit to public safety that accompanies the 153 months in
prison [D.K.B.] faces on each count if he is certified as an
adult. Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds that a lengthy prison
commitment will best serve public safety.

This appeal followed.
DECISION
D.K.B. argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the state’s
motion for adult certification. See In re Welfare of H.B., 986 N.W.2d 158, 166 (Minn.
2022). “A district court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify a case for
adult prosecution.” In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 2012)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). A district court’s certification
decision will not be reversed unless its findings are clearly erroneous, constituting an abuse
of discretion. In re Welfare of D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Minn. App. 1997), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998). Findings are clearly erroneous when there is no reasonable
evidence supporting them or when the reviewing court is left with the firm conviction that
a mistake occurred. In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Minn. 2014).
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Generally, the district court’s juvenile division has “exclusive jurisdiction in
proceedings” of a juvenile under 18 years old who is accused of a crime. Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.101, subd. 1 (2022). But a juvenile over 14 years old who is accused of committing
a crime “that would be a felony if committed by an adult,” may be certified for adult
prosecution. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 1 (2022). To certify a juvenile who is under
16 years old at the time of the offense—a nonpresumptive certification—the state must
establish “by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile
court does not serve public safety.” Id., subd. 2(6)(ii) (2022 ); see also Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 2.
Appellate courts will “not disturb a finding that public safety would be served by
certification unless it is clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 710
(Minn. 2008). Under this review, an appellate court may not reweigh the evidence,
reconcile conflicting evidence, or engage in fact-finding. In re Civ. Commitment of
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221- 22 (Minn. 2021). Instead, an appellate court reviews “the
record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision.” Id. at 222.
A district court must consider six factors in determining whether adult certification
serves public safety:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child’s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;
(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
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(4) the child’s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. A district court must “give greater weight” to the first
and third factors. Id.
Here, the district court determined that a balance of the factors weighed in favor of
certification. D.K.B. does not challenge the district court’s conclusions regarding the first
four factors. Indeed, the district court found that D.K.B. conceded that the seriousness of
the offenses favored certification. D.K.B. does not challenge the findings on his
culpability. And the district court concluded that the third and fourth factors favored EJJ.
D.K.B. argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that factors five and six favor
certification.
Under the fifth public-safety factor, a district court considers “the adequacy of the
punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system.” Id., subd. 4(5) .
Here, experts ruled out several options— supervised probation, foster care, a group home,
a hospital or chemical-dependency treatment, and a long-term residential program —
because they would not be secure enough to protect the public. But the experts opined that
a long-term correctional program, such as the juvenile correctional facility in Red Wing,
would be suitable and meet D.K.B.’s needs. The district court disagreed, stating that if
designated EJJ and sent to Red Wing, for example, D.K.B. could complete treatment “in
as little as 6-10 months.” The district court determined that it was “speculative” that
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providing D.K.B. with more structure would lead to an effective result. And the district
court noted that D.K.B.’s failure to rehabilitate would create “an extreme risk to public
safety.” The district court also found that EJJ did not provide “adequate punishment for
the seriousness of these charges.”
D.K.B. argues that the record shows that Red Wing would be appropriate. He
asserts that mitigating factors show that he would be successfully rehabilitated because he
was only 15 years old; he has ADHD; he is depressed and anxious; he has only a few
friends; he was not doing well in school; he felt “stupid”; he did not make the basketball
team; and he never received therapeutic intervention although he was traumatized as a child
when his mother abused him, he was removed from the home, his biological father was
absent, and his mother’s partner was incarcerated. But the district court considered this
evidence. Additionally, this evidence, although upsetting, does not address the adequacy
of punishment in the juvenile system. The record supports the district court’s conclusion
that factor five favored adult certification.
Under the sixth public -safety factor, a district court considers “the dispositional
options available for the child.” Id., subd. 4(6). The district court determined that the
juvenile court would retain jurisdiction for 36 months. EJJ would provide the court with
jurisdiction for 60 months. The district court determined that this time was insufficient to
guarantee that D.K.B. would not pose a threat to the public. The district court determined
that the adult sentence —261-367 months in prison—was appropriate. Considering that
“[f]or purposes of a certification determination, the charges against the child and the factual
allegations of the petition are presumed true,” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 38, the district court
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reasonably determined that three or five years of treatment and programming may not be
adequate for the offenses of attempted second-degree murder committed with a firearm.
The record shows that the district court considered the dispositional options and
found that the best option to protect the public was the longer adult sentence. Because
there was reasonable evidence to support the district court’s findings, and we are not left
with a firm conviction that a mistake occurred, we will not disturb the district court’ s
findings. See J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35. We conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in finding that the fifth and sixth public-safety factors support certification and that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for nonpresumptive
certification.
Affirmed.