Michael Arthur Rock, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0475

Michael Arthur Rock, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-11687

Michael Arthur Rock, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Matthew D. Hough, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge;
and Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2022, Michael Arthur Rock was convicted of first-degree and third-degree
criminal sexual conduct. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. In 2024, Rock
filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was denied. We affirm.
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FACTS
In May 2020, the state charged Rock with one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct involving penetration of a victim under 16 years old, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(g) (2016), and third-degree criminal sexual conduct involving
penetration of a victim at least 16 but under 18 years old, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344, subd. 1(f) (2018). The complaint alleged that Rock lived in the same house as
his niece, A.H., the 16 -year-old daughter of Rock’s sister, and that Rock raped A.H. on
multiple occasions during the preceding two years.
Testing of A.H.’s bedding revealed semen with a mixture of DNA from two or more
people but not Rock. Before trial, Rock filed motions in limine for leave to “allow the
defense to question state witnesses regarding the state’s own DNA investigation and what
that investigation discovered” and to “allow defense to question the alleged victim in this
case and to call their own witnesses regarding prior sexual conduct to show the source of
DNA.” The district court ruled that Rock’s proffered evidence is inadmissible and denied
the motion.
The case was tried to a jury in May 2022. The state called five witnesses, including
A.H., who testified about two incidents in which Rock penetrated her vagina with his penis.
A police detective testified that investigators did not find Rock’s DNA on any item that
was subjected to forensic testing. Rock did not testify. The jury found him guilty of both
charges. The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 144 and 70 months of
imprisonment, with conditional release for the remainder of his lifetime.
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On direct appeal, Rock argued that the district court erred by excluding his proffered
evidence that semen not matching his DNA profile was found on A.H.’s bedding and by
imposing a lifetime period of conditional release. This court rejected Rock’s first argument
and affirmed his convictions. State v. Rock, No. A22-1266, 2023 WL 4852982, at *2-4
(Minn. App. July 31, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2023). But we agreed with Rock’s
second argument, concluded that the district court erred by ordering a lifetime period of
conditional release, and reversed and remanded for resentencing. Id. at *4-5.
In May 2024, Rock filed two motions on a self-represented basis. In a document
captioned “motion to vacate or set aside conviction and sentence and remand for a new
trial if new evidence is discovered,” Rock argued that the evidence introduced at trial was
insufficient to prove sexual penetration. In a document captioned “ motion for disclosure
and forensic testing not available at trial of DNA evidence,” Rock requested that additional
forensic DNA testing be performed for the purpose of identifying the person who “actually
raped A.H.” In July 2024, the state filed an answer and responsive memorandum. The
state argued that Rock’s request for postconviction relief is procedurally barred by State v.
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976), argued in the alternative that his claim of
insufficient evidence fails on the merits, and argued that he is not entitled to forensic DNA
testing. In September 2024, Rock filed a reply memorandum in which he argued the merits
of his claims but did not address the Knaffla issue.
In December 2024, the postconviction court filed an order denying Rock’s motions,
which the court construed as petitions for postconviction relief. The postconviction court
concluded that Rock’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is procedurally barred by Knaffla.
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The postconviction court also concluded that Rock is not entitled to forensic DNA testing.
Rock appeals.
DECISION
Rock argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his requests for
postconviction relief.
A.
We begin by considering Rock’s argument that the postconviction court erred by
concluding that his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is procedurally barred by Knaffla.
After a criminal offender has taken a direct appeal, “all matters raised therein, and
all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for
postconviction relief.” Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim
is procedurally barred in a postconviction proceeding if the petitioner previously had a
direct appeal but did not make a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument. Davis v. State, 880
N.W.2d 373, 377-78 (Minn. 2016); Azure v. State, 700 N.W.2d 443, 447-48 (Minn. 2005).
The supreme court has recognized two exceptions to the Knaffla bar. A claim is not
procedurally barred (1) “if the claim involves an issue so novel that its legal basis was not
reasonably available at the time of the direct appeal,” or (2) if the claim “has substantive
merit and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue”
previously. Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Minn. 2016).
In his principal brief, Rock briefly mentions both exceptions to the Knaffla bar.
First, he asserts that his claim is novel. For at least half a century, it has been well
established that a person may not be convicted of a crime if the state has not proved all
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elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363
(1970). Consequently, a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is not novel for purposes of the
first Knaffla exception. Azure, 700 N.W.2d at 448-49.
Second, Rock asserts that he did not fail to raise the sufficiency-of- the-evidence
claim on direct appeal. He asserts that he made a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument in
a pro se supplemental brief but that this court did not consider it. We have reviewed all of
the appellate briefs filed by Rock or on his behalf in his direct appeal, and we conclude that
Rock plainly failed to make a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument on direct appeal. Rock
has not provided “a colorable explanation of why [his] claims were not raised previously.”
See Gilbert v. State, 2 N.W.3d 483, 489 (Minn. 2024).
Thus, the postconviction court did not err by concluding that Rock’s sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claim is procedurally barred by Knaffla.
B.
We continue by considering Rock’s argument that the postconviction court erred by
concluding that he is not entitled to forensic DNA testing.
This argument is based on the following provision of the postconviction statute:
A person convicted of a crime may make a motion for
the performance of . . . forensic DNA testing to demonstrate
the person’s actual innocence if:

(1) the testing is to be performed on evidence
secured in relation to the trial which resulted in the conviction;
and

(2) the evidence was not subject to the testing
because either the technology for the testing was not available
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at the time of the trial or the testing was not available as
evidence at the time of the trial.

Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1a(a) (2024).
The postconviction court stated that investigators seized A.H.’s bedding, found
semen on the bedding, and tested it, but the semen did not match Rock’s DNA profile. The
postconviction court reasoned that Rock did not satisfy the statute’s second requirement
that “the evidence was not subject to the testing” at the time of trial.
In his principal brief, Rock contends that “all samples were not tested,” but he does
not identify any particular item that was not tested. He also asserts that he was “the only
male tested,” and he suggests that “all other males” should be tested, but he does not
identify a potential alternative perpetrator. Similarly, in the motion that he filed in the
postconviction court, Rock did not identify any item that should be tested or any other
particular person whose DNA should be tested.
Rock does not identify any evidence that m ight be derived from forensic DNA
testing that was not available at the time of trial. He also does not assert that any new
technology has been developed that was not available at the time of trial. In fact, forensic
DNA testing was performed before trial. But the district court ruled that Rock could not
introduce evidence about the forensic testing, and that ruling was affirmed on direct appeal.
Rock, 2023 WL 4852982, at *2-4. Because A.H.’s bedding was subjected to forensic DNA
testing before trial, and the results of the testing were disclosed to Rock, he cannot satisfy
the requirements of section 590.01, subdivision 1a(a). See Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162,
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171-72 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that postconviction petitioner was not entitled to forensic
DNA testing because testing was performed and disclosed before trial).
Rock also contends that the postconviction court erred by not considering his
request for a new trial “if new evidence is discovered” through additional forensic DNA
testing. Because the postconviction court denied Rock’s motion for additional forensic
DNA testing, no new evidence was discovered.
Thus, the postconviction court did not err by concluding that Rock is not entitled to
forensic DNA testing.
C.
We next consider Rock’s argument that the postconviction court erred by not
holding an evidentiary hearing before ruling on his requests for postconviction relief.
A postconviction petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction
petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show
that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). Under this
statute, an evidentiary hearing is required if “ material facts are in dispute . . . which must
be resolved in order to determine the issues raised on the merits.” Riley, 819 N.W.2d at
167 (quotation omitted).
The postconviction court concluded that Rock is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim because that claim is procedurally barred
by Knaffla. The postconviction court’s conclusion is consistent with caselaw. See Sontoya
v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Minn. 2013); Buckingham v. State, 799 N.W.2d 229 ,
233-34 (Minn. 2011). The postconviction court also concluded that Rock is not entitled to
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an evidentiary hearing on his claim for forensic DNA testing because he had not made
allegations that satisfy the statutory requirements. That conclusion also is consistent with
caselaw. See Jackson v. State, 927 N.W.2d 308, 313- 14 (Minn. 2019); Fort v. State, 829
N.W.2d 78, 83-84 (Minn. 2013). Rock has not identified any material disputed fact that
requires an evidentiary hearing.
Thus, the postconviction court did not err by not holding an evidentiary hearing
before ruling on Rock’s requests for postconviction relief.
D.
Rock makes one more argument: that the district court erred in its pre-trial ruling by
excluding his proffered evidence that semen found on A.H.’ s bedding did not match his
DNA profile. The argument is procedurally barred because it was raised on direct appeal
and was rejected. Rock, 2023 WL 4852982, at *2-4; see also Thoresen v. State, 965
N.W.2d 295, 311 (Minn. 2021). Thus, we will not reconsider Rock’s argument challenging
the district court’s pre-trial ruling on his motion in limine.
In sum, the postconviction court did not err by denying Rock’s requests for
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.