State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0449

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Harold Black,
Appellant.

Filed February 10, 2025
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-23-2323

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Michael V. Mahlen, Assistant County
Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant argues on direct appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction of violating a harassment restraining order. Because the evidence supports a
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finding that appellant violated the harassment restraining order by indirectly contacting the
protected party, we affirm.
FACTS
In August 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant James Harold
Black with violating a harassment restraining order (HRO) pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 6(b) (2022). The trial evidence proved the following facts.
In May 2023, N.J. was granted an HRO that prohibited Black, the father of their
son, J.B. age 4, from indirect contact with her. At the time of the events relevant to this
appeal, J.B. lived with N.J. In June and July that same year, N.J. saw hand-made signs that
she believed Black had created and placed in a ditch near the only entrance to her home.
The signs said, “I MISS YOU [J.B.],” “HA [sic] NEEDS YOU” and “I MISS YOU [J.B.].”
Black admitted that he had placed the signs. Black explained that he wanted his son
to know that he was “thinking about him,” although he acknowledged that his son cannot
read. According to Black, he placed the signs because N.J. “quit allowing [him] to see
[their] son” and the signs were not “in any way” directed toward N.J. In its findings of fact
after the bench trial the district court found that Black and N.J. were disputing custody and
parenting time when the HRO was issued. The district court also found that the HRO was
served on Black and that he understood the terms of the order, including that he is
prohibited from indirectly contacting N.J.
The district court determined that Black’s placement of the signs constituted indirect
contact with N.J. and, therefore, found Black guilty, convicted him of violating an HRO,
and stayed a 90-day sentence with two years of probation.
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Black appeals.
DECISION
When the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, our review “is
limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence . . . was
sufficient” to support the jury’s verdict. State v. Kremmin, 889 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn.
App. 2017) (citing State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989)), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 28, 2017). With respect to determinations of guilt based on direct evidence, as
compared to circumstantial evidence, appellate courts “view[] the evidence and any
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the state”
and determine whether “the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Minn. 1988). In that
analysis, we “assume[] the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved evidence to
the contrary.” Id. We defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations and will not
reweigh the evidence on appeal. State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009); State
v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002). In contrast, we apply the two-step
analysis when a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge relates to circumstantial evidence.
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598-601 (Minn. 2017).
Black argues, and the state agrees, that the state relied on circumstantial evidence to
prove the elements of the offense. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the
[fact-finder] can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. at 599
(quotation omitted). “In contrast, direct evidence is evidence that is based on personal
knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.”
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Id. (quotations omitted). Because we have a responsibility to apply the law, and we believe
the state relied upon direct evidence to prove the elements of the offense, we apply the
direct-evidence standard. See State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990)
(citation omitted) (holding that the duty of the appellate court is to decide cases according
to the law).
We apply the direct-evidence standard here because the district court, acting as the
fact-finder, was not required to make an inference of the necessary facts to find guilt
because Black admitted to the facts which support a finding that he violated the HRO.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.748, subdivision 6(b), states that, when “a
restraining
order is granted under this section and the respondent knows of the order,
violation of the order is a misdemeanor.” Black testified that he had been served with the
HRO and that he knew it prohibited him from having indirect contact with N.J. He further
testified that he placed the signs in the ditch near N.J.’s home which read “I MISS YOU
[J.B.],” “HA [sic] NEEDS YOU” and “I MISS YOU [J.B. ].” And although he testified
that the signs were directed to his son, whom Black agreed could not yet read, and not N.J.,
we defer to the fact-finder’s credibility findings. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73.
Relying on State v. Andersen, 946 N.W.2d. 627 (Minn. App. 2020), Black claims
that because the HRO did not specifically prohibit signage directed at his son, the
conviction must be reversed. We are not persuaded. In Andersen, the HRO prohibited
Andersen from being within 100 feet of the protected party’s residence. 946 N.W.2d.at
628. However, the HRO did not describe the address of the home from which he was
prohibited. Id. We concluded that for the state to prove a violation of the HRO it must
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prove that Andersen knew that his presence in a particular location would subject him to
criminal liability for violating the HRO. Id. at 636. And because the address of the home
from which he was prohibited was not included in the HRO and the state did not otherwise
prove he knew of the location of the residence from which he was prohibited, he could not
be convicted of violating that provision of the HRO.
Unlike Andersen, Black was properly notified of the terms of the HRO. Black knew
that the HRO prohibited indirect contact with N.J., and he admitted to placing signs near
her home. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, and we affirm
Black’s conviction for violating an HRO.
Affirmed.