State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0474

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Weheliye Abdulcadir Abucar Gaal,
Appellant.

Filed April 14, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-23-351

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Megan M. Walsh, Special Assistant Attorney General, Meghan Zula, (certified law student
practitioner), University of Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Daniel L. Gerdts, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2022), which prohibits the
possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who has been convicted of a crime of
violence, and Minnesota Statutes section 609.667(1) (2022), which prohibits the
2
obliteration, removal, change, or alteration of the serial number of a firearm, do not on their
face violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Weheliye Abdulcadir Abucar Gaal was convicted of possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person and the obliteration, removal, change, or alteration of a firearm’s serial
number. On appeal, Gaal challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and
to suppress evidence. We conclude that the statutes under which he was convicted do not
on their face violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. We also
conclude that police officers reasonably seized Gaal because the facts and circumstances
provided them with a reasonable suspicion that he might be en gaged in criminal activity
and might have been involved in a completed felony. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
During the evening of May 23, 2023, a man in the city of Willmar called 911 to
report that, while driving in town, a man in a red or maroon Toyota had shot at him or his
vehicle. The caller provided a first name but was reluctant to disclose a last name and
eventually, after being pressed, provided a common last name in a manner that raised doubt
about whether it was his actual last name. The caller said that he had followed the red
Toyota to read the car ’s license plate , which he provided to the dispatcher. The caller
agreed to meet a police officer at a nearby school.
Officer Lueders went to the school but was unable to find the caller or his vehicle.
Officer Lueders contacted the caller at the same telephone number from which he had
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called 911. The caller answered and told Officer Lueders that there were two persons in
the Toyota and that the person with the firearm was known as Deq. Shortly thereafter, the
caller hung up. Officer Lueders tried to contact the caller two more times, but he did not
answer. The dispatcher was unable to find a person with the name provided by the caller
and the telephone number used by the caller.
Officer Lueders was familiar with Gaal and knew that he used the nickname Deq
and drove a red Toyota. But the dispatcher determined that the license-plate number that
the caller had provided was assigned to a red Mazda owned by a person other than Gaal.
Officer Maschino, who also was familiar with Gaal, drove to Gaal’s home but did not see
the red Toyota. Officer Maschino then drove to Gaal’s father’s place of business and spoke
with him. Gaal’s father agreed to call Gaal and ask him to meet him at his place of business.
Officer Anderson joined Officers Lueders and Maschino there. All three officers were
present when Gaal arrived, alone, in a red Toyota Camry.
Officer Anderson activated his squad’s emergency lights as Gaal exited his car.
Officer Anderson began questioning Gaal about the reported shooting. Meanwhile, Officer
Maschino looked through the windows of Gaal’s car and saw a handgun below the driver’s
seat. The officers, who were aware of Gaal’s prior conviction, for which he had been
sentenced only four days earlier, arrested Gaal for unlawful possession of a firearm. The
officers later obtained a warrant to search Gaal’s car. The search revealed a nine-millimeter
handgun with a scratched-off serial number and eight rounds of ammunition in the
magazine and an ammunition box containing five additional rounds.
4
The state charged Gaal with (1) second- degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 1 (2022); (2) possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person
convicted of a crime of violence, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022);
(3) obliteration, removal, change, or alteration of the serial number of a firearm, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.667(1) (2022); and (4) possession of a pistol without a permit to carry
the pistol, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2022). The complaint alleged
that Gaal has a prior felony conviction of threats of violence and that the prior offense is a
crime of violence.
Gaal moved to suppress the evidence of the firearm and to dismiss all four charges.
He argued that the police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
when they seized him and that all evidence obtained after the seizure should be suppressed.
He also argued that count 1 should be dismissed for lack of probable cause that he shot at
the 911 caller or his vehicle. Gaal argued further that counts 2, 3, and 4 should be dismissed
on the ground that the statutes on which the charges are based are facially unconstitutional
under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The district court granted Gaal’ s motion to dismiss count 1 for lack of probable
cause. The district court denied his motion to dismiss counts 2, 3, and 4 after concluding
that the challenged statutes are not facially unconstitutional. The district court denied the
motion to suppress evidence after concluding that the officers who seized Gaal had a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
In November 2023, the parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence court trial. See Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court adopted the facts to which the parties had
5
stipulated and made a few additional findings. The district court found Gaal guilty of
counts 2, 3, and 4 and imposed concurrent prison sentences of 60 months and 13 months
on counts 2 and 3 but did not adjudicate guilt on count 4. Gaal appeals.
ISSUES
I. Does Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), which prohibits
the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who ha s been convicted of a crime
of violence, or Minnesota Statutes section 609.667(1), which prohibits the obliteration,
removal, change, or alteration of the serial number of a firearm, violate on its face the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution?
II. Did the district court err by denying Gaal’s motion to suppress evidence on
the ground that police officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the
investigative seizure of Gaal?
ANALYSIS
I.
Gaal argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss counts 2
and 3.1 He argues that a criminal conviction of either offense violate s a person’s right to
keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

1Gaal does not challenge the third firearms-related statute, which is the legal basis
of count 4, for which the district court did not adjudicate guilt.
6
infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
“is among the ‘fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.’” United
States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 690 (2024) (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
778 (2010)). Th e right to keep and bear arms “secures for Americans a means of self-
defense.” Id. (citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17
(2022)). But “‘the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.’” Id. (quoting
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)).
Recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court prescribe the analysis for
determining whether a firearm regulation is consistent with or in violation of the Second
Amendment. A court first must ask whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers
an individual’s conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. If so, “the Constitution presumptively
protects that conduct.” Id. In that event, a court must ask a second question: whether the
government can “justify its regulation” by “demonstrat[ing] that the regulation is consistent
with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.; see also Rahimi, 602 U.S.
at 691. But if the answer to the first question is in the negative, there is no violation of a
Second Amendment right, and further analysis is unnecessary. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17.
Before considering Gaal’s constitutional arguments, we must clarify whether he is
making a facial or an as-applied challenge. The district court construed his argument to be
a facial challenge, and the state asserts that he is making a facial challenge. Gaal does not
dispute that characterization, though he does not expressly invoke either type of challenge.
Consistent with the views of the district court and the state, we construe Gaal’s briefs to
assert a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes at issue.
7
The differences between a facial challenge and an as -applied challenge are
significant. A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute “is the ‘most difficult
challenge to mount successfully,’ because it requires a defendant to ‘establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). In responding to a facial
challenge, the state “need only demonstrate that [the challenged statute] is constitutional in
some of its applications.” Id.; see also McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 831 N.W.2d 518,
522 (Minn. 2013). Consequently, to resolve Gaal’s arguments, we need not consider the
particular facts underlying Gaal’s prior conviction or his particular circumstances. Rather,
we consider more generally the persons and conduct that might be prosecuted under the
challenged statutes and seek to determine whether, “in at least some of its applications, the
challenged law ‘impose[s] a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense’ to that
imposed by a historically recognized regulation.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 709 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29).
We separately analyze the constitutionality of the two statutes under which Gaal
was convicted.
A.
Gaal first challenges a statute that provides that “a person who has been convicted
of . . . a crime of violence” “shall not be entitled to possess ammunition or a pistol or
semiautomatic military-style assault weapon or [with one exception] any other firearm.”
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1, 1(2) (2022). For purposes of this statute, the term “crime
of violence” is defined to mean any one of 39 listed offenses, including various forms of
8
homicide, criminal sexual conduct, assault, robbery, burglary, terroristic threats (also
known as threats of violence), and theft, among others. See Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5
(2022).
Gaal contends that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers his conduct
because he was “bearing” the handgun that was found in his car. He contends that the
district court erred by reasoning that the Second Amendment does not protect felons
because they are not “law-abiding.” He also contends that the restrictions on firearms that
existed at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment in 1791 “did not include a
prohibition on the possession of a firearm merely for having a felony conviction.”
Accordingly, he contends that the district court erred by not conducting the historical
analysis required by Supreme Court opinions.
In response, the state contends primarily that this court is bound by State v. Craig,
826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held, in resolving
an as -applied challenge, that section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), did not violate the
appellant’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 791-99.
1.
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Craig governs Gaal’s
challenge to section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), as argued by the state, or whether the Craig
opinion has been effectively overruled by subsequent opinions of the United States
Supreme Court, as argued by Gaal. It is an elementary principle that this court is bound by
the opinions of the Minnesota Supreme Court on questions of both state and federal law.
See State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (collecting cases). But the United
9
States Supreme Court is the “final authority” concerning the interpretation of the United
States Constitution. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1995). Thus, an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court may overrule an opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court on
an issue of federal constitutional law. See, e.g. , State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 866
(Minn. 2015) (recognizing that 2008 and 2009 supreme court opinion s were abrogated by
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013)); Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn.
2012) (recognizing that 1998 supreme court opinion was abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)).
Some federal circuit courts have expressly considered whether Bruen changed the
analytical framework for Second Amendment challenges to the federal felon-dispossession
statute and, if so, whether opinions issued before the 2022 Bruen opinion remain valid. At
least three federal circuit courts have determined that their pre-Bruen opinions are still
good law. See United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 702-04 (4th Cir. 2024), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 17, 2025) (No. 24-6818) ; United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120,
1125 (8th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 3, 2025) (No. 24-6517); Vincent v.
Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 2025). Meanwhile, at least three other circuit courts
have determined that their pre-Bruen opinions have been rendered obsolete by Bruen and
Rahimi. See Range v. Attorney Gen., 124 F.4th 218, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc);
United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 465-67 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
10
Feb. 18, 2025) (No. 24 -6625); United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 645-48 (6th Cir.
2024).2
The question is somewhat different for this court because we must determine the
vitality of an opinion of a superior court, not our own court. We are mindful that an opinion
of the Minnesota Supreme Court is “a definitive statement of the law of Minnesota,” Willis
v. County of Sherburne, 555 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Minn. 1996), and that this court should not
encroach on the supreme court’s authority, see Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286
(Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987). In this situation, given the lack of
clarity and a federal circuit split, we see no reason to depart from our usual practice of
applying supreme court precedent and leaving to the supreme court “‘the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.’” See State v. Brist, 812 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 2012)
(quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989)).
Thus, we will apply the holding in Craig. The Craig court held that, as applied to
the appellant in that case, section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), did not violate the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Craig, 826 N.W.2d at 799. Craig’s holding is a
sufficient legal basis for the conclusion that Gaal cannot succeed on his facial challenge to

2We are not bound by opinions of the lower federal courts, but we may follow them
to the extent that they are persuasive. See Citizens for Balanced City v. Plymouth
Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003); Jendro v. Honeywell, Inc.,
392 N.W.2d 688, 691 n.1 (Minn. App. 1986); see also Craig, 826 N.W.2d at 793 -98
(discussing and following federal circuit court opinions interpreting Second Amendment).
11
the same statute, which requires him to “establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which [section 624.713, subdivision 1(2)] would be valid.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693.
2.
Even if we were to conclude that the holding in Craig was implicitly overruled by
Bruen and Rahimi, we would reach the same result.
Consistent with Bruen and Rahimi, we would first ask whether “the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers [Gaal ’s] conduct” or, given his facial challenge, the
conduct of any person previously convicted of a crime of violence. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at
17. In Bruen, the Court stated that the petitioners were “two ordinary, law-abiding, adult
citizens” and, thus, “part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects. ” Id. at
31-32. In this case, the question is whether Gaal, who has not always been law-abiding, is
among “the people” who are protected by the Second Amendment. See id.
On this point, Craig is instructive, even if not controlling. The Craig court reasoned
that “felon-dispossession statutes, like the ineligible-person statute [in section 624.713,
subdivision 1(2)], are presumptively lawful.” 826 N.W.2d at 793. For this principle, the
Craig court relied on Heller’s statement that “‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.’” Id. at 792-93 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27). The Craig
court noted that Heller had “described the above- quoted statement as a list of
‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures.’” Id. at 793 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627
12
n.26). The Craig court also noted that “[a]ll federal circuit courts that have considered
facial challenges have rejected them, concluding that a felon retains no Second Amendment
right to possess a firearm.” Id. at 794 (citing cases). The Craig court reasoned that,
“because felons are included on Heller’s list of exceptions, they are categorically
unprotected by the Second Amendment against a statute that restricts their right to possess
a firearm.”3 Id.
In effect, the Craig opinion supplies the answer to the question whether Gaal is “part
of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects.” See B ruen, 597 U.S. at 31-32.
The Craig court plainly stated that, as a category, felons are not protected by the Second
Amendment because they “retain[] no Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.”
Craig, 826 N.W.2d at 794. Because our supreme court has determined, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, that felons do not have a Second Amendment right to possess a
firearm, we would answer Bruen’s first question—whether the plain text of the Second

3The Craig opinion states that “the Second Amendment protects the rights of ‘law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home’” and that “a crime
of violence renders the felon the opposite of the law-abiding, responsible citizen who can
assert a Second Amendment right.” 826 N.W.2d at 792, 798 (emphasis added) (quoting
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). After Craig, the United States Supreme Court revisited Heller’s
use of the word “responsible.” In Rahimi, the Court acknowledged that the word is “a
vague term,” that “[i]t is unclear what such a rule would entail,” and that a “responsible”
requirement is not part of the Court’s caselaw. 602 U.S. at 701. The Rahimi Court
elaborated by saying that the Court previously had “used the term ‘responsible’ to describe
the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right” but
that “those decisions did not define the term and said nothing about the status of citizens
who were not ‘responsible.’” Id. at 701-02 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, and Bruen, 597
U.S. at 70).
13
Amendment covers Gaal’s conduct or the conduct of other persons previously convicted
of a crime of violence—in the negative. 4
Thus, if it were necessary to analyze Gaal’s facial challenge to section 624.713,
subdivision 1(2), pursuant to Bruen and Rahimi, we would conclude that, in light of our
supreme court’s prior reasoning, Gaal and other persons with a prior conviction of a crime
of violence are not protected by the Second Amendment, which means that the Second
Amendment’s plain text does not cover Gaal’s conduct or the conduct of any person
previously convicted of a crime of violence. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. This rationale is
an alternative legal basis for the conclusion that Gaal has failed to “establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which [section 624.713, subdivision 1(2)] would be valid.” See
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693.
3.
Even if we were to conclude that the Second Amendment’s plain text covers Gaal’s
conduct and the conduct of all other persons previously convicted of a crime of violence,
we nonetheless would conclude that section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), does not facially
violate the Second Amendment. Consistent with Bruen and Rahimi, we would proceed to

4This conclusion appears to be consistent with an opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which used similar reasoning in holding, after Bruen ,
that felons are categorically excluded from the protections of the Second Amendment .
Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1125. But at least three other federal circuit courts have answered
the first Bruen question in the affirmative and have proceeded to the second Bruen
question. See United States v. Moore , 111 F.4th 266, 268- 69 (3d Cir. 2024), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 11, 2025) (No. 24-968); Diaz, 116 F.4th at 467-71; Williams, 113
F.4th at 648-50; see also United States v. Jackson, 121 F.4th 656 (8th Cir. 2025) (Stras, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
14
ask whether the government can “justify its regulation” by “demonstrat[ing] that the
regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen,
597 U.S. at 17; see also Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691.
On this point, federal circuit courts applying the Second Amendment to the federal
felon-dispossession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018), after Bruen are fairly uniform with
respect to prior felonies that are considered violent. Two federal circuit courts have held
that the federal statute prohibiting violent felons from possessing firearms is consistent
with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. See Diaz, 116 F.4th at 467-72
(holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) not unconstitutional as appli ed to defendant with prior
convictions of car theft, evading arrest, and felon in possession of firearm); Williams, 113
F.4th at 650-62 (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) not unconstitutional as applied to defendant
with prior conviction of aggravated robbery).5 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reviewed numerous historical materials and determined that the federal felon-
dispossession statute is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation
because “governments in England and colonial America long disarmed groups that they

5To our knowledge, the only contrary opinion of a federal circuit court was issued
in response to an as-applied challenge by a person who previously committed a non-violent
felony. See Range, 124 F.4th at 228-32 (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as
applied to defendant with prior conviction of making false statement to obtain food
stamps); cf. Vincent, 127 F.4th at 1265 (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) not unconstitutional
as applied to defendant with prior conviction of bank fraud); see also United States v.
Daniels, 124 F.4th 967, 973-79 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which
criminalizes possession of firearm by person who is “unlawful user of or addicted to any
controlled substance,” unconstitutional as applied to defendant); United States v. Cooper,
127 F.4th 1092, 1094 -99 (8th Cir. 2025) (remanding for determination of as-applied
challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) by person who uses marijuana three or four times per
week).
15
deemed to be dangerous” and that the commission of a violent crime is “at least strong
evidence that an individual is dangerous, if not totally dispositive on the question.”
Williams, 113 F.4th at 657, 658. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reviewed other historical materials showing that, around the time of the ratification of the
Second Amendment, some colonies punished non-hunting offenses with the forfeiture of
the offender’s firearms. Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1127 (citing Act of Oct. 9, 1652, Laws and
Ordinances of New Netherland 138 (1868); Act of Apr. 20, 1745, ch. III, 23 The State
Records of North Carolina 218-19 (1904)). The Eighth Circuit also noted that the colonies
punished other criminal offenses by the forfeiture of a person’s entire estate, which
naturally would include the offender’s firearms. Id. (citing numerous sources).
In light of the historical sources cited in the Williams and Jackson opinions, as well
as the absence of any federal caselaw supporting Gaal’s argument, we conclude, as an
alternative ground, that section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), is “consistent with this Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation.” See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. This rationale is an
additional alternative legal basis for the conclusion that Gaal has failed to “establish that
no set of circumstances exists under which [section 624.713, subdivision 1(2)] would be
valid.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693.
B.
The second statute challenged by Gaal provides that a person commits a crime if he
or she
(1) obliterates, removes, changes, or alters the serial
number or other identification of a firearm;

16
(2) receives or possesses a firearm, the serial number
or other identification of which has been obliterated, removed,
changed, or altered; or

(3) receives or possesses a firearm that is not
identified by a serial number.

Minn. Stat. § 609. 667 (2022). Gaal was charged and convicted of violating the first
paragraph of this statute. Neither the supreme court nor this court has previously
considered the constitutionality of section 609.667(1).
Gaal contends that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers his conduct
because he was bearing “a historically common handgun.” He also contends that the
restrictions on firearms that existed at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment
in 1791 “did not include any laws outlawing the possession of firearms without serial
numbers.” He further contends, again, that the district court erred by not conducting the
historical analysis required by Supreme Court opinions.
In response, the state first contends that the plain text of the Second Amendment
does not protect the possession of firearms without serial numbers. The state next
contends, in the alternative, that criminal prohibitions concerning a firearm’s serial number
are consistent with the nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation.
1.
We first ask whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers [Gaal’s] conduct”
or, given his facial challenge, the conduct of any person who obliterates, removes, changes,
or alters the serial number or other identification of a firearm. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17.
17
In doing so, we focus on whether a firearm with an obliterated, removed, changed, or
altered serial number is within the meaning of the word “arms” in the Second Amendment.
In Heller, the Supreme Court considered the types of arms that are protected by the
Second Amendment. 554 U.S. at 624-25. The Court noted that, in the colonial era, men
who were called for militia service “‘ were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by
themselves and of the kind in common use at the time,’” which included arms used “for
lawful purposes like self-defense.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 (quoting United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). The Heller Court interpreted the earlier Miller opinion
to say that “the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection”
because of “‘the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a
[short-barreled shotgun] . . . has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia.’” Id. at 622 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178)
(alteration in original) . Accordingly, the Heller Court concluded that “the Second
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.” Id. at 625. The Bruen Court
reiterated that “the Second Amendment protects only the carrying of weapons that are those
‘in common use at the time,’ as opposed to those that ‘are highly unusual in society at
large.’” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 47 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
In this case, the key question is whether firearms with obliterated, removed,
changed, or altered serial numbers are typically possessed or commonly used by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as self-defense. See B ruen, 597 U.S. at 31-32;
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. Federal courts that have considered the constitutionality of the
18
equivalent federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2018), have concluded that such firearms
are not typically possessed or commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “‘there is no
compelling reason why a law-abiding citizen’ would use a firearm with an obliterated serial
number and that such weapons would be preferable only to those seeking to use them for
illicit activities” and, furthermore, that “ there is no evidence before us that law-abiding
citizens nonetheless choose these weapons for lawful purposes like self-defense.” United
States v. Price, 111 F.4th 392, 406 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc) , cert. denied, No. 24- 5937,
2025 WL 951173 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2025). The Price court thus concluded “that § 922(k)’s
regulation of such arms does not implicate the Second Amendment.” 111F.4th at 407.
It appears that all federal district courts that have issued published opinions since
Bruen addressing this specific issue—whether firearms with an obliterated serial number
are typically possessed or commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes—
also have concluded that they are not. See United States v. Sing-Ledezma, 706 F. Supp. 3d
650, 656-57 (W.D. Tex. 2023); United States v. Avila, 672 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1143-44 (D.
Colo. 2023); United States v. Trujillo, 670 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 12 40-41 (D.N.M. 2023);
United States v. Serrano, 651 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1210-11 (S.D. Cal. 2023); United States
v. Holton, 639 F. Supp. 3d 704, 710-11 (N.D. Tex. 2022).
In this case, Gaal has not attempted to identify a lawful purpose for a firearm with
an obliterated serial number and has not attempted to argue that such firearms are typically
possessed or commonly used by law-abiding citizens. “If no common-sense reasons exist
for a law-abiding citizen to prefer a particular type of weapon for a lawful purpose like
19
self-defense, and no evidence suggests that law-abiding citizens nonetheless commonly
choose the weapon for lawful uses, then courts can conclude that the weapon is not in
common use for lawful purposes.” Price, 111 F.4th at 405.
Thus, because firearms with obliterated, removed, changed, or altered serial
numbers are not typically possessed or commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes, such firearms are not eligible for Second Amendment protection. This rationale
is a sufficient legal basis for the conclusion that Gaal has failed to “establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which [section 609.667(1)] would be valid.” Rahimi, 602 U.S.
at 693.
2.
Even if we were to conclude that firearms with obliterated, removed, changed, or
altered serial numbers are eligible for Second Amendment protection, we nonetheless
would conclude that section 609.667(1) does not facially violate the Second Amendment.
In that event, the state would be required to “justify its regulation” by
“demonstrat[ing] that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. Upon such a showing, the court would be
required to “assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second
Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id. at 26. The Supreme Court has noted
that “the reach of the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms that were in
existence at the founding.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692. Rather, the “historical inquiry” that
courts must undertake “will often involve reasoning by analogy—a commonplace task for
any lawyer or judge.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 28. “Like all analogical reasoning, determining
20
whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm
regulation requires a determination of whether the two regulations are ‘relevantly similar.’”
Id. at 28-29 (quoting Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773
(1993)). “Why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.”
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 681. A challenged firearm regulation “must comport with the
principles underlying the Second Amendment, but it need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a
‘historical twin.’” Id. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30).
Federal courts have identified various historical practices that indicate a tradition of
regulating firearms in a manner that is similar to the modern practice of requiring serial
numbers and prohibiting their obliteration. For example, an 1805 Massachusetts law
required newly manufactured firearm barrels to be inspected and permanently marked by
an inspector, and, more importantly, made it a crime for a person to buy or sell firearms
without proper proofing or to “falsely forg[e] or alter[]” such proofing. United States v.
Sharkey, 693 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1007-08 (S.D. Iowa 2023) (citing Laws of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts from November 28, 1780, to February 28, 1807, at 259
(1807)). Similarly, an 1830 Maine law required that newly manufactured firearm barrels
be tested, marked, numbered, and certified; penalized the sale of firearms without proper
proof, marking, or certification; and imposed fines on persons “who falsely altered the
stamps, marks, or certificates of any prover of firearms.” Sharkey, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1008
(citing Laws of the State of Maine 546 (1830)).
Federal courts have recognized that the se historical practices were intended to,
among other things, “provid[e] a means to trace hazardous barrels . . . back to the original
21
inspector who affixed the markings” and that modern statutes criminalizing the possession
of firearms with obliterated serial numbers promote “similar objectives by granting
authorities the capacity to recover stolen firearms and trace those that have been implicated
in criminal activities.” Sharkey, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1008; see also Sing-Ledezma, 706 F.
Supp. 3d at 658. We agree that the historical information available to the court indicates
that, both before and after the ratification of the Second Amendment, states used markings
to identify firearms and prohibited the erasure or obscuring of such markings. Such
regulations satisfy the requirement of a “historical analogue,” even if “not a historical
twin.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30 (emphasis omitted).
Thus, we conclude that section 609.667(1), which makes it a crime to obliterate,
remove, change, or alter a firearm’s serial number, is “consistent with this Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. This rationale is an
additional legal basis for the conclusion that Gaal has failed to “ establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which [section 609.667(1)] would be valid.” Rahimi, 602 U.S.
at 693.
In sum, the district court did not err by denying Gaal ’s motion to dismiss counts 2
and 3 because section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), and section 609.667(1) do not on their
face violate the right to keep and bear arms that is protected by the Second Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
22
II.
Gaal also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence. Specifically, he argues that the officers who temporarily seized him did not have
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigative seizure.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The
Fourth Amendment also protects the right of the people to be secure in their motor vehicles.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979); State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87
(Minn. 2000). But a law-enforcement officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
conduct a brief investigatory stop of a person in a motor vehicle if the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person might be engaged in criminal activity.
State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)). In addition, an investigative stop is appropriate if a law-enforcement officer has
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person “was involved in or is wanted in
connection with a completed felony.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985);
see also State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Minn. 1993).
A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if “the police officer [is] able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The reasonable-suspicion
standard is not high, but the suspicion must be more than a “mere hunch” and must be
based on “specific and articulable facts.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn.
23
2021) (quotation omitted). A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. Id. at 752. If the relevant facts are
undisputed, this court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s ruling that
an investigatory stop is valid. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 551 (Minn. 2009).
“The information necessary to support an investigative stop need not be based on
the officer’s personal observations.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn.
1997). An investigative stop may be based on an anonymous tip if the totality of the
circumstances indicates a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, “taking into account
the facts known to the officers from personal observation, and giving the anonymous tip
the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of reliability as established through independent
police work.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). The value of an anonymous
tip depends on “both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability.” Id. “Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information
will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if
the tip were more reliable.” Id. In analyzing an anonymous tip, a court should consider
factors such as the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. Id. at 328-29
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).
In this case, the district court reasoned that the 911 caller appeared to have a basis
of knowledge because his report concerned an incident to which he was an eyewitness. See
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 399 (2014) (reasoning that anonymous 911 caller’s
“eyewitness knowledge” of dangerous driving gave “significant support to the tip’s
reliability”). The district court also reasoned that the reliability of the caller’s report was
24
enhanced because it was “at least minimally corroborated” by the officers’ knowledge that
Gaal was known by the nickname Deq and drove a red Toyota. The district court further
reasoned that the caller’s veracity was supported by his use of the 911 telephone system,
which has been recognized as an “indicator of veracity” because the system has “features
that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against
making false reports with immunity.” See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 400. The district court
concluded that the totality of the circumstances indicated a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the officers’ seizure of Gaal.
Gaal challenges the district court’s ruling primarily by attacking the veracity of the
911 caller. He contends that the caller was generally “untruthful” because the caller likely
did not provide his actual name and was otherwise evasive. The district court specifically
addressed this issue in its order. The district court stated that “it is highly likely the
complainant provided a false name” and that he “was hesitant to provide any identifying
information, . . . acted evasive when speaking with Officer Lueders, and ultimately hung
up on the officer and refused to answer the officer’s return calls.” But the district court did
not consider those facts to be determinative of the veracity of the caller’s report of a
shooting. Rather, the district court considered other factors, including the caller’s first-
hand knowledge of the reported incident and the officers’ corroboration of some aspects of
the caller’s information. It was appropriate for the district court to treat the 911 caller in
the same or similar manner as other anonymous informants, without completely
discrediting the caller’s information, because the caller’s hesitance to provide his actual
name makes him similar to anonymous tipsters who decline to identify themselves but are
25
not pressed to do so. It also was appropriate for the district court to consider other factors
relevant to anonymous tips. See id. at 328-29 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230).
Our de novo review of the record confirms the district court’s analysis. The caller’s
basis of knowledge is demonstrated by his report of a personal experience as the target of
a shooting. The caller ’s basis of knowledge is enhanced by the fact that he identified a
specific location where the shooting reportedly occurred: “on highway 71 . . . by the police
station.” Also, the caller identified one of the persons in the other vehicle by a unique
nickname. An informant’s “statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his
tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 234.
In addition, the reliability of the caller’s report is enhanced by the officers’
knowledge of corroborating information concerning Gaal’s nickname and the brand and
color of Gaal’s car. “‘[C]orroboration through other sources of information reduce[s] the
chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale.’” Id. at 244-45 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960)). Also, “there is no mandate that every fact in the [informant’s
report] be corroborated, that a certain number of facts be corroborated, or that certain types
of facts must be corroborated.” State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008)
(emphasis omitted).
Furthermore, it is significant that the 911 caller’s report suggested that a person had
committed a serious offense, which later was charged as felony second-degree assault. In
investigating a completed crime, the reasonableness standard that is “embodied in the
Fourth Amendment” requires courts to “balance[] the nature and quality of the intrusion
on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
26
the intrusion.” Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228. The nature of those governmental interests has
been expressed by the United States Supreme Court as follows:
[W]here police have been unable to locate a person suspected
of involvement in a past crime, the ability to briefly stop that
person, ask questions, or check identification in the absence of
probable cause promotes the strong government interest in
solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. Restraining
police action until after probable cause is obtained would not
only hinder the investigation, but might also enable the suspect
to flee in the interim and to remain at large. Particularly in the
context of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety,
it is in the public interest that the crime be solved and the
suspect detained as promptly as possible. The law enforcement
interests at stake in these circumstances outweigh the
individual’s interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no
more extensive than permissible in the investigation of
imminent or ongoing crimes.

Id. at 229.
Our supreme court has recognized that a report of a completed crime may provide
law-enforcement officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an
investigative detention. State v. Waddell, 655 N.W.2d 803, 806 -10 (Minn. 2003)
(concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle within three hours of
murder based on information concerning type and color of vehicle and descriptions of
persons suspected of murder). This court has recognized that even uncorroborated
information provided by an anonymous informant may provide law- enforcement officers
with the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop if there is an
“element of imminent danger,” on the ground that “officers receiving an anonymous tip
that a person is armed are almost invariably justified in conducting an investigative stop.”
State v. Balenger, 667 N.W.2d 133, 136, 138 (Minn. App. 2003) (concluding that officer
27
had reasonable suspicion to stop pedestrian in crowd based on unidentified informant’s tip
that pedestrian had pointed gun at another person), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003).
In this case, the officers promoted proper government interests by continuing their
investigation into the reported shooting by temporarily detaining Gaal less than one hour
after the report, even though the 911 caller no longer was cooperating. Their efforts to do
so were reasonably calculated to elicit evidence that might not have been available at a
later time or date. Moreover, the circumstances of this case suggest the possibility of
ongoing conflict or additional criminal activity, which implicates the general interests of
“effective crime prevention.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The caller reported that the
shooter had driven away, presumably while still armed. The caller hung up on Officer
Lueders without an explanation. Given various uncertainties and a potentially dangerous
situation, the officers reasonably decided to pursue an investigation with the information
available to them.
For these reasons, the totality of the circumstances allowed law-enforcement
officers to form a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Gaal had committed a serious crime
and might be engaged in ongoing criminal activity, thereby justifying an investigative
detention of Gaal. Thus, the district court did not err by denying Gaal’s motion to suppress
evidence.
DECISION
The district court did not err by denying Gaal’s motion to dismiss counts 2 and 3 or
by denying Gaal’s motion to suppress evidence.
Affirmed.