In re the Marriage of: Oluwafunbi Ige Olusina, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0468

In re the Marriage of:
Oluwafunbi Ige Olusina, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Ann Oludolapo Olusina,
Respondent.

Filed January 13, 2025
Affirmed; motions denied
Worke, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-FA-20-8916

Christopher E. Brevik, St. Michael, Minnesota (for appellant)

Ann Oludolapo Olusina, Carver, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Smith,
John P., Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by awarding
respondent sole legal custody of the parties’ child, (2) clearly erred by valuing the marital

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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property, and (3) abused its discretion by awarding respondent conduct-based attorney
fees. Both parties move this court for attorney fees and appellant moves to strike
respondent’s brief. We affirm the district court’s order and deny the parties’ motions.
FACTS
Appellant-father Oluwafunbi Ige Olusina and respondent-mother Ann Oludolapo
Olusina were married in 2012 and their joint child was born in 2018. Father filed a petition
for dissolution of marriage in July 2020, seeking joint legal and joint physical custody of
the child.
In August 2020, the parties attended an Initial Case Management Conference
(ICMC) and were ordered to participate in early neutral evaluations and begin informal
discovery. In the 22 months that followed, the parties repeatedly accused each other of
misconduct and discovery violations and sought court intervention for custody and
parenting-time disputes.
In June 2022, the district court held a three- day trial but suspended proceedings
when both parties asserted that the other had failed to disclose recent tax filings, and father
asserted that mother had purchased real property in Nigeria, and had failed to report
employment income.
The district court determined that it lacked the judicial resources to continue
monitoring the parties’ compliance with orders and appointed a special master to oversee
the remainder of the discovery process. The district court continued trial until the special
master determined that discovery was complete.
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After its review, the special m aster concluded that mother did not purchase real
property in Nigeria, that any marital funds purportedly used to purchase real property in
Nigeria had been accounted for, and that “ [w]ith very minor exception[s], all of the
documents, information, and positions were known and disclosed between the parties
before the trial was interrupted.” The special master further determined that father
unreasonably contributed to the length and expense of the proceedings by making multiple
discovery requests for previously furnished information, filing numerous objections in
contravention of district court orders, and persisting in his claim that mother used marital
assets to purchase real property in Nigeria.
The district court entered its judgment and decree on August 1, 2023, in which it
awarded joint physical custody of the child to mother and father, sole legal custody to
mother, apportioned the parties’ marital assets and debt, and awarded mother $75,000 in
conduct-based attorney fees. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Custody
Rebuttable presumption of joint legal custody
Father argu es that there was insufficient evidence to overcome the statutory
presumption that joint legal custody is in the best interests of the child.
“Appellate review of custody determinations is limited to whether the [district] court
abused its discretion.” Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). “A district
court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
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Woolsey v. Woolsey , 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). We review a district court’s
findings of fact for clear error and reverse only when left “with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790
(Minn. 2019).
The clear-error standard of review “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence
exists to support the decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222
(Minn. 2021). “When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). When applying the clear-error standard of
review, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings;
(2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile
conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus,
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all
the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.

Id. at 222 (quotations omitted); see Bayer v. Bayer , 979 N.W.2d 507, 513 (Minn. App.
2022) (citing Kenney in family-law appeal); Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468,
472 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear-error standard of review); cf. McDonald v.
McDonald, No. A22-1421, 2023 WL 8361312, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 4, 2023) (using this
language) (Worke, J.).
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In deciding a custody dispute, the child’s best interests are a district court’s
“paramount commitment.” Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 1995). To
determine the best interests of the child, the district court must consider all relevant factors
and 12 statutory factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2022). “The court shall use a
rebuttable presumption that upon request of either or both parties, joint legal custody is in
the best interests of the child.” Id., subd. 1(b)(9) (2022). But “[j]oint legal custody should
be granted only whe[n] the parents can cooperatively deal with parenting decisions.” Estby
v. Estby, 371 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Minn. App. 1985). “When evidence shows that parties to
a dissolution are completely unable to communicate and cooperate, joint legal custody is
not appropriate.” Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 368 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied
(Minn. Nov. 14, 2006).
Here, the district court made detailed findings on the 12 best-interest factors. The
district court concluded that factors (1) – (8) and (11) were neutral, and that factors (9) and
(10) favored father’s proposed parenting-time schedule. The district court found that “[t]he
child is physically well-provided for in each of the parties’ homes,” and that “[b]oth parents
have shown a willingness to provide care for their child and to meet her needs.”
The district court’s decision to grant mother sole legal custody turned on factor (12).
That factor instructs the court to consider “the willingness and ability of parents to
cooperate in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information and minimize
exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to utilize methods for resolving disputes
regarding any major decision concerning the life of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd.
1(a)(12). The district court stated that it had “grave concerns for the parties’ ability to
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cooperate on any issue,” citing examples from the record that demonstrated the parties’
“absolute inability to cooperate with each other and a failure to even discuss matters
regarding their child without discord and hostility.”
The district court determined that it was in the best interests of the child to award
sole legal custody to one parent “so that the important decisions in the child’s life can be
made without extensive disputes and further litigation.” Ultimately, the district court
awarded mother sole legal custody because she had “shown a slightly better ability, on at
least some occasions, to rise above the conflict with [father] and act in [child]’s best
interests.” Because we conclude that the record supports the district court’s well-reasoned
sole-custody award, we affirm. See In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214,
222 (Minn. 2021) (affirming that appellate courts need not provide extended discussion of
the evidence to demonstrate district court’s findings are correct). Moreover, the inability
of these parties to cooperate weighs against joint legal custody. See Ozenna v. Parmelee,
407 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that joint legal custody “is not to be used
as a legal baseball bat to coerce cooperation.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Notice of intent to seek legal custody
Father also claims that the district court abused its discretion by allowing mother to
seek sole legal custody without timely filing a counterpetition. Father does not contend
that mother was required to file a counterpetition. Rather, he argues that without a
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counterpetition, “there would not be fair notice to an adverse party as to what was being
requested for as relief at trial.”
But the record shows that father had fair notice because he knew or should have
known that mother intended to seek sole legal custody. The record amply demonstrates
each party’s attempt to disparage the other in their custody dispute. Additionally, two
months before trial, mother expressly rebuffed father’s request to agree to joint custody.
Finally, mother declared her intent to seek sole legal custody in the pretrial brief she filed
nine months before the trial concluded. We discern no abuse of discretion.
Property valuation
Father challenges the district court’s valuation of the marital property, arguing that
the district court applied inconsistent valuation dates.
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2022), “[t]he [district] court shall value marital
assets . . . as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement conference, unless
a different date is agreed upon by the parties, or unless the court makes specific findings
that another date of valuation is fair and equitable.” By standing order in the county where
father’s petition was filed, the valuation date of a dissolution “shall be the date of the first
scheduled ICMC.” We review a district court’s determination of the marital property
valuation date for an abuse of discretion. Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn.
App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002).
Father’s argument is premised primarily on his incorrect assertion that the district
court “used August 31, 2020, or dates closest in time to August 31, 2020,” as the valuation
date. But the record shows that the district court valued each asset based on the account
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statements the parties provided, and that the district court simply used whichever statement
was dated closest in time to the August 11, 2020, valuation date (the date of the parties’
first ICMC) . In valuing father’s MoneyGram 401(k) account, for example, the district
court used the value described on a June 30 statement because that statement was the
“closest statement provided to valuation date.” In valuing mother’s investment account,
the district court used the beginning balance of July 31, rather than the ending balance of
August 31, because July 31 was “closer to valuation date.” It appears that father simply
misunderstands how the district court determined value based on the valuation date.
Father next argues that the district court did not apply the valuation date
consistently. He specifically challenges the valuation of mother’s investment accounts,
insisting that the district court should have used an August 31 valuation date because it
used that date to value the other accounts. This argument fails because the district court
did not use August 31 to value the other accounts.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s valuations.
Debt apportionment
Father also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not apportioning
$13,500 in credit-card debt held in his name. “A [district] court has broad discretion in the
apportionment of debts in a dissolution proceeding and will be reversed only upon a clear
showing of an abuse of that discretion.” Jones v. Jones, 402 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Minn. App.
1987).
In its factual findings, the district court painstakingly detailed the parties’ finances,
including each party’s marital and nonmarital interests in the homestead, retirement
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accounts, cash, stocks, and personal property. The district court also considered the parties’
circumstances, finding that father had exclusive use and possession of the homestead
throughout the proceedings but failed to make mortgage payments despite a court order to
do so, withdrew and dissipated funds from marital accounts, and bought a vehicle out of
forfeiture after his second driving-while-impaired arrest. These findings are supported by
the record.
The district court apportioned the debt associated with three of the parties’ credit
cards, but did not specifically apportion $13,500 of debt associated with two credit cards
in father’s name. Father contends that by omitting the debt, the district court made a
“passive award” to mother. But father presumes that the district court would have
apportioned the debt equally, and the district court was not required to do so. The district
court was only required to make a fair and equitable division of property, Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58, subd. 1, and “[a]n equitable division of marital property is not necessarily an
equal division.” Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 297 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). In fact, a fair and equitable division “does not require the [district]
court to apportion marital debts[,]” and “[a] party to a dissolution may be held liable for
marital debts even though the other party receives the benefit of payment.” Justis v. Justis,
384 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Minn. App. 1986) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. May 29,
1986). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning the
parties’ debt.
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Attorney fees
Father challenges the district court’s award of $75,000 in conduct-based attorney
fees to mother.
“Conduct-based fee awards may be awarded against a party who unreasonably
contributes to the length or expense of the proceedings and are discretionary with the
district court.” Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007); Minn.
Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1a (2022). We will not disturb the district court’s award of attorney
fees absent a clear abuse of discretion. Erickson v. Erickson, 452 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Minn.
App. 1990).
The district court made detailed findings of father’s actions that “unreasonably
contributed to the length and expense of th[e] proceeding.” The “[m]ost serious[]” conduct,
according to the court, was father’s persistent claim that the parties owned marital property
in Nigeria. The district court determined that the Nigerian property issue was “the primary
reason for the delay of trial in June 2022 and the subsequent appointment of the special
master.” The special master found that father unreasonably contributed to the length and
expense of the proceedings through his “vacuous” Nigerian property claim; his
unwillingness to thoroughly investigate that claim; and his multiple discovery requests for
information that mother had already furnished. The district court also found that mother
incurred additional legal fees due to father’s disregard of court orders to pay custody-
evaluator fees and home expenses, and his failure to cooperate in discovery.
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Because the record supports the findings that father unreasonably contributed to the
length and expense of the proceeding, we affirm the district court’s award of conduct-based
attorney fees.
The parties’ additional motions
Father moves to strike mother’s appellate brief for failure to cite to the record and
referencing matters outside the record. But any evidence to which mother referred without
citing the record was not relevant to our analysis of the issues on appeal. Nor was any
extra-record information that mother mentioned relevant to our analysis of the issues on
appeal. Therefore, we deny father’s motion. We note, however, that briefs to this court
are required to cite to the record for each material fact. Minn. R. Civ. P. 128.03; see Hecker
v. Hecker, 543 N.W.2d 678, 681 n.2 (Minn. App. 1996) (stating citations to the record “are
particularly important where . . . the record is extensive”) aff’d, 568 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.
1997); see also Cole v. Star Trib., 581 N.W.2d 364, 371-72 (Minn. App. 1998) (noting that
failure to cite to the record can result in an argument not being properly before this court).
Father also seeks attorney fees and sanctions from this court for what he asserts is
“frivolity” in mother’s brief. Because father fails to cite a procedural rule for requesting a
sanction or a statute under which this court may base an award, father’s motion is denied.
See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480
(Minn. 2007) (declining to address an inadequately briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733
N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family law appeal); Skyberg v.
Orlich, 10 N.W.3d 303, 309 n.6 (Minn. App. 2024) (citing Wintz and Brodsky).
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Mother moves for further attorney fees, asserting that she lacks the financial
resources to pay for the costs of this appeal because father has failed to comply with the
district court’s dissolution order. Because mother has not provided documentation
supporting her claimed fees, or father’s ability to pay them, mother’s motion is denied. See
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.05 (addressing requests for attorney fees on appeal).
Affirmed; motions denied.